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Abstract This introduction provides a short overview on the book “The Ethics of 
Cybersecurity”. The volume explains the foundations of cybersecurity, ethics and 
law, outlines various problems of the domain such as ethical hacking and cyberwar, 
and it lists recommendations and best practices for cybersecurity professionals 
working in various application areas. Furthermore, the introduction outlines the 
background of the European CANVAS project, from which this volume emerged.
Keywords Cybersecurity · Ethics · Law · Trust · Values
The increasing use of information and communication technology (ICT) in all 
spheres of modern life makes the world a richer, more efficient and interactive 
place. However, it also increases its fragility, as it reinforces our dependence on ICT 
systems that can never be completely safe or secure. Therefore, cybersecurity has 
become a matter of global interest and importance. Accordingly, we can observe in 
today’s cybersecurity discourse an almost constant emphasis on an ever-increasing 
and diverse set of threats, ranging from basic computer viruses to sophisticated 
kinds of cybercrime and cyberespionage activities, as well as cyber-terror and 
cyberwar. This growing complexity of the digital ecosystem in combination with 
increasing glo bal risks has created the following dilemma. Overemphasising 
cybersecurity may violate fundamental values such as equality, fairness, freedom or 
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privacy. However, neglecting cybersecurity could undermine citizens’ trust and con-
fidence in the digital infrastructure, in policy makers and in state authorities. Thus, 
cybersecurity supports the protection of values such as nonmaleficence, privacy and 
trust, and therefore imposes a complex relationship among values: some may be 
supportive and others conflicting, depending on context. For example, whereas 
cybersecurity is in most cases a precondition to protect data and thus the privacy of 
people, it may also make private information more accessible to cybersecurity 
experts, in order to detect malicious activities.
Understanding this and other value dilemmas has become imperative, yet cyber-
security is still an under-developed topic in technology ethics. Although there are 
numerous papers discussing issues such as ‘big data’ and privacy, cybersecurity 
is—if at all—only discussed as a tool to protect (or undermine) privacy. Nevertheless, 
cybersecurity raises a plethora of ethical issues such as ‘ethical hacking’, dilemmas 
of holding back ‘zero day’ exploits, weighting data access and data privacy in sensi-
tive health data, or value conflicts in law enforcement raised by encryption algo-
rithms. For example, a governmental computer emergency response team (CERT) 
may fight a ransomware attack by turning off the payment servers and destroying 
the business model of the attackers to prevent future attacks—but this means that 
people whose data already has been encrypted would never retrieve it. A medical 
implants producer may want to protect the data transfer between implant and 
receiver server by means of suitable cryptology—but this significantly increases the 
energy consumption of the implant and frequently requires more surgeries for bat-
tery exchange. Finally, a white hat hacker may discover a dangerous vulnerability in 
an IoT device and inform the manufacturer—but the company does not attempt to 
correct the error and the hacker considers how to generate public attention for the 
case. Such issues are usually discussed in an isolated manner, whereas a coherent 
and integrative view on the ethics of cybersecurity is missing. Only a few authors 
such as Kenneth Einar Himma (2005, 2008) have worked systematically on the ethi-
cal issues of cybersecurity for a longer time, and recent authors on this topic have 
focused on more specific issues such as cyberwar (Lucas 2017; Taddeo and Glorioso 
2017). A rare example of broader coverage of the topic is Manjikian (2017).
This book aims to provide the first systematic collection of the full plethora of 
ethical aspects of cybersecurity. It results from the research activities of the 
CANVAS Consortium—Constructing an Alliance for Value-driven Cybersecurity—
that unified technology developers with legal and ethical scholar and social scien-
tists to approach the challenge of how cybersecurity can be aligned with European 
values and fundamental rights. The project was funded by the European Commission 
and aimed to bring together stakeholders from key areas of the European Digital 
Agenda—business/finance, the health system and law enforcement/national secu-
rity—in order to discuss challenges and solutions when aligning cybersecurity with 
ethics. A special focus of CANVAS was on raising the awareness of the ethics of 
cybersecurity through teaching in academia and industry.
In a series of four White Papers, the CANVAS consortium provides an extensive 
overview of the discourse of ethical, legal and social aspects of cybersecurity. The 
first White Paper ‘Cybersecurity and Ethics’ outlines how the ethical discourse on 
cybersecurity has developed in the scientific literature, which ethical issues have 
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gained interest, which value conflicts are being discussed, and where the ‘blind 
spots’ are in the current ethical discourse on cybersecurity (Yaghmaei et al. 2017). 
Here, an important observation is that the ethics of cybersecurity is not yet an estab-
lished subject. In all domains, cybersecurity is recognised as being an instrumental 
value, not an end in itself, which opens up the possibility of trade-offs with different 
values in different spheres. The most prominent common theme is the existence of 
trade-offs and even conflicts between reasonable goals, for example between usabil-
ity and security, accessibility and security, and privacy and convenience. Other 
prominent common themes are the importance of cybersecurity to sustain trust (in 
institutions) and the harmful effect of any loss of control over data.
The second White Paper ‘Cybersecurity and Law’ explores the legal dimensions of 
the European Union’s value-driven cybersecurity policy (Jasmontaite et al. 2017). It 
identifies the main critical challenges in this area and discusses specific controversies 
concerning cybersecurity regulation. The White Paper recognises that legislative and 
policy measures within the cybersecurity domain challenge EU fundamental rights 
and principles, stemming from EU values. Annexes provide a review of EU soft-law 
measures, EU legislative measures, cybersecurity and criminal justice affairs, the rela-
tionship of cybersecurity to privacy and data protection, cybersecurity definitions in 
national cybersecurity strategies, and brief descriptions of EU values.
The third White Paper ‘Attitudes and Opinions regarding Cybersecurity’ sum-
marises the currently available empirical data regarding the attitudes and opinions 
of citizens and state actors regarding cybersecurity (Wenger et al. 2017). The data 
emerges from the reports of EU projects, Eurobarometer surveys, policy documents 
of state actors and additional scientific papers. It describes what these stakeholders 
generally think, what they feel and what they do about cyber threats and security 
(counter)measures.
Finally, the fourth White Paper ‘Technological Challenges in Cybersecurity’ 
summarises the current state of discussion regarding the main technological chal-
lenges in cybersecurity and their impact, including ways and approaches to address 
them, on key fundamental values (Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2017).
These White Papers serve as a baseline for this volume, which involves the con-
tributions of CANVAS researchers as well as those of external experts. The first part 
of the volume outlines the general problems associated with the ethics of cyberse-
curity. This involves defining the basic technical concepts of cybersecurity, the val-
ues affected by cybersecurity, and the ethical and legislative framework, with a 
particular focus on Europe. The second part of the volume introduces a variety of 
ethical questions raised in the context of cybersecurity. The contributions are mostly 
structured along the major domains of interest that were investigated in the CANVAS 
project: business/finance, the health system, and law enforcement/national security. 
The last part of the volume is dedicated to recommendations in order to tackle some 
of the ethical challenges of cybersecurity. Overall, given the broad scope of the top-
ics addressed in this book, it will not only be relevant for scholars focusing on phi-
losophy and the ethics of technology. Many practitioners in cybersecurity—providers 
of security software, CERTs or Chief Security Officers in companies—are increas-
ingly aware of the ethical dimensions of their work. We therefore hope that the 
practical focus of this book will also help those experts to not only gain awareness 
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of the ethics of cybersecurity but also provide them with the concepts and tools to 
tackle them.1
As cybersecurity is a quickly evolving domain, this book will not provide a com-
plete overview of all relevant topics. Emerging issues concern, for example, cyber- 
currencies or the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity. The latter will 
become important both as a tool to complement the toolset for defending against 
attacks (e.g., for supervising large networks) as well as for more efficient attacks. AI 
may also become a dangerous tool for very new kinds of attacks (e.g. for learning 
instabilities in electronic stock markets and providing buy/sell ‘signals’ that destabi-
lise the stock market). Furthermore, ‘hacking’ AI systems—which in the future may 
play important roles such as in autonomous driving—through compromised data may 
also become an increasingly relevant issue for cybersecurity. In addition, as processes 
and interactions in many social spheres increasingly rely on ICT systems, traditional 
security issues interfere with cybersecurity issues in domains such as food-security or 
migration and security. In this book, we only cover a few of these emerging issues, 
such as the danger of ‘hacking democracy’ through ICT-mediated means such as deep 
fakes and botnets (see Chaps. 11 and 12) and partly AI threads related to critical infra-
structure (Chap. 8). Others should become topics of a new book, perhaps with more 
emphasis on autonomous decision-making systems and machine learning.
1.1  Explaining the Foundations
In the first chapter, Dominik Herrmann and Henning Pridöhl provide a technical 
introduction to the topic of this book. In this chapter, they review the fundamental 
concepts of cybersecurity by explaining common threats to information and sys-
tems to illustrate how matters of security can be addressed with methods from risk 
management. They also describe typical attack strategies and principles for defence. 
They review cryptographic techniques, malware and two common weaknesses in 
software: buffer overflows and SQL injections. This is followed by selected topics 
from network security, namely reconnaissance, firewalls, Denial of Service attacks 
and Network Intrusion Detection Systems. Finally, they review techniques for con-
tinuous testing, stressing the need for a free distribution of dual-use tools.
Ibo van de Poel then provides an introduction into the core values and value con-
flicts in cybersecurity. He does so by distinguishing four important value clusters that 
should be considered by deciding about cybersecurity measures: security, privacy, 
fairness and accountability. Each cluster consists of a range of further values that 
may be seen as articulating specific moral reasons relevant in devising cybersecurity 
measures. Following this introduction, potential value conflicts and value tensions 
are discussed as well as possible methods for dealing with these conflicts.
The next chapter by Michele Loi and Markus Christen provides an in-depth dis-
cussion of ethical frameworks for cybersecurity. These include the principlist frame-
1 For doing this, the CANVAS project has also created a whole spectrum of practical tools such as 
briefing material, a reference curriculum on the ethics of cybersecurity including teaching mate-
rial, and a Massive Open Online Course. This material is available on the CANVAS website www.
canvas-project.eu.
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work employed in the Menlo Report on cybersecurity research and the rights-based 
principle that is influential in the law, in particular EU law. The authors show that 
since the harms and benefits caused by cybersecurity operations and policies are of 
a probabilistic nature, both approaches cannot avoid dealing with risk and probabil-
ity. Therefore, the ethics of risk is introduced in several variants as a necessary 
complement to such approaches. They propose a revised version of this framework 
for identifying and ethically assessing changes brought about by cybersecurity mea-
sures and policies, not only in relation to privacy but more generally to the key 
expectations concerning human interactions within the practice.
Finally, Gloria González Fuster and Lina Jasmontaite introduce the legislative 
framework for cybersecurity. The authors provide an overview of the current and 
changing legal framework for regulating cybersecurity with a particular focus on the 
new EU Data Protection Regulation. By invoking a historical perspective, the chapter 
analyses the policy developments that have shaped the cybersecurity domain in the 
EU. It reviews the mobilisation of multiple domains (such as the regulation of elec-
tronic communications, critical infrastructures and cybercrime) in the name of cyber-
security imperatives, and explores how their operationalisation surfaced in the EU 
cybersecurity strategy. It highlights how the perception of cybersecurity’s relation 
with (national) security play a determinant role in EU legislative and policy debates, 
whereas fundamental rights considerations are only considered to a limited extent.
1.2  Outlining the Problems
The chapter by Gwenyth Morgan and Bert Gordijn provides a care-based stake-
holder approach to the ethics of cybersecurity in business. After sketching the main 
ethical issues discussed in the academic literature, the chapter aims to identify some 
important topics that have not yet received the attention they deserve. The chapter 
then focuses on one of those topics, namely ransomware attacks, one of the most 
prevalent cybersecurity threats to businesses today. Using Daniel Engster’s care- 
based stakeholder approach, the responsibilities that businesses have to their stake-
holders are analysed—in particular with respect to patching identified vulnerabilities 
and paying the ransom.
Karsten Weber and Nadine Kleine investigate in their chapter the specific ethical 
issues of cybersecurity in health care. Using the approach of principlism, enhanced 
with additional values, they demonstrate how value conflicts can emerge in that 
domain and they provide possible solutions. With the help of implantable medical 
devices and the electronic Health Card as case studies, they show that these conflicts 
cannot be eliminated but must be reconsidered on a case-by-case basis.
The cybersecurity of critical infrastructures is analysed in the chapter of Eleonora 
Viganò, Michele Loi and Emad Yaghmaei. They provide a political and  philosophical 
analysis of the values at stake in ensuring cybersecurity for national infrastructure. 
Based on a review on the boundaries of national security and cybersecurity with a 
focus on the ethics of surveillance for protecting critical infrastructure and the use 
of AI, they apply a bibliographic analysis of the literature until 2016 to identify and 
discuss the cybersecurity value conflicts and ethical issues in national security. This 
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is integrated with an analysis of the most recent literature on cyber-threats to 
national infrastructure and the role of AI. They show that the increased connected-
ness of digital and non-digital infrastructure enhances the trade-offs between values 
identified in the literature of the past years.
In the next chapter David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle and Michele Loi discuss an 
inherent ethical issue of cybersecurity: ethical and unethical hacking. They provide 
a conceptual analysis of ethical hacking, including its history, in order to provide a 
systematic classification of hacking. They conclude by suggesting a pragmatic best- 
practice approach for characterising ethical hacking, which reaches beyond 
business- friendly values and helps with taking decisions respectful of the hackers’ 
individual ethics in morally debatable, grey zones.
The interrelation of cybersecurity and the state is then investigated in the chapter 
by Eva Schlehahn. The author provides an overview of state actor’s opinions and 
strategies relating to cybersecurity matters, with a particular focus on the 
EU.  Furthermore, the role of the new European data protection framework is 
addressed, while it is explained why data protection also has a close relationship to 
cybersecurity matters. The main tensions and conflicts in relation to IT and cyber-
security are depicted, which evolve primarily around the frequently negative effect 
on the rights of data subjects that IT and cybersecurity measures have. In particular, 
the issue of governmental surveillance is addressed, with its implications for the 
fundamental rights of European citizens.
Seumas Miller then approaches this political dimension by analysing the tricky 
balance between freedom of communication and security in the cyber domain. The 
author provides definitions of fake news, hate speech and propaganda, and shows 
how these phenomena are corruptive for epistemic norms. He elaborates on the right 
to freedom of communication and its relation both to censoring propaganda and to 
the role of epistemic institutions, such as a free and independent press and universi-
ties. Finally, he discusses the general problem of countering political propaganda in 
cyberspace.
The contribution of George Lucas goes in a similar direction, but he particularly 
discusses the case that increasingly, state actors undermine cybersecurity, broadly 
construed by both propaganda and other types of cyber operations. He presents the 
current cyber domain as a Hobbesian state of nature, a domain of unrestricted con-
flict constituting a “war of all against all”. The fundamental ethical dilemma in 
Hobbes’s original account of this ‘original situation’ was how to establish a more 
stable political arrangement, comprising a rule of law under which the interests of 
the various inhabitants in life, property and security would be more readily guaran-
teed. The author discusses how to achieve an acceptance of general norms of respon-
sible individual and state behaviour within the cyber domain, arising from experience 
and consequent enlightened self-interest.
Finally, Reto Inversini proposes focusing on ‘cyberpeace’ as a guiding principle 
in cybersecurity. He analyses elements of cyber conflicts and attacks, defines the 
term cyber peace and identifies the components that make such a state possible. The 
chapter closes with an assessment of the different roles and responsibilities of stake-
holders to reach and preserve a state of peace in the digital sphere.
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1.3  Presenting Recommendations
The first chapter of the final part is dedicated to technological means. Josep 
Domingo-Ferrer and Alberto Blanco-Justicia review the entire spectrum of privacy- 
enhancing techniques (PET). They first enumerate design strategies and then move 
to privacy-enhancing techniques that directly address the hide strategy but also aid 
in implementing the separate, control and enforce strategies. Specifically, they con-
sider PETs for: (1) identification, authentication and anonymity; (2) private com-
munications; (3) privacy-preserving computations; (4) privacy in databases; and (5) 
discrimination prevention in data mining.
The next chapter outlines some concrete best practices and recommendations for 
cybersecurity service providers. Based on a brief outline of dilemma that cyberse-
curity service providers may experience in their daily operations, Alexey Kirichenko, 
Markus Christen, Florian Grunow and Dominik Herrmann discuss data handling 
policies and practices of cybersecurity vendors along the following five topics: cus-
tomer data handling, information about breaches, threat intelligence, vulnerability- 
related information and data involved when collaborating with peers, CERTs, 
cybersecurity research groups, etc. They also include a discussion of specific issues 
of penetration testing such as customer recruitment and execution as well as the 
supervision and governance of penetration testing. The chapter closes with some 
general recommendations regarding improving the ethical decision-making proce-
dures of private cybersecurity service providers.
Salome Stevens then analyses a highly debated strategy of businesses to counter-
act cyber threats: hacking back. Several security experts call for a more active 
cyber-defence of companies, including offensive actions in cyberspace taken with 
defensive purposes in mind. The lack of legal regulations, however, raises insecuri-
ties over the legal scope of action of private companies. The authors investigate 
questions such as: When is a private company allowed to act? When by such an act 
could it itself be implicated into committing illegal actions? The chapter concludes 
by giving recommendations for companies on how to define ethical cyber-defence 
within their security strategy.
How the awareness for cybersecurity can be enhanced in health care is then dis-
cussed by David Koeppe. Given that the medical domain is characterised by special 
processing situations and, in particular, by the very high protection requirements of 
data and processes, cybersecurity is a must and requires the setup of proper informa-
tion security management systems. The authors discuss the key requirements of 
such management systems—also given the requirements of the new EU data protec-
tion regulation.
Finally, Paul Meyer discusses norms of responsible state behaviour in cyber-
space. The chapter sketches the increasing ‘militarisation’ of cyberspace as well as 
the diplomatic efforts undertaken to provide this unique environment with some 
‘rules of the road’. The primary mechanism for discussing possible norms of respon-
sible state behaviour has been a series of UN Groups of Governmental Experts 
which have produced three consensus reports over the last decade. The author calls 
for renewed efforts to promote responsible state behaviour that will require greater 
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engagement on the part of the private sector and civil society, both of which have a 
huge stake in sustaining cyber peace.
In conclusion, it is our sincere hope that this book enables the reader to gain a 
broad understanding of the various ethical issues associated with cybersecurity. We 
close by expressing our gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers of this manuscript, 
who provided helpful comments, and to Edward Crocker, proof reader of Cambridge 
Proofreading & Editing LLC. This book has been supported by the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 700540 
and the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI) under 
contract number 16.0052-1. We are thankful to our funding institutions.
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Chapter 2
Basic Concepts and Models 
of Cybersecurity
Dominik Herrmann and Henning Pridöhl
Abstract This introductory chapter reviews the fundamental concepts of cyberse-
curity. It begins with common threats to information and systems to illustrate how 
matters of security can be addressed with methods from risk management. In the 
following, typical attack strategies and principles for defence are reviewed, fol-
lowed by cryptographic techniques, malware and two common weaknesses in soft-
ware: buffer overflows and SQL injections. Subsequently, selected topics from 
network security, namely reconnaissance, firewalls, Denial of Service attacks, and 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems, are analysed. Finally, the chapter reviews 
techniques for continuous testing, stressing the need for a free distribution of dual- 
use tools. Although introductory in nature, this chapter already addresses a number 
of ethical issues. For instance, well-intended security mechanisms may have unde-
sired side effects such as leaking sensitive information to attackers. As asymmetries 
and externalities are at the core of many security problems, devising effective secu-
rity solutions that are adopted in practice is a challenge.
Keywords Advanced persistent threat · Availability · Black hats · Certificates · 
Confidentiality · Cryptography · Integrity · Malware · Supply-chain attack · 
Vulnerabilities · White hats
2.1  Introduction
Honesty was never a given in human history. In the physical world, we can rely on 
decades of experience to defend against malicious actors. We have devised sophis-
ticated laws that govern what is acceptable and what is illegal. In addition, we have 
a number of technical means at our disposal to secure our property and our secrets.
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However, we are still in the process of learning how to secure cyberspace. 
Cyberspace has become the handle of choice to refer to the virtual world created by 
networked computer systems that affect large parts of our lives; securing it is chal-
lenging. According to Bruce Schneier “complexity is the enemy of security” (Chan 
2012). There are not only more devices hooked up to the Internet, but also more 
manufacturers building them, which increases both the size and diversity of the 
systems forming the cyberspace and thus the probability of failures.
Moreover, cybersecurity is subject to significant asymmetries. Attackers can 
choose from a large variety of approaches, while defenders have to pay attention to 
every detail and be prepared for anything at any time. Therefore, successful attacks 
are not necessarily the result of negligence. Sometimes security controls are in place 
but are not used properly, for instance, because they conflict with the needs of users. 
Given these difficulties, there is now much interest in reactive security, which 
embraces the insight that we cannot prevent all attacks.
In this chapter, we introduce the basic concepts of cybersecurity. We start by defin-
ing common threats in Sect. 2.2 and reviewing typical attack and defence techniques 
in Sect. 2.3. Subsequently, we present security fundamentals in various domains, 
namely cryptography for data security in Sect. 2.4, malware in Sect. 2.5, software 
security in Sect. 2.6 and network security in Sect. 2.7. Finally, we stress the impor-
tance of continuous testing in Sect. 2.8 before we conclude the chapter in Sect. 2.9.
2.2  Threats
Before we can discuss attacks and defences in cyberspace, we must clarify what is 
at stake. In the following, we review the fundamental protection goals that help us 
gain a comprehensive picture of all aspects of security.
Before the term ‘cybersecurity’ became fashionable, discussions focused on 
computer security. The goal of computer security is to protect assets. Valuable assets 
can be hardware (e.g. computers and smartphones), software and data. These assets 
are subject to threats that may result in loss or harm.
Computer security consists of information security and systems security. It is 
instructive to consider the foundations of these two fields, which laid the ground for 
cybersecurity. Information security is concerned with the protection of data (poten-
tially processed by computers) and any information derived from its interpretation. 
In systems security, we aim to ensure that (computer) systems operate as designed; 
i.e. attackers cannot tamper with them.
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2.2.1  Information Security
We begin our discussion of threats with information security. There are three protec-
tion goals in information security: confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(Anderson 1972; Voydock and Kent 1983), commonly referred to as the ‘CIA triad’ 
(the origin of this abbreviation is unknown). Security measures have the purpose of 
addressing one or more of these objectives, as follows:
 – Confidentiality: prevent unauthorised information gain.
 – Integrity: prevent or detect unauthorised modification of data.
 – Availability: prevent unauthorised deletion or disruption.
These protection goals apply both to data at rest, i.e. stored on a computer or on 
paper, and to data in transit, i.e. when data is sent over a network. The definitions 
refer to ‘unauthorised’ activities, which implies that there is an understanding about 
which actors are supposed to be allowed to interact with the data.
In some scenarios, there is only one authorised actor. An example in the context 
of the protection goal confidentiality is a smartphone or a computer with encrypted 
storage (sometimes called ‘full-disk encryption’). In this case, only the owner of the 
device is authorised. An example for the goal availability is to backup data so that it 
remains accessible when a machine fails.
Most of the time, there are several authorised actors; often there are precisely 
two. For instance, the protection goal confidentiality may be relevant when a sender 
sends an e-mail to a particular recipient. Confidentiality is also essential during 
online banking. Here, we also want integrity protection for the exchanged messages 
to avoid transactions being modified.
The three fundamental protection goals of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability refer to the content. Besides content, we may also be concerned with the 
identity of other actors. For instance, we would like to know when the sender of an 
e-mail message has been forged. The protection goal authenticity prevents actors 
from impersonating someone else, usually by providing others with a means to 
verify a claimed identity. A related and even stronger protection goal is non- 
repudiation, which prevents actors from denying that they carried out a particular 
act, for instance, sending a message. Authenticity and non-repudiation are neces-
sary to hold actors accountable (Gollmann 2011: 38).
2.2.2  Systems Security
How should we design systems so that they provide security for data stored on 
them? This question is at the centre of systems security. Consequently, the protec-
tion goals that are pursued in systems security are the same ones as in information 
security.
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Often there are multiple ways to achieve the desired goal. For instance, confiden-
tiality can be achieved by encrypting data or by a combination of authentication 
(e.g. by requiring users to enter a password) and access control (rules that govern 
which user is allowed to access which particular files). Designing systems that use 
a suitable combination of security measures is a non-trivial task.
However, systems security is not limited to achieving information security. Some 
systems hold no particularly interesting data at all. However, we rely on them and 
their functionality, i.e. the proper flow of a process. For instance, if an authentica-
tion system component of an operating system contains a bug, attackers may be able 
to shut it down (preventing authorised users from controlling the server) or bypass 
it (allowing unauthorised users to control the server). Integrity and availability are 
common protection goals in systems security. Keeping a particular procedure confi-
dential may be a goal to secure intellectual property. However, it is considered bad 
practice to hide how a system works for reasons of security (cf. Sect. 2.3.2).
Of particular interest in systems security are so-called cyber-physical systems 
that affect the real world, such as traffic lights, autopilots, industrial robots, and 
control systems for chemical processes or power plants. Some of these systems are 
considered critical infrastructures; i.e. failures may have a significant impact on 
society. Policy makers are concerned that future wars might be fought by attacking 
critical infrastructures to cause chaos—without having to use physical force 
(Wheeler 2018). Well-known attacks on cyber-physical systems include the Stuxnet 
malware, which was used to sabotage an Iranian uranium enrichment facility at 
Natanz in 2010 (Langner 2013) and an attack on a Ukrainian power plant in 2015 
(Zetter 2016).
2.2.3  Security Versus Safety
The cybersecurity community differentiates between security and safety (cf. 
Fig. 2.1). Harm can be caused by humans or by nonhuman events (Pfleeger et al. 
2015). Examples of nonhuman events are natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
fires, floods, loss of electrical power, faults of hard disks and so on. Human threats 
are either benign or malicious. Benign threats are the result of accidents and inad-
vertent human errors such as mistyping a command, whereas malicious acts result 
from bad intentions.
Ensuring that a system remains operational during natural disasters and when 
faced with human errors (i.e. benign threats) is a matter of safety. Safety is crucial 
in cyber-physical systems, where the failure of a system may harm humans. Safety 
has a long tradition in engineering, for instance, in cars and airplanes that contain 
many critical systems designed for maximum dependability.
In contrast, matters of security focus on malicious acts of humans, which are 
called attacks. There are random attacks and directed attacks. In random attacks, 
attackers do not care who they attack as long as there is something to gain from the 
victim (cf. pickpockets in the physical world). In the electronic domain, phishing 
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scams are a well-known example. In contrast, targeted attacks are directed at a par-
ticular victim. Targeted attacks are more difficult to defend against than random 
attacks because attackers act strategically, i.e. they may dynamically change their 
course of actions in response to security measures.
2.2.4  Security as Risk Management
Building software and hardware are complex and error-prone tasks. On average, 
every 1000 lines of code contain three to 20 bugs, and even a thorough code review 
reduces this number only by one order of magnitude (McConnell 2004). There are 
various ways in which these bugs can affect the security of a system. The ‘Common 
Weakness Enumeration’ (https://cwe.mitre.org) is a community-developed list of 
weaknesses. Weaknesses are generic types of mistakes that occur frequently. We 
discuss two common weaknesses in more detail later on, namely buffer overflows 
(see Sect. 2.6.1) and SQL injections (see Sect. 2.6.2).
A concrete realisation of a weakness in a particular product is called a vulnera-
bility. A vulnerability is “a flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, 
or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the system’s secu-
rity policy” (Shirey 2007). Vulnerabilities in widely deployed products are assigned 
a unique identifier and archived in the ‘Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures’ 
(https://cve.mitre.org), which contained more than 115,000 entries in June 2019.
An attack on a system is possible if a system is exposed to an attacker and if it 
contains weaknesses that can be exploited. Unreachable systems cannot be attacked, 
and the mere presence of, e.g. a buffer overflow in a program, does not necessarily 
mean that it is exploitable. Furthermore, the fact that a system exposes an exploitable 
vulnerability does not mean that an attack is inevitable. The notion of risk captures 
this uncertainty. The severity of a risk is the product of the impact of an attack on an 
asset (typically concerning monetary loss) and the likelihood that the attack takes 
place. The likelihood of an attack depends on exposure and  exploitability but also on 
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the question of whether the attack has the desired impact to reach the goal of an 
adversary. In practice, it is difficult to predict impact and likelihood accurately. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between risk and vulnerabilities.
There are various ways to handle risks (Shostack 2014). Firstly, risks can be 
avoided, e.g. by refraining from implementing a feature. Secondly, risks can also be 
mitigated, e.g. by implementing security controls (also called countermeasures) that 
decrease the likelihood and impact of a risk. Thirdly, risks can be transferred, e.g. 
by buying insurance that covers potential losses. Fourthly, risks can be accepted, i.e. 
by deciding to cover the costs of an attack. Acceptance may make sense for risks 
that are very unlikely.
In practice, system designers often try to transfer risks to the users of a system, 
creating a so-called negative externality. Transferring risks is feasible because of an 
asymmetric power ratio between system designers and users. This situation is prob-
lematic because operators of a system may have less incentive to take security seri-
ously when the impact of attacks does not affect them but someone else.
2.3  Approaches for Attack and Defence
For an attack to succeed, an attacker needs a working method, an opportunity to 
attack and a motive (Pfleeger et al. 2015). It is therefore instructive to survey differ-



















Fig. 2.2 Relationship between vulnerability and risk
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2.3.1  Attackers and Their Motives
What kind of attackers exist and what are their motives? In most cases, the same as 
in the physical world. For instance, corporate spies carry out cyber-attacks on organ-
isations to obtain trade secrets. There are also cyber criminals, individuals or groups 
that seek financial gain. One of their methods of operation is holding their victims to 
ransom, either by installing ransomware on their machines, by threatening to release 
sensitive information, or by threatening to carry out a Denial of Service attack (cf. 
Sect. 2.7.3). The most advanced attackers are nation states that, for example, aim to 
influence politics in a counterpart or extend their power. Nation states can conduct 
very sophisticated attacks that require many financial resources. Many attacks by 
nation states reach the level of an advanced persistent threat (APT), i.e. an attack 
that involves advanced techniques that allow an attacker to covertly compromise and 
potentially even control the systems of a victim for long periods of time.
Besides these ‘professional’ attackers, there are also hobbyists. The term ‘script 
kiddies’ refers to unskilled attackers that are only able to use ready-to-run tools for 
their attacks (see also Chap. 9). Moreover, there are hacktivists that perform attacks 
to further a cause and create publicity, e.g. free speech and anti-surveillance. Finally, 
there are rogue hackers that mostly attack systems out of curiosity. There are also 
hackers that attack for personal gain. They make fun of their victims by defacing 
their websites, brag about their abilities in their community and may even sell off 
sensitive data on the black market.
The term ‘black hats’ is used for attackers with malicious motives. In contrast, 
‘white-hat hackers’ are interested in improving overall security. They report all dis-
covered vulnerabilities to the respective system operators.
Many efforts aim to keep attackers ‘out’. This practice neglects insiders that have 
much better opportunities to attack than outsiders do. Insiders may be disloyal 
employees (users or operators) in a particular organisation. A comprehensive view 
of insiders should also include all employees that work at vendors, i.e. suppliers that 
provide tools used within an organisation. There have been several attempts to 
attack high-profile targets by infecting their vendors with malware. This approach, 
which is called a supply-chain attack, is quite powerful and difficult to detect 
(Korolov 2018).
2.3.2  Defences
Most defences focus on proactive security. However, this is not sufficient because it 
is impossible to prevent all attacks with absolute certainty. Proactive techniques are 
therefore combined with reactive techniques to handle the residual risk. In total, 
there are six approaches to secure a system (Pfleeger et al. 2015: Section 2.1.5). We 
begin by describing the three proactive approaches.
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 – Preventive controls ensure that an attack against a target is not possible or not 
successful, e.g. by controlling exposure (e.g. by a firewall) or exploitability (e.g. 
by fixing a buffer overflow vulnerability).
 – Deterrence merely increases the effort for an adversary, aiming to make the tar-
get unattractive. An example of a deterrence control is two-factor authentication, 
which requires additional proofs of identity (e.g. possession of a particular 
smartphone) besides knowing the correct password. Determined adversaries may 
still succeed if they can get access to the second authentication factor.
 – In deflection, the goal of the defender is to redirect the efforts of an adversary to 
another target. Deflection can be achieved, for instance, by deploying honeypots 
within an organisation (Spitzner 2002). A honeypot is a non-production system 
that is intentionally set up to fool attackers. Adversaries cannot easily distinguish 
honeypots from production systems, and they are configured to look like attrac-
tive targets.
The next three approaches provide reactive security:
 – Detection controls can focus either on real-time notifications or on documenta-
tion. Intrusion Detection Systems such as Snort (https://www.snort.org) can alert 
operators about suspicious network traffic in real time so that system administra-
tors can thwart an ongoing attack. In contrast, logging solutions collect evidence 
that may become useful during a so-called ‘post-mortem analysis’ of a security 
incident. Logs may contain network traffic (often stored in the so-called NetFlow 
format that includes metadata but not the content of communication), user inter-
actions, executed programs, modified files, and any other pieces of information 
that may be useful to track down the perpetrators (‘attribution’). Post-mortem 
analysis may also be capable of figuring out the extent of the attack, i.e. what 
files and systems have been compromised.
 – Mitigation controls reduce the impact of an attack. A frequently deployed miti-
gation control is network segmentation, which prevents machines located in dif-
ferent parts of a corporate network from communicating with each other. Thus, 
an adversary who has compromised the workstation of an employee in the human 
resources department cannot steal blueprints that are only accessible by mem-
bers of the research department.
 – Recovery controls help to revert the effects of an attack as fast as possible and to 
resume normal operation. Recovery measures include off-site backups as well as 
emergency playbooks that offer guidance during a crisis.
Typically, organisations will combine various techniques from the six categories. 
Ideally, they prevent the majority of the attempted attacks. The remaining attacks 
will then hopefully be detected and handled with reactive security techniques.
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) have devised generic Security Design Principles 
for building secure systems. Over time, the principles have been refined (Smith 
2012). We summarise them in the following:
 – Continuous improvement. Security is a process and operators have to make 
changes to keep it secure on a continuous basis.
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 – Least privilege. Users and components should not have more access rights than 
necessary to carry out their tasks.
 – Defence in depth. A single security mechanism should not be relied upon. 
Instead, multiple mechanisms should be used simultaneously, increasing the 
effort for adversaries.
 – Open design. Mechanisms should not rely on the fact that adversaries do not 
know their design (no ‘security by obscurity’).
 – Chain of control. Only trustworthy software should be executed whenever pos-
sible and non-trustworthy components should be restricted.
 – Deny by default. Unless explicitly specified, no access should be granted.
 – Transitive trust. If A trusts B and B trusts C, then A may also trust C.
 – Trust but verify. Even if a component is trustworthy, its identity must be 
verified.
 – Separation of duty. Critical tasks should be split up and delegated to separate 
components or individuals.
 – The principle of least astonishment. Good usability of security mechanisms is 
essential; mechanisms should be comprehensible and consequences should be 
intuitive.
2.3.3  Stages of an Intrusion
We now consider a typical workflow during an attack by discussing the Cyber Kill 
Chain, a popular framework proposed by Lockheed Martin (Hutchins et al. 2011). 
It separates the actions of attackers that attempt to ‘hack’ into a secured network:
 1. Reconnaissance: Research, identification and selection of targets, e.g. by crawl-
ing websites for e-mail addresses, social relationships, or information on specific 
technologies in use by the target.
 2. Weaponisation: Coupling a remote access Trojan with an exploit into a deliver-
able payload. Typically, client application data files such as the Portable 
Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents serve as the weap-
onised deliverable.
 3. Delivery: Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. Prevalent 
delivery vectors for weaponised payloads are e-mail attachments, websites and 
removable media such as USB sticks.
 4. Exploitation: After the weapon is delivered to the target host, the malicious code 
of the attacker is triggered, either by exploiting an application or operating sys-
tem vulnerability (such as a buffer overflow), by convincing users to click on an 
e-mail attachment or by leveraging operating system features that execute code 
automatically (e.g. ‘autorun.inf’ in Windows).
 5. Installation: Installation of a remote access tool on the target system, which 
allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the environment.
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 6. Command and Control (C&C): Typically, compromised hosts connect outbound 
to a controller server on the Internet. Once the C&C channel is established, 
intruders have ‘hands on the keyboard’ access inside the target environment.
 7. Actions: After progressing through the first six phases, intruders can take actions 
to achieve their original objectives, e.g. data exfiltration, which involves collect-
ing and extracting information from the victim environment.
The Cyber Kill Chain has been adopted by many practitioners to reason about secu-
rity architectures. However, this framework is also subject to criticism (Engel 2014; 
Sheridan 2018). The Cyber Kill Chain has been proposed at a time when security 
focused on prevention. Reactive security measures were mostly non-existent at that 
time. Once attackers had breached the firewall, they could often move around the 
network without much restriction. Nowadays, many networks implement the prin-
ciples of least privilege, separation of duties, and defence in depth. As a result, lat-
eral movement becomes noisier, which gives defenders more chances to detect 
attackers.
Moreover, the Cyber Kill Chain focuses on attacks that involve running malware 
(cf. Sect. 2.5) on the machines of users that work inside the infrastructure of a vic-
tim. Not all attacks require all the steps mentioned above. For instance, sensitive 
data stored on an improperly secured web server may be exfiltrated with a single 
request exploiting an SQL injection vulnerability (cf. Sect. 2.6.2).
2.4  Threats and Solutions in Data Security
Storing and transmitting data is at the core of many computing tasks. Adversaries 
may interfere either with ‘data at rest’ (stored on a system) or ‘data in transit’. In this 
section, we review common attacks on data and introduce the concepts of crypto-
graphic countermeasures. Our discussion focuses on data in transit, using a simplis-
tic model that consists of a sender and a recipient of messages.
2.4.1  Unauthorised Disclosure of Information
We begin with attacks on confidentiality, which means we consider adversaries that 
are interested in learning secrets. Obtaining data at rest, e.g. on the system of the 
sender or the receiver, will generally require attackers to intrude into a system (cf. 
Sect. 2.3.3). In contrast, data in transit can be obtained more stealthily by eaves-
dropping on the transmission. Eavesdropping is possible in many distributed sys-
tems that consist of multiple components, which communicate over public networks. 
Attackers that control intermediary systems (such as routers or Wi-Fi access points) 
that are used to forward traffic between sender and receiver have access to all 
exchanged messages. Eavesdropping is also possible in case of wireless 
D. Herrmann and H. Pridöhl
21
communication if the attacker is close enough to the communicating parties. 
Eavesdroppers are said to be passive attackers because they do not interfere with 
transmissions.
The standard countermeasure to prevent attacks on confidentiality is to encrypt 
data. A prerequisite for encrypted communication is for the sender and recipient to 
establish a cryptographic key, often just a sufficiently large number of random bits. 
In the case of symmetric cryptography, sender and receiver use the same key. The 
key has to be exchanged ‘out of band’, i.e. over a channel that is not under the con-
trol of the considered adversaries.
The sender feeds a message together with the key to an encryption function, 
obtaining the encrypted text (ciphertext) of the message. The recipient decrypts the 
ciphertext by supplying it along with the same key to the decryption function. An 
eavesdropper would have to guess the key by attempting all possible combinations. 
For a popular key size such as 256 bits, this would require 2256 ≈ 1077 trials. Equipped 
with one million computers, each of which being capable of trying out one billion 
keys per second, an adversary would still need more than 1054 years on average to 
complete such a task.
Note that encryption is typically only applied to the content of messages, i.e. the 
identities of sender and recipient are transmitted in the clear. Routers need these 
addresses to forward a message towards its destination. This fact allows eavesdrop-
pers to perform traffic analysis attacks: Adversaries still learn who communicates 
with whom, at what time, and how often. Traffic analysis attempts can be made 
more difficult by using multiple layers of encryption and forwarding messages over 
additional nodes to obfuscate their route. The Tor network (http://torproject.org) is 
a practical system that uses these techniques.
2.4.2  Unauthorised Modification and Fabrication
In the following, we discuss attacks on integrity by active attackers. Common objec-
tives include modifying messages exchanged between the sender and recipient or 
sending faked messages to the recipient.
For technical reasons not elaborated here, merely using encryption is not suffi-
cient to prevent modification of the underlying plaintext. Therefore, even encrypted 
messages need additional integrity protection. A basic integrity protection technique 
works as follows: the sender supplies the message (its content and possibly also the 
sender and receiver addresses) along with a cryptographic key (which has to be 
exchanged out of band, like before) into a function that generates a message authen-
tication code (MAC). The MAC is sent to the recipient together with the message. 
The recipient feeds the message, the key, and the MAC to a verification function that 
checks whether the MAC fits the message. As adversaries do not have access to the 
key, they cannot generate a correct MAC after they have modified a message. This 
technique cannot prevent modifications; however, it allows the recipient to detect 
whether any tampering has taken place.
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If there is an agreement between sender and recipient that all messages are going 
to contain a MAC, attackers cannot create fake messages on their own. However, 
attackers can intercept a message of another user and send them to the designated 
recipient once again. Such a replay attack is useful for messages that instruct the 
recipient to perform a particular action, for instance, to unlock a door or to reset the 
password of an account. Replay attacks can be detected by the recipient as follows: 
sender and receiver agree that the sender adds a counter value to each message, 
which is supposed to be incremented with every message. Replays can then be 
detected because their counter value is smaller than a previously seen value or equal 
to the last seen one. The attacker cannot manipulate the counter value as it is also 
protected by the MAC.
Nevertheless, even replay detection is not sufficient in all cases. Consider the 
example of modern cars with a ‘smart’ entry system. Whenever the key is close to 
the car, the doors will automatically unlock if you attempt to open them. Car thieves 
have found a cheap technique to exploit this comfortable feature by working in 
teams (Greenberg 2017). The first perpetrator either gets close to the victim (in a 
coffee shop queue) or to the key (which may sit on a cupboard right behind the front 
door at home), carrying an antenna working on the same frequency as the smart key. 
The antenna is connected to a wireless transmitter with an extended range. The 
second perpetrator walks up to the car with the same equipment. This setup allows 
the thieves to carry out a relay attack, which makes the car believe that its key is 
close. Many modern cars have been shown to be vulnerable to relay attacks 
(Francillon et  al. 2011). In principle, cars could be programmed to detect relay 
attacks, for instance, by measuring the delays between messages. Until manufactur-
ers have upgraded security, consumers have to take care of themselves, e.g. by 
shielding the key or removing its battery.
2.4.3  The Benefits of Asymmetric Cryptography
Up to now, we have discussed what is called symmetric encryption and symmetric 
authentication—an approach that has several weaknesses. Firstly, these approaches 
require that each pair of senders and receivers that wants to communicate with each 
other have exchanged a secret key out of band. For n participants 0.5 · n (n–1) keys 
have to be exchanged, i.e. in a system comprised of 20 components there would be 
190 different keys. Thus, the symmetric approach scales poorly.
Secondly, sender and receiver have to store identical keys on their devices. This 
design increases the risk of key compromise because the adversary can obtain the 
keys either from the sender’s or the receiver’s device.
Thirdly, there are applications where symmetric message authentication is not 
sufficient. Consider a message containing the statement “I, Bob Miller, owe 100 
Euros to Laura Fisher.” Assume that Laura receives a letter with this statement in her 
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mailbox, however without any further indication of the sender. If the letter also 
contains a MAC and Laura can verify the MAC with the key she has exchanged with 
Bob, then Laura can be confident that it was indeed Bob who sent the letter. She has 
confirmed the authenticity of Bob’s identity. However, let us assume that Bob later 
denies that he wrote the message. In that case Laura will not be able to convince a 
court that the MAC proves that Bob Miller wrote this message—after all, the key 
used for the MAC is not only known to Bob but also to her, i.e. she could have 
forged that message herself.
Asymmetric cryptography (also called public-key cryptography) allows us to 
overcome these limitations. In contrast to the symmetric approach, every entity 
(user or component) creates a key pair, which consists of a public key and a private 
key. The public key is shared with everyone else, and the private key is kept a secret.
Senders have to obtain the public key of the recipients with whom they want to 
communicate. As with symmetric cryptography, the key exchange is a sensitive 
matter. In particular, integrity protection is required, i.e. all parties must be certain 
that they obtained the authentic public keys. Without integrity protection, an adver-
sary could interfere with the initial transmission of the public key. This would allow 
the adversary to forward the public key of a self-generated key pair to other parties. 
As a result, the adversary would become a so-called man in the middle (MitM). 
MitM attackers can impersonate communication parties and decrypt messages des-
ignated for them. After decryption with the adversarial key, a MitM can encrypt the 
message with the public key of the designated recipient and forward the message 
towards the recipient, which makes it impossible for the recipient to detect that any 
kind of eavesdropping or manipulation has taken place. Although the concept of 
MitM attacks is considered basic knowledge, MitM attacks keep taking place in 
practice (cf., e.g. Cimpanu 2018; Seals 2018; Walker 2018).
Once senders have obtained a public key of their communication partner, they 
can create an encrypted message by feeding the message and the public key into an 
encryption function to obtain the ciphertext. The recipient can then retrieve the 
plaintext of the message by feeding the ciphertext and the corresponding private key 
to a decryption function.
Message authentication works similarly. A sender signs a message by feeding it 
together with the sender’s private key into a signing function. Everyone who is in 
possession of the public key of the sender can then verify the message. The verifica-
tion function consumes a message, the public key of the purported sender, and the 
signature. If verification succeeds, this means that the message has not been tam-
pered with (integrity) and that the signature was genuinely generated by the private 
key that belongs to the public key used during verification (non-repudiation).
Asymmetric cryptography is in widespread use today. Most prominently, it is 
used to secure e-mails with the S/MIME and OpenPGP message formats. It also 
plays a vital role in securing the World Wide Web, which we discuss in the next 
section.
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2.4.4  Case Study: Secure HTTP
Browsers typically communicate with web servers via HTTP (Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol), which is specified (among others) in RFC 7230 (Fielding and Reschke 
2014). Today, many web servers respond by redirecting the browser to an HTTPS 
URL, which ensures that the connection between browser and server is protected 
against eavesdropping and tampering. Furthermore, HTTPS prevents adversaries on 
the network from impersonating a web server (which would allow adversaries, 
among others, to steal log-in credentials that are entered on web sites hosted there).
The security mechanisms of HTTPS are implemented with the Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) protocol. The most recent version, TLS 1.3, is specified in RFC 
8446 (Rescorla 2018). This means that web servers are equipped with key pairs, 
which are associated with one or more domain names (e.g. www.uni-bamberg.de). 
The asymmetric key pair of a web server is not used to encrypt the actual data. The 
reason for this design is to provide a property known as forward secrecy: Even 
attackers that obtain the private key of a web server in the future shall not be able to 
learn the contents of a communication that has been observed (and stored) in the 
past. Therefore, the asymmetric key pair is only used to establish ephemeral sym-
metric session keys, which are then used to encrypt and authenticate the requests of 
the browser and the responses of the server.
In principle, this key establishment takes place for every new connection. This 
design, however, opens up a possibility for MitM attacks that aim to impersonate the 
destination web server. To prevent any tampering with the messages in the key 
establishment phase, the web server signs some of the messages with its private key. 
The browser can verify their integrity and authenticity with the public key of the 
web server. However, typically the client will not know the public key of the web 
server. This problem is tackled by making web servers send their public key to the 
client during the key establishment. However, without additional safeguards, this 
approach would allow MitM attackers to impersonate a web server by injecting 
their own key into the communication. This problem is overcome by introducing 
so-called certificates. Instead of sending the raw public key, a web server sends a 
certificate, which contains its public key, the domain names for which this certifi-
cate is valid, and a digital signature of a so-called Certification Authority (CA). CAs 
are organisations that issue certificates. A certificate is only issued to web server 
operators that can prove ownership of the domains to be included in the certificate. 
This approach prevents MitM attackers from forging certificates on the fly.
To verify the certificate presented by a web server, the browser needs the public 
key of the CA that issued that certificate. Browsers are equipped with the public 
keys of a number of large CAs by default (root certificates). If a web site uses a 
certificate from a different CA, the web server will include the certified public key 
of one or more intermediate CAs so that the browser can follow the chain of trust 
until one of the trusted root certificates is reached.
It is insightful to review different attacks against HTTPS. The objective of the 
adversary is either to eavesdrop on data in transit or to impersonate a particular web 
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server while users attempt to connect to it, with the ultimate goal of learning sensi-
tive pieces of information such as the passwords of users. We review two well- 
known attacks in the following.
The first attack, sslstrip, was presented by Marlinspike (2011). This attack can be 
conducted by adversaries that control routers, for instance, a Wi-Fi access point that 
is being used by a victim to connect to the Internet. Whenever the victim visits a 
website via HTTP, sslstrip watches the (unencrypted) HTTP response for attempts 
by the web server to redirect the user’s browser to the secure HTTPS version. In this 
case, sslstrip removes the redirection from the HTTP response. As a result, the 
user’s browser will never learn that the web server intended to serve a secure ver-
sion. Many users will not notice the mishap and enter sensitive data. The adversary 
can trivially eavesdrop on all communication before sslstrip forwards the traffic to 
the web server (of course, encrypted with HTTPS, as requested by the server).
Universally preventing sslstrip attacks is not trivial because of the conservative 
architecture of the World Wide Web: It relies on HTTP for initial contact. As a first 
step, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has released the browser extension 
HTTPS Everywhere that replaces all HTTP connection attempts with HTTPS for a 
list of websites known to support HTTPS (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2018). A 
more generic approach envisions that web servers indicate that they support HTTPS 
by adding a ‘Strict Transport Security’ header to their responses (Hodges et  al. 
2012). The information that a web server supports HTTPS is then cached by brows-
ers for a defined amount of time, which prevents sslstrip attempts after the initial 
connection. The initial connection remains vulnerable as it still relies on HTTP.
The second attack on HTTPS connections exploits the fact that every CA in the 
root certificate store can be used to issue a certificate for any domain name and that 
all major browsers will trust those certificates. Given that browsers trust several hun-
dreds of CAs, there is a substantial risk that one of them will be compromised. Several 
CAs have been hacked in the past, resulting in the issuance of rogue certificates. 
Well-known cases are the CAs TürkTrust, Comodo, and DigiNotar (Laurie 2014).
In the past, users could not make out rogue certificates and there was no afford-
able way for most site owners to detect that another CA has issued a certificate for 
their domain.
A promising approach to detect rogue certificates is the Certificate Transparency 
initiative, which requires all CAs to add every issued certificate into one of several 
publicly verifiable append-only log files (Laurie et  al. 2013). These log files are 
implemented in a tamper-proof fashion so that CAs cannot retroactively lie about a 
certificate they have issued. Browsers will only accept certificates from CAs that 
participate in this programme, which serves as a strong incentive for CAs to partici-
pate. Site owners can run monitors that continuously check whether certificates for 
their domains have been issued by rogue CAs, which minimises the amount of time 
such certificates can be used for malicious purposes. However, the deployment of 
Certificate Transparency comes with a catch, as we discuss in Sect. 2.7.1.
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2.5  Malware Threats and Solutions
Malicious software, malware for short, is a significant threat to information and 
systems security. Malware is “a program that is inserted into a system, usually 
covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availabil-
ity of a victim’s data, applications, or operating system or otherwise annoying or 
disrupting the victim” (Souppaya and Scarfone 2013). Following the approach of 
Stallings and Brown (2014), we discuss propagation methods and payloads. After 
that, we consider countermeasures.
2.5.1  Propagation and Delivery
Some malware is designed to spread on its own. A well-known example is the SQL 
Slammer worm that infected more than 75,000 hosts over the Internet in 2003 
(Moore et al. 2003). SQL Slammer exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability (cf. 
Sect. 2.6.1) in Microsoft’s SQL Server. The vulnerable systems were reachable 
because the servers were not protected by a firewall (cf. Sect. 2.7.2).
Since then, the prevalence of firewalls has increased significantly. Therefore, 
malware authors have to rely on the help of humans for delivery. There are still 
some viruses around that infect files or file systems in the hope that users will 
exchange these with others, e.g. via USB sticks. However, most malware is now 
delivered via the Internet.
In the absence of vulnerabilities, the only way to infect a system consists in con-
vincing a user to execute the malware. A typical approach consists in attaching 
malware to e-mails and tricking victims to execute it, exploiting their curiosity and 
insufficient technical expertise. Such attacks employ the same techniques that are 
also used for phishing. Sophisticated attackers use social engineering techniques to 
improve their chances, in quite the same way as so-called spear-phishing attacks 
target a particular person.
Another technique is called drive-by download. Here, users are tricked into visit-
ing a website that is controlled by an attacker. The website is crafted to exploit a 
vulnerability (e.g. a buffer overflow, cf. Sect. 2.6.1) in the browser, ultimately forc-
ing the browser to execute the malicious payload of the attacker. A more sophisti-
cated variant of drive-by downloads are malvertising attacks (Nichols 2015). Here, 
attackers insert their malicious code into ads that they place on popular websites, 
which results in the infection of all visitors that have not patched their browser.
Adversaries that have researched their targets very well may be able to carry out 
a waterholing attack. A waterholing attack is possible if an adversary finds a way to 
either compromise a website that is typically visited by a victim or a server that 
hosts updates for software that is used by the victim. The attacker can then place the 
malware on this website, waiting for the victim to download it. In 2017, a state- 
sponsored waterholing attack was conducted by releasing a maliciously infected 
update for the CCcleaner tool (Amir 2017).
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2.5.2  Payloads
Once a piece of malware is run on a target, it will execute its payload. The malware 
will typically deceive the user about its purpose, for instance, by exposing some 
benign functionality or an error. This kind of malware is called a Trojan horse.
In the past, the primary objective of malware was system corruption, by either 
deleting all files on a machine or preventing it from booting its operating system. 
Later on, malware authors discovered that they could exploit the fact that many 
users do not have backups: so-called ransomware encrypts the files on a system and 
demands the payment of a ransom in exchange for the decryption key and a tool that 
recovers the data.
Other payloads include key loggers to exfiltrate account credentials as well as 
remote control tools. Attackers that control a large number of systems can build up 
botnets that perform orchestrated activities such as sending out large amounts of 
spam e-mails or Distributed Denial of Service attacks (cf. Sect. 2.7.3).
2.5.3  Countermeasures
Baseline countermeasures against malware are the timely installation of security 
patches and user awareness training. These countermeasures try to avoid automated 
exploitation of known vulnerabilities and unintended execution of malware by naïve 
users. A typical—and if consequently followed also sensible—recommendation is 
to scrutinise e-mails with attachments, refraining from opening suspicious ones. 
However, it is difficult to spot a professionally executed spear-phishing attack.
Automated prevention of malware infections is the purpose of the so-called 
‘anti-virus’ (AV) solutions. AV solutions monitor a system for suspicious activities 
that are indicative of malware. In principle, there are two approaches to decide 
whether a particular executable is malicious or not. The traditional method relies on 
malware signatures that are continually updated by the vendor. The effectiveness of 
signature-based AV tools is limited because they fail to detect slightly modified 
malware samples. In addition, AV tools increasingly rely on static and dynamic 
code analysis (heuristics). However, even this behaviour-based approach is not able 
to detect malware with 100% accuracy. Moreover, it may result in many false alerts 
(cf. Sect. 2.7.4).
Although widely deployed in organisations, some security practitioners are scep-
tical of AV tools. Firstly, professional attackers test their malware with a large num-
ber of AV tools, tweaking until it is not detected anymore. Secondly, some AV tools 
have been shown to introduce additional vulnerabilities (Anthony 2017a). A par-
ticularly interesting case is Windows Defender, the default AV engine of Windows, 
which scans all incoming e-mails for malware. Due to a vulnerability in Windows 
Defender, attackers could send specially crafted e-mails to victims that contained 
code that was automatically executed upon reception—even if the user never opened 
the e-mail (Anthony 2017b).
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An alternative approach to AV solutions consists in executing suspicious files 
within a sandbox. Sandboxes are isolated machines instrumented with extensive 
monitoring capabilities. In contrast to behaviour-based AV tools, sandboxes do not 
have to make a real-time decision. While promising, sandboxes are no silver bullet. 
Malware authors have adapted to this new countermeasure; for instance, by delay-
ing the execution of the payload until the timeout of the sandbox analysis has 
expired.
In some cases, it may be tempting to use active defence in order to defeat mal-
ware, for instance, by attempting to shut down its command and control infrastruc-
ture (cf. Sect. 2.3.3). Whether ‘hacking back’ is legal and ethically justifiable is an 
ongoing debate (Dittrich 2012; Schmidle 2018; see also Chap. 16). There have been 
incidents where interference with good intentions has caused harm. A noteworthy 
example is the case of the German e-mail provider Posteo that has deleted a mailbox 
used by the authors of the Petya ransomware (Cimpanu 2017). As a result, users 
who were willing to pay (or had already paid) the ransom could not get in touch 
with the authors any more to obtain the decryption key for their data. Initially, 
Posteo’s decision was received critically. However, later on it was discovered that 
the particular variant of Petya used in the attack had been programmed to delete files 
(rather than encrypting them). Therefore, Posteo’s act could be justified in the end, 
because no one would have gotten back their files anyway (Spring 2017).
2.6  Threats and Solutions in Software Security
Software security is concerned with weaknesses that result from programming 
errors. In the following, we present two common weaknesses, namely, buffer over-
flows and SQL injections. Subsequently, we discuss how vulnerabilities are found 
and reported to the vendors.
2.6.1  Case Study: Buffer Overflows
The most dominant security weakness in applications written in C and C++ are buf-
fer overflows (Erickson 2008). To understand how buffer overflows work and what 
risks they impose, we have to introduce the basic ideas of memory management in 
C/C++ applications. Computations usually require some storage space in the com-
puter’s main memory, namely a buffer. A buffer has a specific location in the main 
memory and a given size. In C/C++, software developers are responsible for ensur-
ing that buffers are large enough for the input they should hold. Programming lan-
guages that put this burden on the software developer are said to miss a security 
feature called ‘memory safety’.
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If software developers fail to allocate enough space for a buffer, they introduce a 
weakness into the code, a buffer overflow. An adversary can turn this weakness into 
a vulnerability by writing or reading outside the buffer, affecting other buffers 
located in the main memory, either before or after the original buffer. Modifying the 
content of this other buffer can influence the behaviour of the application; in par-
ticular, it may allow the adversary to execute arbitrary commands. Thus, a buffer 
overflow can result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
To get the picture, consider the source code in Fig. 2.3, which reads input from 
the user and outputs it again. It contains an administration function that can only be 
activated by exploiting a buffer overflow.
Line 1 includes a common software library that makes it easier for the developer 
to read in user input and generate output shown to the user. In line 2, we define the 
main function of the program. Everything from line 3 to line 10 is part of this func-
tion and is executed in sequential order when the main function is executed; this 
happens at the start of the application. Line 3 defines a variable called ‘privilege_
level’, which can store integer values. Initially, the privilege_level variable has a 
value of ‘1’. Variables allocate space in the main memory, in this case 4 bytes. Line 
4 allocates 124 bytes for a buffer called ‘buf’, also in the main memory, next to the 
privilege_level variable. In line 5, the program reads a user’s input from the key-
board by invoking the function ‘fgets’ (which is defined in the file ‘stdio.h’). fgets 
is instructed to read up to 1024 bytes and write them into the buffer buf. However, 
buf can only store 124 bytes, thus introducing a buffer overflow. Line 6 checks for a 
condition: lines 7 and 8 only get executed if privilege_level is above 10. These lines 
print the user’s current privilege level.
An adversary can exploit the buffer overflow to gain administrative privileges 
and execute lines 7 and 8. He starts the application and provides a specially crafted 
input. This input consists of arbitrary 124 bytes to fill buf, followed by 4 bytes with 
the value he wants privilege_level to have. So if he enters ‘AAA...AAABBBB’ (124 
times ‘A’ followed by four ‘B’s), the application will print: ‘You have admin rights. 
Level: 1111638594’. Internally, the application calls fgets on the adversary’s input. 
Fig. 2.3 Example of a C program with a buffer overflow vulnerability
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Consequently, fgets writes 128 bytes to buf. Since buf has only a size of 124 bytes, 
fgets continues writing to the memory location ‘behind’ buf, which in our example 
holds the value for privilege_level (the concrete locations of variables in memory 
depend on various factors; in our example we assume them to be as explained). 
Thus, privilege_level gets overwritten with four ‘B’s, which are consecutively inter-
preted as 1111638594.
We have discussed a simple example where we can spot the buffer overflow in 
the source code easily. However, in the source code of real-world applications, buf-
fer overflows are more subtle, often hidden in calculations of buffer sizes. In addi-
tion, user input is not restricted to direct input on the keyboard, as in our example 
above. In real-world applications, buffer overflows may show up when reading 
image, audio, and video files, during the execution of JavaScript on web pages, and 
while processing network communication data.
Buffer overflows result from human mistakes. Thus, they cannot be prevented in 
all circumstances. Several techniques have been developed to make the exploitation 
of buffer overflows more difficult (e.g. Larsen and Sadeghi 2018). These techniques 
include data execution prevention (DEP), address space layout randomization 
(ASLR), stack canaries, and control-flow integrity (CFI). The diversity of defenses 
is the result of a cat-and-mouse game between defenders and attackers. Attackers 
consistently discover new ways to circumvent protections, for instance, return- 
oriented programming (ROP) against DEP (Buchanan et al. 2008).
2.6.2  Case Study: SQL Injections
Web applications commonly store their data in SQL (Structured Query Language) 
databases. However, this requires careful handling of users’ input to avoid so-called 
SQL injections (Stuttard and Pinto 2011). To understand SQL injections, we first 
introduce the basics of SQL-based database systems.
SQL databases store data in tables. Each table has a name and several columns. 
Every row holds an individual record; just as we would expect it for a table. We will 
consider a table named ‘users’ with the columns ‘id’, ‘email’, ‘password’ and ‘last_
active’ (cf. Table 2.1). To query the database, we use a domain-specific language, 
the SQL. An SQL statement describes which data to fetch from the database.
The idea behind an SQL injection is to maliciously modify the statement, either 
to extract additional information from the database or to modify the behaviour of an 
application, e.g. to bypass a login screen. We elaborate on the latter.
Table 2.1 A table in an SQL database that is used by an application vulnerable to SQL injections
id email password last_active
1 john@example.com 3858f62230ac3c915f300c664312c63f 2018-09-01
2 jane@example.com 96948aad3fcae80c08a35c9b5958cd89 2018-10-14
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We consider the program shown in Fig. 2.4, which implements a login form in 
PHP, a programming language often used for web applications.
Line 2 reads the e-mail address from the user input in the browser, while line 3 
reads the user’s password. Additionally, line 3 applies a hash function to the entered 
password to compare it against the value stored in the database later on. This avoids 
storing the password in clear text, which is considered bad practice. Lines 4–7 con-
struct an SQL statement. There are different types of SQL statements; the most com-
mon ones are SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT and DELETE.  Our statement selects 
certain data from the database; hence it starts with a SELECT followed by the col-
umns we are interested in, namely ‘id’ and ‘last_active’. However, the database sys-
tem still needs to know which table we want to query, since multiple tables might use 
the same column names, e.g. ‘id’ to store a unique identifier for every record. 
Therefore, we use the FROM keyword to specify the table we are interested; in our 
case: ‘users’. Now that the database system is aware of the table and its columns we 
wish to receive, we can apply a filter to fetch only a subset of all rows in the table. The 
WHERE condition on line 6 performs filtering: we state that we are only interested in 
rows which match the entered e-mail address and the provided password. Since e-mail 
addresses are unique, a correct input on the login form (consisting of e-mail address 
and password) will fetch exactly one row from the database, e.g. issuing the following 
SQL statement: SELECT id, last_active FROM users WHERE email = 'john@exam-
ple.com' AND password = '38...3f'. The SQL statement is sent to the database system 
on line 7, while line 8 checks if exactly one row is returned. If that is the case, we 
execute lines 9 and 10 to read the result from the database and display the value stored 
in the id column of the row that matches the user’s e-mail and password.
While this implementation of the login form works well for non-malicious inputs, 
it is prone to SQL injections and allows an adversary to bypass the login. In line 6, 
the application passes user input to an SQL statement without sanitising it first. We 
assume an adversary would enter some arbitrary password ‘abc’ into the password 
field and write the following into the e-mail address field in the login form:














$email = $ _ POST['email'];
$pw = hash _ password($ _ POST['password']);
$query = "SELECT id, last _ active
FROM users
WHERE email = '$email' AND password = '$pw'";
$resource = $db->query($query);
if($resource->numRows() == 1) {
    $user = $resource->fetchRow();
echo "User logged in. ID: ", $user['id' ];
}
?>
Fig. 2.4 Login source code fragment of a PHP program that is vulnerable to SQL injections
2 Basic Concepts and Models of Cybersecurity
32
This will result in a valid SQL statement, which the application sends to the data-
base system: SELECT id, last_active FROM users WHERE email = " OR 1 = 1 
LIMIT 1 -- ' AND password =  'abc'. We briefly discuss why this SQL statement 
results in a successful login without knowing a password. Compared to the benign 
SQL statement, the adversary alters the WHERE condition and adds an additional 
LIMIT keyword. In SQL, two dashes followed by a space (-- ) start a comment 
which will be ignored by the database system. Hence, our condition only reads 
WHERE email =" OR 1 = 1 and is followed by LIMIT 1. The condition is true if the 
e-mail is empty (which is never the case) or if 1 is equal to 1 (which is always the 
case). Consequently, the condition matches all rows. However, the code checks in 
line 8 whether the database has returned exactly one row. Hence, the adversary adds 
a LIMIT 1 clause to ask the database system to return only the first row matching 
the condition. Thus, the check on line 8 passes and line 9 receives a valid row from 
the ‘users’ table. The adversary has successfully bypassed the login without know-
ing a password or e-mail address. More critically, an adversary could use the same 
SQL injection vulnerability to steal the whole database content, using a UNION 
SELECT statement.
SQL injections can be prevented by using prepared statements, which address 
the underlying problem of SQL injections: confusion of data and code. In our exam-
ple above, the e-mail address field should have been treated as data. Prepared state-
ments explicitly separate data from code, making SQL injections impossible. To 
this end, the SQL statements contain placeholders rather than the actual data. The 
pieces of data that are inserted instead of the placeholders are sent separately to the 
database. The source code in Fig. 2.5 illustrates prepared statements.
Line 2–4 create a prepared statement ‘stmt’ using questions marks (‘?’) as place-
holders for data. On line 5, actual values are assigned to the question marks (declar-
ing them as two strings). After that the query is executed on line 6. The data will be 
used by the database system in the places marked with the placeholders.
In real-world applications, SQL injections appear especially when SQL state-
ments are constructed dynamically, e.g. when conditions are added and removed 
based on the users’ input. Since SQL injections are easily avoidable, their occur-










"SELECT id, last _ active FROM users
     WHERE email = ? AND password = ?")
$stmt->bind _ param("ss", $email, $password);
$result = $stmt->execute();
?>
Fig. 2.5 PHP code with a prepared statement to protect against SQL injection attacks
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2.6.3  Finding and Handling Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities can be found in applications using different methods; they may be 
kept secret or reported to vendors, either publicly or privately. Vendors respond in 
different ways to those reports and differ in their approaches to addressing the issue. 
Besides fixing known vulnerabilities, vendors can take preventive measures to avoid 
vulnerabilities in the first place or apply defence-in-depth techniques for mitigation. 
We elaborate on these aspects, beginning with how to find vulnerabilities and con-
cluding on techniques for prevention and mitigation.
As seen in the previous case studies, vulnerabilities can be found by carefully 
reading the source code. This method is called a code audit and is typically per-
formed by trained security auditors. Security auditors may use tools for assistance. 
Those tools highlight source code locations that potentially contain a vulnerability. 
However, false positives are quite common. These locations are reported to contain 
a vulnerability, although they are fine.
Furthermore, there are plenty of false negatives because it is not possible to 
detect all vulnerabilities automatically. Firstly, code audit tools apply heuristics, i.e. 
approximations of how the source code may behave; they are only as good as their 
heuristics are. Secondly, complete reasoning about the source code would be equiv-
alent to deciding the halting problem,1 which is known to be impossible (Chess and 
McGraw 2004). Therefore, complete reasoning is not possible. Thirdly, identifying 
security-related logic bugs—i.e. bugs that are highly specific to the concrete behav-
iour of an application—require a machine-readable specification of the applica-
tion’s behaviour, which in most cases does not exist. Moreover, a specification does 
not necessarily cover the human intent, thus being erroneous itself. Consequently, 
tools can never replace a security auditor in a code audit.
Performing a code audit requires access to the source code of an application. 
Unless an application is open source software, the source code is typically not avail-
able to external auditors, who analyse an application without being instructed by the 
vendor. In this case, auditors have to perform reverse engineering, i.e. understand 
the application’s machine code, which is intended to be run by a computer and not 
easily understandable for humans. Even with tool support, it is impossible to recover 
the source code completely. Despite these hurdles, many vulnerabilities are found 
with reverse-engineering techniques.
1 The halting problem asks an abstract machine model, the Turing machine, to decide whether a 
computer program terminates (halts) on a given input or runs forever. It is undecidable, i.e. it can-
not be answered for all computer programs and inputs, despite the fact that there is a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answer for every program and input. The Church-Turing thesis states that what humans and Turing 
machines can compute is equivalent. Given this thesis, humankind cannot answer all questions for 
which there are answers; even with unlimited computational resources (Sipser 2012).
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A third technique is fuzzing. Fuzzing feeds millions of different random inputs 
to an application and checks for unintended behaviour such as crashes. A crash is a 
good indicator of the existence of a vulnerability. Inputs that lead to crashes are then 
stored for later analysis. To generate those inputs, a fuzzer modifies existing inputs 
and observes which parts of an application are executed given the modified input. 
To increase the likelihood of a crash, the fuzzer tries to execute all parts of an appli-
cation. The motivation behind this method is to find parts that are usually not exe-
cuted on expected user inputs and are therefore untested for (security) bugs. Fuzzing 
has proven surprisingly effective: for instance, a fuzzer found several vulnerabilities 
in the popular OpenVPN software even after two code audits had already been per-
formed (Vranken 2017).
After a vulnerability is found, the security auditor may decide to keep it secret or 
to report it. Motivations for keeping a vulnerability secret include planned criminal 
actions, espionage by secret services, and accessing a suspect’s device by law 
enforcement. In all those cases, it is likely that an exploit is developed to make use 
of the vulnerability. A vendor cannot fix a vulnerability as long as he is not aware of 
it. Thus, unreported vulnerabilities often stay unfixed for a long time. Vulnerabilities 
without a fix are called ‘zero days’ or ‘0-days’.
There are two approaches to the publication of vulnerabilities: full disclosure and 
responsible disclosure. In full disclosure, the vulnerability is disclosed in public, 
without notifying the vendor in advance. Advocates of full disclosure argue that all 
users of a vulnerable software should have the same information regarding the vul-
nerability to be able to assess their risks and take appropriate countermeasures until 
a fix is released. They accept the risk that adversaries may use the information to 
develop an exploit and target the users of the vulnerable software. Furthermore, 
proponents of full disclosure argue that full disclosure puts more pressure on the 
vendor to faster create and ship a fix and to care more about security in the first 
place.
In contrast to full disclosure, responsible disclosure (sometimes also called coor-
dinated disclosure) mandates informing the vendor first, usually granting it a spe-
cific timeframe to release a fix before going public. The length of this embargo is a 
trade-off between putting pressure on the vendor and giving the vendor the oppor-
tunity to investigate the issue thoroughly, including extensive testing of the fix. A 
typical value is 90 days. Vendors may ask for an extension of the embargo. However, 
it is at the discretion of the finder to grant it. For instance, there has been a high- 
profile case in which security researchers working at Google have not granted 
Microsoft an extension (Tung 2018).
Responsible disclosure is not without flaws. Some software is distributed by dif-
ferent organisations that may release a fix at different times. This is the case for 
Linux distributions that contain thousands of different software packages. A fix 
released by one Linux distribution can provide information about the vulnerability, 
which can then be used by adversaries to attack users of other Linux distributions 
that have not released a fix yet. Furthermore, the more people are involved with 
developing and distributing a fix, the more likely it is that information about the 
vulnerability leaks before a fix is shipped.
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Vendors should follow established best practices for adequate handling of vul-
nerabilities (see also Chap. 15). Firstly, they should provide a dedicated security 
contact on their website to ensure that vulnerability reports reach the right group 
within an organisation. Otherwise, support staff who are not educated in reading 
technical security reports might ignore those reports due to misunderstandings. In 
addition, it is recommended to provide a public key (cf. Sect. 2.4.3) for exchanging 
encrypted mails with the security contact, e.g. using OpenPGP. Secondly, the ven-
dor should acknowledge the receipt of a vulnerability report and after investigating 
the issue, confirm the problem (if it is valid). Thirdly, the vendor is expected to sug-
gest a schedule for a coordinated release of a fix and the report. Guidelines and 
detailed recommendations have been published by Householder et al. (2017).
Vulnerability finders invest their time to make users of the vendor’s software 
more secure. Legal threats as a response to a report are considered immoral and may 
result in a Streisand effect, i.e. trying to hide or censor some information has the 
effect of unintentionally distributing the information more widely. Today, this often 
occurs through social media and results in negative publicity for the software 
vendor.
Instead of legal threats, the security community encourages vendors to be trans-
parent about security problems in their products. Moreover, vendors should provide 
as much information as possible to allow their users to accurately assess any risks 
they may be exposed to. Quickly providing a fix is considered best practice. Besides, 
some vendors offer a bug bounty program, which provides vulnerability reporters 
with monetary compensation.
2.7  Threats and Solutions in Network Security
Many systems are interconnected over networks. This increases their exposure. In 
the following, we consider selected threats to networked systems.
2.7.1  Case Study: Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance of the target is an essential part of sophisticated attacks. Networked 
systems provide a significant amount of information that can be used to launch 
attacks that are tailored to the environment of the victim and thus more likely to 
succeed.
Attackers benefit from the fact that the Internet has been designed to be an open 
network. For instance, information about network operators is publicly available so 
that system administrators of different parts of the world can communicate with 
each other in case of problems. This kind of information can be looked up with the 
so-called ‘whois service’, a distributed database that holds contact information 
about anyone who has leased IP addresses or domain names. Given some seed 
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information such as an IP address (e.g. 141.13.240.24) or a domain name (e.g. 
www.uni-bamberg.de) of a target, the whois service helps attackers finding other 
and related systems run by the same organisation. Moreover, whois ‘leaks’ names 
and contact information of employees, which can be useful for social engineering.
Some of the information shared via whois is considered personal data and there-
fore protected under the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union. 
As a result, the German registrar DENIC stopped unrestricted access to contact 
information for all ‘.de’ domains in 2018 (DENIC eG 2018). This move consider-
ably increases the effort for system administrators that want to contact domain own-
ers to resolve problems (Winterfeldt 2018).
Whois is not the only system that leaks information. For instance, attackers can 
use the Domain Name System, which is a distributed database that maps domain 
names such as example.com to IP addresses. Many administrators assign telling 
names to their servers that help attackers understand the purpose of a system. 
Reverse DNS lookups allow attackers to look up these hostnames (e.g. webmail05.
example.net) given the IP address of a system of interest.
Moreover, attackers can exploit two relatively new systems that aim to increase 
transparency, but come with an inherent security trade-off, namely Certificate 
Transparency (cf. Sect. 2.4.4) and Passive DNS. These systems have been created to 
mitigate particular security problems. However, they have the side effect of leaking 
sensitive information to attackers. Certificate Transparency creates transparency 
about all TLS certificates that are registered. Passive DNS services make available 
all domain names that are looked up by a group of DNS clients. Both services leak 
the hostnames of internal systems, helping attackers find potential targets.
Finally, attackers use port scanners to enumerate all publicly reachable hosts and 
services. With tools such as nmap, attackers can obtain a list of open ports and addi-
tional information such as the software that might be offering the ports as well as the 
operating system. If system administrators of a target have been careless or negli-
gent, they might have forgotten to set up strict firewall rules (cf. Sect. 2.7.2) that 
prohibit unauthorised connection attempts to sensitive services from the outside. 
Although port scans are not harmful on their own, they certainly help to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of attacks.
A relatively new development is that attackers do not necessarily have to use a 
port scanner themselves. For an initial sweep of a target, attackers can also rely on 
the information provided by services such as shodan.io and censys.io. These two 
services continuously scan (a large part of) the Internet and make the results avail-
able on their website via a convenient full-text search engine. Their actual purpose 
is to help system administrators secure their networks by simplifying continuous 
monitoring. However, they also help attackers find improperly secured systems 
without having to send a single packet to a target. This dilemma makes shodan.io an 
interesting tool for creating awareness about vulnerable industrial control systems 
that are insufficiently protected (cf., e.g. Gallagher 2018).
D. Herrmann and H. Pridöhl
37
2.7.2  Case Study: Perimeter Security Via Firewalls
Firewalls are systems that are deployed to restrict the access to services on the net-
work layer. These services are either internal services that should not be available 
from outside an organisation’s network or services on the Internet that should not be 
accessed by the employees of an organisation.
On the network, information is sent in packets. Each packet consists of a header 
and a payload. The payload contains the data that is being sent. The header contains 
information about the sender, the receiver, and the so-called ports being used. 
Services listen on particular ports (identified by a number between 1 and 65535). A 
packet is delivered to a service, if the port number stated in the packet corresponds 
to the port number of the service.
Most firewalls filter packets solely based on their header. To allow only access to 
specific services, a system administrator can configure a firewall to drop all packets 
that do not match a list of specific port numbers. The underlying assumption behind 
such firewall rules is that particular services listen on specific ports, e.g. web servers 
listen on port 443 (the default port for HTTPS, cf. Sect. 2.4.4) for encrypted com-
munication. However, this assumption does not hold necessarily, since services can 
be reconfigured to listen on arbitrary ports.
Thus, firewalls can be bypassed using ports that are commonly allowed in the 
firewall’s configuration, such as port 443. If users inside a corporate network want 
to access the Internet without any restrictions, they can run a tunnel service on a 
publicly reachable Internet server on port 443 and send their communication through 
this tunnel, which forwards it to the Internet, bypassing the firewall.
As a response to tunnel services, some firewalls check if the packets contain data 
for a specific service, e.g. they check if packets for port 443 actually contain HTTPS 
data. This technique is called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). It is an open debate 
whether DPI is an acceptable practice. Opponents of DPI argue by comparing pack-
ets to postal mail: the packet’s header is like the address data on the envelope and 
must be read by the postal service for delivery, while the packet’s payload is like the 
letter inside the envelope. DPI looks at the payload; therefore, it is like opening the 
envelope of every letter, thus violating postal privacy. It is noteworthy that even DPI 
cannot entirely prevent users bypassing a firewall. Thus, data exfiltration prevention 
is another cat-and-mouse game between attackers and defenders. For example, 
there are sophisticated tunnelling techniques, e.g. DNS tunnels such as iodine 
(Nussbaum et al. 2009), that trick DPI solutions by hiding the exchanged data within 
DNS messages (which are typically not restricted by firewalls).
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2.7.3  Case Study: Denial of Service Attacks
In a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, an adversary tries to occupy a massive amount 
of the victim’s resources. The goal is to deny these resources to legitimate users. 
Typical DoS attacks either create large amounts of traffic to fill up the victim’s com-
munication lines or exhaust the victim’s computational resources.
Adversaries can also instruct many machines to participate in an attack. This 
results in a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. To perform a DDoS attack, 
an adversary compromises thousands of machines. These machines then form a so- 
called botnet. One of the largest botnets for DDoS attacks, called Mirai, was built 
using insecure Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as routers and IP cameras. 
Users often employ these devices without knowing their security ramifications. 
Once deployed, IoT devices are often poorly maintained and seldomly receive any 
security updates. The Mirai botnet attacked KrebsOnSecurity, a blog maintained by 
the security journalist Brian Krebs, with a bandwidth of 620 GBit/s (Krebs 2016). 
For comparison, many commercial websites are only connected to the Internet with 
a bandwidth of 1 GBit/s.
One particularly intriguing type of DoS attacks are amplification attacks. In an 
amplification attack, an adversary uses a third party, e.g. a DNS server, to perform 
the attack. The DNS server responds to a small request sent by the adversary with a 
large answer. To attack a victim, the adversary spoofs his sender address, setting it 
to the address of the victim. Consequently, the DNS server receives the small request 
from the adversary and sends a large response to the victim. Thus, the adversary’s 
DoS traffic is amplified by the DNS server. Spoofing the sender address is possible 
because Internet Service Providers do not filter the traffic of their customers 
properly.
DoS attacks are made possible because of externality effects. Firstly, vendors of 
cheap IoT devices have no incentive to provide security updates for the whole life-
time of a product. Secondly, there is virtually no reason for Internet service provid-
ers to check for address spoofing. In both cases, there is a party that is passively 
responsible but does not bear the costs of attacks. To improve the state of affairs, 
vendors and service providers have to be externally incentivised, for instance, 
through legal regimes.
Often, attackers use DoS attacks to force victims into paying ransoms. Online 
shops lose money when they are not reachable for their customers. Therefore, they 
will do almost anything to stop an ongoing DoS as quickly as possible. Defending 
against DoS attacks is difficult for server operators in practice. After all, the defender 
must provision more resources than the attacker can consume, which is quite costly. 
Therefore, there is now a market for DoS protection. Companies in this market pro-
vide large amounts of resources and filter their customer’s traffic for DoS attacks. 
Legitimate traffic is forwarded to the customer, while DoS traffic is discarded.
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2.7.4  Case Study: Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) such as Snort try to detect attacks on 
the network layer. They look into the packets that arrive over the network and decide 
whether the communication associated with the packets might be an attack. There 
are two different types of NIDS: signature-based and anomaly-based.
Signature-based NIDS can only detect attacks that are already known. They rely 
on a database of signatures to identify attacks. A signature describes the content of 
network packets that can be observed during a specific attack; for instance, there is 
one signature for the Heartbleed attack (http://heartbleed.com) as well as one signa-
ture for the Shellshock attack (Seltzer 2014). Thus, to detect current threats, the 
database of a NIDS must be updated on a regular basis.
In contrast, an anomaly-based NIDS analyses network communication patterns 
within a network. After the NIDS has learned what ‘normal’ communication pat-
terns look like, the NIDS tries to detect deviations. Those anomalies are then con-
sidered to be attacks or at least unwanted behaviour. Whereas anomaly-based NIDS 
have the advantage that there is no database to maintain, they rely on the question-
able assumption that there was no malicious activity during training. Moreover, 
whenever the communication patterns on the network change, e.g. because new 
software is introduced, the NIDS has to be retrained.
Neither signature-based nor anomaly-based NIDS can detect all threats. Their 
information is limited to network communication. They have no information about 
the inner workings of the software used on the network. For instance, communica-
tion exploiting logic bugs can be difficult or impossible to distinguish from benign 
communication.
Furthermore, network communication is increasingly encrypted. Encrypted traf-
fic cannot be analysed by NIDS. This limitation can be overcome by allowing the 
NIDS to intercept all encrypted traffic by adding its certificate to the root certificate 
store on all clients. This approach, which is called TLS interception, is a very intru-
sive form of Deep Packet Inspection (cf. Sect. 2.7.2). TLS interception has been 
called into question, because it allows the administrators of the NIDS to eavesdrop 
on all encrypted communication. Moreover, TLS interception often decreases the 
actual security of encrypted communications (Waked et al. 2018).
The evaluation of the accuracy of a NIDS is not straightforward. We have to 
consider four metrics: the true positive rate (attacks that are detected), the false 
negative rate (attacks that are not detected), the false positive rate (benign commu-
nication wrongly flagged as an attack) and the true negative rate (benign communi-
cation not flagged as attack).
Even very accurate NIDS generate many false positives (false alarms) because 
malicious traffic is much more seldom than ‘normal’ traffic. This is known as the 
base rate fallacy (Axelsson 1999). Assume that 1 out of every 100,000 packets has 
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a malicious payload (this is the base rate). Further assume that a hypothetical NIDS 
has an accuracy of 99.9%, which refers to the true positive rate and to the true nega-
tive rate, which are equal here. Most of the very few malicious packets will be clas-
sified correctly. However, during the reception of the 99,999 benign packets, the 
NIDS will generate about 100 false alarms. In other words: the operators of this 
hypothetical NIDS have to handle 100 times more false alarms than malicious pay-
loads. The imbalance between false alarms and real alarms is not a theoretical prob-
lem, it is one of the most pressing issues in practical NIDS.
2.8  Continuous Testing
Properly securing a system means that defenders have to perform regular checks. 
After all, every change to the infrastructure, every update for a software package 
and every change in operational procedures may introduce vulnerabilities.
As described in Sect. 2.6.3, code audits can be used to detect vulnerabilities in 
software. Finding vulnerabilities in distributed systems is more involving. Common 
practices consist in running security scanners and performing penetration tests.
Security scanners such as Nessus and OpenVAS allow system operators to check 
their infrastructure for a wide array of known vulnerabilities by probing all devices 
within a defined address range. The specifics that determine how a scanner checks 
for a particular vulnerability are provided by the vendors of such scanners.
Whereas security scanners are typically set up by the operators of a system, pen-
etration tests are usually conducted by specialised firms. Penetration tests are useful 
because they simulate a real attack. Among other things, they allow organisations to 
understand whether previously launched awareness campaigns on social engineer-
ing were effective and whether operators react sensibly when under pressure.
Many penetration testers use a toolkit called Metasploit (metasploit.com), which 
makes it possible to validate whether a particular vulnerability can be exploited—by 
actually exploiting it and launching a selectable payload. From an ethical perspec-
tive, Metasploit is interesting because it encapsulates exploits in ready-to-run pack-
ages, which eases the job of security analysts. Sharing exploit code is considered 
essential to improve security. However, in former times when exploits were shared 
on mailing lists, it was regarded as good practice to intentionally modify the code so 
that script kiddies would not be able to execute it. Metasploit has broken with this 
tradition, lowering the bar considerably.
Given its potential for damage, it is not surprising that there have been attempts 
to regulate the distribution of dual-use tools such as Metasploit (Schneier 2007; 
Hulme 2012). However, such a policy is mostly ineffective. Attackers will always 
find ways to get access to such tools. Moreover, restrictions make it difficult to use 
offensive tools for educational purposes, which would decrease the competence of 
the defenders in the long run.
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2.9  Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the basic concepts and models of cybersecurity. Given 
the complexity of this field, there are many directions for further exploration. 
Nonetheless, even the basics presented in this chapter raise several ethical 
questions.
First, ethical issues are relevant for cybersecurity professionals, i.e. on the level 
of individuals. Security analysts may have to decide how they should deal with a 
newly discovered vulnerability. Should they only disclose it to the responsible ven-
dor or also inform the public? If they decide to publish it, which details should be 
made available before the vulnerability is fixed? On the one hand, publishing too 
much or too early might cause significant harm. On the other hand, keeping the 
vulnerability secret prevents users of the vulnerable product from taking action on 
their own, and it decreases the vendor’s incentive to actually ship a fix in a timely 
manner. This is only one example where the actual outcomes of various alternatives 
are difficult to predict, which is why there is no consensus about vulnerability dis-
closure in the community (more in Chaps. 3 and 4).
Ethical issues are also encountered on an organisational level. Most organisa-
tions struggle with finding a justifiable balance between investing in security and 
accepting the remaining risks. Security cannot be bought from the shelf because 
organisations have different needs. Moreover, effective security relies on humans—
and humans tend to act (or fail) in surprising ways. Organisations may also be 
inclined to exploit power asymmetries that allow them to externalise their costs by 
transferring risks to users or other unrelated parties.
Finally, ethical issues also arise on an architectural level. It is challenging to 
predict how a new system or security mechanism will be used. This is particularly 
an issue for dual-use tools whose impact on security depends on the intentions of 
the actor. Another example is Certificate Transparency, which has been designed to 
solve a particular security issue. However, it can also be misused for reconnais-
sance. Of course, this kind of exploitation was foreseeable for experts, but it still 
startles system administrators whose internal hosts are now exposed in a public 
database. Building useful systems with limited misuse potential is a challenging 
problem for which we do not yet have readily available solutions.
Tackling ethical questions in the field of cybersecurity is difficult due to its very 
nature: We usually have to make decisions based on insufficient information. We 
often do not fully understand the consequences of turning a particular lever and 
systems exhibit surprising (emergent) behaviour once users (and creative adversar-
ies) lay their hands on them. In rare cases, we may be able to collect some facts (e.g. 
by studying past events); however, it is questionable whether these are still appli-
cable. After all, cybersecurity is an endless cat-and-mouse game with constantly 
changing rules.
Acknowledgements The chapter was created with funding from the European Commission 
(H2020-700540 CANVAS). The authors are grateful to Stephanie Loreck and Oleg Geier for 
comments on a draft of this chapter.
2 Basic Concepts and Models of Cybersecurity
42
References
Amir W (2017) CCleaner backdoor attack: a state-sponsored espionage campaign. https://www.
hackread.com/ccleaner-backdoor-attack-a-state-sponsored-espionage-campaign/. Last access 
7 July 2019
Anderson JP (1972) Information security in a multi-user computer environment. Adv Comput 
12:1–36
Anthony S (2017a) It might be time to stop using antivirus. https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/01/antivirus-is-bad/. Last access 7 July 2019
Anthony S (2017b) Massive vulnerability in Windows Defender leaves most Windows PCs vul-
nerable. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/windows-defender-nscript-
remote-vulnerability/. Last access 7 July 2019
Axelsson S (1999) The base-rate fallacy and its implications for the difficulty of intrusion detec-
tion. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on computer and communications security, 
CCS ’99. ACM, New York, pp 1–7
Buchanan E, Roemer R, Shacham H et al (2008) When good instructions go bad: generalizing 
return-oriented programming to RISC. In: Ning P, Syverson PF, Jha S (eds) Proceedings of 
the 2008 ACM conference on computer and communications security, CCS 2008, Alexandria, 
Virginia, USA, October 27–31, 2008, ACM New York, pp 27–38
Chan CS (2012) Complexity the worst enemy of security. https://www.schneier.com/news/
archives/2012/12/complexity_the_worst.html. Last access 7 July 2019
Chess B, McGraw G (2004) Static analysis for security. Secur Priv 2(6):76–79
Cimpanu C (2017) E-mail provider shuts down Petya Inbox Preventing Victims from re-covering 
files. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/email-provider-shuts-down-petya-
inbox-preventing-victims-from-recovering-files/. Last access 7 July 2019
Cimpanu C (2018) Popular Android Apps vulnerable to man-in-the-disk attacks. https://www.
bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/popular-android-apps-vulnerable-to-man-in-the-disk-
attacks/. Last access 7 July 2019
DENIC eG (2018) Extensive changes planned for DENIC Whois domain query: proactive approach 
for data economy and data protection. https://www.denic.de/en/whats-new/press-releases/
article/extensive-innovations-planned-for-denic-whois-domain-query-proactive-approach-
for-data-economy-and/. Last access 7 July 2019
Dittrich D (2012) So You Want to Take Over a Botnet… In: Kirda E (ed) 5th USENIX workshop 
on large-scale exploits and emergent threats, LEET ’12, San Jose, CA, USA, April 24, 2012 
Berkeley USENIX Association. https://www.usenix.org/conference/leet12. Last access 7 July 
2019
Electronic Frontier Foundation (2018) HTTPS everywhere. https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere. 
Last access 7 July 2019
Engel G (2014) Deconstructing The Cyber Kill Chain. https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-
breaches/deconstructing-the-cyber-kill-chain/a/d-id/1317542. Last access 7 July 2019
Erickson J (2008) Hacking: the art of exploitation, 2nd edn. No Starch Press, San Francisco
Fielding R, Reschke J (2014) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): message syntax and rout-
ing. Request for comments, RFC 7230. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230. Last access 7 July 
2019
Francillon A, Danev B, Capkun S (2011) Relay attacks on passive keyless entry and start systems 
in modern cars. In: Network distributed system security. The Internet Society, NDSS, Reston
Gallagher S (2018) Vulnerable industrial controls directly connected to Internet? Why not?. https://
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/01/the-internet-of-omg-vulnerable-factory-
and-power-grid-controls-on-internet/. Last access 7 July 2019
Gollmann D (2011) Computer security, 3rd edn. Wiley, Chichester
Greenberg A (2017) Just a pair of these $11 radio gadgets can steal a car. https://www.wired.
com/2017/04/just-pair-11-radio-gadgets-can-steal-car/. Last access 7 July 2019
Hodges J, Jackson C, Barth A (2012) HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). Request for com-
ments, RFC 6797. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797. Last access 7 July 2019
D. Herrmann and H. Pridöhl
43
Householder AD, Wassermann G, Manion A et al (2017) The CERT® guide to coordinated vulner-
ability disclosure. Special report CMU/SEI-2017-SR-022, Carnegie Mellon University, CERT 
Division
Hulme GV (2012) Metasploit review: ten years later, are we any more secure? https://searchse-
curity.techtarget.com/feature/Metasploit-Review-Ten-Years-Later-Are-We-Any-More-Secure. 
Last access 7 July 2019
Hutchins EM, Cloppert MJ, Amin RM (2011) Intelligence-driven computer network defence 
informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and intrusion kill chains. Lead Issue Inf Warf 
Secur Res 1:80
Korolov M (2018) What is a supply chain attack? Why you should be wary of third-party provid-
ers. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3191947/data-breach/what-is-a-supply-chain-attack-
why-you-should-be-wary-of-third-party-providers.html. Last access 7 July 2019
Krebs B (2016) KrebsOnSecurity hit with record DDoS. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/
krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/. Last access 7 July 2019
Langner R (2013) To kill a centrifuge: a technical analysis of what Stuxnet’s creators tried to 
achieve. https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf. Last 
access 7 July 2019
Larsen P, Sadeghi AR (eds) (2018) The continuing arms race: code-reuse attacks and defences. 
Association for Computing Machinery and Morgan & Claypool, New York
Laurie B (2014) Certificate transparency. Queue 12(8):10:10–10:19
Laurie B, Langley A, Kasper E (2013) Certificate transparency. Request for comments, RFC 6962. 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962. Last access 7 July 7 2019
Marlinspike M (2011) sslstrip. https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/. Last access 7 July 2019
McConnell S (2004) Code complete: a practical handbook of software construction, 2nd edn. 
Microsoft Press, Redmond
Moore D, Paxson V, Savage S et al (2003) Inside the Slammer Worm. IEEE Secur Priv 1(4):33–39
Nichols S (2015) You’ve been Drudged! Malware-squirting ads appear on websites with 100+ mil-
lion visitors. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/14/malvertising_expands_drudge/. Last 
access 7 July 2019
Nussbaum L, Neyron P, Richard O (2009) On robust covert channels inside DNS. In: Gritzalis D, 
López J (eds) Emerging challenges for security, privacy and trust, 24th IFIP TC 11 international 
information security conference, SEC 2009, Pafos, Cyprus, May 18–20, 2009. Proceedings, 
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol 297. Springer, Berlin/New 
York, pp 51–62
Pfleeger CP, Pfleeger SL, Margulies J (2015) Security in computing, 5th edn. Prentice Hall Press, 
Upper Saddle River
Rescorla E (2018) The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3. Request for com-
ments, RFC 8446. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446. Last access 7 July 2019
Saltzer JH, Schroeder MD (1975) The protection of information in computer systems. Proc IEEE 
63(9):1278–1308
Schmidle N (2018) The digital vigilantes who hack back. https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2018/05/07/the-digital-vigilantes-who-hack-back. Last access 7 July 2019
Schneier B (2007) New German hacking law. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/08/
new_german_hack.html. Last access 7 July 2019
Seals T (2018) Bluetooth bug allows man-in-the-middle attacks on phones, laptops. https://threat-
post.com/bluetooth-bug-allows-man-in-the-middle-attacks-on-phones-laptops/134332/. Last 
access 7 July 2019
Seltzer L (2014) Shellshock makes Heartbleed look insignificant. https://www.zdnet.com/article/
shellshock-makes-heartbleed-look-insignificant/. Last access 7 July 2019
Sheridan K (2018) The cyber kill chain gets a makeover. https://www.darkreading.com/threat-
intelligence/the-cyber-kill-chain-gets-a-makeover/d/d-id/1332892. Last access 7 July 2019
Shirey R (2007) Internet security glossary, Version 2. Request for comments, RFC 4949. https://
tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949. Last access 7 July 2019
Shostack A (2014) Threat modeling: designing for security, 1st edn. Wiley, Indianapolis
Sipser M (2012) Introduction to the theory of computation, 3rd. Cengage Learning, Boston
2 Basic Concepts and Models of Cybersecurity
44
Smith R (2012) A contemporary look at Saltzer and Schroeder’s 1975 design principles. IEEE 
Secur Priv 10(6):20–25
Souppaya M, Scarfone K (2013) Guide to malware incident prevention and handling for desktops 
and laptops. NIST Special Publication SP Gaithersburg 800–883
Spitzner L (2002) Honeypots: tracking hackers. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., 
Boston
Spring T (2017) ExPetr called a Wiper Attack, not Ransomware. https://threatpost.com/expetr-
called-a-wiper-attack-not-ransomware/126614/. Last access 7 July 2019
Stallings W, Brown L (2014) Computer security: principles and practice, 3rd edn. Prentice Hall 
Press, Upper Saddle River
Stuttard D, Pinto M (2011) The web application Hacker’s handbook: finding and exploiting secu-
rity flaws, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York
Tung L (2018) Google’s Project Zero exposes unpatched Windows 10 lockdown bypass. https://
www.zdnet.com/article/googles-project-zero-reveals-windows-10-lockdown-bypass/. Last 
access 7 July 2019
Voydock VL, Kent ST (1983) Security mechanisms in high-level network protocols. ACM Comput 
Surv 15(2):135–171
Vranken G (2017) The OpenVPN post-audit bug bonanza. https://guidovranken.com/2017/06/21/
the-openvpn-post-audit-bug-bonanza/. Last access 7 July 2019
Waked L, Mannan M, Youssef A (2018) To intercept or not to intercept: analyzing TLS intercep-
tion in network appliances. In: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia conference on computer and 
communications security, ASIACCS, vol 18. ACM, New York, pp 399–412
Walker J (2018) Cybersecurity company hit by man-in-the-middle attack. http://www.digitaljour-
nal.com/tech-and-science/technology/cybersecurity-company-hit-by-man-in-the-middle-
attack/article/510402. Last access 7 July 2019
Wheeler T (2018) In cyberwar, there are no rules. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/in-cyber-
war-there-are-no-rules-cybersecurity-war-defence/. Last access 7 July 2019
Winterfeldt B (2018) The fight is on to save access to WHOIS: a call to action for brand own-
ers. http://www.circleid.com/posts/20180419_fight_is_on_to_save_access_to_whois_call_to_
action_brand_owners/. Last access 7 July 2019
Zetter K (2016) Inside the cunning, unprecedented hack of Ukraine’s power grid. https://www.
wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. Last access 7 
July 2019
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
D. Herrmann and H. Pridöhl
45© The Author(s) 2020
M. Christen et al. (eds.), The Ethics of Cybersecurity, The International Library 
of Ethics, Law and Technology 21, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29053-5_3
Chapter 3
Core Values and Value Conflicts 
in Cybersecurity: Beyond Privacy Versus 
Security
Ibo van de Poel
Abstract This chapter analyses some of the main values, and values conflicts, in 
relation to cybersecurity by distinguishing four important value clusters that should 
be considered when deciding on cybersecurity measures. These clusters are secu-
rity, privacy, fairness and accountability. Each cluster consists of a range of further 
values, which can be viewed as articulating specific moral reasons relevant when 
devising cybersecurity measures. In addition to the four value clusters, domain- 
specific values that are served by computer systems, such as health, are important. 
Following a detailed discussion of the four relevant value clusters, potential value 
conflicts and value tensions are considered. The relationships of five pairs of values 
(privacy-security, privacy-fairness, privacy-accountability, security-accountability 
and security-fairness) are analysed in terms of whether they are largely supportive 
or conflicting. In addition, possible methods for addressing these potential value 
conflicts are discussed. It is concluded that values, and value conflicts, in cyberse-
curity should be considered in context, also taking into account the specific com-
puter systems at play, to enable the use of nuanced and fine-grained methods for 
addressing the relevant value conflicts.
Keywords Accountability · Fairness · Privacy · Security · Value conflict · Values
3.1  Introduction
Moral dilemmas in cybersecurity are often framed in terms of privacy versus secu-
rity. If we want to avoid illegal access to ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) systems through hacks, cybercrime or cyberwarfare, we need to be 
willing to accept the monitoring of Internet traffic and hence give up (some) privacy, 
so the suggestion goes. Although we may indeed sometimes be confronted with 
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such dilemmas, the privacy versus security tension, as a general framing of moral 
issues in cybersecurity, is too simplistic. Privacy and security are not always in con-
flict but are sometimes mutually reinforcing. Whether privacy and security are con-
flicting or supportive depends on the specific context or application being considered. 
Moreover, it depends on technical and design choices that can also be made differ-
ently so that the conflict can sometimes be designed out. The privacy versus security 
framing is also too simplistic in that it ignores the fact that a range of other values 
are at stake in cybersecurity.
The aim of the chapter is twofold. First, it sets out to develop a coherent and 
comprehensive account of the main values relevant to cybersecurity. This concerns 
both the values at stake when cybersecurity is somehow compromised as well as 
those values that should be considered when devising (technical or institutional) 
measures to maintain or increase cybersecurity. Second, the chapter aims to shed 
more light on value conflicts in cybersecurity and the possible methods for address-
ing such conflicts.
The chapter begins with a philosophical clarification of the notion of value. 
Values are understood as evaluative dimensions that can be used to evaluate the 
goodness of certain state-of-affairs. Different values thus correspond to different 
varieties of goodness. In addition, values are conceived as arising in response to 
certain morally problematic situations, or certain moral concerns. Therefore, they 
correspond to certain moral reasons (for or against certain actions). This under-
standing of values allows several value clusters to be discerned in relation to cyber-
security. A value cluster is here understood as a number of values which are a 
response to similar types of moral concerns and express similar moral reasons. It is 
argued that, in relation to cybersecurity, four values cluster can be discerned: secu-
rity, privacy, fairness and accountability.
After addressing these value clusters in more detail, the chapter discusses value 
conflicts. A value conflict is understood as a situation in which it is not possible to 
fully realise or respect a range of relevant values simultaneously. Value conflicts are 
thus practical conflicts, as opposed to values contradicting each other at a general or 
abstract level. Identifying value conflicts requires a consideration of the specific 
application or context. Moreover, whether values conflict depends on what is tech-
nically possible and what design choices have been made. I discuss some of the 
main value conflicts in cybersecurity and possible methods to address them.
3.2  Values and Value Clusters
3.2.1  What Are Values?
Although the notion of ‘value’ is generally used in philosophy and the social sci-
ences, there does not seem to be a generally accepted definition of what values are. 
In general, values are associated with what is good and desirable, and they are often 
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believed to provide people with a certain orientation for how to behave. Within this 
general characterisation, additional conceptions of values are possible.
In the social sciences, values are often associated with attitudes, preferences and 
interests, and are usually seen as subjective (Williams Jr. 1968; Rokeach 1973; 
Schwartz and Bilsky 1987). Here, I employ a more philosophical understanding of 
values, in which values are associated with what is good. So conceived, the notion 
of value can refer to what is good (ontology), or what we belief (epistemology) or 
express (semantics) to be good (Hirose and Olson 2015). Values help to evaluate 
certain state-of-affairs in terms of goodness, and different values can therefore be 
understood as varieties of goodness (von Wright 1963). For example, computer 
systems may be evaluated in terms of the values of privacy and cybersecurity, by 
which each constitute a different variety of the goodness of such systems.
Values belong to the evaluative domain of the normative, whereas norms and 
reasons belong to the deontic domain of the normative (Stocker 1990; Dancy 1993; 
Raz 1999). The evaluative refers to the normative evaluations we make of state-of- 
affairs or persons (in terms of goodness). Conversely, the deontic refers to the rea-
sons we have for doing certain things (or refraining from doing them) or to what we 
should do. The deontic is concerned with rightness (of actions) whereas the evalua-
tive is concerned with goodness (of state-of-affairs).
Since values are evaluative, they are not directly action guiding. Nevertheless, it 
is often believed that there is a correspondence between values and reasons (for 
action) of the following kind (cf. Scanlon 1998; Raz 1999):
V: If x is a value (or a valuable object) then one has reasons (of a certain kind) for a positive 
response (a pro-attitude or a pro-behaviour) towards x
For example, if cybersecurity is a value, we might have reason to increase it 
through technical and institutional measures; and if privacy is also a value, we might 
have reason to respect the privacy of computer users in devising such cybersecurity 
measures. Increasing and respecting are both positive responses.
Statement V is intended to be neutral with respect to the question of whether 
values ground reasons (as consequentialists typically believe) or reasons ground 
values (as deontologists typically hold) or that neither can be reduced to the other. 
As Dancy (2005) notes, whatever position one takes in this debate, something like 
statement V seems to be true.
It should be stressed that the above account of values does not assume conse-
quentialist ethics. Deontologists may also employ the notion of value, although val-
ues may have a different epistemological and ontological status for them than for 
consequentialists; for the former, values typically follow from reasons (and other 
deontic concepts such as norms) rather than the other way around (cf. Anderson 1993).
In this respect, it is also important to stress that the positive response mentioned 
in statement V can take another form than just increasing or maximising the value 
x. Consequentialists often believe not only that the goodness of the outcomes (con-
sequences) of actions determine the rightness of actions but also that right actions 
increase or even maximise the ‘amount’ of value or goodness. Although increasing 
or maximising a value can be termed a positive response (or a pro-behaviour), it is 
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certainly not the only possible positive response. Values can, for example, also be 
respected; and a valuable object can be admired. Respect and admiration are also 
positive responses, but they do not have the consequentialist overtone that increas-
ing or maximising value has.
What the appropriate positive response to a value (or a valuable object) is depends 
both on the value at stake as well on the specific context. For example, in some 
contexts, we might have reason to maximise privacy, whereas in other contexts it 
may be sufficient to respect a certain minimal amount of privacy. The proper 
response to a value in a specific context is often not prima facie obvious; it may 
require judgment and deliberation.
3.2.2  Value Clusters
If values are varieties of goodness, it seems natural to assume that there exists a 
plurality of values. Some philosophers have, nevertheless, maintained that there is 
one overarching value, such as human happiness or human dignity, to which all 
other values can be related or even reduced; a doctrine known as value monism. 
Here, I assume that the opposite thesis of value pluralism is true; i.e. there exists a 
variety of values which cannot be reduced to each other (Mason 2018).
A next question that arises is whether there is a limit to the number of values we 
can discern or whether it is in principle always possible to discern additional values. 
One reason to think that there is no limit to the number of values we can discern is 
that we can almost always make values more specific. For example, starting from 
the very general and abstract value of security, we can distinguish between indi-
vidual and collective security. Next, individual security can be further divided 
between, for example, physical and psychological individual security. This process 
can go on for quite a while. We might even want to argue that the value of security 
of person X is not exactly the same value as the security of person Y. In other words, 
if we zoom in on specific values, and on the specific contexts in which we use value 
terms, it seems we could almost endlessly discern more specific values.
My aim in this contribution is to discern and analyse the core values in cyberse-
curity. This is, by its nature, an exercise on a rather general and abstract level. The 
goal is to come to a set of general values that may require further specification when 
applying them in specific contexts but that nevertheless provide some insight into 
the moral concerns and problems that might arise in relation to cybersecurity. 
However, even at this general level, we might distinguish a large number of different 
values. For example, in the literature study we conducted for the CANVAS project1 
we found a large number of value terms in the domains of health, business and 
national security in relation to cybersecurity (Yaghmaei et al. 2017).
1 See https://canvas-project.eu/canvas/
I. van de Poel
49
To create more order in this multiplicity of relevant values, I propose introducing 
the notion of ‘value cluster’. A value cluster is a range of values that express some-
what similar moral concerns. In line with the above-proposed characterisation of 
values, values in a value cluster correspond to similar moral reasons for action, or to 
similar norms. Moreover, the values that are part of one value cluster are typically 
articulated in response to somewhat similar morally problematic situations. It 
should be stressed that I use the notion of value cluster here relative to a particular 
domain or societal activity. In this case, the domain is cybersecurity and the value 
clusters I distinguish are defined in relation to cybersecurity.
3.3  Value Clusters in Cybersecurity
A first value cluster in relation to cybersecurity is that of security. Security can be 
understood in a number of more specific ways, pinpointing different more specific 
values that are part of this cluster, such as individual security or national security. In 
this cluster, I also locate the value of cybersecurity and a range of values closely 
related, or instrumental, to cybersecurity such as information security, and the con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability of (computer) data. The main reasons to which 
this value cluster corresponds are the protection of humans and other valuable enti-
ties against all kinds of harm. The values in this cluster may be seen as a response 
to morally problematic situations in which harm is (potentially) done, ranging from 
data breaches and loss of data integrity to cybercrime and cyberwarfare.
A second relevant value cluster is privacy. This cluster contains, in addition to 
privacy, such values as moral autonomy, human dignity, identity, personhood, lib-
erty, anonymity and confidentiality. Values in this cluster correspond to reasons (and 
norms), for example we should treat others with dignity, we should respect people’s 
moral autonomy, we should not store or share personal data without people’s 
informed consent, and we should not use people (or data about them) as a means to 
an end. Typically morally problematic situations to which these values are a response 
include the secret collection of large amounts of personal data for cybersecurity 
purposes or the unauthorised transfer of personal data to a third party.
A third cluster is fairness. This consists of values such as justice, fairness, equal-
ity, accessibility, freedom from bias, non-discrimination, democracy and the protec-
tion of civil liberties. This cluster of values is a response to the fact that cybersecurity 
threats, or measures to avoid such threats, do not affect everyone equally, which 
may sometimes be morally unfair. Another type of moral problem is: These values 
are a response to the fact that cybersecurity threats, or measures to increase cyber-
security, may sometimes undermine democracy, or civil rights and liberties. 
Important moral reasons that correspond to this value cluster are that people should 
be treated fairly and equally, and that democratic and civil rights should be upheld.
The fourth and final value cluster I distinguish is that of accountability. Values in 
this cluster include transparency, openness and explainability. This value cluster is 
relevant because cybersecurity measures taken by, for example, governments can 
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potentially harm others, such as citizens, which requires accountability. 
Accountability, as a more procedural value, is particularly relevant because cyber-
security measures often require the weighing of a range of conflicting substantive 
values (such as security, privacy and fairness). Typical reasons to which the value of 
accountability is related include the obligation to account for one’s actions but also 
being blamed for unjustified behaviour or paying damages, or a fine, for the harm 
that arises from unjustified behaviour.
In addition to the four value clusters, there are values connected to specific appli-
cations for which cybersecurity is an issue. These values are domain-specific. 
Examples are values such as health (in the medical domain) or national security. 
Although these values are different from domain to domain, and sometimes even 
from application to application, they are connected to a range of more instrumental 
or technical values related to the proper functioning of applications. I include here 
more specific values such as efficiency, ease of use, understandability, data avail-
ability, reliability, compatibility and connectivity. These technical values are never-
theless often morally relevant as they are frequently instrumental, if not essential, 
for achieving specific moral values.
3.3.1  Security
The first value cluster is that of security. Below, I propose a general conceptualisa-
tion of the value of security that indicates how cybersecurity can be seen as a spe-
cific kind of security, roughly understood as the state of computer systems being 
free from cyber threats. There are, however, many varieties of security, some of 
which are also directly relevant for the discussion about cybersecurity. These 
include, for example, personal or individual security but also national security, or 
the security of certain businesses (cf. Kleinig et al. 2011). It is important to realise 
that these different, more specific types of security often correspond to distinct val-
ues that may conflict with each other on occasion. Nevertheless, the various security 
values may be said to belong to one value cluster. This is the case not only because 
they all fit the same general conceptualisation of security, but also because they are 
all responses to similar morally problematic situations, i.e. situations in which 
something valuable is threatened by an external danger. Moreover, they also all cor-
respond to similar moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons for protecting what is of value 
against an external threat or danger.
In very general terms, security may be understood as follows:
Security is the state of being free from danger or threat
Often we speak about the security of a certain entity X from a specific type or kind 
of danger Y. In such cases, the following general characterisation seems to apply:
The security of X from Y is the state of an entity X being free from danger or threat of 
kind Y
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Here, X can refer to an individual agent, a person, but also to collective social enti-
ties such as an organization, a business or a state. X may also refer to a technical 
system, such as a computer system. Depending on X, we can thus distinguish more 
specific types of security such as personal security, national security and computer 
security.
Y can refer to specific types of danger or threat. For example, when we talk about 
personal physical security, Y refers to physical dangers or threats (to individuals). In 
the case of national security, Y may refer to, for example, terrorist attacks or an inva-
sion by a foreign country, but nowadays also to (foreign) cyberattacks.
Two further remarks are necessary regarding this general characterisation. First, 
sometimes a distinction is made between the values of safety and security along the 
following lines: safety is protection against accidental or unintentional danger (e.g. 
a collapsing bridge or an earthquake), whereas security is protection against 
intended harm (e.g. theft or a terrorist attack) (Hansson 2009). The above charac-
terisation does not follow this distinction but rather subsumes it under one general 
concept of security. This follows the conventional manner of discussing cybersecu-
rity. For example, according to the 2016 EU scoping paper, “Cybersecurity refers to 
the protection of networks and information systems against human mistakes, natu-
ral disasters, technical failures or malicious attacks” (Scientific Advice Mechanism 
High Level Group 2016: 2). This includes, obviously, unintentional as well as inten-
tional harm.
Second, this characterisation stresses the absence of danger or threat. We might 
argue that this is only part of the story as security—in particular personal or indi-
vidual security—may also be understood as a certain peace of mind and the pres-
ence of preconditions in which people can live a meaningful and happy life (cf. 
Kleinig et al. 2011; Waldron 2011). Following the well-known distinction between 
negative and positive freedom (Berlin 1958), a similar distinction could perhaps be 
made between negative and positive security here.2 For the current purpose, I adhere 
to the negative (“absence of”) characterisation of security, as that seems most 
important when it comes to cybersecurity. Nevertheless, the positive aspect seems 
important for understanding the moral importance of the value of security in certain 
contexts, as we will see.
Now that we have a general characterisation of the value of security, we may 
inquire into the moral importance of this value. Philosophers often make a distinc-
tion between instrumental and intrinsic values (e.g. Frankena 1973). Instrumental 
values are merely valuable because they contribute to something that is valuable, 
whereas intrinsic values are believed to be good in themselves.3 In the literature 
2 The positive connotation is, for example, also present in a notion such as food security, which 
does not primarily refer to the absence of danger or threat (famine) but rather to the availability of 
(enough) food. Similarly, we might understand cybersecurity as the presence of reliable computer 
and network infrastructure, although most current definitions stress the absence of, or protection 
against, certain dangers and threats.
3 Intrinsic values are also sometimes called final or terminal values, while instrumental values are 
also sometimes called extrinsic. The different terminologies may not always trace the same distinc-
tion (cf. Korsgaard 1983).
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review conducted for the CANVAS project, cybersecurity was in most cases 
described as an instrumental value (Yaghmaei et al. 2017). The reason for this seems 
quite obvious. Computer systems are not valuable in themselves but because of the 
functions they fulfil in society, or for individuals and groups, and because of the 
economic value they represent. Computer systems may also be used for bad pur-
poses, and, in such cases, cybersecurity may even be deemed undesirable.
A value that is closely related to cybersecurity is information security. This value 
is often understood in terms of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of infor-
mation. For example, according to the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA), information security “[e]nsures that … information is pro-
tected against disclosure to unauthorised users (confidentiality), improper modifica-
tion (integrity), and non-access when required (availability)” (ISACA 2016). 
Confidentiality can be understood as being instrumental to privacy, as it prevents 
unauthorised access to information, which is often essential in maintaining privacy. 
The integrity and availability of information are instrumental for the (original) pur-
pose of the information system by ensuring that required information is reliably 
available and accurate. This seems to suggest that information security is merely an 
instrumental value. Whereas cybersecurity may be more encompassing than infor-
mation security—it may, for example, also relate to security from unauthorised 
access to cyberphysical systems (such as the energy grid or a water barrier)—the 
above seems to support the thesis that cybersecurity is mainly an instrumental value.
However, even if cybersecurity is an instrumental value, we should be careful in 
drawing too strong conclusions about its moral importance. If we consider, for 
example, cybersecurity threats to heart monitoring devices in hospitals or aviation 
systems then in both cases, a lack of cybersecurity may lead to a loss of human lives. 
In similar ways, cybersecurity is important for the protection of a large number of 
human and moral values. What these values are depends on the specific technical 
application and context. However, for some contexts, it would be a misunderstand-
ing to think that cybersecurity is devoid of moral importance just because it is an 
instrumental value, as in those contexts cybersecurity may be a sine qua non for 
upholding other values with great moral importance, including values of personal 
security and health. As Dewey (1922) already highlighted in his criticism of the 
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values, such distinctions tend to 
uncritically reify the gap between means and ends; what is a means in one context 
may well be an end in another (and vice versa).
Whereas cybersecurity is usually seen as instrumental value, several authors 
have argued that personal (or individual) security is an intrinsic value (e.g. Himma 
2016). The main argument for this seems to be that without some degree of personal 
security, individual people do not have a life at all, let alone a meaningful and happy 
one. This appears to show that some degree of security is required for individuals to 
live a good life. However, it is not obvious that this is enough to make security an 
intrinsic value. We might also argue that it is merely an enabling value (Raz 2003); 
i.e. a value that is necessary for people to have a meaningful life and to acquire other 
values. The reason why security understood as the mere absence of threat may not 
be an intrinsic value is that a life that merely consists of the absence of threat seems 
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hardly worth living; it is only when people start to do other valuable things that such 
a life becomes worthwhile.
Whereas there are good reasons to think of personal security as an intrinsic or at 
least an enabling value, this is less clear from more collectivist notions of security 
such as national security or business and organisational security. These would seem 
to be instrumental values, as their moral importance is derived from how they help 
support other values such as personal security.4 Moreover, discussions of national 
security may create a slippery slope, as it allows certain political groups the possi-
bility to claim the moral importance of certain restrictive measures that in practice 
restrict individual values, including personal security, rather than support them. At 
the same time, it is clear that some degree of national security is required to ensure 
personal security. Nevertheless, collectivist notions of security such as national 
security seem to derive their moral importance from how they eventually impact the 
security, but also other values such as privacy or liberty, of individuals rather than 
being intrinsically valuable (cf. Waldron 2011).
3.3.2  Privacy
Privacy is generally seen as an important value in relation to cybersecurity. There is, 
however, no agreement on how exactly to understand and conceptualise the value of 
privacy (Moore 2003). Proposed understandings include such notions as “the right 
to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890), “informational control” (Westin 1967), 
an extension of personality and personhood (Pound 1915) and an act of self-care 
(Allen 2016). Privacy also has several dimensions. Koops et al. (2017) distinguish 
between bodily, intellectual, spatial, decisional, communicational, associational, 
proprietary and behavioural privacy and view informational privacy as crosscutting 
through these categories.
Where cybersecurity is concerned, privacy is usually understood in informa-
tional terms. Such informational privacy is about what information about a person 
is (not) known to, or shared with, others. A further distinction is between notions of 
privacy stressing the confidentiality or secrecy of data (and information) and those 
stressing control over what data (or information) is shared with whom. If the first 
understanding is adhered to, it might be best not to collect and store personal data in 
the first place to enhance privacy (Warnier et al. 2015). Obviously, that will often be 
neither possible nor desirable (for other reasons). According to the control concep-
tion of privacy, the collecting, storing and sharing of data is not always problematic, 
rather privacy is about giving people control over the collection, storage and sharing 
of their own personal data. Here, the notion of ‘informed consent’ is important. 
Informed consent means that the collecting, storing and sharing of personal data 
4 A similar stance has been taken by the approach to national and international security known as 
‘human security’; see e.g. Gregoratti (2013).
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require the deliberate and informed consent of the data subject. People may thus 
also deliberately decide to share information about themselves with others. For both 
the confidentiality and the control notion, privacy breaches may result from unau-
thorised access to data and, in this sense, cybersecurity is instrumental, if not cru-
cial, to protecting privacy.
What information is appropriate to share with whom may not only be dependent 
on the autonomous choices of individuals (as the control notion of privacy stresses) 
but also be different for various social spheres. The question of what is appropriate 
to share with an employer is different from what information can appropriately be 
shared with a physician or spouse. This idea is captured in the notion of privacy as 
contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2004).
Some authors have argued that privacy is an intrinsic value, whereas others see it 
primarily as an instrumental one (e.g. Kleinig et al. 2011; Himma 2016). Those who 
tend to see it as an intrinsic value may point out that some degree of privacy is indis-
pensable for (moral) autonomy. If one’s thoughts and actions are continuously 
known to others, it will undermine one’s capacity to decide and act in a morally 
autonomous way. Since moral autonomy is crucial for human agency and human 
dignity, some minimal degree of privacy is required to live a good life. Those who 
conceive of privacy as an instrumental value may object that what is valued here is 
not so much privacy in itself but rather what it allows or enables. The relationship 
between privacy and the ability to live a morally worthwhile life may in this respect 
not be so different from that between personal security and a good life, as discussed 
before. We might therefore conceive of privacy as an enabling value, i.e. as a value 
that is necessary as a precondition for a good life, but one that is not necessarily 
itself intrinsically valuable; however it is also not a mere instrumental value in the 
sense that it cannot be replaced by others means and is indispensable for living a 
worthwhile life.
A somewhat related debate is the one between authors who adhere to reduction-
ist accounts of privacy and those who provide non-reductionist accounts (Katell and 
Moore 2016). According to reductionist accounts, the moral importance of privacy 
is based on other values such as autonomy, human dignity and liberty. In the final 
analysis, there is nothing that the value of privacy adds to the relevant moral consid-
erations and reasons that cannot already be derived from those others values. 
Privacy, in other words, is merely a placeholder for moral concerns that can already 
be derived from other values. Van den Hoven, for example, has argued that privacy 
derives its moral importance from four types of moral considerations: (1) preven-
tion of information-based harm, (2) prevention of informational inequality, (3) pre-
vention of informational injustice, and (4) respect for moral autonomy (Van den 
Hoven 1998; Van den Hoven and Vermaas 2007). Conversely, non-reductionists do 
not need to deny that privacy is related to a range of other values and part of a 
broader value cluster as I have called it, but they at least maintain that the value of 
privacy articulates moral considerations and corresponds to moral reasons that can-
not, or at least cannot fully, be expressed by other values.
As Katell and Moore (2016) stress, even if reductionism about privacy were true, 
in many practical contexts it would still be useful to use the notion of privacy. After 
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all, many of the social and political debates about ICT technologies, including those 
on cybersecurity, are framed in terms of privacy. Nevertheless, it is often helpful to 
unpack the other values and reasons that are implied when the value of privacy is 
articulated in concrete situations and debates. This is so because it is frequently the 
case that what is at stake in such situations is not just the threat of unauthorised 
access to personal data but rather a range of broader moral concerns related to such 
values as autonomy, identity and liberty. This is one of the reasons why it is useful 
to think in terms of value clusters rather than individual values. As indicated before, 
the value cluster of privacy also contains such values as moral autonomy, human 
dignity, identity, personhood, liberty, anonymity and confidentiality. Some of the 
values have a more justificatory relationship to privacy, i.e. they articulate why pri-
vacy is morally important (such as moral autonomy, human dignity, identity, per-
sonhood and liberty), whereas others (such as anonymity, confidentiality and 
control) seem more instrumental for preserving privacy.
There is a mutual relationship between how privacy is exactly understood and 
conceptualised and what other values are (more closely) related to it. For example, 
Whitman (2004) argues that in the US context, privacy is merely understood (and 
laid down in laws) in relation to liberty and in particular to moral concerns about 
government infringements in the personal life sphere of citizens. Such conceptions 
of privacy tend to stress liberty and the protection of citizens against state actors. He 
contrasts this with the European, primarily French and German, tradition in which 
privacy is more closely linked to human dignity and that stresses the relationship 
between people, so that privacy is also a concern between individuals, or between 
individuals and companies, rather than between citizens and the state. Arguably, in 
the current age of information systems and big data, both conceptions are important 
when it comes to privacy concerns.
3.3.3  Fairness
The third value cluster relevant to cybersecurity is that of fairness. This is a relevant 
value because both cybersecurity threats and measures to increase cybersecurity 
impact people differently, which may raise fairness issues. This is connected to a 
range of other values such as equality, justice, non-discrimination and freedom from 
bias. In addition, democracy is a relevant value because some cybersecurity mea-
sures may be so consequential and invasive that they require democratic legitima-
tion rather than being the authority of private actors such as companies.
In political and moral philosophy, many different notions and theories of both 
democracy and fairness have been developed. I refrain from delving here into all the 
subtleties but rather restrict myself to highlighting how these values are affected by 
cybersecurity concerns and how they are relevant for the institutional and technical 
design of cybersecurity measures.
Justice and fairness are important values because cybersecurity measures typi-
cally come with costs and benefits that may be unequally distributed across the vari-
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ous actors involved. Parts of these costs and benefits are financial and economic in 
nature, and a first question that will therefore arise is whether a certain proposed 
cybersecurity measure is worth the cost. Strictly speaking, this is more a question 
about efficiency (i.e. the ratio between benefits and costs) than a question of justice 
and fairness (i.e. the distribution of costs and benefits). It should be noted, however, 
that if certain cybersecurity measures are not taken for efficiency reasons (i.e. 
because the benefits are not considered worth the costs), there will likely be distri-
butional effects. This is the case because, if and when cybersecurity breaches mate-
rialise, the costs and harms caused by such breaches will likely not be equally 
distributed. Indeed, if people are victim to cybersecurity breaches, questions may 
arise about a right to compensation or the need for insurance.
The fact that costs and benefits are usually not equally distributed implies that 
even if from a societal point of view it is efficient or cost-effective to take certain 
cybersecurity measures, it is possible that for none of the actors involved are such 
measures also individually cost-effective. This may be particularly problematic if 
the distribution of costs and benefits is somehow unfair. An example is a company 
that offers services that are sensitive to cyber-attacks. As long as the costs (and other 
harm) due to the cyberattacks can be externalised (for example to the users of their 
services), it may not be cost-effective for the company to take certain cybersecurity 
measures. However, such externalisation of costs may be considered unfair, which 
in turn may lead to the introduction of a legal obligation (by the government) for the 
company to compensate its customers for damages due to avoidable cybersecurity 
breaches. This new distribution of costs and benefits may make certain cybersecu-
rity measures cost-effective that were not so before. In this sense, questions about 
the cost-effectiveness of cybersecurity measures cannot be completely separated 
from questions about the fair or just distribution of costs and benefits.
Fairness and justice considerations do not only accrue to distributional effects 
but may also imply that people have a right to some minimal level of information 
access (Van den Hoven and Rooksby 2008) or even access to ICT services.5 Given 
the crucial importance of information, and also of certain ICT services, in today’s 
society, we may question whether access to such goods and services should not 
become a basic right. Perhaps, now or in the future, we should grant everybody the 
right to affordable, secure and accessible ICT services. If such rights were intro-
duced, it would also have implications for the minimal level of cybersecurity that 
should be guaranteed for everybody. Of course, many questions can be asked 
regarding whether it is desirable to introduce such rights and about who bears the 
duties that correspond to such rights. Nevertheless, what these deliberations reveal 
is that questions about what constitutes a desirable level of cybersecurity do not just 
5 A report by special rapporteur Frank La Rue to the UN in 2011 stated: “Given that the Internet has 
become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights, combating inequality, and 
accelerating development and human progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should be 
a priority for all States. Each State should thus develop a concrete and effective policy (…) to make 
the Internet widely available, accessible and affordable to all segments of population” (Rue 2011: 
22). This was interpreted by some as a plea for Internet access as a human right.
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concern efficiency and cost-effectiveness but also fairness, justice and perhaps even 
human rights.
Fairness and justice may require impartiality but they would not seem to require 
that people are always or necessarily treated equally (Miller 2017). In most theories 
of fairness or justice, it is allowed, and sometimes even required, to treat people dif-
ferently if they somehow deserve different treatment. What factors are relevant in 
justifying (or requiring) different treatments may be different for different theories 
and accounts. Nevertheless, some factors are almost universally seen as constituting 
improper ground for different treatments. This includes such factors as race, gender 
and sexual preferences. Here, the value of non-discrimination is relevant.6
Non-discrimination may be a particularly important value for cybersecurity 
because it is known that ICT technologies may be vulnerable to bias, i.e. they may 
unjustifiably treat people differently on the basis of, for example, gender, race or 
marital status. Such bias may be intentional, but it is often the unintended result of 
how such systems are designed and used. Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996) discuss 
three sources of such bias, namely pre-existing bias in human practices, institutions, 
and attitudes that is reified in computer systems; technical bias (resulting from tech-
nical requirements and constraints); and emergent bias that emerges from the use of 
the system (e.g. use in another context than originally foreseen). The increased use 
of big data and of self-learning algorithms has further increased the problem of bias 
(Barocas and Selbst 2016; O’Neil 2016; Ferguson 2017). Algorithmic bias may, in 
particular, result when algorithms are trained with biased data sets, or on a limited 
group of people or cases. Large-scale data collection for cybersecurity, therefore, is 
likely to also be vulnerable to bias if non-discrimination is not from the start consid-
ered in the design, training and use of relevant algorithms.
The value of democracy is relevant to cybersecurity in a number of ways. 
Cyberattacks may undermine the democratic process, as suggested by the 2016 US 
president elections, which witnessed the hacking of the Democratic Party, trolling 
and the spread of fake news (see also Chap. 11). It has also been suggested that 
cybersecurity measures, such as end-to-end-encryption, may protect democratic lib-
erties such as freedom of speech (cf. Christen et al. 2017). However, cybersecurity 
measures may occasionally also undermine democracy. A particular concern is the 
strategic use of cybersecurity by national governments for national security aims 
(see also Chap. 12). Although such use may be justified, it raises a number of con-
cerns (Kleinig et al. 2011; Newell 2016; Rubel 2016; Strossen 2016). One is that it 
may undermine the civil liberties of citizens. Second, because such use is by its 
nature often secretive, there may be a lack of democratic legitimacy. A further 
 concern is that government agencies that find cybersecurity weaknesses may strate-
gically keep these secret in order to use them against other countries (or even against 
their own population). This is not only problematic because such use usually lacks 
democratic legitimation but also because it increases cybersecurity risks for citizens 
6 However, positive discrimination would seem warranted in some cases, as justice may require 
advantaging underprivileged groups in specific circumstances.
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and companies. It thus leads to fairness concerns because these societal actors have 
to bear the burden of the costs of cybersecurity threats that have not been revealed 
by government agencies.
3.3.4  Accountability
The value of accountability (and related values such as transparency, openness and 
explainability) is particularly relevant to cybersecurity in two types of situations. 
One are situations in which someone (allegedly) harms someone else, or infringes 
on the rights of that person. In such situations, we typically hold the (alleged) per-
petrator accountable. The other are situations in which there is a power imbalance 
between two agents and in which the more powerful is in the position to introduce 
rules or measures that may harm the less powerful ones. For example, governments 
and companies may be accountable to citizens and consumers for what cybersecu-
rity measures they take even if there is not (yet) a suspicion of undue harm.
In the first type of situation, accountability is closely related to responsibility and 
its different meanings, such as blameworthiness, liability and obligation- 
responsibility (Van de Poel et al. 2015). An agent may be said to be accountable if 
there is a reasonable suspicion that that agent did something wrong or caused undue 
harm. Accountability here implies an obligation to account for one’s actions and 
their consequences. Such an account may show that the agent is not blameworthy 
(despite the reasonable suspicion), but if the account is unsatisfactory, the agent 
may be blameworthy or liable to correct his or her wrong or to pay damages. 
Accountability is also related to responsibility-as-obligation; in particular, an agent 
may be accountable if there is a reasonable suspicion that it did not fill its 
obligation-responsibilities.
What sets the second type of situation apart from the first is that there is not (yet) 
a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Rather, the need for accountability is based 
on power imbalances. Although such power imbalances exist in any society, they 
seem to be aggravated in today’s information society by the unequal access to large 
amounts of data and information. Moreover, citizens and consumers seem increas-
ingly dependent on government and large commercial organisations for the secure 
storage of (personal) data. This would seem to imply that such powerful organisa-
tions are accountable for what cybersecurity measures they take. Such accountabil-
ity would imply some degree of transparency about what cybersecurity measures 
are taken. In addition to such transparency, it would also imply a willingness and 
ability to account for the decisions on which such measures are based. This is par-
ticularly important because cybersecurity involves a range of values that are poten-
tially conflicting. There might not be one best way to reconcile these values or to 
strike a balance between them, which makes it even more important that powerful 
actors account for how they make such decisions. Accountability here implies a 
certain traceability of how decisions are made but also the articulation of the reasons 
and motivations underlying such decisions.
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3.4  Value Conflicts in Cybersecurity
It is often said that some of the values relevant to cybersecurity are in conflict with 
each other. The most frequently mentioned conflict is that between security and 
privacy, but this is certainly not the only possible value conflict in the domain of 
cybersecurity. Moreover, as already indicated in the introduction, it is not the case 
that (cyber)security and privacy are always in conflict.
3.4.1  What Are Value Conflicts?
What does it mean to say that two values are conflicting? If values are varieties of 
goodness and are used for (moral) evaluation, then one interpretation of a value 
conflict is that two (or more) values are conflicting if (and only if) they provide 
opposite or contradictory evaluations of the same state-of-affairs (or object or pol-
icy). Therefore, if something is evaluated as good on the basis of one of the values 
it should, by definition, be bad on the basis of the other value. In cybersecurity, the 
values of transparency (or openness) versus confidentiality may provide an exam-
ple. What is transparent is not confidential, and vice versa.
Such value conflicts that seem to derive from oppositions at the semantic level of 
values are, however, relatively rare. More often, value conflicts seem to derive from 
the practical implications of values. Under this interpretation, values conflict if they 
express or correspond to contradictory norms or reasons for actions. For example, if 
a value such as privacy would require that a certain piece of information is kept 
confidential, whereas transparency would require that same piece of information to 
be made public, then the values of privacy and transparency are conflicting.
It should be noted that the question of to which reasons a value corresponds is 
one of interpretation and judgment, and depends both on the value at stake and the 
specific context (see Sect. 3.2.1). More specifically, it depends on how the values at 
stake are conceptualised and specified. Conceptualisation is “the providing of a 
definition, analysis or description of a value that clarifies its meaning and often its 
applicability” (Van de Poel 2013: 261). For example, privacy may be conceptualised 
in terms of confidentiality as well as in terms of control over information. On the 
second conceptualisation, it would seem less likely that privacy conflicts with trans-
parency, although it is certainly not impossible.
Moreover, whether values conflict will also depend on their specification. 
Specification may be understood as the translation of values into more specific 
norms and requirements (Van de Poel 2013). If privacy is conceptualised in terms of 
confidentiality, a specification would further specify what (personal) information 
should exactly stay confidential, and to whom. This means that on some specifica-
tions of privacy as confidentiality, privacy and transparency would conflict whereas 
on other specifications, the values would not conflict. Of course, there are limits to 
how a value can be specified. In general, a specification may be considered adequate 
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if meeting the more specific norms and requirements would count as a proper 
response to the value at stake (cf. the earlier discussion about values in Sect. 3.2.1).
With the above in mind, we can now more precisely define value conflicts. One 
possible definition is the following:
Values are conflicting for a particular X, in context C, if it is practically impossible to 
respond properly to all values that are relevant to X in context C simultaneously
Here X can be a state-of-affairs but also (and more relevant to the current discus-
sion) a certain (technical or institutional) cybersecurity measure. This definition 
would also allow value conflicts if there is only one value, because it may also be 
practically impossible to respond properly to that one value for that particular X. For 
example, for a particular cybersecurity policy it may turn out to be impossible to 
respect (which is a proper response) the value of privacy.
If X is a cybersecurity policy (or measure), the natural response to such value 
conflicts may be to look for another policy, or measure, that does properly respond 
to all relevant values. Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, and Van de Poel (2012) argue that 
in such situations of value conflict (or a moral dilemma), there is a second-order 
obligation to look for options that help to avoid the value conflict, now or in the 
future. This may be done through technical or institutional innovation or design, as 
such innovation or design may extend what is feasible and so allow options that 
overcome the initial value conflict (Van den Hoven 2013; Van de Poel 2017).
Nevertheless, sometimes it may turn out to be impossible to find options that 
allow all relevant values to be responded to in an appropriate way. This bring us to 
the final definition of value conflicts. This definition takes as a starting point the 
situation in which we need to choose between different options (such as different 
cybersecurity measures or policies) and in which none of the options seem best in 
light of all the values at stake. This results in the following definition of value con-
flict (Van de Poel and Royakkers 2011):
 1. A choice has to be made between at least two options for which at least two val-
ues are relevant as choice criteria.
 2. At least two different values select at least two different options as best.
 3. There is no single value that trumps all others as choice criterion. If one value 
trumps another, any (small) amount of the first value is worth more than any 
(large) amount of the second value.
It is this type of value conflict that I focus on in the remainder.
3.4.2  Value Conflicts in Cybersecurity
I now examine a number of more specific value conflicts in cybersecurity. Since 
value conflicts are usually practical conflicts, whether two values are conflicting 
will depend on the specific context. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish a num-
I. van de Poel
61
ber of more general value tensions in cybersecurity. Christen et al. (2017) present 
the following figure as a graphical representation of potential value conflicts in 
cybersecurity.
The grey rectangles in Fig. 3.1 represent values. The values of ‘information harm 
prevention’ and ‘physical harm prevention’ belong to the cluster of security I previ-
ously discussed; privacy and personal freedom belong do the privacy cluster; and 
discrimination prevention, fairness, equality and social justice belong to the fairness 
cluster. Accountability is not mentioned in the figure, which may be explained by 
the fact that this is more of a procedural value.
Full arrows represent a supporting or reinforcing relation, while dotted arrows 
represent potential tensions. As shown, cybersecurity is directly instrumental for 
harm prevention (and so for personal security). It may, however, also involve moni-
toring and surveillance, which may in turn negatively affect a number of values. 
Similarly, it involves personal efforts as well as economic costs that may also nega-
tively affect a number of values.
Below, I discuss relations between value clusters, taking the four earlier distin-
guished value clusters as a starting point. For each relation between value clusters, 
I discuss whether it is largely supportive or conflicting (or can be both), and if there 





















Fig. 3.1 Value tensions in cybersecurity. (Reproduced from Christen et al. 2017)
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3.4.2.1  Privacy Versus Security
The most frequently mentioned conflict in cybersecurity is most likely that between 
privacy and security. However, closer examination shows that the relationship 
between security and privacy is much more complex. Consider the following cases7:
 1. Sometimes security is attained at the cost of privacy. An example is full cable 
monitoring which contributes to (cyber)security but would seem (in most cases) 
an unjustified privacy intrusion.
 2. Sometimes security helps to achieve privacy. For example, limited or targeted 
monitoring may help to detect security incidents, which in turn may prevent data 
leaks, so that the confidentiality of personal information is maintained and, 
hence, privacy is served.
 3. In computer systems, privacy requires some degree of cybersecurity. Privacy sets 
limits on who has access to what (personal) information. Without some degree of 
cybersecurity, these limits cannot be maintained, and personal information is 
subject to unauthorised access.
 4. Sometimes, privacy is attained at the cost of security. For example, complete 
anonymity and secrecy of communications can be exploited by malicious agents.
 5. Sometimes, privacy contributes to security. For example, if certain information 
about users of a system is kept confidential, spear phishing attacks can no longer 
leverage excessive available user information to choose attack targets.
As these examples demonstrate, security and privacy are not necessarily conflict-
ing but also can support each other. Some degree of cybersecurity is, moreover, 
required to guarantee privacy. Nevertheless, the question can be asked how we are 
to deal with those situations in which privacy and security are conflicting.
In the philosophical literature, some authors have argued that security trumps 
privacy, while others have held that privacy trumps security. Himma (2016), for 
example, argues the former. His argument is based on the assumption that (per-
sonal) security is much more indispensable for a worthwhile life (including values 
such as autonomy and freedom) than privacy, because without some degree of secu-
rity, we may not have a life at all. He admits, however, that this does not mean that 
any amount of security increase (however small) can justify any amount of privacy 
loss (however large).8
Conversely, Moore (2016) argues that privacy and accountability trump privacy. 
He does so by debunking four often-used arguments for sacrificing some privacy (or 
accountability) for security. These (fallacious) arguments are (1) “just trust us”, i.e. 
give the benefit of the doubt to those in power and assume that officials will not 
override individual rights without just cause, (2) the nothing to hide argument, (3) 
7 These examples are based on a presentation by Josep Domingo-Ferrer on the 26th of April 2018 in 
Brussels concerning the CANVAS white paper on Technological challenges to cybersecurity 
(Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2017). See also Chap. 13.
8 On this basis, one might wonder whether the point he makes is really about trumping values, or 
more about the centrality of certain values for a good or worthwhile life.
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The “security trumps” view, and (4) the consent argument, i.e. people voluntarily 
offer (private) information all the time. While his debunking of the four arguments 
is convincing, it is questionable whether it follows that privacy (and accountability) 
trump security, in the sense that no amount of privacy or accountability should be 
given up to achieve more security.
The problem with trumping arguments is that they discuss value conflicts at a too 
general level. What values require in a specific situation, and whether values are 
conflicting, always requires judgement in the specific context (see also Chap. 7). 
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that either security trumps privacy or privacy 
trumps security in all possible situations one can imagine (or cannot yet imagine for 
that matter). Trumping accounts, then, are not able to do justice to how the value of 
privacy and security play out in specific situations and, therefore, offer an inade-
quate response to cases of value conflict.
The question, then, remains: how are we to deal with those situations in which 
the conflict between privacy and security is real? Although this may always require 
context-specific judgments, the earlier presented examples suggest a somewhat 
more general approach to the conflict between privacy and security. What we see 
from these examples is that conflicts in particular arise in two types of situations:
 1. All data are gathered or monitored (as in the case of full cable monitoring) so 
that security is achieved at the cost of privacy
 2. No data is gathered or monitored (as in the case of complete anonymity or 
secrecy) so that privacy is achieved at the cost of security
This suggests that, at least in a practical sense, the conflict boils down to conflict-
ing requirements that follow from the values of security and privacy regarding what 
data should be collected, stored and shared, and for what purpose. This means that 
in looking for potential solutions to the value conflict, we should put centre stage 
questions such as:
 – How much data and what data need to be gathered?
 – What data should be accessible to whom?
 – For how long should these data be stored?
It should also be noted that on a control account of privacy, it is entirely conceiv-
able that individuals consent to the monitoring (and temporary storage) of their data 
for cybersecurity ends. After all, individuals will value their personal security and 
this will require some degree of cybersecurity. Therefore, if privacy is understood in 
control terms rather than confidentiality terms, it may be easier to solve the conflict 
between privacy and cybersecurity. Another notion that may be important in answer-
ing the mentioned questions is contextual integrity. The information that can be 
properly monitored and gathered in the light of privacy concerns will be different 
for different spheres in society such as business, health care, insurance, personal life 
and politics.
One of the implications of this is that to properly deal with the potential conflict 
between privacy and (cyber)security, we need fine-grained technical and institu-
tional infrastructure that enables the fine-tuning of the data that are monitored, gath-
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ered, stored, and shared to the different public spheres and the informed consent of 
individuals. This allows a sophisticated attuning of privacy and security concerns to 
the specific context, considering all the relevant value considerations.
3.4.2.2  Privacy Versus Fairness
The relationship between privacy and fairness is often seen as supportive. There are 
at least two general arguments for why privacy supports fairness. One is that privacy 
limits what data can be collected about individuals, which can prevent unfair treat-
ment. If, for example, no data about race are collected, it limits the possibilities for 
discrimination or algorithmic bias based on race.9 Secondly, it may be argued that 
some degree of privacy for office holders and political representatives is required in 
a well-functioning democracy (cf. Lever 2016; Mokrosinska 2016). One reason for 
this is that otherwise, some private circumstances may be held against political rep-
resentatives or office holders that endanger their proper and independent function-
ing, which is required in a democracy. They may, for example, be blackmailed, 
which may introduce conflicts of interest and forms of secrecy that undermine the 
democratic process.
Conversely, democracy is supportive of privacy because privacy is often consid-
ered a civil liberty or basic right in democratic societies (see also Chaps. 4 and 5). 
Most democratic countries have laws that protect the privacy of their citizens.
Nevertheless, on occasion, fairness and democracy may also conflict with pri-
vacy. Fairness, for example, may require the sharing of some information with the 
government, in particular in those cases where fairness requires that people are not 
treated exactly the same. For example, fair taxation may require information about 
people’s income, information that some people may consider private. Conflicts may 
also occur in cases where democracy seems to require a certain transparency or 
openness regarding how governmental decisions are made and what the government 
does (e.g. in terms of surveillance) (cf. Mathiesen 2016). Such transparency or 
openness may be in conflict (at least at first sight) with the confidentiality require-
ments that follow from privacy concerns. Since the call for transparency and open-
ness of government operations is often based on considerations of accountability, I 
first discuss the relationship between privacy and accountability before discussing 
potential methods for addressing this value conflict.
9 It does not make it entirely impossible, however. The reason is that discrimination or bias may 
also be based on proxies. For example, discrimination based on postal codes may in effect be a 
form of discrimination based on race or income (due to geographical segregation).
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3.4.2.3  Privacy Versus Accountability
Privacy and accountability, at first sight, seem to be at tension with each other. 
Accountability requires the ability and willingness to account for one’s actions, in 
particular for how and why certain decisions were made. This require a certain 
transparency, and the revelation of information that may be privacy-sensitive.
It should be noted that this tension does not just occur if privacy is understood in 
terms of confidentiality. In addition, regarding the control notion of privacy, an 
agent may prefer not to share certain information that is required for proper account-
ability. An agent may even strategically choose not to reveal certain information to 
evade accountability under the guise of privacy concerns. Under such circum-
stances, privacy may even become a means for offenders or criminals (including 
cyber criminals or cyber attackers) to avoid accountability and responsibility (and 
hence punishment).
This suggests that control conceptualisations of privacy that give full and unlim-
ited control to individuals regarding what data and information they share with 
whom are problematic in terms of accountability. One way to address this may be to 
build in restrictions on what information individuals can reasonably decide not to 
share with others. It could be argued that a control notion of privacy should be 
grounded not in absolute liberty but in moral autonomy (and human dignity). Moral 
autonomy not only implies a certain freedom in shaping one’s life but also the will-
ingness to take responsibility for one’s actions, and to account to others where that 
is warranted. If privacy as control is understood in such a way, the conflict with 
accountability is softened (although, perhaps, not completely avoided).
More generally, dealing with the potential conflict between privacy and account-
ability would require focusing on what information should be shared (or not be 
shared) with whom. Accountability does not require the disclosure of all informa-
tion but rather those pieces of information that are crucial in the light of account-
ability. Moreover, accountability may require the disclosure of some information to 
some people but not to others. These requirements need not be in conflict with pri-
vacy, as privacy also typically does not require that all (personal) information 
remains confidential.
For example, political accountability may require that it becomes known who 
made what decision based on what information and which considerations went into 
a decision, but it does typically not require disclosure of other personal information. 
In some situations, it may even be irrelevant who exactly decided what for political 
accountability, and it may be enough to disclose how a decision was made in terms 
that are more general. Moreover, as we have seen before, political accountability 
may be served by some degree of privacy, because this avoids office holders or 
political representatives being held accountable for things that are private and not 
politically relevant.
The above does not rule out the fact that privacy and accountability may, on 
occasion, correspond to conflicting requirements about what information to disclose 
(or keep confidential) to whom. Such conflicts can, of course, occur. Nevertheless, 
it brings the discussion to where it should be, namely regarding what information 
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should be shared and what should be kept confidential to whom in the light of pri-
vacy and accountability concerns, and indeed other values such as democracy, fair-
ness and security.
3.4.2.4  Security Versus Accountability
I have argued before that (cyber)security measures, or the lack thereof, require some 
form of accountability. This is the case because a lack of appropriate cybersecurity 
measures may create undue harm. However, in as far as accountability requires a 
revelation of what cybersecurity measures are exactly taken, it may be in conflict 
with cybersecurity itself. The reason for this is that cybersecurity threats often arise 
not just from unintentional harm but from the actions of malicious agents or adver-
saries. These agents will typically strategically adapt their adversary strategies to 
what cybersecurity measures are taken (or the lack thereof). In this sense, cyberse-
curity is akin to an arms race, meaning that too much public accountability may 
undermine the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures.
A similar conflict may occur in those cases where cybersecurity weaknesses are 
exploited for national security ends. Here again, the revelation of these security 
strategies, or even of the cybersecurity weaknesses on which they are based, may 
undermine the effectiveness of those strategies and hence decrease security. 
Therefore, there seems to be a very real tension between accountability and security.
While this tension may require some form of balancing or trade-off, there are 
also institutional mechanisms that may help to alleviate the tension. One such insti-
tutional mechanism is to create fora for accountability that do not require the full 
public disclosure of (cyber)security measures, for example, parliamentary commit-
tees, cybersecurity committees or councils to which governments, or companies, are 
accountable for the cybersecurity measures they take (or fail to take). Such institu-
tions may work under certain confidentiality requirements in the sense that they 
cannot disclose certain cybersecurity measures (or the lack thereof) if that is likely 
to help cyber attackers or criminals.
These types of institutional mechanisms may still imply a trade-off between 
accountability and security as they are likely to neither attain full accountability nor 
full security. The main point, nevertheless, is that the tension between accountabil-
ity and security should be an incentive to look for new institutional arrangements 
that allow both values to be better served simultaneously than current institutions. 
In as far as trade-offs are still inevitable, they should not only be considered in terms 
of security versus accountability but also in terms of the other values at stake, 
including the values of privacy and fairness and the values served by the computer 
systems that are the possible target of cyberattacks.
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3.4.2.5  Security Versus Fairness (and Democracy)
Security may conflict with fairness and democracy, in particular when cybersecurity 
is used for national security aims, for example large state surveillance programmes 
or cyberattacks on other countries by government agencies. Such activities may put 
at risk civil liberties and the privacy of citizens (e.g. Rubel 2016; Strossen 2016). 
This may sometimes be justified but would then require at least some form of demo-
cratic legitimacy and accountability. However, the fact that these activities are often 
secretive makes democratic legitimation and accountability frequently more diffi-
cult to achieve.
It is important here to distinguish between different kinds of security, in particu-
lar national versus personal security (Kleinig et al. 2011; Waldron 2011). National 
security should not be seen as an intrinsic value but rather as a value that derives its 
moral importance from other values such as personal security. It is important to be 
aware that some measures to increase national security, such as the secretive large- 
scale surveillance of citizens, may not only serve personal security (through increas-
ing national security) but also endanger it. In particular, if such programmes, in 
effect, diminish civil liberties without clear democratic legitimacy and a lack of 
accountability, the loss in personal security may occasionally be bigger than the net 
gain through increased national security.
This is not to deny that national security is a legitimate concern; arguably, it may 
require more attention than in the past in the light of an increase in the number of 
terrorist attacks (at least in Western countries) and an increase in foreign cyberat-
tacks by state agencies (and others). The point is that in addressing conflicts of 
security versus fairness and democracy, we should not just examine national secu-
rity but primarily examine the effect on personal security (of citizens).
One particular issue here is that national security measures, and also other types 
of cybersecurity measures, may well increase the personal security of some while 
diminishing the personal security (and civil liberties and privacy) of others (Waldron 
2011). In other words, such measures have distributive effects that raise questions of 
fairness. As argued before, it can often be difficult to neatly separate such fairness 
questions from questions about the right level of (cyber)security that is still worth 
the costs involved (financial and otherwise).
It might be thought that fairness requires equal treatment and therefore translates 
into an equal distribution of the costs and benefits of cybersecurity. However, this is 
far less obvious than may appear. People are not to the same degree vulnerable to 
cyber threats so that benefits of cybersecurity measures are likely to be unequally 
distributed. Moreover, it seems just (or fair) that people or organisations that (delib-
erately) exploit weaknesses in cybersecurity at the cost of others should also bear a 
larger burden of the costs, if only to compensate for the harm they have done. 
Another consideration is that in order to increase the total level of (cyber)security 
we should sometimes be willing to accept some inequalities.
Therefore, although unequal distributions of the costs and benefits of cybersecu-
rity, or national security, are not necessarily or always unfair (or unacceptable), 
fairness requires that some minimal level of basic rights, including a certain right to 
3 Core Values and Value Conflicts in Cybersecurity: Beyond Privacy Versus Security
68
personal security, civil liberties and privacy protection, is guaranteed for all (Rawls 
1999 [1971]). This again underlines the fact that in considering value tensions 
between security and other values (privacy, accountability, democracy), we should 
always and primarily keep in mind the effect of different choices on personal secu-
rity rather than simply focusing on national security and cybersecurity (which are 
largely instrumental values). Moreover, to guarantee some minimal degree of per-
sonal security for all, we must also pay attention to privacy, civil liberties and demo-
cratic rights.
3.5  Conclusions: Beyond Security Versus Privacy
I began this chapter by stating that the framing of ethical and value issues in cyber-
security in terms of security versus privacy is unsatisfactory. In concluding, I wish 
to highlight three ways in which we should go beyond this framing if the approach 
in this chapter is on the right track.
First, we should consider a broader range of values. In particular, I have pointed 
out that in addition to the value clusters of security and privacy, there are two other 
values clusters particularly important for cybersecurity, namely fairness and 
accountability. Moreover, there are those values that are related to cybersecurity in 
more specific domains (or applications), such as the business domain (Chap. 6), the 
health domain (Chap. 7) or the national security domain (Chap. 8). These values are 
also indispensable in understanding value issues and value tensions in relation to 
cybersecurity. By considering all these values, we gain a much richer picture of both 
the value issues and conflicts in cybersecurity.
Second, I have argued for a contextual approach when it comes to identifying 
and addressing value conflicts. This is in line with my general understanding of 
values as varieties of goodness that require an appropriate response and correspond 
to certain types of moral considerations and reasons. The question of what consti-
tutes a proper response to a certain value is context-specific and always requires 
judgement. A value analysis of cybersecurity, therefore, requires contextual judge-
ments. Moreover, values are usually not conflicting in the abstract, but in a specific 
context. Privacy and security, for example, conflict in some contexts and applica-
tions but not in others. Without a proper analysis of context, we are in danger of 
understanding value conflicts in cybersecurity in too general terms, for example as 
a conflict between privacy and security, which may hinder rather than help in better 
addressing such value conflicts.
To better address value conflicts in cybersecurity, then, requires a superior under-
standing of what is at stake in those conflicts. This not only requires an understand-
ing of what specific values require in a specific situation but also an understanding 
of why and how values may conflict or support each other. I have discussed this in 
more general terms for a number of potential value conflicts in cybersecurity. It 
became apparent that a crucial issue in several of these potential conflicts is what 
data or information should be monitored, collected, stored and shared for what 
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 purposes, and who is entitled to access such data. Attaining more precision about 
this type of question would be, at the very least, a step towards alleviating conflicts 
between, in particular, security, privacy and accountability. In other words, we 
should zoom in on what the various relevant values require in a specific situation 
and how these requirements can be reconciled, for example through technical and 
institutional solutions rather than very general philosophical arguments about why 
security trumps privacy or vice versa.
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Abstract This chapter presents several ethical frameworks that are useful for ana-
lysing ethical questions of cybersecurity. It begins with two frameworks that are 
important in practice: the principlist framework employed in the Menlo Report on 
cybersecurity research and the rights-based principle that is influential in the law, in 
particular EU law. It is argued that since the harms and benefits caused by cyberse-
curity operations and policies are of a probabilistic nature, both approaches cannot 
avoid dealing with risk and probability. Therefore, the chapter turns to the ethics of 
risk, showing that it is a necessary complement to such approaches. The ethics of 
risk are discussed in more detail by considering two consequentialist approaches 
(utilitarianism and maximin consequentialism), deontological approaches and con-
tractualist approaches to risk at length, highlighting the difficulties raised by special 
cases. Finally, Nissenbaum’s ‘contextual integrity’ approach is introduced, which 
has become an important framework for understanding privacy, both descriptively 
and normatively. A revised version of this framework is proposed for identifying 
and ethically assessing changes brought about by cybersecurity measures and poli-
cies, not only in relation to privacy but more generally to the key expectations con-
cerning human interactions within the practice.
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The term cybersecurity explicitly conveys its main ethical goal, namely to create a 
state of being free from danger or threat in cyberspace, if we follow the general defi-
nition of the English term ‘security’ (Oxford Dictionary). However, in ethics, the 
concept of security rarely plays a central role in theory building. For example, if we 
search the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for ‘security’, the term only appears 
in the entry under information ethics (which is the context that interests us here) and 
in political philosophy, referring to the security of nation states. This is remarkable, 
as from a purely biological perspective, organisms (and groups of social animals) 
invest considerable resources in protecting themselves against threats. Certainly, 
conditions resulting from insecurity such as harm or injustice are central topics in 
ethical theorising. Nevertheless, the positive orientation aimed to overcome those 
conditions refer to values like justice or benevolence, not security (probably with 
the exception of social security).
Why is this? One reason could be that the term ‘security’ used in a more general 
sense has certain negative connotations, particularly within ethics. These may refer 
to the problems that result when security is enforced by states through coercive 
capacities, to the observation that authoritarian regimes often rely on security when 
actually promoting injustice, or to the more general impression that a state of secu-
rity involves a static and closed setting of societies. In that sense, within moral the-
ory security is usually not an ethical value of its own, but rather an instrumental 
value to protect ethical values (but see also the considerations in Chap. 3) Thus, as 
an instrumental value, security can also be unethical, when either the protected 
goals or the means used to establish security are unethical. The same holds for 
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity, understood broadly, is usually considered as a whole bundle of 
technologies and policies to protect the cyber-infrastructure. Following Hildebrandt 
(2013), we can distinguish three main classes of technology for cybersecurity: tech-
nologies that ensure confidentiality of information (including authentication of the 
intended recipients of communication); technologies that detect and counter online 
threats and vulnerabilities; and technologies that detect and counter cybercrime 
such as forgery, fraud, child pornography and copyright violations committed in 
cyberspace. In each of those application domains, different ethical problems emerge.
Given that cybersecurity is by itself not a genuine ethical value, we may pose a 
follow-up question of how to analyse the ethical questions raised by enforcing 
cybersecurity. In this chapter, we present several ethical frameworks useful for ana-
lysing ethical questions that arise in the context of cybersecurity. We start with two 
frameworks that are important in practice: the principlist framework employed in the 
Menlo Report on cybersecurity research (Sect. 4.2) and the rights-based principle 
that is influential in the law, in particular EU law (Sect. 4.3). We show that since the 
harms and benefits caused by cybersecurity operations and policies are often prob-
able, rather than certain, both approaches cannot avoid dealing with risk and proba-
bility. Therefore, we turn to the ethics of risk, demonstrating that it is a necessary 
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complement to such approaches (Sect. 4.4). Section 4.5 considers the ethics of risk 
in more detail by considering at length two consequentialist approaches (utilitarian-
ism and maximin consequentialism), deontological approaches and contractualist 
approaches to risk, highlighting the difficulties raised by special cases. Finally, in 
Sect. 4.6, we introduce Nissenbaum’s ‘contextual integrity’ approach and extend it 
to address all the human interactions (and not only informational exchanges) affected 
by new cybersecurity applications.
4.2  Principlism
The Menlo report was intended to guide research in cybersecurity, understood tra-
ditionally as a form of investigation aimed at generalisable knowledge for the ben-
efit of society, and in so far as it deals with human subjects. However, it can also be 
applied more broadly to cybersecurity operations that involve a research compo-
nent, e.g. acts of inspections and the collection of intelligence, such as those carried 
out by computer emergency response teams, if there is direct interaction with a 
human or if there are human data (Johnson, Bellovin, and Keromytis 2011). 
Cybersecurity—“the subdiscipline of computer science concerned with ensuring 
simultaneously the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IT systems against 
the attacks of some set of adversaries” (Spring and Illari 2018, para. 1) can arguably 
produce general knowledge (Spring and Illari 2018) of a particular form. The gen-
eral knowledge produced does not take the form of scientific theories, rather the 
discovery and modelling of peculiar mechanisms (e.g. mechanisms that disrupt the 
intended working of an information system). This knowledge of mechanisms pro-
vides, in the long run and in a patchwork way, cybersecurity experts with general 
knowledge on how to detect and respond to information security challenges, and 
how to improve cybersecurity defences (Spring and Illari 2018).
Principlism is a system of ethics based on a limited number of principles (usually 
3 or 4) with a grounding in common-sense morality and professional ethical prac-
tice (see also Chap. 7). An instance of principlism is the Belmont Report for the 
protection of human research subjects, which includes three principles: Respect for 
Persons, Beneficence, and Justice. The Menlo Report (US Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate) adapted this approach to the context 
of Information and Communication Technology Research (Kenneally et al. 2010; 
Kenneally and Bailey 2013), using the same principles and highlighting ways of 
applying them to the cybersecurity domain.
Principlism is a form of deontology (deontology = the study of duty). The main 
principles of the theory can be regarded as the sources of prima facie duties in the 
sense of W.D. Ross (2002). According to Ross, an action’s moral rightness cannot 
be explained in terms of its being productive of the good; rather, it should be anal-
ysed by considering prima facie duties. For example, if I fulfil my promise to you, 
what makes it right that I do so is not the consequences of fulfilling my promise but 
rather the fact that I promised. Of course, this is not to imply that I should respect 
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my promise even when this would produce disastrous consequences. The way Ross 
explains this is by claiming that the duty to ‘respect one’s promises’ is not the only 
duty and it is only a prima facie duty. A person also has a duty to relieve distress, 
which (in certain situations) may override the duty to keep one’s promise. The prima 
facie duty to keep one’s promise makes it right to keep one’s promise if it is a stron-
ger prima facie duty than conflicting prima facie duties, or if there are no other 
prima facie duties. The theory of prima facie duties is an alternative to the conse-
quentialist theory that all conflicts of duties should be resolved by asking which 
action produces the most good. Instead, with prima facie duties there is no higher- 
order theory to determine how conflicts of duties are to be resolved.
It is not difficult to see that the logic of Ross’s prima facie duties can be applied 
to principlism. The three (or four) principles in principlism can be regarded as prima 
facie duties: from the moral point of view, we always have good reasons to respect 
persons, to pursue the good of others, to avoid harming them, and to act justly in the 
absence of countervailing considerations. However, in practice, the duties implied 
by those principles may conflict and, when this happens, the principles must be bal-
anced against each other. In the tradition of principlism, the balance of different 
duties occurs according to intersubjective agreements that, as in prima facie duties 
theories, are not theoretically predetermined in advance.
The principlist approach is a modest, minimalist framework that affords signifi-
cant flexibility. It leaves to the researchers, or cybersecurity operatives, the difficult 
task of identifying the specific factors and circumstances that should carry weight in 
deliberations concerning a concrete case and the even more difficult task of weigh-
ing these considerations against each other when trade-offs occur.
Let us now briefly introduce the three principles of the Menlo Report. Respect for 
persons concerns all those cases in which data may be linked with identifiable per-
sons, e.g. data concerning communication between individuals or IP addresses which 
may be linked to individuals. Respect also involves all research in which consent can 
be asked and in which it is realistically considered a necessary condition of research, 
for example some forms of experimental (psychological) research on human factors 
in cybersecurity, performed in the lab with research subjects recruited for that purpose 
(e.g. Hadlington 2017). One area of cybersecurity research that involves such meth-
ods is research on human factors of cybersecurity, which includes the experimental 
study of user acceptance, confusion, frustration, cognitive workload, error/risk reduc-
tion and the optimisation of error-tolerant systems (Boyce et al. 2011). Realistically, 
however, consent is often impracticable; in such contexts, the principle of beneficence 
may be the basis of a duty to do research when the cost- benefit ratio clearly favours it 
(Kenneally et al. 2010). The benefit principle applies in all generality to cybersecurity 
research; it should be understood as the principle of maximising probable benefit and 
minimising probable harm. Minimising harm also requires considering the full spec-
trum of risks to persons, including reputational, emotional, financial and physical 
harm (Kenneally et al. 2010). Justice involves a distributive aspect, concerning the 
fair distribution of the benefits and possible burdens of research. So for example, 
research should not be designed in such a way that one group benefits from the 
research while another group bears the burdens (e.g. re-identification).
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4.3  Human Rights
The idea of a balance, familiar in the context of prima facie duties, is often used to 
discuss a trade-off between the extent to which human rights can be respected and 
security be achieved. The existence of a trade-off implies the weighing of different 
duties: e.g. which duty—protecting the security of personal information (e.g. by 
favouring the diffusion of encryption technology) or preventing criminal attacks 
(e.g. by limiting the diffusion of encryption technology or requiring device makers 
to build back doors)—should take priority in a given context?
Note that the duty of protecting the security of personal information is here both 
a duty of cybersecurity and a duty in relation to human rights (the human right to 
privacy). This should not be a surprise. Indeed, cybersecurity technology that aims 
to protect privacy and confidentiality, such as encryption, is in general aligned with 
human rights; the threat to human rights is typically not cybersecurity, but inade-
quate cybersecurity or the lack thereof. However, there might be cases in which 
cybersecurity technology for the protection of privacy and confidentiality is both a 
means to privacy and a threat. Cybersecurity technologies such as encryption are 
naturally accompanied by authentication (which distinguishes those who have the 
right to obtain the non-encrypted information from the rest); authentication involves 
certification and the management of credentials. This requires the collection of 
information about individuals, which may expose users to privacy infringement.
Other kinds of cybersecurity technologies—those involved in monitoring web 
trafficking and fighting cybercrime—are in more direct conflict with human rights. 
Monitoring is associated with surveillance and surveillance involves threats of cen-
sorship (which can be a violation of the human right to free speech) and eavesdrop-
ping (which can be violation of the human right to due process). Moreover, 
monitoring is associated with profiling. Profiling “may be used by the police or 
security agencies to find criminals or terrorists; by airports to decide who to check 
more carefully” (Yaghmaei et al. 2017: 29–30). Hence, profiling is associated with 
potential violations of the human right against discrimination, because in profiling 
“people are approached, judged or treated in a certain way because these have char-
acteristics that fit a certain profile and that are associated with certain other traits 
(i.e. traits other than by which they are identified as belonging to the profile)” 
(Yaghmaei et  al. 2017: 29). The main ethical issue in profiling is not privacy, 
although personal information may be used to build profiles. It is the fact that “pro-
filing may inflict all kinds of undeserved harm on people, from nuisance to false 
accusations to even, in extreme cases, imprisonment of innocent people” (Yaghmaei 
et  al. 2017: 29–30). This happens because in profiling “a generalisation is made 
based on limited information about a person” (Yaghmaei et al. 2017: 30). The sta-
tistical discrimination involved in any form of profiling is only in conflict with the 
human right to non-discrimination when profiling involves specific (typically, 
legally protected) categories:
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The fundamental right of non-discrimination concerns the prohibition of discrimination in 
the context of occupation or employment, the provision of goods and services or other 
important domains of everyday life such as housing, social security or healthcare. Such 
prohibitions, which vary across jurisdictions, are limited to a set of grounds and do not 
touch price discrimination based on economic calculation or actuarial approaches to insur-
ance. (Hildebrandt 2013, 368)
Protecting the human right to non-discrimination is one of the goals of (most) 
data protection regulation and is enshrined in Chapter III of the EU Charter, which
includes […] gender equality (Article 23) [and] also prohibits ‘[a]ny discrimination based 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, prop-
erty, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ (Article 21). The underlying objectives of 
equality and non-discrimination principles have been further pursued in the EU secondary 
law such as the Equal Treatment Directive in the context of employment (Directive 2006/54/
EC) and the Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irre-
spective of racial or ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43). (Jasmontaite et al. 2017, 81; see also 
Chapter 5)
The cybersecurity technologies protecting individuals from cybercrime may 
conflict with human rights. Cybercrime may be defined to include four different 
broad categories of crime: cybertrespass, cybervandalism, cyberpiracy and com-
puter fraud (Brey 2007). The first concerns gaining unauthorised access to data and 
information systems, the second disrupting processes and corrupting data, the third 
reproducing and distributing software or content which violates intellectual prop-
erty and the fourth the misrepresentation of identity or information for the sake of 
deception for personal gain (Brey 2007).
The tension between the third type of cybersecurity and human rights should be 
clear from the outset, for the fight against cybercrime often involves “technologies 
to gain secret access to computing systems, to capture, observe and/or intercept data 
and content” (Hildebrandt 2013: 371). However, gaining access to and capturing 
data involves exactly the kind of cyber-threats to the privacy of information and 
confidentiality of communication that the first kind of cybersecurity technologies is 
designed to protect people from.
Hildebrandt (2013) observes that the expression ‘to balance’ can be used in this 
context to indicate two very different concepts. In the sense of a trade-off, the con-
cept of a balance implies that it is necessary to curtail, imperfectly realise or nar-
rowly specify a right’s content in order to achieve a high enough level of security. 
But the core of the human right in question should not be compromised to achieve 
a marginal gain in cybersecurity and other ways of enhancing cybersecurity without 
undermining rights have to be explored, even if they are significantly less efficient, 
easy to realise or comprehensive. The idea of a ‘balance’ may also refer to some-
thing different from a trade-off. Balance, as in the expression of ‘checks and bal-
ances’, indicates quite a different concept. This is the idea that any increase in 
security measures needs to be accompanied by a proportional increase in alternative 
safeguards of the human rights, which cybersecurity risks undermining. Importantly, 
balancing cybersecurity and human right, in this sense, means creating checks and 
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balances to protect human rights that may be threatened by heightened cybersecu-
rity measures.
What are the rights that need to be balanced with cybersecurity? According to 
Hildebrandt, those rights are privacy, data protection, non-discrimination, due pro-
cess and free speech. We have already mentioned examples involving some of these 
above. With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), the right to physical 
integrity becomes also paramount, due to the capacity of attacks to undermine the 
physical integrity of individuals whose life-sustaining functions depend on the 
proper functioning of ICT mechanisms, for example in the health domain (Weber 
2010; Mittelstadt 2017; Weber et al. 2018). For example, it is the physical integrity 
of a person that is a stake, if a ‘black hat’ hacker—a hacker moved by malicious 
intent—aims to access the software in a pacemaker in order to disrupt it and kill or 
harm the person who has it (Newman 2017).
Interestingly, Hildebrandt argues that if privacy is understood as “the freedom 
from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity” (Agre and 
Rotenberg 1998: 7) then the other four rights are actually implied by the right to 
privacy in the era of smart environments (but arguably this extension does not 
include the fifth right we added to Hildebrand’s list, of physical integrity). 
Hildebrandt explains the connection as follows: data collection and the profiling of 
the data subject define our identity for others and make us vulnerable to be defined 
by other people in ways that we would not choose to endorse; profiling enables 
discrimination practices against specific individuals or types or categories or groups 
of individuals—it bypasses conscious, reflective attitudes and plans that are key to 
being able to use due process. Free speech is also affected by the inability to control 
processes that steer our thinking (and expression) in ways that are unreflective, 
sometimes even unconscious. This includes “freedom from monitoring, filtering, 
and blocking of Internet traffic” (Hildebrandt 2013: 369). Of course, not all forms 
of monitoring, filtering and blocking of traffic have a negative impact on the human 
interests that the human right to free speech is meant to protect. The problem is, 
however, that essentially the same technologies that allow an Internet service pro-
vider, for example, to inspect traffic to identify and block malware, or other illegal 
content (including pirated media) may also be used to monitor and filter the contents 
of speech in a politically non-neutral way, which counts as a violation to the core 
interest that the human right to free speech is meant to protect. Thus, all cybersecu-
rity technologies involving the monitoring and filtering are potential threats to this 
right. Interestingly, European law allows Internet service providers to inspect pack-
ages against malware and other security threats if this results from their own initia-
tives, but prohibit courts to oblige them to do so, to protect copyright (Hildebrandt 
2013: 369). This example demonstrates that courts themselves (in this case the 
European Court of Justice) engage in balancing (in both senses of the expression) 
when interpreting the scope of fundamental human rights. In this case, the courts 
may have reasoned that citizens’ interest in avoiding cybertrespass and cybervandal-
ism has sufficient weight to justify the use of monitoring and filtering technology in 
spite of the risks involved, whereas citizens’ (and companies’) interests in avoiding 
cyberpiracy do not. Alternatively, they may have reasoned that the monitoring and 
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filtering of malware, given its nature, is less likely to imply censorship consequences 
than the monitoring and filtering of content related to intellectual property.
The following example, inspired by a real-world case study (Dittrich et al. 2011), 
illustrates the principlist and rights-based approach applied to the deployment of 
cybersecurity technology for monitoring computer systems in a response to a cyber-
security attack.
An information warfare monitor: You are investigating a malicious botnet, the victims of 
which included the foreign embassies of dozens of countries, the Tibetan government-in- 
exile and multinational consulting firms. You begin your research by reviewing data col-
lected by passive monitoring of suspected victim networks, which confirms the intrusions 
and identifies the malware. You collect more data from compromised computers with the 
owners’ consent, monitor the command and control (C&C) infrastructure enough to under-
stand the attackers’ activities and to enable notification of infected parties at the appropriate 
time, work with government authorities in multiple jurisdictions to take down the attacker’s 
C&C infrastructure, and store and handle data securely. (Adapted from Dittrich et al. 2011)
An information warfare monitor poses threats to right to privacy and of free 
speech of the suspected and actual victims (which may be particularly relevant for 
an exiled government). These threats are posed by the passive monitoring of sus-
pected victim monitors (without consent) and subsequent data collection from the 
affected computers (with consent). In terms of the principlist approach, informed 
consent and notification fulfil the duty of respect of persons. In terms of the rights-
based approach, they can be regarded as a way to balance (in the sense of checks 
and balances) the risk to the privacy of the victims caused from monitoring. Informed 
consent, it may be claimed, reduces the vulnerability to which a privacy breach and 
surveillance expose the subject of the right. Moreover, from a principlist point of 
view, security measures taken in the storing and handling of data from the comput-
ers of the victim (e.g. encryption, anonymisation, etc.) fulfil the duty of beneficence 
(which includes nonmaleficence as risk reduction). From the perspective of a human 
rights approach, they can be seen as a way to balance (in the sense of ‘checks and 
balances’) the heightened risk to privacy and informational self-determination of all 
other persons that the data in the infected computers may identify.
4.4  From Principlism and Human Rights to the Ethics 
of Risk
Hildebrandt advocates a legal approach (the ‘triple test’; explained below) which 
involves both balancing as a trade-off and balancing as in ‘checks and balances’. 
Some kind of trade-off is unavoidable when considering a rich and diversified set of 
human rights, because the duty implied by respect for one right may contradict the 
duty implied by respect for a different right. However, the idea of accepting a trade- 
off involving a human right may appear to contradict the very idea of a right, if a 
right is a side-constraint; that is, a rigid constraint defining the permissible scope of 
all other moral actions (Nozick 1974), or a ‘trump card’ (Dworkin 1977); that, is a 
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consideration defeating all other utility considerations. According to those views, 
rights are different from other interests because they are the kind of things that soci-
eties cannot violate even when the violation clearly leads to a maximisation of 
aggregate interests (Rawls 1999: 3).
However, unless rights are very few and limited in the kind of duties they entail,1 
they are very likely to logically contradict each other in practical contexts. This is 
especially true of human rights as they are quite numerous and tend to have signifi-
cant implications in terms of the resources and duties required by society to satisfy 
them.
The way Hildebrandt and John Rawls2 address the problem of trade-offs involv-
ing rights is by acknowledging the necessity of limiting rights “without losing their 
substance” (Hildebrandt 2013: 375). What that means, in practice, is that one has to 
draw a distinction between the core elements of a right, which ought never be sacri-
ficed (what Rawls calls “the central range of applications” [Rawls 1982: 11]) and 
those elements that are peripheral and should be satisfied, when possible, and sacri-
ficed when they conflict with the core elements of another right. The hope is to be 
able to achieve, in a rationally defensible way, what Rawls calls a fully adequate 
scheme of rights and liberties. In doing so, pragmatic elements (what historical 
experience teaches us about the co-possibility of satisfying different rights within a 
coherent institutional arrangement) also play a role. However, deciding what appli-
cations of a human right are central to its meaning requires some kind of theory 
about the social function of the right in question.3
Hildebrand’s triple test, which derives from an interpretation of the second para-
graph of Art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (binding for the 52 
states of the Council of Europe), requires that a right’s infringement “must be in 
accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society and have a legitimate 
aim” (Hildebrandt 2013: 375). The necessity requirement “is understood as a 
requirement of proportionality between infringing measure and legitimate aim” 
(Hildebrandt 2013: 376). Proportionality is, philosophically, a difficult notion, but 
in the context of Hildbrandt’s reasoning it may be interpreted, again, as a weighing 
1 This is arguably the case of a framework that only includes Nozickian libertarian ownership 
rights. These are strict negative rights prohibiting aggression and other forms of non-consensual 
interference aimed at dispossessing individuals of the fruits of their labor and of voluntary 
exchanges with other individuals.
2 See for instance (Rawls 1982, 1996 Lecture VII: §8–11).
3 This, of course, leaves open the question of how to address a conflict of rights when the clash 
involves the peripheral area of both rights, or the core area of both rights. There is no time here to 
dwell on the analysis of this problem. Perhaps it is acceptable to claim that it is compatible with 
respect for human rights to decide democratically which of two rights to sacrifice when both are 
involved only peripherally; the real tragic case is the one of a conflict between the cores of two 
rights, and perhaps a viable approach here is compensation (not necessarily only monetary). One 
potential solution that appears problematic here is a maximising one (i.e. to choose the combina-
tion of rights that maximises a given parameter). Any sufficiently pluralist conception of the fun-
damental interests and values behind such rights entails that there is no single metric to be 
maximised. That element of pluralism is perhaps what distinguishes, most fundamentally, a rights 
approach from a utilitarian one.
4 Ethical Frameworks for Cybersecurity
82
of the likelihood that, should a given privacy infringement not be allowed, an inter-
est in the central range of application of some other right will be at risk, combined 
with a weighing of the likelihood that the cybersecurity measure adopted will not 
undermine the overall protection of the core human interests protected by the right 
in the core range of application of the right. An illustration of this could be the 
interpretation offered above of a high court decision to allow ISP to monitor and 
filter Internet traffic against malware and other cyberthreats, but to prohibit lower 
courts to oblige ISP to monitor and filter Internet traffic against violations of copy-
right laws.
Note, however, that even in a human rights approach, it is impossible to escape 
some probabilistic assessment of the risks of violating a right. Thus a right-based 
theory, no less than principlism, involves the assessment of risk and probabilities at 
some level of analysis. The evaluation of probabilities is explicit in the idea of risk- 
benefit analysis that is also explicitly invoked by the Menlo report in the application 
of the benevolence principle in practice.
It seems legitimate to conclude that the ethical assessment of cybersecurity 
always depends on risk assessment of a probabilistic form. Risk-assessment is 
normally understood as an aspect of the consequentialist approaches that justify 
the line of action that produces the biggest net benefit. When the outcomes are 
uncertain, actions and policies can only be assessed in terms of their expected net 
benefit. However, beyond utilitarianism (that is only concerned with outcomes) 
risk-benefit assessments are an integral aspect of any ethical framework that 
assesses the morality actions also in relation to their outcomes; for example, it is 
invoked by most interpretations of the duty of beneficence in principlist approaches 
in research ethics. Note that the Menlo Report states very clearly that the risk-
benefit assessment under the heading of beneficence is not meant to be restricted 
in scope to research subjects. Instead, “[…] researchers should systematically 
assess risks and benefits across all stakeholders. In so doing, researchers should be 
mindful that risks to individual subjects are weighed against the benefits to society, 
not to the benefit of individual researchers or research subjects themselves” 
(Dittrich and Kenneally 2012 L 9).
Balancing a cybersecurity measure that poses a threat to privacy with heightened 
privacy guarantees requires an assessment of proportionality between the risk that a 
cybersecurity measure is meant to protect society against and the threat (free speech, 
due process, non-discrimination or data protection) that it constitutes against a 
human right. This presupposes a consideration of the probability of the violation of 
a right in the core area of application of such right.
4.5  Cybersecurity and the Ethics of Risk
In what follows, we shall consider a single cybersecurity case as a way of illustrat-
ing different approaches to the ethics of risk.
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Responding to ransomware: You are the leader of a CERT team and you have identified 
ransomware (a software virus that encrypts the data in the computers infected and directs 
the victims to a payment service where, after paying 1000€, the victims can obtain the 
decryption key). You know that a partner software company has already begun to code an 
algorithm to decrypt the data; you estimate that the company has a 65% chance of success 
within one month (and a 0% chance of succeeding later). At the moment, 1000 computers 
are affected, all belonging to the network of an important hospital. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to reconstruct what data was saved in each computer and the date of the latest 
backup. The probability that an alteration or deletion of data in a single computer will cause 
the death of a patient is 1/1000 for each device.
You can choose one of two response strategies:
 – Policy A: you quarantine all the affected computers and shoot down the payment 
servers. These measures, with foreseen 100% efficacy, will prevent the spread of 
the infection and reduce the incentives for attackers to involve other computers 
in similar attacks in the near future. However, the malware is designed to detect 
your response and retaliate to it. It will irreversibly introduce random changes in 
the data in ways that are extremely hard to detect, or simply delete it. It is not 
possible to identify the data causally linked to the lives of patients in a reasonable 
amount of time.
 – Policy B: you do not isolate the affected system and do not bring down the pay-
ment server; after one month, either you have obtained the decrypting tool with 
no losses; or you have not, in which case the infection will have spread to other 
1,000,000 computers, with an expected aggregate economic loss for your society 
of €400,000,000, mostly consisting of donations of €500 to the hackers.
4.5.1  Expected Utility Maximisation
According to the moral theory of utilitarianism, the moral appraisal of any action is 
solely a function of the utility consequences of that action, i.e. of the sum total of 
well-being (or happiness) produced. (The net amount of aggregate well-being due to 
an action may also be negative if well-being losses are greater than gains.) Three 
features of utilitarianism are worth noticing: it is consequentialist, welfarist (the ethi-
cal appraisal of consequences only considers the well-being of sentient beings 
involved) and aggregative (individual losses of well-being to one individual may be 
compensated by greater gains to others). Utilitarianism is also a strictly maximising 
theory: the right action is the one that maximises well-being in the aggregate. Even an 
action that produces a net gain of well-being relative to a previous state of the world 
is wrong, if a different action leading to a greater increase of utility is feasible.
Since the consequences of virtually every action are to some degree uncertain, 
any action-guiding version of utilitarianism must not assess actions based on the 
outcome that actually materialises. The action-guiding version of utilitarianism pre-
scribes the maximisation of aggregate expected utility, by which one means the 
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probability-weighted average of utility in all possible states of the world that an 
action could cause.
The ethical dilemma for our case is to compare an expected disutility of 
€260,000,000€ (65% chance of a possible €400,000,000 damage if the decryption 
tool is not developed) with the probability of causing one or more deaths. The prob-
ability that no single computer is essential to the life of a patient is (999/1000)1000, 
which entails a 1−(999/1000)1000 —roughly a 63%—chance that one person will die 
because of the first policy. Thus, policy A imposes a significant risk to a single indi-
vidual. As a guide to cases like this, the guidance by utilitarian risk-benefit assess-
ment strikes some as counterintuitive. It requires the decision-maker to compare a 
high expected likelihood of death, for a single person, with aggregate disutility for 
a large group, formed by individuals each of whom suffers a very small loss com-
pared to death. It may seem plausible that, no matter how large in the aggregate, the 
sum of many small individuals losses cannot justify imposing a high risk of death 
for a single person. Utilitarianism, however, implies that the opposite must be the 
case: no matter how valuable a personal life (assuming a finite value), the aggregate 
of small damages inflicted to a group will count for more, if the group is large 
enough.
4.5.2  The Maximin Rule
A close relative of utilitarianism (or better, expected utility consequentialism) is 
what one may call maximin consequentialism. According to the maximin rule, in 
Hansson’s formulation:
the utility of a mixture of potential outcomes is equal to the lowest utility associated with 
any of these outcomes. (Hansson 2003: 296)
The ‘mixture’ of the potential outcomes of an action is the set of all outcomes 
whose probability of occurring is more than zero. The maximin rule orders the 
desirability of actions according to the desirability of their worst possible outcomes. 
The algorithm for the cybersecurity professional in the case at hand is:
 1. assess the total utility of the worst outcome (OA) associated with A, considered 
as if it were certain;
 2. assess the total utility of worst outcome (OB) associated with B, considered as if 
it were certain;
 3. if U(OA) > U(OB), choose A; if U(OA) < U(OB), choose B, if U(OA) = U(OB) draw 
a lottery with a 50% chance of A and B.
The worst outcome for action A is the certain death of one person; the worst 
outcome for action B is a certain damage of €400,000,000. The maximin approach 
requires that we compare the two outcomes and choose the lesser of the two. Note 
that this approach suffers from an objection analogous to utilitarianism, namely 
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that, unless an individual life has an infinite moral value, it may justify the sacrifice 
of a human life to avoid a large sum of individually limited economic damages.
Maximin is also subject to another objection. Suppose that OA is an outcome 
with a very small probability, e.g. a 1/1,000,000,000 chance of causing non- 
permanent health damage to all patients, amounting to a loss of 1,000,000,000€ in 
medical expenses and compensation. Utilitarianism entails that OA should be cho-
sen, because the expected disutility of OB, being certain, is much higher, than the 
disutility of OA, which is discounted by its low probability. Maximim requires 
choosing OB, because it does not discount the disvalue of OA because of its low 
probability. Many would find utilitarianism more plausible than Maximin, given 
that in everyday life we consider it rational to engage in activities, such as crossing 
the street, which have a very small probability of leading to very bad outcomes 
(death after being hit by a car), even for the sake of a very small utility gains (e.g. 
purchasing ice cream).
Arguably, a significant proportion of those who believe that an individual life 
should be considered more important than a loss of €400,000,000 (distributed in 
small €500 losses for each individual), may nonetheless agree that strategy A is 
justifiable, given that the risk of causing death is so small. For example, we allow 
people to drive cars, in spite of the fact that allowing car driving increases the risk 
of death for innocent pedestrians, which may in fact be higher. Maximin consequen-
tialism, however, obliges you to base your decision on what the worst possible out-
come is for each scenario, in a method that is totally insensitive to its probability.
Therefore, the problem with this approach is that it would prohibit all cybersecu-
rity measures that have some probability, no matter how low, of causing very signifi-
cant harm as a side-effect (no matter how unlikely the causal chain that would lead 
to such outcome). Another problem is the difficulty of enumerating the low- 
probability events that may be associated with a given policy. As Hansson points 
out, we have to stop considering low-probability events that may follow from our 
actions at a certain point, and there may be no non-arbitrary cut-off point. This 
would introduce a degree of moral arbitrariness in the moral evaluation of such risks 
that counts against adopting the Maximin rule (Hansson 2003: 296).
4.5.3  Deontological and Rights-Based Theories
Deontological approaches are typically built around a list of morally prohibited 
acts, that is, acts that are prohibited no matter what, i.e. irrespective of the conse-
quences. Suppose, for example, that it is not permissible to expose the private health 
condition of an individual to the public against his consent. A strict deontological 
moral system entails that it is always wrong to do so, even if, let us suppose, know-
ing this information would allow millions of shareholders of a company led by the 
sick man to reduce their exposure to financial risk. Let us refer to the acts that are 
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prohibited—even when they would maximise utility—as ‘violations of deontologi-
cal constraints’. Deontological approaches to risk claim that moral agents act 
wrongly if acting involves a non-null risk of violating a deontological constraint.
(Absolutist) rights-based theories are similar to deontological theories, but they 
are framed in a manner that shifts our attention to the person obligations are owed 
to, rather than to the agent who is obligated. If persons have rights, certain things 
cannot be done to them no matter how good the general consequences, while other 
things are owed to them, no matter what the costs are. By extension, rights-based 
theories of risk claim that moral agents ought not to perform actions that have a 
more than a null risk of violating the rights of other people. For example, every 
innocent person may be believed to have a negative right to life, entailing a duty of 
other people not to act in ways that would cause that person to die.
Let us move to a more rigorous formulation of such views. Following Hansson, 
let us define:
Probabilistic absolutism:
[for deontological theories]: If it is morally prohibited to perform a certain action, then this 
prohibition extends to all mixtures in which this action has non- zero probability.
[for rights-based theories]: If someone has a moral right that a certain action not be per-
formed, then this right extends to all mixtures in which this action has non-zero proba-
bility. (Hansson 2003: 298)
In Hansson’s terminology, mixtures are value carriers (actions, outcomes). For 
example, in the CERT case, the CERT manager is addressing the following two 
mixtures:
A: shutting down the payment server, limiting the range of computers affected by ransom-
ware and indirectly causing a person’s death;
B: not shutting down the payment server, allowing ransomware attacks to continue and 
allowing economic damage to occur.
According to probabilistic absolutism, if ‘indirectly causing an (innocent) per-
son’s death’ is impermissible, then every act that has a small probability of causing 
a person death is impermissible too. Thus, probabilistic absolutism prohibits A even 
when the probability of harming a patient is very low (e.g. equal to or less than 
0.001% in the variation of the ransomware scenario discussed in Sect. 4.5.2).
The problem with this theory is that it is, in general, too demanding for the moral 
subject who, by virtue of some apparently innocent act, associated with some terri-
ble outcome by virtue of a very unlikely chain of events, risks violating his duties. 
It also prevents the execution of many acts of beneficence (often attempts to do the 
good have a very small probability of doing some evil). Often, agents will face a 
dilemma in which they will violate duties whichever option they choose.
Some of the implausible consequences of probabilistic absolutism are avoided 
by risk-deontological and risk-rights-based theories  acknowledging  a probability 
limit.
Probability limit for risk-deontological theories: Each prohibition of an action is associated 
with a probability limit. The prohibition extends to a mixture that contains the action if and 
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only if the action has, in that mixture, a probability that is above the probability limit. 
(Hansson 2003: 298)4
In the threshold approach, risk-deontological (or risk-rights-based) constraints 
generate moral duties only if the risk of violating a deontological constraint (or 
another person’s rights) is higher than a given threshold value. Therefore, it is legiti-
mate to ignore risk-deontological (or risk-rights-based) prohibitions when we do 
actions that only have a very low chance of causing violations of these constraints.
This approach may seem to deliver a reasonable method to assess the scenario 
described above. With a probability threshold set to 5%, policy A would be 
impermissible in the first case discussed (where the risk of death of a patient was 
>60%) but not in the second one (where the probability of health damage was 
extremely low).
The main problem with the theory is that it appears difficult to justify such 
thresholds (e.g. how low should the probability of killing an innocent be to allow it 
to occur?). Not only it is difficult to justify a single threshold, but it seems even 
harder to justify different thresholds for different types of harm (e.g. how high 
should the threshold for allowing economic damage be set, in comparison to the 
threshold for causing death?) a priori.
Justice theories may explain some intuitions concerning the imposition of risk. 
Some of these theories imply that it is ceteris paribus ethically wrong to impose risk 
on individuals who are already vulnerable to risk instead of targeting less vulnerable 
people (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007; Ferretti 2009, 2016). For example, if a threat 
exists that could lead to the irremediable loss of equally sensitive data, it is ceteris 
paribus wrong to let the risk be imposed on poor instead of wealthier people. This 
is because, for the former, losing €500 due to the ransom may involve a significant 
sacrifice of economic security, which may increase their exposure to other kinds of 
risk (e.g. tackling disease or unemployment). Ferretti’s (2016) theory focuses on 
total risk, suggesting that the threshold level should be different when duties affect 
persons in circumstances that already add to/reduce their total risk level. Similar 
implications can be drawn from capability-based theories of disadvantage and risk 
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007; Murphy and Gardoni 2012).5
These non-deontological theories explain intuitions, which may be quite wide-
spread, that what counts as an “acceptable level of risk” depends on both the kind 
of risk in question and the situation of the person affected by this risk. In contrast 
to the latter, risk-deontological (or risk-rights based) theories of risk assume an 
equal risk- threshold for all. The risk-deontological approach as such does not provide 
4 The probability limit for rights-based theories can be defined along similar lines.
5 These theories measure the impact of risk in terms of their impact on capabilities, defined as genu-
ine opportunities to achieve valuable functionings (Sen 2009; Nussbaum 2006). The approach by 
Wolff and De Shalit (2007) focuses in particular on the fact that certain categories of risks tend to 
affect more than one capability. It attributes more harmful effects to ‘cross-category risks’ and 
‘inverse cross-category risks’.
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any principled guidance to assign different levels of risks in different cases.6 In 
order to justify a different risk threshold, one needs to appeal to some independent 
conception of fairness in risk distribution. One last approach we will consider is the 
one provided by contractualism.
4.5.4  Contractualism and Risk
Aggregative views in general (not just aggregative views on risk) are exposed to 
peculiar counterexamples; the cybersecurity response to ransomware in Sect. 4.5.1 
may be taken as one such example. The cybersecurity response A, which imposes a 
65% risk that a person will die, seems morally objectionable because the sum of 
individual small losses, no matter how large, cannot justify imposing a significant 
risk of death to a single person.
The philosopher Thomas Scanlon has proposed contractualism as an alternative to 
utilitarianism. Contractualism compares the strength of the individual claims without 
aggregating them (Scanlon 1998: 235). Scanlon’s way of comparing individual com-
plaints has later been labelled the MiniMax Complaint principle, which states that 
“when we would not be violating any moral constraints, we are morally required to 
act in the way that minimises the strongest individual complaint” (Horton 2017, 55). 
In our example, the relevant complaints concern (a) the life of one individual person 
whose medical treatment depends on the integrity of the encrypted data and (b) the 
individual loss of €500 of one individual, not yet affected, who will end up paying a 
ransom for his encrypted data if further attacks are not prevented by shooting down 
the payment server. Since the complaint against death is greater than the complaint 
against a ransom, one ought not to quarantine the computers and to shoot down the 
payment servers.
There is a lively philosophical debate on how to interpret the MiniMax Complaint 
principle in cases involving risk. Consider the choice between two vaccines, assum-
ing that choosing either one is necessary to avoid the spread in the population of an 
epidemic that will unavoidably kill everyone on Earth. Vaccine A has a one in a 
million chance of killing the user as a side effect; vaccine B leads to the certain 
paralysis of one limb for all users. The ex post version of the MiniMax Complaint 
(Scanlon 1998; Reibetanz 1998; Otsuka 2015), requires choosing B, since it adopts 
the perspective of a person who is certainly going to die as a result of A. Here it is 
assumed that in a population of several billion people it is almost certain that some-
one will die, but the identity of this person cannot be known in advance. In the ex 
post approach, the claim of the statistical individual who will unavoidably die is 
stronger (for ex post contractualism) than the claims of every person who, if the 
6 However, they can be used to represent all the appropriate beliefs. For example, a deontological 
theory can be a simple list of many different duties and rights, associated with specific probabilities 
specified at the level of concrete situations.
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other vaccine is chosen, will only end up paralysed. Many find this 
counterintuitive.
An alternative theory is ex ante contractualism (Lenman 2008; James 2012; 
Frick 2015). A simple ex ante version compares complaints in terms of expected 
harm, that is to say, the outcome is weighted by the probability of its occurrence. 
Thus, the risk of 1 in a billion chance of losing life may be considered weaker than 
having a paralysed limb with full certainty. Thus the ex ante view justifies using 
vaccine A. This is considered more plausible by those who think, for example, that 
compulsory vaccination for non-lethal diseases is not necessarily morally wrong, 
even it is known in advance that some people will die because of lethal 
complications.
Ex ante contractualism may appear to have plausible implications in the case of 
a CERT’s response to ransomware. When the risk of a patient’s death (for each 
patient) is very low, it entails that it is permissible to quarantine the system and put 
the server used for the payments of the ransom offline. When the risk is significant, 
it prohibits sacrificing the patients.
But even ex ante contractualism has detractors. The objections against it can be 
explained more easily by focusing on a different case:
A choice of anti-malware: You are dealing with malware that turns the affected computers 
into nodes in a botnet performing a distributed denial-of-service attack against servers in an 
important hospital, which risks placing the lives of its patients at risk. You have three anti- 
malware tools in your arsenal, all of which are effective against the malware. However, the 
malware is designed to retaliate by wiping out the entire hard disk, as soon as it is discon-
nected from the malicious server. A preliminary study of the malware shows that it could be 
fought with three different software approaches. Each of them fails in specific ways to limit 
the damage. Due to time and resource constraints, you can develop only one of these before 
the malware spreads, causing morally intolerable human damage. Which one do you 
develop?
 – Anti-malware 1: it protects all computers but deletes all Excel and Word files 
during installation.
 – Anti-malware 2: it only works on non-Apple operating systems, which entails 
that Apple systems will have to be quarantined (and will lose all data). Ten per-
cent of the computers in the botnet are Apple ones.
 – Anti-malware 3: it works perfectly on all computers, except on those with some 
specific UUIDs, Universal Unique Identifiers, assigned by the malware itself. It 
is impossible to determine the UUID generated by the malware without trigger-
ing a malware response that would erase all data. Hence, for every practical 
purpose, the UUID of each infected computer can be considered unknown and 
unknowable. It is known, however, that the malware will wipe out all the data if 
the last numerical digit of the UUID it assigned to device is 0. Since every Arabic 
numeral has the same chance of being the last numerical digit in these UUIDs, 
every computer has an ex ante 10% probability of being wiped out completely 
and a 90% probability of being rescued completely.
Let us begin by comparing Anti-malware 1 vs. 2. Ex ante contractualism here 
entails weighing the ex ante complaint of Mac users (having the hard-disc com-
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pletely wiped out) vs. the ex ante complaint of other users (having only text and 
spreadsheet files deleted), considered individually. Since Mac users have the 
 strongest ex ante complaint (they are 100% sure of having all their files deleted), 
contractualism requires that you choose anti-malware 1. In the imaged scenario, 
Apple software runs on 10% of the affected computers; note, however, that contrac-
tualism would have implied the same response if there had been a single Mac user 
in the botnet.
Let us now consider anti-malware 1 vs. anti-malware 3. Suppose that you have 
established empirically that each computer owner strongly prefers a lottery with a 
90% chance of rescuing the data and a 10% probability of losing all data in the 
computer, compared to the certain loss of all their text and spreadsheet files. Ex ante 
utilitarianism entails, in this case, that you ought to choose anti-malware 3.
Is the choice of malware 3 morally unobjectionable? Similar cases in moral phi-
losophy have been criticised for two reasons. First, it treats identified individuals, 
such as owners of Mac computers, differently from statistical individuals, e.g. own-
ers of computers with a UUID whose last numeral digit is 0, whose identity can be 
determined only after they suffered from the harm. However, the difference between 
statistical individuals and identified individuals seems entirely morally arbitrary—
in no way are statistical individuals less worthy of respect. Second, it uses statistical 
individuals as means: their interests are sacrificed to promote the aggregate good 
(Rüger 2018).7
In summary, it seems reasonable to expect that some situations faced in cyberse-
curity analysis and operation deal with outcomes that are not certain, but to which 
probabilities (often, mere subjective probabilities) can be assigned. Unfortunately, 
utilitarianism suffers from known objections (sacrificing the individual for the 
greater good) and there are hard cases in which the most intuitively plausible ver-
sion of contractualism is no different from utilitarianism in this respect.
4.6  Contextual Integrity
Contextual integrity is a framework for understanding privacy, both descriptively 
(i.e. why do people find some technologies upsetting?) and normatively (should 
society favour the introduction of certain technologies?) (Nissenbaum 2004, 2009). 
The main insight of this theory is that privacy violations consist of violations of 
social norms concerning the transmission of information between persons. The rel-
evant social norms are specific for the social contexts/practices and the social roles 
that individuals have within those practices. For example, the transmission of infor-
mation between patient and physician in a hospital, spouses within a family, priest 
7 Philosophers have tried to avoid these types of problems by providing more sophisticated formu-
lations of both ex ante and ex post versions of contractualism. All appear to be vulnerable to coun-
terexamples and, for this reasons, it has been argued that the Minimax Complaint view should be 
abandoned altogether when dealing with risk (Horton 2017).
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and confessor within the church, employer and employee within a company, police-
men and citizen within the state, need not be (and usually are not) governed by the 
same informational norms. Individuals have privacy when established expectations 
concerning the way information should be transmitted are respected—this is com-
patible with people expecting different people in different contexts to handle their 
information in very different ways. However, not all changes of social norms and 
expectations concerning information should be considered violations of privacy 
since, as we shall see, some changes in informational norms may be justified, all 
things considered.
Contextual integrity is a mildly conservative theory. The violation of a contextual 
integrity norm provides a prima facie case for considering a new practice (e.g. the 
introduction of a new cybersecurity technology) as a sensitive privacy issue. 
However, the overall evaluation of the innovation may turn out to be justified in the 
end. Thus, the theory has a conservative bias, but it does not support conservative 
prescriptions in every case. Violating established expectations can be significantly 
harmful,8 but it may not be wrong overall. The conservative bias of the theory can 
be overcome by pointing out, following the work of Michael Walzer (1983), that a 
transformation even in an established social norm can provide a more sensible 
method to achieve the goals that actors in a practice are set to achieve, without alter-
ing the most general relevant principles applying to the domain, and without violat-
ing the fundamental rights and interests of all those affected (Nissenbaum 2009: 
Chap. 8).
In recent work (2009), Nissenbaum explains how to use the theory as a basis for 
the empirical analysis of technologies that are perceived as raising a privacy prob-
lem; the feeling of a technology being problematic is explained as a consequence of 
its violation of expectations concerning information, given the existing context- 
relevant social norms. The moral assessment is driven by the assessment of the goal 
of the practice and the framework of more general principles and values applying 
across domains. Nissenbaum’s privacy as contextual integrity is directly relevant to 
assessing cybersecurity technologies whose goal is to ensure the confidentiality of 
information. It is also pertinent to assessing technologies for detecting online threats 
and counter cybercrime, since such technologies are likely to affect the way infor-
mation is accessed and used as a side effect.
8 Nissenbaum (2004, Chap. 8) justifies the conservative inclination of the theory by considering 
arguments for conservativism provided by the radical utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham 
(1747–1832) and the conservative philosopher Edmund Burke (1729–1797). Bentham argues that 
laws contradicting established ones tend to undermine the sense of security that derives from estab-
lished expectations about the law. Thus, radical legal innovations could bring about—at least dur-
ing the transition to a new legal regime—a utility loss, making it more difficult for agents to plan 
rationally in the pursuit of their own goals. Burke, on the other hand, considers established customs 
as the product of accumulated wisdom, which normally exceeds the ability of the individual minds 
to build models of social interactions and solutions for social problems that work in practice. 
Arguably, both arguments apply also to abrupt changes in conventional norms concerning 
information.
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Moreover, some aspects of Nissenbaum’s framework can be expanded and 
applied beyond its original scope, i.e. privacy. In particular, let us assume that the 
moral importance of contextual integrity derives from the value (in terms of 
 security, peace of mind and the ability to rationally plan one’s life) of fulfilling 
expectations. If so, there is no reason to consider only expectations connected with 
informational norm, as Nissenbaum’s approach does. Her theory can be gener-
alised into a more overarching theory that requires cybersecurity agents to consider 
established social norms and expectations concerning the actions (e.g. ‘investigat-
ing a crime’, ‘assessing the trustworthiness of an employee’, ‘responding to an 
emergency in a patient’) and not only those associated with the way information is 
accessed, transacted and used.
We thus conclude this essay by sketching a methodology for the ethical assess-
ment of cybersecurity technology, which is essentially a version of Nissenbaum’s 
contextual integrity privacy framework (2009: Chap. 9), extended to include social 
norms and expectations affecting all human interactions that are constitutive of an 
established social practice. The approach applies to all cases in which the adoption 
of a cybersecurity policy, or technology, affects the way information is exchanged. 
It also applies to all cases in which it affects the relations between people with 
established roles (roles linked to stable expectations) within the institution (e.g. 
hospital, company) or practice (e.g. diagnosis, marketing) that is affected by them. 
Following Nissenbaum, the framework consists of the following steps:
 1. Establish the prevailing context of the cybersecurity measures in question (e.g. 
finance, law-enforcement, administration, business, medicine or some combina-
tion of more than one context);
 2. Ascertain the information attributes (e.g. citizen’s name, age, amount and entity 
of commercial transactions, purchase type) affected by the cybersecurity mea-
sures proposed; ascertain what aspects of human interactions (which are not 
defined by informational exchanges) are affected
 3. Determine what changes in the principles/social norms governing the transmis-
sion of information are foreseeably due to the cybersecurity measures; determine 
other foreseeable changes in human interactions and modalities of operation in 
practice;
 4. Red flags: if the new cybersecurity measures generate changes in the actors (e.g. 
client, financial institution employee, police investigator, nurse, physician), attri-
butes (e.g. the kind of information/interaction affected) or relevant social norms, 
flag the measure as a prima facie violation of the contextual integrity of the 
domain in question. This counts as a prima facie violation and counts against the 
measure unless it can be justified in steps 5 and 6 below.
 5. For a technology that has raised a red flag, determine what are the socially valu-
able goals and the core EU values and rights affected by the change in informa-
tional norms and expectations concerning the social interactions that have been 
detected;
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 6. For a technology that has raised a red flag, determine if the changes caused in 
this way improve the prospects of the actors to achieve the valuable goals of the 
practice; determine also whether they conflict with core EU values and rights.
4.7  Conclusions
This chapter presented several ethical frameworks for evaluating cybersecurity 
threats, countermeasures and policies. The chapter began with an examination of 
two influential approaches, the principlist approach (especially influential for the 
ethics of cybersecurity research) and the human rights approach (especially impor-
tant for the law, in particular EU law). Both approaches are non-utilitarian, in that 
they do not define as morally right, or morally required, those cybersecurity acts (or 
policies) that maximise the good, defined as a single value (e.g. utility, or happi-
ness). We then demonstrated that both these non-utilitarian approaches raise ques-
tions about the ethics of risks and present different ethical approaches to evaluating 
risk. Finally, we presented Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity theory both as 
a framework to understand why some technological changes are perceived as prob-
lematic and as a normative approach to assess whether they count as privacy viola-
tions all things considered. We proposed a revised version of Nissenbaum’s 
contextual integrity framework for identifying and ethically assessing changes 
brought about by cybersecurity measures and policies, not only in relation to pri-
vacy but more generally to the key expectations concerning human interactions 
within the practice.
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Chapter 5
Cybersecurity Regulation in the European 
Union: The Digital, the Critical 
and Fundamental Rights
Gloria González Fuster and Lina Jasmontaite
Abstract This chapter provides an overview of the European Union (EU) policies 
and legislative measures developed in an attempt to regulate cybersecurity. By 
invoking a historical perspective, policy developments that have shaped the cyber-
security landscape of the EU are highlighted. More concretely, this contribution 
investigates how the EU has been delimiting and constructing its cybersecurity poli-
cies in relation to different and sometimes opposing objectives, and questions what 
such choices reveal about (and how they determine) the evolution of the EU’s cyber-
security policy and its legal contours. For this purpose, the major steps in the evolu-
tion of the EU’s agenda on cybersecurity are analysed, ranging from the adoption of 
the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy to other numerous norms, initiatives and sectorial 
frameworks that tackle issues arising from the active use of information systems and 
networks. The chapter reviews the mobilisation of multiple areas (such as the regu-
lation of electronic communications, critical infrastructures and cybercrime) in the 
name of cybersecurity imperatives, and explores how the operationalisation of such 
imperatives surfaced in the EU cybersecurity strategy published in September 2017. 
The chapter suggests that one of the key challenges of cybersecurity regulation is to 
impose the right obligations on the right actors, through the right instrument. 
Reflecting on issues surrounding the current liability framework dating from the 
80s, it considers how principles such as data protection by design and default as 
well as the ‘duty of care’ have emerged. Finally, the chapter considers how the per-
ception of cybersecurity’s relationship with (national) security plays a determinant 
role in the current EU legislative and policy debates, where fundamental rights con-
siderations, despite being acknowledged in numerous policy documents, are only 
considered in a limited manner.
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5.1  Formulating Cybersecurity as a Policy Area and Its 
Objectives
The publication of the First European Union (EU) Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 
marked the formal establishment of ‘cybersecurity’ as a new policy area in the EU 
(European Commission and High Representative 2013). This recognition was a 
long awaited development acknowledging the blurring of lines in three initially 
distinct but converging policy areas of (1) network and information security 
measures that target operators of essential services, and providers of critical and 
digital infrastructures; (2) electronic communications, including privacy and data 
protection issues; and (3) cybercrime (van der Meulen et al. 2015; Christou 2016). 
It took over 20 years for a gradually growing number of scattered initiatives address-
ing issues concerning the digital environment—ranging from digital signatures and 
ecommerce to cybercrime and critical infrastructure—to be recognised under an 
overarching umbrella term of cybersecurity. In addition, the area has, most recently 
included measures concerning cyberdefence (Christou 2016).
This chapter aims to capture the current state of the art of the cybersecurity 
landscape in the EU. It does so by analysing EU policies and legislative measures in 
an attempt to regulate cybersecurity; identifying the challenges of conceptualising 
this policy area; reflecting on the limitations imposed on cybersecurity regulation 
by the principle of conferral and the way this affects the choice of regulatory 
measures and addressees of regulation; and, finally, discussing the triggers shaping 
cybersecurity regulation, in particular political developments and the perception of 
EU values and interests.
It is now established that a highly fragmented legal framework constitutes the 
European cybersecurity policy area and that this area is bound to develop further 
given the EU’s digital dependency. As suggested by Ramses Wessel, cybersecurity 
forms “an excellent example of an area in which the different policy fields need to 
be combined (a requirement for horizontal consistency), and where measures need 
to be taken at the level of both the EU and Member States (calling for vertical con-
sistency)” (Wessel 2015: 405). Therefore, it is proposed that the five strategic EU 
cybersecurity priorities listed below capture the complexity of the policy area and 
provide insights into how both horizontal and vertical consistency could be attained. 
The five strategic EU cybersecurity priorities are (European Commission and High 
Representative 2013: 4–16):
 – Achieving ‘cyber resilience’ by establishing minimum requirements for the func-
tioning, cooperation and coordination of national competent authorities for net-
work information systems.
 – Reducing cybercrime by (a) ensuring a swift transposition of the cybercrime 
related EU Directives, (b) encouraging ratification of the Council of Europe’s 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe 2001), and (c) funding 
programmes for the deployment of operational tools.
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 – Developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) by (a) assessing operational EU cyberdefence 
requirements, (b) developing the EU cyberdefence policy framework, (c) pro-
moting dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors in the EU, 
and (d) facilitating a dialogue with international partners.
 – Developing the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity by (a) 
establishing a public-private platform on Network and Information Security 
(NIS) solutions, (b) providing technical guidelines and recommendations for the 
adoption of NIS standards and good practices, and (c) encouraging the develop-
ment of security standards for technology ‘with stronger, embedded and user- 
friendly security features’.
 – Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and promot-
ing core EU values by mainstreaming cyberspace issues into EU external rela-
tions and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and by supporting 
capacity building on cybersecurity and resilient information infrastructures in 
third countries. More specifically, the EU should ensure that its consultations 
with international partners on cyber issues are designed to complement the exist-
ing bilateral dialogues between the Member States and third countries. These 
consultations shall be driven by the EU core values of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights. 
Following the objectives of this priority, the EU aims to attain a high level of data 
protection, including the protection of personal data transferred to third 
countries.
In summary, the term ‘cybersecurity’, from an EU perspective, entails a combi-
nation of cyber resilience, cybercrime, cyberdefence, (strictly) cybersecurity and 
global cyberspace issues.
By identifying these five distinct priority areas, the 2013 Strategy aimed “to 
make the EU’s online environment the safest in the world” (European Commission 
and High Representative 2013) —somehow challenging the cliché that no technical 
environment is 100% secure. It is hard to measure the current cybersecurity capacity 
at the EU level and whether it effectively results in the safest possible online envi-
ronment. Two ransomware attacks known under the names of WannaCry and Petya 
(malware) that broke out in 2017 indicated that many improvements, in particular in 
terms of the response and cooperation among different actors concerned with cyber-
security at EU and national level, could still be made.
The two mentioned attacks are also interesting to consider from another perspec-
tive. They constitute a particularly good demonstration of a series of characteristics 
of cybersecurity as a policy area. First, this policy area recognises that cyber-attacks 
are the new reality and that such attacks not only can have cascading effects that are 
hard to predict and but that they may also cripple many more organisations in 
Europe than anticipated. At the same time, the recognition of the seriousness of 
cyber-attacks increases in the aftermath of cyber-incidents that inflict damage on 
EU-based businesses. Secondly, tackling cyber-attacks requires close cooperation 
between well-established networks composed of both public and private entities. 
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Thirdly, ineffective cybersecurity policies may obstruct the smooth functioning of 
the Digital Single Market, which in turn may have detrimental monetary implica-
tions for individuals, businesses and the public sector.
In autumn 2017, preceding the mentioned two cyber-attacks, the European 
Commission (EC) and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy published a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union titled Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: 
Building strong cybersecurity for the EU (the Second EU Cybersecurity Strategy or 
2017 Joint Communication) which built on previous initiatives and sectorial frame-
works, such as the legal frameworks for telecommunications, electronic commerce 
and electronic signatures, policy and regulatory measures, which have traditionally 
delineated the fragmented landscape of EU’s approach to cybersecurity. The Second 
EU Cybersecurity Strategy emphasised the need for measures that would allow 
(1) building greater EU resilience to cyber-attacks, (2) facilitating detection of 
cyber- attacks, and (3) strengthening international cooperation on cybersecurity 
(European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 2017).
The 2017 Joint Communication illustrates well the evolution of the EU’s under-
standing of the cybersecurity landscape. It also foresees that for the conventional 
idea of cybersecurity being a multi-stakeholder responsibility to be implemented in 
the EU, “multiple layers of government, economy and society should be involved” 
in order to improve cybersecurity capacity (European Commission and High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017, 3). For 
this purpose, the Second EU Cybersecurity Strategy insists on having “more robust 
and effective structures to promote cybersecurity and to respond to cyber-attacks in 
the Member States but also in the EU’s own institutions, agencies and bodies”, 
which to some extent delineates the scope of the EU cybersecurity area (European 
Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy 2017: 3). Similarly important is the call for “a more comprehensive, cross- 
policy approach to building cyber-resilience and strategic autonomy, with a strong 
Single Market” which receives stronger emphasis in comparison with the First EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy (European Commission and High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017: 3). The Second EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy, despite not being a legally binding instrument, also clarifies the roles of 
different EU agencies shaping the cybersecurity policy area.1
From a legal perspective, particularly relevant is the Second Cybersecurity 
Strategy’s willingness to address liability questions in cybersecurity (European 
Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy 2017: 6). The Second EU Cybersecurity Strategy, following up on the Mid- 
Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy which 
was published in spring 2017, highlights the need to analyse the implications of new 
1 In particular, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in the domain of cybersecurity.
G. G. Fuster and L. Jasmontaite
101
technologies and to take steps to address the risks that they create. The Second EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy does not elaborate on such implications but instead relies on 
statements made in the Mid-Term Review—the high-level policy document repre-
senting positions of different units of the Commission working within this area. The 
Mid-Term Review refers to security challenges caused by Internet of Things (IoT) 
based applications, including “the safety of connected systems, products and ser-
vices, as well as for businesses’ liability” (EC 2017b: 11).2 The Mid-Term Review 
explains that “[f]aulty sensors, vulnerable software or unstable connectivity may 
make it difficult to determine who is technically and legally responsible for any 
ensuing damage” (EC 2017b: 11). In this, the EC vows to revise the existing legal 
framework to address “new technological developments (including robotics, 
Artificial Intelligence and 3D printing), especially from the angle of civil law liabil-
ity and to take into account the results of the ongoing evaluation of the Directive on 
liability for defective products and the Machinery Directive” (EC 2017b: 11).
The need to address liability in this context then resurfaces in the 2018 
Communication on Artificial Intelligence, where it is highlighted that ‘[a]s with any 
transformative technology, some AI applications may raise new ethical and legal 
questions, for example related to liability’ (EC 2018: 2). Liability was also referred 
to as a concern of cloud computing contracts (EC 2012). The frequency at which 
liability questions remerge in policy debates and documents suggests that it is a 
principled issue that requires legal consideration.
5.2  A Virtuous But Vicious Circle of Regulation: 
From Cybersecurity Law to Policy and Vice Versa
It is interesting to note that whereas the two EU Cybersecurity Strategies followed 
the adoption of numerous legislative measures concerning cybersecurity, they put 
forward policy objectives which subsequently resulted in legislation, namely the 
Network and Information Security Directive and the Cybersecurity Act, which fur-
ther clarifies the role and mandate of the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA). Building on this observation, we suggest that the 
cybersecurity area revives itself by both law and inter-area policy measures. Policy 
measures from various policy areas eventually led to changes and adjustments in 
various EU legal frameworks and vice versa. The following paragraphs provide two 
illustrative examples supporting this claim.
First, while the Second EU Cybersecurity Strategy proposes to set up an EU 
certification framework that would benefit both business and the users, the details 
over the envisioned certification framework that would “inform and reassure 
2 Whereas the word ‘safety’ at first glance may seem to be displaced and the term ‘security’ would 
have been a better fit, it reflects the very carefully selected language of the EC. The use of this term 
establishes a link with the General Product Safety Directive 2001/95/EC and The Radio Equipment 
Directive 2014/53/EU.
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 purchasers and users about the security properties of the products and services they 
buy and use” are provided in the proposal for a Cybersecurity Act (European 
Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy 2017: 5). This framework, though it would not result in “any immediate regu-
latory obligations”, would allow certification and conformity self-assessment of 
ICT products and services.3
The mention of the ‘duty of care’ principle in the Second EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy is the second example, which reflects a vicious circle approach to cyberse-
curity regulation. Stakeholders are encouraged to explore this principle as it may 
lead to “a range of methods from design to testing and verification”, which could 
potentially tackle and minimise software vulnerabilities (European Commission 
and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017: 
5). The rationale of this principle was to a certain extent already pursued in the 
Network and Information Security Directive adopted in 2016—a year before the 
Second Cybersecurity Strategy was published. More specifically, the ‘duty of care’ 
principle is anchored in Article 14 of the NIS Directive, which obliges Member 
States to foresee security requirements and incident notification requirements for 
operators of essential services (e.g. providers of electricity or water). More specifi-
cally, entities that have been identified as operators of essential services by Member 
States have to take appropriate measures that would enable the prevention and mini-
misation of the “the impact of incidents affecting the security of the network and 
information systems used for the provision of such essential services, with a view to 
ensuring the continuity of those services” (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2016: Article 14.2). The same provision also requires operators of 
essential services to notify as soon as reasonably possible “the competent authority 
or the CSIRT of incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the essen-
tial services they provide” (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union 2016: Article 14.3).
This section demonstrated that the cybersecurity area is evolving and comprised 
of highly fragmented measures. Cybersecurity is a horizontal problem, which is in 
a sense a common denominator of various new technologies connected to the World 
Wide Web. The following section illustrates some challenges and risks arising from 
the different perceptions of cybersecurity as a policy area.
5.3  Conceptualising Cybersecurity as a Policy Area 
Through Piecemeal Legislation and Policy
As mentioned, numerous policies and regulatory measures have been adopted to 
advance the security of citizens, businesses and public administrations in the areas 
of network and information security measures, electronic communications and 
3 The use of standards is generally promoted by the EC.
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cybercrime. In fact, the EU has only recently started using the term ‘cybersecurity’ 
in its policy documents. We suggest that the adoption of a comprehensive EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 can be considered the tipping point which triggered 
the increased use of the term in EU policy documents (e.g., in 2016 Communication 
‘Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and 
Innovative Cybersecurity Industry’, and the Cybersecurity Act).
The 2013 Strategy provided in a footnote a definition according to which “[c]
ybersecurity commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to pro-
tect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that 
are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information 
infrastructure” (European Commission and High Representative 2013: 3). In this 
context, cybersecurity’s primary objectives were considered to be the preservation 
of “the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confiden-
tiality of the information contained therein” (European Commission and High 
Representative 2013: 3).
This definition, to a certain extent, deviated from a prior suggestion put forward 
by the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). ENISA pro-
posed using “a contextual definition” because cybersecurity is a broad and evolving 
term, arguing that whereas opting for a specific definition can allow for maintaining 
clarity, stakeholders and policy makers should select definitions that fit their par-
ticular needs in a specific context (ENISA 2016: 28). Consequently, various stake-
holders and policy makers, including EU institutions, often opt for definitions 
developed by standardisation organisations, such as the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) and the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), or international organisations, such as the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). Not surprisingly, by now numerous definitions 
coexist focusing on different dimensions of cybersecurity (e.g. political, military, 
economic, technical, legal and citizens’).
Although some definitions may appear extremely broad,4 narrow and more spe-
cific definitions, in particular related to technical requirements, might also need to 
be considered with caution. Whereas they may serve well during a negotiation 
phase, it is important to consider limitations embedded in them. For example, many 
definitions developed by standardisation organisations target the micro- management 
level. Therefore, they may carry a risk of conceptualising ‘cybersecurity’ in an 
unduly limited way. For example, cybersecurity may be seen only as a concern of 
risk that may arise online; it may be understood as a protection of only virtual 
assets; or it may only target malicious activities. Such definitions carry a risk of not 
considering, for instance, implications for individuals and their rights.
4 For example, according to the ITU in Plenipotentiary Resolution 181 (Guadalajara, 2010) on defi-
nitions and terminology relating to building confidence and security in the use of information and 
communication technologies, consider cybersecurity to be “the collection of tools, policies, secu-
rity concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and orga-
nization and user’s assets”.
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Definitions used to refer to cybersecurity by various actors, including EU 
Member States, bodies and institutions, typically represent different perspectives, 
which can potentially be at odds with each other (see for an overview Table 5.1). For 
example, whereas ENISA often frames cybersecurity as a mere technical issue, 
some Member States in their national security strategies regard cybersecurity as an 
issue of national security (e.g. Estonia and Slovakia).
The possibility of attaching different meanings to the term ‘cybersecurity’ has 
both advantages and disadvantages. It indicates the flexibility of the term that can 
adapt to changing circumstances. At the same time, an ever-evolving term can 
become overly inclusive or broad in a manner that would obstruct coherent regula-
tion in this area and in this way hamper the development of regulatory measures. It 
also opens a space for friction between EU and Member States powered around the 
national security notion. Consequently, this shifting meaning of the term may make 
progress in this particular policy area hard to attain, or at least less visible.
To render the conceptualisation of cybersecurity more complicated from a legal 
perspective, in measures addressed to the Member States, EU institutions appear to 
be reluctant to even use the term. That is the case, for example, of the EU adopted 
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union (NIS Directive). The NIS Directive lays down 
obligations for all Member States to adopt certain measures (e.g. national strategies 
on the security of network and information systems) that would enable the develop-
ment of a culture of security across industries and sectors that rely on the use of 
information communication technologies.
Within the context of this Directive, “security of network and information 
systems” is regarded as “the ability of network and information systems to resist, at 
a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, 
integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related 
services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems” 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2016 Article 4 (2)). This 
definition seems to align with the conception reflected in the EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy, where the underlying objective of cybersecurity is considered to be the 
preservation of “the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and 
the confidentiality of the information contained therein” (European Commission 
and High Representative 2013: 3). Nonetheless, the NIS Directive formally 
addresses “security of information systems and networks”, and not cybersecurity.
In short, the ambiguity embedded in and sustained by the term ‘cybersecurity’ 
allows for the term to be invoked across the different policy areas mentioned above. 
Whereas this is not problematic in itself, the fragmented approach may not be cost- 
efficient (ENISA 2017: 4). More importantly, it begs the question of whether EU 
cybersecurity shall be considered an autonomous notion, with a specific nature in 
EU policy as opposed to other policy levels.
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Table 5.1 Definitions of cybersecurity in national cybersecurity strategies of EU Member States
Document title, country, 
year Definition
Austrian Cyber Security 
Strategy, 2013
The term ‘cyber security’ stands for the security of infrastructure in 
cyber space, of the data exchanged in cyber space and above all of the 
people using cyber space.
Croatian Cybersecurity 
Strategy, 2015
Cyber security encompasses activities and measures for achieving the 




for the period of 
2015–2020
Cyber security comprises a sum of organisational, political, legal, 
technical, and educational measures and tools aiming to provide a 
secure, protected, and resilient cyberspace in the Czech Republic for 
the benefit of both public and private sectors, as well as for the 
general public.
Cybersecurity Strategy 
of the Republic of 
Cyprus: Network and 
Information Security 
and Protection of 
Critical Information 
Infrastructures, 2012
Cybersecurity refers to the broader security of networked systems 
that operate in cyberspace, i.e. in most cases connected to the 
internet, and this term also covers the safe and secure usage of these 
systems by end users.
Dutch National Cyber 
Security: Strategy from 
awareness to capability, 
2018
Cyber security is the entirety of measures to prevent damage caused 
by disruption, failure or misuse of ICT and how to recover should 
damage occur.
Estonian Cyber Security 
Strategy, 2014–2017
Cyber security is an integral part of national security; it supports the 
functioning of the state and society, the competitiveness of the 
economy and innovation.
Finland’s Cyber security 
Strategy, 2013
Cyber security means the desired end state in which the cyber domain 
is reliable and in which its functioning is ensured.




With the term cyberspace, we refer to the complex of all 
interconnected ICT hardware and software infrastructure, to all data 
stored in and transferred through the networks and all connected 
users, as well as to all logical connections however established among 
them. It therefore encompasses the internet and all communication 
cables, networks and connections that support information and data 
processing, including all mobile internet devices.
Cyber Security Strategy 
for Germany, 2011
Cyberspace is the virtual space of all IT systems linked at data level 
on a global scale. The basis for cyberspace is the internet as a 
universal and publicly accessible connection and transport network, 
which can be complemented and further expanded by any number of 
additional data networks. IT systems in an isolated virtual space are 
not part of cyberspace.
Hungarian Government 
Decision No. 1139/2013 
(21 March) on the 
National Cyber Security 
Strategy of Hungary, 
2013
Cyber security is the continuous and planned taking of political, 
legal, economic, educational, awareness-raising and technical 
measures to manage risks in cyberspace that transforms the 
cyberspace into a reliable environment for the smooth functioning 
and operation of societal and economic processes by ensuring an 
acceptable level of risks in cyberspace.
(continued)
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Document title, country, 
year Definition
Cyber Security Strategy 
of Latvia, 2014–2018
Cyber security is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, 
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used 
to protect the cyber environment and organisation and user’s assets. 
Organisation and user’s assets include connected computing devices, 
personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications 









Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, 
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used 
to protect the cyber environment and organisation and user assets. 
Organisation and user assets include connected computing devices, 
personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications 
systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in 
the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment 
and maintenance of the security properties of the organisation and 
user assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment.
Malta, National Cyber 
Security Strategy, Green 
Paper, 2015
Cybersecurity “is the safeguards and actions that can be used to 
protect cyber domain from those threats that are associated with or 
that may harm its interdependent networks and information 
infrastructure. It strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the 
networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information 
contained therein.”
Cyberspace Protection 
Policy of the Republic 
of Poland, 2013
Cyberspace security—a set of organisational and legal, technical, 
physical and educational projects aimed at ensuring the uninterrupted 
functioning of cyberspace.
Cyber Security Concept 
of the Slovak Republic 
for 2015–2020
Cyber security is one of the defining elements of the security 
environment of the Slovak Republic and a subsystem of national 
security. At a state level, it is a system of continuous and planned 
increasing of political, legal, economic, security, defence and 
educational awareness, also including the efficiency of adopted and 
applied risk control measures of a technical-organisational nature in 
cyber space in order to transform it into a trustworthy environment 
providing for the secure operation of social and economic processes 
at an acceptable level of risks in cyber space.
National Cyber Security 
Strategy of Spain, 2013
Cyber security is a necessity of our society and our economic model.
UK National Cyber 
Security Strategy, 
2016–2021
‘Cyber security’ refers to the protection of information systems 
(hardware, software and associated infrastructure), the data on them 
and the services they provide from unauthorised access, harm or 
misuse. This includes harm caused intentionally by the operator of 
the system or accidentally, as a result of failing to follow security 
procedures.
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5.4  Principle of Conferral Limits the Scope of Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is nowadays typically regarded as a highly complex issue which 
requires the active involvement of a range of stakeholders, including the legislator. 
It is commonly agreed that the legislator is in particular responsible for setting up an 
appropriate regulatory framework within which private and public entities could 
carry out their tasks and duties (Bannelier and Christakis 2017; see also Chap. 10). 
This is a significant change from an initial understanding of cybersecurity according 
to which it was perceived as a purely technical matter related to measures ensuring 
the availability, integrity and confidentiality of information and information systems 
(see Chap. 2).
When discussing cybersecurity regulation in the EU, it is necessary to consider 
the principle of conferral. Whereas in general the EU can legislate in areas where it 
is more appropriate than for the Member States to act individually, introducing any 
regulatory measure at the EU level, including measures concerning cybersecurity, 
requires the legislator to provide legal justification: in other words a legal basis 
(Wessel 2015). In particular, the proposal for a legislative measure has to meet the 
criteria set out in Article 5 of the Treaty of the EU (TEU). In principle, this means 
that to establish competence over a policy area, a legislative measure has to fall 
under one of these two situations: (1) either “the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level” or (2) “by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level” (TEU; Article 5(3)).
Considering the principle of conferral and in particular the limited competences 
of the EU in security issues, the EC was obliged to provide an explanation for 
acquiring competence to legislate in the cybersecurity area. This occurred in the 
NIS Directive by establishing a link between cybersecurity and the internal market, 
largely resembling the reasoning used in order to introduce rules for personal data 
protection in 1995 (González Fuster 2014: 125). Recital 5 of the NIS Directive pro-
claims that the diverse Member States’ practices with regards to cybersecurity mea-
sures hinder the protection awarded to consumers and business, and consequently 
reduce “the overall level of security of network and information systems” (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union 2016). The NIS Directive was 
adopted to increase consistency of Member States’ practices concerning cybersecu-
rity measures.
5.5  Remaining Challenges to an Effective Cybersecurity 
Legal Framework
Different actors, including academics, policy makers and private sector representa-
tives try to get their heads around the cybersecurity area in the EU. To ease such 
tasks, the European Court of Auditors, an institution that takes care of EU tax 
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 payers’ interests, published a report providing an excellent overview of the EU’s 
complicated cybersecurity policy framework. The report identifies many challenges 
to effective policy delivery, such as the meaningful evaluation and accountability of 
policy and legislative framework; addressing gaps in EU law and its uneven trans-
position; aligning investment levels with goals; the need for a clear overview of EU 
budget spending; adequately resourcing the EU’s agencies; and strengthening infor-
mation security governance, and threat and risk assessments (European Court of 
Auditors 2019).
5.5.1  Choice of Appropriate Regulatory Measures
Most legal measures concerning cybersecurity are found in directives that are mini-
mal harmonisation measures (e.g. NIS Directive and Directive on Attacks against 
Information Systems). In practice, this means that Member States are free to choose 
the form and methods to implement requirements stemming from such directives. 
This flexibility may be seen as a weakness of minimal harmonisation tools. However, 
directives are considered to be the best tool when introducing a complex legislative 
change, such as the introduction of a new regulatory area (Craig and de Burca 
2015: 106).
In some areas that have been traditionally more strictly regulated, such as the 
protection of personal data and health care, there is a tendency to adopt more har-
monised regulation (see also Chaps. 7 and 17). Examples include the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), repealing Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and 
Medical Device Regulation (MDR) repealing the Directive on Medical Devices 
(European Union 2016: 2017).
The MDR is particularly interesting as it aims to establish a “predictable and 
sustainable regulatory framework for medical devices which ensures a high level of 
safety and health whilst supporting innovation” (European Union 2017, Recital 1). 
The MDR defines a ‘medical device’ as “any instrument, apparatus, appliance, soft-
ware, implant, reagent, material or other article intended by the manufacturer to be 
used, alone or in combination, for human beings for one or more of the following 
specific medical purposes” (European Union 2017, Article 2.1). Such purposes may 
include the diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, prediction, prognosis, treatment or 
alleviation of disease. The term ‘software’ is not a new addition to this definition, 
and it can be found in the Directive on Medical Devices. However, the use of this 
term means that apps and their accessories that are developed for a medical purpose 
(e.g. monitoring and measuring blood pressure for diabetes management) are sub-
ject to rules as well as safety and performance requirements listed in this regulation, 
including a comprehensive post-market surveillance system. However, qualifying 
some software, such as mobile apps, as a medical device is sometimes particularly 
challenging. A wafer-thin line separates health and well-being apps that are consid-
ered to be medical devices from apps that are not considered to be so.
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5.5.2  Targeting the Right Addressees
Cybersecurity measures at the EU level target different actors. Consequently, there 
are numerous addressees of legislative measures. For example, recent regulatory 
measures, such as the GDPR and NIS Directive, impose requirements on the ones 
responsible for the certain operations, namely controllers, processors, providers of 
essential services and providers of digital infrastructure. They all must take appro-
priate security measures in response to the risk that they may be subjected to.5
The fact that the current regulation of data protection by design focuses exclu-
sively on data controllers (i.e., entities defining the means of the processing of per-
sonal data), however, is regrettable, as it can address only part of the problems in the 
area. The obligation to implement data protection by design does not extend to the 
actual developers of technology or service providers (Jasmontaite et al. 2018: 173). 
Recital 78 of the GDPR reveals some hesitations of the legislator, noting that not 
only controllers but also processors, producers of the products, services and appli-
cations, should be among the ones who should consider the right to data protection 
when developing and designing products, services and applications based on the 
processing of personal data. While recognising the limited legal value of this Recital 
(i.e. it is not legally binding but helps in the interpretation Article 25 of the GDPR), 
the actual software developers or producers of hardware, unless they are data con-
trollers or processors, are de facto not subjected to the legal obligations foreseen in 
the EU data protection framework.
The debate within the field of data protection over who should be responsible for 
ensuring the rights of individuals in the online environment is, as a matter of fact, 
still an open matter in the EU.  Discussions concerning the proposed ePrivacy 
Regulation also confirm that this is an unresolved issue. This being said, it may be 
concluded that one of the key challenges of cybersecurity regulation is to impose the 
right obligations on the right actors, through the right instrument—in addition to 
avoiding the imposition, through disparate instruments, of very similar but not 
exactly coincidental obligations on the same actors. For example, it is estimated that 
at the moment there are “at least eleven instruments of EU law having a bearing on 
[data and information security] breaches, five in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) and six in the internal market” (Porcedda 2018, 3).
The issue of targeting the relevant actors is also a pressing one in discussions 
surrounding the EU liability framework (Directive 85/374/EEC), which in many 
cases may inappropriately favour some software developers. Whereas software is 
not explicitly included under the scope of the Product Liability Directive, the 
academic doctrine has argued that, for the purposes of product liability, software 
should be perceived as a product (Alheit 2001: 194). According to Article 3 of the 
Product Liability Directive, which has been transposed into national laws, any 
person in the supply chain can be held liable and requested to compensate victims 
5 See Articles 25.1 and 32 of the GDPR and Articles 14 and 16 of the NIS Directive.
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for any personal injury or damage caused to private property caused wholly or in 
part by a defect of a product. In such cases, the plaintiff does not have to prove 
negligence on the part of the producer, but only that it is was defective and the 
damage occurred because there was causality between the defect and damage 
(Alheit 2001, 197–99).
This means in practice that the EU has opted in for a strict liability regime for 
which no proof of fault is necessary. At the same time, it should be noted that in 
circumstances where a product leads to a pure economic loss or infringement of 
individuals’ rights, the strict liability regime may not be invoked, as the damage 
should occur to a person or to a private property. Furthermore, the Product Liability 
Directive in Article 7 foresees that there are several situations in which the produc-
er’s liability can be avoided. Recognising the limitations of the current liability 
framework, the European Parliament noted that in the context of the IoT “tightening 
up liability regimes” would be desirable as it could “lead to a better quality of prod-
ucts and a more secure environment” (European Parliament 2017: 13).
A new approach to the liability framework could provide individuals with the 
comprehensive and meaningful protection of their security, including the protection 
of their personal data (Daley 2016). Such an approach, as proposed by Daley, would 
require to balance ex ante incentives to invest in security with ex post liability, 
incentivise software developers to publicly disclose source code, and promote trust 
and public confidence in embedded systems (Daley 2016). It seems that this 
approach, though controversial, could help to develop the “high-quality, affordable, 
interoperable and trustworthy cybersecurity products” that the EC called for in June 
2017 (Speech by Vice-President Ansip 2017).
5.5.3  The Long-Awaited Recast of Product Liability Directive, 
Pending
As discussed above, it is generally assumed that clearly defined liability framework 
for devices, applications and services could improve the protection of individuals 
and consequently that of the cyberspace. However, the current liability framework 
dates back from the 1980s and does not address such complex issues as embedded 
systems, embedded software and application software. It seems that there is a com-
mon understanding and agreement that regulating software and including it into the 
framework of Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective 
products would represent a major milestone. This would clarify the current standing 
of software that is perceived differently across Member States, both as a service and 
as a product.
In spite of this, it seems that these questions will remain unaddressed for the time 
being. In this context, the EC is promoting the use of code of conducts and prepar-
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ing interpretative guidance of the Liability Directive.6 In light of the policy line 
taken by the EC, which does envision the recast of the Liability Directive, it comes 
as no surprise that the European Parliament might look for alternative legal clarifi-
cation of the current legal vacuum via other legislative proposals. For example, in 
its amendments on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, 
the European Parliament proposed specific rules for software that is embedded in 
tangible goods (smart goods). Although such ‘isolationism’ may be welcome, it 
may create fragmentation in the regulatory landscape, without necessarily improv-
ing an overall security of IT.
5.6  A Pressing Need to (Cyber)Secure EU Values 
and Interests
The observation that the “information revolution makes security an increasingly 
important concern in all sectors of society” has surely withstood the test of time and 
accurately reflects the current debates within the EU (Eriksson and Giacomello 
2006). In a reflection paper on the future of cybersecurity regulation published in 
2017, the EC emphasised the need to protect European values and interests against 
new types of threats (EC 2017c: 6). To improve the competitiveness and security of 
the EU, the reflection paper considered three scenarios (i.e. Security and Defence 
Cooperation, Shared Security and Defence, Common Defence and Security) which 
would allow Member States’ industrial and technical resources to be pooled. Within 
the scope of that document, the EC questioned EU competence in the field of cyber-
security and considered ways to extend them beyond the limits of Digital Single 
Market. Cybersecurity becomes thus intertwined with the objectives of a Security 
and Defence Union and it is suggested that deeper integration, in particular the cre-
ation of a Common Defence Security, would improve cybersecurity resilience both 
at national and EU levels. It is also argued that a deeper integration scenario would 
allow for “Europe […] to deploy detection and offensive cyber-capabilities”, which 
could be used in case of “cyber-attacks or external interference in Member States’ 
democratic processes” (EC 2017c: 14–15).
The EC’s rhetoric in recent policy documents could be regarded as favouring the 
consolidation of a broadened vision of cybersecurity through the specific prism of 
EU cybersecurity. It insists on the need for more cooperation and coordination of 
programmes concerning the interoperability of information systems for security, 
border and migration management. For example, the EC in one of its recent docu-
ments refers to ‘the global cyberattack using ransomware’ (known as WannaCry) as 
6 See, Commission publishes evaluation reports on EU rules on machinery safety and product lia-
bility, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/commission-publishes-evaluation-reports-
eu-rules-machinery-safety-and-product-liability_en, last accessed 15 November 2018.
5 Cybersecurity Regulation in the European Union: The Digital, the Critical…
112
a case demonstrating the need for expansion of EU actions, and thus acclaiming 
competence, within the cybersecurity domain (EC 2017a: 2). In another policy doc-
ument, the EC relies on statistics about ransomware from the United States in order 
to strengthen its claim about the potential risks of cyberattacks for business, econ-
omy and democracy in the EU: “wider instruments for European solidarity and 
mutual assistance” in the field of cybersecurity could address these risks (EC 2017b: 
12). This somehow far-stretched rhetoric could be in conflict with the rationale of 
EU better regulation policy, which should be driven by the “best available evidence” 
and the involvement of stakeholders (EC 2015: 5).
It is also possible to argue that the European Union could have taken a different 
approach in response to the increasing number of cyberattacks and cyberthreats. For 
example, Wojciech Wiewiórowski, Assistant EDPS, suggested that if appropriate 
security measures, required under data protection law, had been implemented, the 
mentioned attacks could have been prevented (Wiewiórowski 2017). This observa-
tion suggests that in response to cyberthreats, the European Commission may also 
emphasise the need for better implementation of requirements stemming from the 
existing EU data protection framework rather than the need for stronger cooperation 
mechanisms among concerned actors.
5.7  Concluding Remarks
The future of cybersecurity regulation appears to be at a crossroads: perceived cyber 
threats may shape political choices and lead to deeper integration, in particular with 
the ongoing discussions about the mandate of ENISA and the implementation of the 
Cybersecurity Act. As such, EU cybersecurity might actually have been at multiple 
crossroads since its inception.
This chapter aimed to reflect the particular challenges related to understanding 
cybersecurity regulation in the EU, based on a discussion of how such policy terri-
tory has been constructed. As outlined, numerous policy areas fall under the over-
arching scope of cybersecurity, and cybersecurity ‘as such’ is considered a horizontal 
issue. At the same time, the interconnected policy areas (e.g. cybercrime, IoT, 
autonomous vehicles, Artificial Intelligence, cloud computing) reflect and address a 
limited subset of cyber threats, ranging from the fight against cybercrime to the 
security of critical infrastructures and goods.
The EU cybersecurity landscape is continuously evolving as policy measures 
eventually lead to changes and adjustments in the legal framework and vice versa. 
The contours of this landscape have also been changing thanks to the flexibility, if 
not ambiguity, embedded in the very term ‘cybersecurity’, which entails both advan-
tages and disadvantages. It may allow the area to integrate new technologies and 
policy issues as they emerge, but at the same time it can make it overly inclusive, 
potentially hindering the impact of regulation in this area.
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When considering specific regulatory challenges, the current legal setup renders 
it, in a way, more difficult to impose the appropriate obligations on the right actors 
who could make a tangible contribution to the security of digital environments. This 
argument is illustrated by examples stemming from the GDPR, which does not for-
mally address actual software developers or producers of hardware as such, unless 
they would qualify as data controllers or processors, and to the extent they would. 
The debate over who should be responsible for ensuring the rights of individuals 
and the security of their data as well, as well as that of any product and service con-
nected to the online environment is, as a matter of fact, still ongoing in the EU and 
globally.
Emerging legal solutions for current uncertainty surrounding cybersecurity regu-
lation might be regarded as encompassing the ‘duty of care’ principle, as well as the 
revision of the existing liability framework. However, considering the reluctance of 
the EC to revise the liability framework and address technical and legal riddles such 
as the regulation of liability of self-evolving software (i.e. Artificial Intelligence), it 
seems that it might be easier to introduce new principles.
Ultimately, the elastic nature of EU cybersecurity triggers questions regarding its 
relation to fundamental rights protection. EU cybersecurity policy seems to inter-
mittently be about the protection of fundamental rights, sometimes about security in 
accordance with fundamental rights requirements, and occasionally about (almost 
any) cyber issues independently from fundamental rights considerations. A clarifica-
tion of the—certainly profound—linkages between the effective regulation of cyber 
resilience, cybercrime, cyberdefence, (strictly) cybersecurity and global cyberspace 
issues would surely contribute to a more precise delineation of the necessary, albeit 
moving, boundaries of EU cybersecurity.
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Chapter 6
A Care-Based Stakeholder Approach 
to Ethics of Cybersecurity in Business
Gwenyth Morgan and Bert Gordijn
Abstract This chapter focuses on ethical issues in cybersecurity in business. It first 
sketches the main ethical issues discussed in the academic literature thus far. Next, 
it identifies some important topics that have not yet received the attention they 
deserve. The chapter then focuses on one of those topics, ransomware attacks, one 
of the most prevalent cybersecurity threats to businesses today. It provides a brief 
overview of the main types of ransomware attacks and discusses businesses’ respon-
sibilities to their stakeholders to respond to them. Daniel Engster’s care-based 
stakeholder approach is used to assess the responsibilities that businesses have to 
their stakeholders. The analysis involves establishing who counts as a stakeholder 
when a ransomware attack occurs and what the stakeholders’ interests might be. 
Based on stakeholders’ interests, the analysis concludes on whether businesses have 
an ethical responsibility to their stakeholders to (1) respond to grey hat demands by 
patching identified vulnerabilities within the given timeframe and (2) respond to 
black hat demands by paying the ransom.
Keywords Cybercrime · Privacy · Ransomware · Stakeholder theory
6.1  Introduction
Due to the uptake of information and communication technology (ICT) in the busi-
ness sector, the value of information has increased. Information is now considered 
the new oil and as oil brought both prosperity and problems, so too does informa-
tion. Prosperity emanates from the fact that businesses can utilise ICT to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency by providing round-the-clock availability of both 
information and services to customers. In providing that availability, problems 
arise. If information is constantly available, this means that it is constantly vulner-
able to an attack. This trade-off between providing availability and securing 
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 information is something that businesses must grapple with in carrying out their 
day-to-day activities not only to protect identifiable data, i.e. individual’s names, 
addresses, account details etc., but also to remain compliant with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (2018) (GDPR).
The GDPR in 2018 set the bar for businesses that collect, process, analyse and 
store EU citizen’s identifiable information. It compels businesses who physically 
reside within the jurisdiction of the GDPR to be compliant, and extends to those that 
reside outside the EU who process EU citizens’ identifiable information (European 
Commission 2018a, b; see also Chap. 5). The GDPR is particularly relevant when 
businesses are hacked, as it compels them to notify the National Data Regulator 
when a data leak/breach occurs. A failure to report a data leak or breach within 72 h 
of the breach occurring, can result in a fine up to the value of 4% of the businesses 
entire annual returns (European Commission 2018a, b). Additionally, if an organisa-
tion is non-compliant with the GDPR, —and it is established that non-compliance 
has caused material damage, such as financial loss, or non-material damage, such as 
reputational loss or psychological distress to individuals— those individuals can 
claim compensation (European Commission 2018a, b). Thus, non-compliance can 
result in significant legal and economic consequences for a business.
From an economic perspective, the cost of data breaches is increasing. For exam-
ple, the  Ponemon Institute’s 2018 study suggests that the average cost of data 
breaches of 2500–100,000 lost or stolen records is globally US $3.86 million, which 
is a 6.4% increase on their 2017 report. Wenger et al. (2017) point to the reputa-
tional damage that can result from a successful cyber-attack. They state that a sig-
nificantly large percentage of consumers are less likely to engage with a business 
that has been hacked, even if they were not directly affected by the attack. In efforts 
to detect and prevent cybersecurity breaches and data loss, businesses are investing 
large sums of money into cybersecurity. For example, a study conducted by 
Bromium states that large enterprise organisations are spending on average US 
$16.7 million annually on cybersecurity (Bromium 2016).
While individuals, businesses, acadeics and governmental organisations are try-
ing to grapple with the legal and financial side to cybersecurity threats and responses, 
very few have lended their attention to the ethics of cybersecurity. Ethics and cyber-
security deserve the attention of the reader, the scholarly community and profes-
sionals for two fundamental reasons. (1) A cyber-attack is a matter of when, not if. 
Businesses must therefore adequately prepare themselves for the inevitable by 
exploring the response options available to them and making an informed decision 
on the most appropriate, fast and effective response that is in the interests of named 
stakeholders. (2) Businesses have a responsibility to ensure that the hardware and 
software that they use to process, store and analyse identifiable information has an 
adequate level of security to protect the users who have access to those systems. 
Businesses must also protect the confidentiality and privacy of individuals data held 
within those systems. For businesses to have any chance of achieving this, they must 
be aware of the threat landscape. In knowing the main threats, businesses can allo-
cate sufficient resources to protect themselves, it is an efficient use of resources and 
it has the potential to reduce the likelihood of a successful attack.
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This chapter focuses on one main threat, ransomware attacks and is structured in 
the following way. Firstly, we present a brief overview of the ethical issues that arise 
in the literature on cybersecurity in business. Next, we observe that there are impor-
tant gaps in the current debate with regard to (i) education (ii) ransomware attacks 
and (iii) the disclosure of data breaches. We then introduce Daniel Engster’s care- 
based stakeholder theory which we think can be used as a normative theory to anal-
yse the under debated issues. Given the space restraints of this chapter, we do not 
develop a full-fledged stakeholder analysis of all three issues. Instead, we focus in 
on ransomware attacks, a topic that has prominently featured in the news in the past 
few years.
6.2  Ethical Issues in Cybersecurity
In a systematic literature review focused on cybersecurity and ethics, we identified 
the 15 most frequently discussed ethical issues in cybersecurity in the business 
domain. Table 6.1 ranks the frequency in which these ethical issues arise (Yaghmaei 
et al. 2017).
The ethical issues listed are wide ranging and are context relative. For example, 
privacy arises in terms of data breaches and keeping information secure from unau-
thorised access. It also surfaces in respect of employee privacy in the workplace. 
Whereas autonomy, for example, is discussed in terms of data collection, process-
ing, analysis and storage.
Table 6.1 Ethical issues in cybersecurity in business
Ethical issue
Number of sources that discuss this 
ethical issue
Privacy 27
















See Yaghmaei et al. 2017 for details on the methodology
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In addition to identifying the ethical issues in cybersecurity, we note that (1) the 
main threats in cybersecurity stem from attackers targeting vulnerabilities in people 
and technology and (2) the impacts of cybersecurity breaches can be wide ranging, 
from having a limited impact to having a detrimental effect on the data owner, the 
business and wider society (Yaghmaei et al. 2017).
6.3  Gaps in the Literature on Ethics and Cybersecurity
There are at least three important gaps in the ethical literature. They relate to (1) 
ransomware attacks, (2) education and (3) the disclosure of data breach informa-
tion. More specifically, there appears to be a lack of thorough ethical analysis on (1) 
the ethical responsibilities that businesses have to specific stakeholders to engage 
with grey hats and black hats on the continuum of ransomware attacks, (2) the ethi-
cal responsibilities that businesses have to specific stakeholders to improve their 
employees cybersecurity awareness and expertise despite it being known that one of 
the main precursors of successful cyber-attacks is the inadvertent actions of employ-
ees and (3) the ethical responsibilities that businesses have to specific stakeholders 
to disclose data breach information.
 (1) F-Secure reports that technology and people are the two main weaknesses in 
cybersecurity in business (F-Secure 2018). Cybercriminals exploit technology 
through supply chain vulnerabilities or unknown vulnerabilities (otherwise 
known as zero-day). The European Commission offers a certificate to ethical 
hackers (European Council 2018a, b). Ethical hackers, otherwise known as 
white hats, are security testers who try to find vulnerabilities in information 
systems, networks and IT infrastructures (for more details see Chap. 9). Grey 
hats are not traditionally known as ethical hackers as they also search for vul-
nerabilities but do so without the knowledge of the systems owner. Both grey 
hats and white hats have the intention to find the vulnerabilities before a black 
hat (a malicious hacker) finds them. Despite grey hats undertaking their endeav-
ours in the absence of consent, they argue that their actions are warranted as 
they contribute to a safer cyber environment for all by making it more difficult 
for black hats to successfully attack businesses for financial, political or other 
malicious purposes (Leiwo and Heikkuri 1998). A discussion in the ethical lit-
erature questions whether grey hats actions are ethical (Leiwo and Heikkuri 
1998; Brey 2007; McReynolds 2015). It centres on the issue of consent and 
concludes that grey hat actions are in fact unethical. Another popular topic 
relating hacking is the hacker ethic. The hacker ethic relies on the notion that all 
information should be free and unlimited. This is one argument used by hackers 
to justify exposing questionable activities or corporations or governments. Brey 
(2007) makes a valid point that if all information was free and unlimited, this 
would go against the accepted Western interpretation of intellectual property, as 
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it would impede individuals’ ability to profit from patented information. It also 
would be a huge privacy infringement and, as a consequence, could not be con-
sidered ethical.
The literature fails to address businesses interactions with hackers, in particular 
in relation to the continuum of ransomware attacks (Yaghmaei et al. 2017). We take 
this opportunity to share more insights into how grey hats and black hats do "busi-
ness". Consider the following. When a grey hat finds a vulnerability, he notifies the 
owner (in this case let us presume the owner is a business) by giving them a certain 
amount of time to fix the vulnerability. In failing to fix or “patch” the vulnerability, 
the grey hat threatens to release the vulnerability to the public. Releasing the vulner-
ability to the public means that the vulnerability can be accessed by anyone includ-
ing malicious hackers, making the business more likely to be attacked. Conversely, 
a black hat might choose to install ransomware on a business’s system that shuts 
down all business services until the business either (1) identifies and resolves the 
problem themselves or (2) takes the risk of paying the ransom to the hacker in the 
hope that the ransomware will be removed upon receipt of payment. As we can see, 
a ransom of sorts is involved in both activities. Instead of us hashing out whether the 
act of ransoming a business is unethical, we believe a more fruitful discussion can 
arise from juxtaposing a grey hat’s ransom against a black hat’s ransom from the 
viewpoint of specific stakeholders.
 (2) People are a weakness in cybersecurity in business due to human error and due 
to their considerable lack of cybersecurity knowhow (Wenger et al. 2017). This 
weak spot is something that cybercriminals exploit to target businesses and 
achieve their ends. Despite businesses and international bodies acknowledging 
that cybersecurity awareness and education needs to improve (PECB 2017; 
ENISA 2018; Kaspersky Lab 2018), we note that there is little ethical research 
that examines the extent to which businesses are responsible for doing so 
(Yaghmaei et al. 2017). In this instance, we interpret ethical analysis as one that 
considers specific stakeholders’ interests when it comes to education and 
assessing how those interests might conflict with one another and how such 
conflict could be resolved.
 (3) End-users have expressed their desire to know if their data has been breached 
(Wenger et al. 2017). As data breaches have the potential to cause irreparable 
damage to a business’s reputation and can incur a financial cost, it is in a busi-
ness’ interests to lessen the impact of a data breach. It is interesting that the ethi-
cal literature mentions businesses’ responsibility to disclose data breach 
information when private or identifiable information has been breached. 
However, there is no discussion that covers the fact that non-disclosure contrib-
utes to the weakening of an already fragile cyber-environment. In addition, little 
is offered in respect of how underreporting cybersecurity breaches affects the 
authenticity of cybersecurity incident reports, which can otherwise be used as 
effective tools that illustrate the cyber threat landscape.
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6.4  Care-Based Stakeholder Theory
To conduct an ethical analysis of the ethical responsibilities that businesses have to 
specific stakeholders to respond to grey hats and black hats ransoms, we apply a 
stakeholder approach. Edward Freeman is considered the founding father of stake-
holder theory (ST) since the publication of his book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach (1984). Therein, stakeholders are viewed as important but 
nevertheless a means through which the corporation can achieve its preordained 
goals (Freeman 1984). In Freeman’s later work, the stakeholder assumes a more 
central role in the firm such that they have personal projects that the corporation 
should be constructed to serve (Freeman and Gilbert 1989). An even more recent 
paper by Freeman and Gilbert (1992) lists the shortcomings of ST, paying particular 
attention to the language used to describe ST. They argue that the autonomous—
masculinist—individualistic mode of thinking surrounding ST reduces its applica-
bility to business today. Two years after this publication, Freeman and Gilbert 
published a more elaborate paper with Wicks on the specific shortcomings of ST 
(Wicks et al. 1994). In their paper, they reinterpret the existing version of ST through 
the lens of care ethics, which they refer to as feminist ethics (Wicks et al. 1994). 
They note that in order for businesses to flourish in a fast-paced ever-changing busi-
ness environment, there is a need to replace the masculinist language of conflict 
with the feminist language of communication, cooperation and collective action. 
One example they give is to replace notions of competition and control with coop-
eration and communication. They state that businesses need to share information, 
embrace change and improve their networks rather than try to exert control over 
their environment. Wicks et al. (1994) argue that ST theory considers corporations 
as webs of relations amongst stakeholders whose interests need to be at the core of 
decision-making processes and, in this way, ST is a way of interpreting the meaning 
of the corporation and the responsibilities that businesses have to those inside and 
outside the business. Burton and Dunn (1996) extend the work of Wicks et al. by 
claiming that care ethics has a natural affinity to ST and that Gilligan’s work on care 
ethics is a strong lens through which to view the theory.
Burton and Dunn (1996) advocate using Wicks et al.’s (1994) application of care 
ethics to ST, stating that their reinterpretation offers a more practical approach to it 
(Burton and Dunn 1996). Daniel Engster (2011) narrows the focus on the practical 
application of this care-based stakeholder approach and the notion of creating a car-
ing business. He argues that while the idea of using care ethics and ST in business 
seems logical, flaws still exist. He notes that businesses are left with the following 
three questions: (1) who exactly counts as a stakeholder? (2) how should businesses 
distribute care to those stakeholders? and (3) what ethical approaches should busi-
nesses adopt when conflict arises amongst stakeholders? For example, is it possible 
for businesses to follow a particular principle that might mitigate stakeholder con-
flict? Engster addresses these predicaments by combining insights taken from 
Freeman (1984), Freeman (2010), Freeman and Gilbert (1989, 1992), Wicks et al. 
(1994), and Burton and Dunn (1996).
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 (1) In relation to the first question, Engster argues that stakeholders should include 
those whose functioning and survival is directly tied to the firm’s activities 
namely, shareholders, employees, the local community, customers, suppliers 
and competitors (Engster 2011). This is counter to Freeman’s definition of a 
stakeholder, which includes all individuals who are affected by the firm. Engster 
states that it is impossible to include all individuals who are affected by the firm 
as this would exhaust businesses care, energy and resources and would not 
enable a business to allocate care to those who need it the most (Engster 2011).
 (2) In respect of the second question, Engster offers three ethical principles that can 
be used as tools in the decision-making process. These principles are (a) the 
proximity principle, (b) the relational principle (both previously advocated by 
Burton and Dunn 1996) and (c) the urgency principle.
 (a) The proximity principle states that there is justification in using our limited 
resources to care for individuals who are in some way close to us before 
attempting to care for distant others. This puts limited resources to the best 
possible use as we can attend more directly to individuals who are close to 
us based on the understanding that we usually have a better idea of their 
circumstances, customs, and needs, and can therefore care better for them 
than for distant others. It can be argued that the proximity principle justi-
fies: (a) caring for ourselves before others; (b) caring for individuals who 
are geographically and temporally close to us before those who are far 
away; and (c) caring for individuals in our own culture or state before those 
in foreign cultures or states.
 (b) The relational principle states that businesses should prioritise caring for 
individuals with whom we have a close personal relationship over others. 
Engster (2011) defines a close relationship as one where one party depends 
on the other for meeting his or her survival and developmental needs, using 
the analogy of the mother and baby relationship. He states that close rela-
tionships deserve priority because they are so closely tied up with the goals 
of caring. If we apply this interpretation of a close relationship to the busi-
ness domain, the number of stakeholder relationships that ought to be con-
sidered by a business significantly reduces.
 (c) Engster (2011) advocates the use of the urgency principle wherein he 
encourages businesses to care for individuals who have more urgent needs 
over those with less urgent needs. Using the urgency principle is deter-
mined by the effect that an action/inaction could have on a person’s or 
group’s survival. Engster states that if there is a focus on the urgent needs 
of stakeholders over less urgent ones, this allows a business to give priority 
to the needs of individuals or groups who will not survive or function with-
out acting. We note that this principle also reduces the number of stakehold-
ers that must be considered by businesses when making decisions about the 
distribution of care, time and resources more feasible.
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 (3) When conflicts arise amongst stakeholders, care ethics dictates that the highest 
priority be given to shareholders and employees as their interests are “generally 
more important than those of other stakeholders” (Engster 2007: 107). This 
does not apply in all cases. For example, he sets one over-riding condition, 
which is that when the health and safety of employees and customers and other 
individuals is at stake, the interests of employees and customers should receive 
the highest priority. He states that prioritising the health and safety interests of 
employees and customers trumps even the importance of the firm’s survival. 
Engster (2011) notes that while a strong commitment to worker health and 
safety and high environmental standards may result in less profit for investors 
and even the loss of jobs for some workers, individuals are more likely to suffer 
much greater and immediate threats to their survival and functioning when 
health, safety and environmental standards are compromised (Engster 2011). 
He continues his argument by stating that jobs should be favoured by busi-
nesses, at least in the short term. There are limits to this policy, as choosing jobs 
over profit in the long-term may result in the solvency of the firm. He notes that 
when job cuts are unavoidable, businesses can resort to the ‘rule of consensus’ 
which requires businesses to try and find solutions to stakeholder conflicts that 
are acceptable to all by communicating the proposed solutions to stakeholders 
and trying to solicit alternative proposals from them.
6.5  Ransomware Attacks
The number of malicious ransomware attacks targeting businesses tripled between 
2017 and 2018 (Bromium 2016). Ransomware attacks can be divided into two cat-
egories: cryptors and blockers (see also Chap. 2). Cryptors encrypt data on the vic-
tim’s device. Usually, the black hat will demand money and in receipt of same will 
restore the encrypted data. Blockers, otherwise known as lockers, do not interfere 
with the data stored on the device, instead they prevent the victim from accessing it 
(Ivanov et al. 2016). Ivanov et al. (2016) report that black hats are using new and 
more sophisticated ways to target companies that require little effort and have a 
large pay-off. Our research suggests that ransomware attacks are only considered as 
such when done through cryptos or blockers by hackers with malicious intent (i.e.) 
ones who hope to gain financially, politically etc. Grey hats also attack computer 
network systems and ransom businesses but have different intentions and foresee 
different outcomes. They scour networks for vulnerabilities and when a vulnerabil-
ity is found, they notify the owner or business that their system contains vulnerabili-
ties that require fixing. From the grey hat’s perspective, in doing so they are helping 
improve the overall security of cyberspace. However, it can be argued that the virtu-
ousness of this action is tainted as it involves gaining unauthorised access to a sys-
tem without the permission of the system owner. It also involves the grey hat 
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ransoming the business into fixing the vulnerability, as the grey hat will traditionally 
threaten to release the vulnerability if the business does not rectify it within a given 
timeframe. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests after the public release 
of vulnerabilities, there is a consequential increase in malicious attacks. The time 
between the release of a vulnerability and public release of an exploit is referred to 
as the vulnerability-to-exploit time period and it is decreasing steadily over time. In 
the past, the time between a vulnerability announcement and the release of a corre-
sponding exploit could be measured in month or years. For example, when Microsoft 
announced a vulnerability on 17 October 2000, (Microsoft Security Bulletin 
MS00-078), the exploit followed in the form on Nimda worm on 18 September 
2001. This means security teams had 336 days to patch their vulnerability. In the 
December 2015 Microsoft security bulletin, exploits were available for two of the 
eight disclosed vulnerabilities on the day that the public announcement was made 
(CISCO 2018). Although it could be argued that a grey hat threatening to release 
vulnerability information to the public acts as a catalyst for fixing the vulnerability, 
this, however, does not remove the threat itself. On the basis that a threat is made at 
all, one could counter argue that this practice is unethical as the researcher is using 
the business as a means to an end. Yet, when grey hats ransom businesses, not for 
money but for the greater good of cyberspace, they create a common ground with 
black hats. The common ground is ransoming and punishing businesses who do not 
comply with their demands. We argue that both types of hackers fall on different 
points on the same ransomware spectrum.
6.6  The Stakeholders and Their Interests
We use Engster’s method to identify the main stakeholders and their interests in 
both grey hat and black hat ransom attacks and assess whether a conflict of interest 
exists amongst stakeholders. In doing so, we aim to establish what exactly are busi-
nesses’ responsibilities to their stakeholders in these situations. In addition, we con-
sult the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Code of Ethics & Professional 
Conduct (‘the Code’) to which all members of the ACM including all computing 
professionals are bound (ACM 2018a, b). As the ACM’s code extends to security 
researchers (white hat and grey hat hackers), we include hackers as the seventh 
stakeholder (see also Chap. 9). We also note that the ACM rank the general public 
as being the first and foremost stakeholder in cybersecurity. We found this interest-
ing, as Engster (2011) does not include the general public in his care-based stake-
holder theory. In this instance, where the actions of hackers can affect the functioning 
and survival of members of the general public, the criteria that Engster uses to 
identify who counts as a stakeholder (see above), we believe that it is appropriate to 
name the general public as the eighth stakeholder.
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6.6.1  Shareholders
Grey hat and black hat ransoms create more issues for shareholders than any other 
stakeholder. For example, it could be argued that one element of success of a firm 
depends on IT systems. If those systems are inadequately protected, this affects 
shareholders’ interests. Shareholders are interested in “a fair return on his or her 
investment” (Engster 2011: 101). While a grey hat identifying vulnerabilities is not 
authorised or instigated by the shareholders, the shareholders are now in a position 
of reduced power as they are now subject to the terms as set by the grey hat. They 
have a choice to either respond to the grey hat demands or ignore them. We argue 
that if the shareholders choose to patch the vulnerability, the business is acting in the 
interests of the shareholders as it reduces their likelihood of being successfully 
hacked by a black hat. Without the involvement of the grey hat, the shareholders 
would remain in the dark, unbeknownst to the vulnerabilities in their system. If 
vulnerabilities exist, they are likely to be exploited. On this basis, we argue that it is 
imperative that businesses respond to grey hat’s demands. If one weighs the deci-
sion to not patch the vulnerability within the given timeframe against ignoring the 
grey hat demands and the vulnerability being made public; it is in the shareholders’ 
interests to not put the business and specific stakeholders’ information and IT sys-
tems, networks and infrastructure at a higher risk of being successfully attacked by 
a black hat, as this can cause economic loss and reputational and psychologi-
cal damage.
When a black hat ransoms a business, the situation is quite different. For the sake 
of argument, we assume the intention of the black hat is financial gain. Let us also 
assume that the black hat installs either a ‘blocker’ or ‘locker’ (Ivanov et al. 2016). 
In certain circumstances, responding to a black hat’s demands can be in the interest 
of shareholders for the following reasons: (1) As the business is held to ransom, it 
might be in the shareholders’ interests to immediately pay the ransom. This might 
be the case when it is not foreseeable for the business themselves to reverse engineer 
the attack. Assuming that both parties deliver what has been ransomed and prom-
ised, by paying the ransom the business can resume service without the potential 
collateral damage associated with a data leak (Brey 2007). (2) A study conducted by 
Datto, Inc. (2018) reveals that ransomware from 2016 to 2017 cost European SMEs 
£71 M in downtime, with the average ransom ranging between £350 and £1407 
(Ismail 2018). If the average ransom is lower than the potential cost of a data breach 
or leak, and is less than the cost of service stoppage, this leads us to suggest that it 
is in shareholders’ interests to pay the ransom. (3) Ninety-nine percent of all busi-
nesses in Europe are SMEs. SMEs may not have the means nor manpower to reverse 
engineer a ransomware attack. This leads us to suggest that SMEs (in particular) 
should attempt to negotiate a lower price with the black hat. Negotiating with ran-
somware families has been known to successfully reduce the cost of the ransom. 
Sean Sullivan, a cybersecurity specialist from F-Secure, explains that crypto ran-
somware works so well that it has become an industry run by families, similar to the 
way legitimate businesses run (Sullivan 2016). For example, the Cerber  ransomware 
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family has a user-friendly website that supports several languages and offers cus-
tomers convenient support forms so the victim can ask how to get their files back. 
Sullivan (2016) and his colleagues investigated the customer journey more closely 
by examining four crypto-ransomware families and find- found that three out of the 
four families negotiated with the victims of the ransomware attack, offering an aver-
age discount of 29% from the original sum demanded (Sullivan 2016). Sullivan and 
his colleagues also found that the demanded timeline is not set in stone, as 100% of 
the crypto-ransomware families contacted gave extensions to the deadlines. This 
leads us to suggest that businesses ought to engage with hackers to negotiate not 
only the sum of the ransom but the timeframe within which it is expected to be paid.
6.6.2  Employees
For employees who wish to remain in long-term employment, it is in their interests 
for the business to remain in business. To do so, companies need to use ICT and 
have appropriate security defences. Grey hats are acting in the interest of the com-
mon good by trying to improve computer security defences. It is thus in employees’ 
interests for the business to respond to grey hats’ identification of vulnerabilities 
and patch them.
It is in the employees’ interests for a business to reduce the potential collateral 
damage associated with a malicious black hat attack. We argue that it is in the inter-
ests of employees for businesses to firstly (a) try to find and use a decryption key 
and not pay the ransom and secondly (b) when decryption keys are not readily avail-
able, engage with the ransomware attacker and try to negotiate a lower fee. Both are 
in employees’ interests, as the first avoids having to pay any financial fee at all and 
the second, while not ideal, can significantly lower the financial impact that an 
attack can have on a firm.
6.6.3  The Local Community
If it is in the interests of the employees for the business to respond and negotiate 
with grey hats and black hats respectively, so too is it in the interest of the local com-
munity. This is based on Engster’s (2011) argument that employees tend to be part 
of the local community. As a result, the business impact on the local community is 
channelled through its relations with employees. We interpret this to mean that the 
interests of employees reflect the interests of the local community, but this is not 
always the case. For example, the local community might have invested in a busi-
ness by offering them tax-cuts. This creates a business relationship somewhat simi-
lar to the relationship between shareholders and the business, based on the fact that 
the local community has a financial interest in the business. If the business performs 
well, the local community can benefit. Performing well in this context is understood 
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as either reducing costs and/or increasing profits. If a business is successful in their 
endeavours to reduce costs and increase profits, they may be in a position to employ 
more people and/or expand its range of activities. Both endeavours can have a posi-
tive effect on the local community as it can lead to an increase in population flow to 
the local area, a betterment of services etc. We thus argue that it is in the local com-
munities’ interests for the business to respond and negotiate with grey and black 
hats respectively.
6.6.4  Customers
For a customer who expects fast and efficient services, responding to grey hats and 
black hats is in their interests. In a crypto-ransomware attack in particular, it is in 
customers’ interests for the business to do everything it can to prevent their private 
information from being sold or shared with the public. Brey (2007) states that data 
breaches containing sensitive information can cause psychological harm. If this is 
true, we argue that it is in the customers’ interests for the business to respond to grey 
hats to reduce the likelihood of a crypto-ransomware attack. Equally, we argue that 
it is in the customers’ interests for the business to negotiate with black hats to reduce 
the likelihood of the customers’ private and confidential information from being 
sold to an interested third party (Engster 2011).
6.6.5  Suppliers
In respect of suppliers, they have an invested interest in the targeted business. It is 
in their interests that companies, with whom they engage and do business with, have 
a secure and reliable network. We subsequently argue that it is in suppliers’ interests 
for the targeted businesses to readily respond to grey hats’ demands. In relation to a 
black hat attack, a stoppage of services and a data breach not only affects the busi-
ness targeted, it can have a knock-on negative effect on the market. Reducing the 
impact, longevity and cost of black hat blockers and crypto attacks is as much in the 
suppliers’ interests as it is in the targeted businesses’ interest. This is based on the 
fact that the supplier is interested in continuing business as normal and does not gain 
by being associated with a business who has fallen victim to a ransomware attack. 
Furthermore, a supplier’s confidential and private information stored on the targeted 
business’ systems might be leaked, misused or altered by the malicious hackers. It 
is thus in the suppliers’ interests for the attacked business to resolve the issue as 
quickly and as responsibly as possible. We argue that this can be achieved by the 
targeted business responding to the black hats’ ransom by firstly trying to find the 
decryption and, if none is available, to open up a communication channel with the 
black hat and try to negotiate a reduced fee.
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6.6.6  Competitors
Competitors are impacted by other businesses operations within their industry. For 
example, when one company in an industry operates unethically, or in a way that 
attracts negative attention, competitors can suffer. Additionally, in certain industries 
associations exist that involve members pooling resources for industry-wide promo-
tions and lobbying efforts. If one business chooses not to abide by the associations’ 
ethical code, this can damage not only the business themselves but the association 
and other members of the association. We can apply this notion to a ransomware 
attack. For example, if one business does not respond to a grey hat’s demands, the 
business could be argued as passively contributing to a weaker cyber environment. 
In doing so, the business not only increases their likelihood of being victim to a suc-
cessful black hat attack, but the business may also be in violation of their associa-
tion’s ethical code. A violation of ethical code depends on the code itself and the 
values promoted within it. In other words, the business might be in violation of the 
ethical code if it encourages members to engage in promoting sustainability for all 
members of the association through collaboration, communication, co-operation 
and the sharing of information.
In the case of black hat attacks, it is in all competitors’ interests (especially those 
who are members of an association) for the business to respond ethically and 
responsibly. For example, if an association sets a standard that its member must fol-
low when they find themselves victim to a black hat attack, this can create a stan-
dard within one industry. Therefore, it is not only in competitors’ interests and the 
business’s interest to choose an ethical response to black hat attacks, we argue that 
it is an industry-wide interest. We extend this argument further by contending that it 
is in competitor’s interests for the business attacked to have the knowhow to not 
immediately pay the ransom and try to find a decryption key. Thereafter, if a decryp-
tion key is not available, the business should engage in negotiation talks with the 
black hat with a view to lowering the original ransom demanded.
6.6.7  Hackers
Falk (2014) argues that the grey hat hacker is a black hat in a morally ambiguous 
state and recommends that grey hacking is a morally wrong action and as such 
should not be encouraged nor practiced by well-meaning computer professionals”. 
We do not agree with this line of thinking for the following reasons. Despite both 
grey hats and black hats ransoming businesses (Yaghmaei et al. 2017), grey hats are 
interested in improving the information security community by scouring for vulner-
abilities. Grey hats afford businesses the opportunity to patch those vulnerabilities 
before they are exploited by a black hat (Brey 2007). Black hats are not interested 
in using their skill set for the greater benefit of wider society. They tend to use their 
skills for malicious and illegal purposes (Radziwill et  al. 2015). Black hats also 
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believe in the more traditional hacker ethic that all information should be free and 
unlimited (Leiwo and Heikkuri 1998). This notion goes against the very idea of 
intellectual property as it suggests that individuals could and should not be able to 
benefit from information considered valuable (Brey 2007).
When we consult the ACM Code, it states that all computing professionals have 
an obligation to minimise the “negative consequences of computing, including 
threats to health, safety, personal security, and privacy” in addition to minimising 
the possibility of indirectly and directly harming others (ACM 2018a, b). It might 
be argued that grey hats follow this code whereas black hats do not. One interesting 
point made within the ACM Code is that computer professionals should only gain 
unauthorised access to systems when “there is an overriding concern for the public 
good” (ACM 2018a, b). This statement could be interpreted as the ACM condoning 
grey hat behaviour going on the assumption that grey hat’s actions are undertaken 
out of concern for the public good. Being privy to the fact that grey hats are inter-
ested in improving the security of cyberspace and are working in the interests of 
businesses and wider society, whereas black hats interests are malicious, self- 
serving and can have detrimental consequences on a business, we argue that it is in 
businesses’ interest to know the said differences between grey hats and black hats, 
to respond to grey hat demands, and to explore all options available to them when 
they fall victim to a black hat attack.
6.6.8  General Public
From the general public’s view, they trust businesses to keep their information safe 
and secure (Wenger et al. 2017). In addition, as consumers they want easy access to 
information without disruptions to services (Yaghmaei et al. 2017). One example of 
a ransomware attack causing havoc amongst the general public was the WannaCry 
attack on the National Health Service in 2017 (National Audit Office 2017). From 
the public’s perspective, resuming service and access is in their interest. This leads 
us to suggest that it is in the public’s interest for businesses to negotiate with black 
hats about their demands.
In relation to a grey hat’s demands, it can be argued that the grey hat is extending 
care to the general public by identifying vulnerabilities in a system or network and 
forcing businesses to patch them. This argument can be made as grey hats are 
improving cyberspace for all by making it more secure. The more secure it becomes, 
the less likely it is that individuals and institutions will be successfully attacked by 
a malicious hacker. In this way, grey hats are working with businesses to try to 
reduce the prevalence of malicious attacks. This not only benefits businesses but 
right down to individuals who use cyberspace for personal use. Therefore, the grey 
hat is not only extending care to the general public and thus acting morally from a 
ST care perspective, but the grey hat is fulfilling the third principle of the ACM 
Code, which states that computing professionals must ensure that the public good is 
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the “central concern during all professional computing work” (ACM 2018a, b). 
With this in mind, we argue that is in the public’s interest for businesses to respond 
to grey hats.
6.7  Conflicts of Interests Between the Stakeholders
We identify two conflicts of interest: (1) between grey hats and the other named 
stakeholders, and (2) between black hats and the other named stakeholders.
6.7.1  Grey Hats’ Interests Versus the Other Named 
Stakeholders’ Interests
 (1) Grey hats gain access to systems without the consent of the system’s owner. In 
this way, grey hats penetrate and manipulate what were otherwise believed to be 
private and confidential systems. Those systems can contain sensitive and valu-
able information relating to the other named stakeholders. As these stakehold-
ers are obviously interested in keeping their information safe from unauthorised 
access, a conflict here arises between the interests of the stakeholders men-
tioned and the interests of grey hats. Tavani argues that the helpfulness inherent 
in a hacker pointing out security weaknesses may not outweigh the harm it 
causes, as activities in cyberspace do inflict harm in the real world. He states 
that the act of hacking itself undermines privacy, integrity and can compromise 
the accuracy of information, as all hackers cannot be trusted to freely access and 
modify information at will (Tavani 2013).
 (2) In seeking out vulnerabilities in systems, in rare cases, grey hats can stumble 
upon unintentional findings that are suggestive of criminal behaviour. In such 
cases, the grey hat is forced to decide whether they should notify the authorities 
or the vendor who maintains the business’ systems. If the incriminating infor-
mation obtained only relates to the dubious behaviour of one individual work-
ing within a firm, rather than to the general activities of the firm, should the grey 
hat notify the business directly, or the authorities? Depending on the nature of 
the findings, the discovered data could have the potential to damage the busi-
ness and its shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and possibly even 
competitors. A grey hat’s aim is to improve the security of cyberspace, not to 
incriminate unethical individuals or institutions. Therefore, it is clear that this 
particular, albeit rare, circumstance can create a conflict of interest between 
greys hats and the other named stakeholders.
 (3) Grey hats want to help users protect against unpatched vulnerabilities and limit 
the attack surface. Publishing vulnerabilities comes with the risk of weaponis-
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ing criminals and other parties who may cause harm to organisations and indi-
viduals. When a grey hat notifies a business that they have discovered a 
vulnerability that needs patching within a given time frame and the business 
fails to patch the vulnerability, it falls to the grey hat to decide how to proceed. 
Publishing the vulnerability increases public awareness that a particular system 
or device is insecure. It also provides black hats with the information they need 
to exploit the vulnerability. Not publishing the vulnerability can lead to a false 
sense of security. The conflict here arises as both publishing and unpublishing 
the vulnerability has the potential to benefit or cause harm to the other named 
stakeholders.
6.7.2  Black Hats Interests Versus the Other Named 
Stakeholders’ Interests
 (1) Black hats want the highest ransom fee to be paid by businesses whilst it is in 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, competitors and the general 
public’s interest to pay the lowest fee or no fee. The higher the ransom paid, the 
more likely it is that black hats can continue with their line of ‘business’. If a 
solution could be reached without the business paying any fees at all, the inter-
ests of the stakeholders that have a financial interest in the firm (shareholders, 
employees, the local community, customers and suppliers) are upheld. The 
remaining stakeholders (competitors and the general public) have an interest in 
a lower or no fee due to the interconnected and interdependent nature of cyber-
space. This is based on the notion that any action in cyberspace has a knock-on 
effect on a device, software, hardware or individual in some way shape or form.
 (2) Black hats are interested in their best-case scenario. This can involve receiving 
the original ransom demanded, not having to share the decryption key so it can 
be re-used and selling the decrypted data (in a leakware or doxware ransom-
ware attack) to the highest bidder. Businesses should be aware that paying the 
higher ransom does not guarantee that the black hat will share a decryption key, 
nor does it guarantee that the data encrypted will not be shared or sold to an 
interested third party. With this in mind, the worst-case scenario for the business 
and the other named stakeholders, is in fact the best-case scenario for the black 
hat, thus illustrating that a clear conflict of interest exists.
 (3) It is in a black hat’s interest for the business to pay the original ransom demanded 
without question. The other named stakeholders do not share this interest. 
Paying the ransom in this way sets a precedent for all other businesses. In other 
words, if we apply the principle of universality and all businesses began to do 
this, it might lead to an expectation that businesses must pay the highest ransom 
without question nor negotiation. It might also lead black hats to think that their 
ransoms are too low and encourage them to increase the cost of their demands. 
Assuming this to be true, businesses who pay the ransom without question nor 
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negotiation are not acting in the interests of the previously named stakeholders 
due to the potential financial impact and knock-on effect that it might have.
6.8  Responsibilities of Business
In today’s technologically driven fragile cyber environment, it is clear that busi-
nesses have an ethical responsibility to all of their stakeholders to respond to the 
ransomware demands from both grey hats and black hats in one way or another. At 
the beginning of this analysis, it appeared that grey hat demands were questionable. 
However, upon conducting an ethical analysis of the main stakeholders and their 
interests, it seems that grey hats are acting in the interests of the business and their 
stakeholders by identifying vulnerabilities and forcing them to patch them, as this 
improves the business’s computer security defences. We subsequently argue that 
businesses have an ethical responsibility to their stakeholders to respond to grey 
hat demands.
Engaging with black hats is not as straightforward. Black hats’ motivations are 
different, and black hats cannot be trusted to stick to their end of the deal. For 
example, if businesses choose to pay the original ransom immediately after it 
becomes known that their data or services have been targeted, the business could not 
only be left out of pocket from paying the ransom, but their services and data might 
remain inaccessible despite having paid it.
An additional problem with paying the ransom demanded is that businesses 
could be accused of aiding or abetting cybercrime. For example, institutions such as 
Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre, the National High-Tech Crime Unit of the 
Netherland’s Police and security company McAfee advise companies not to pay the 
ransom demanded by black hats. They state on their ‘No More Ransom’ website (a 
website established to try to help victims of ransomware retrieve their encrypted 
data without having to pay criminals) that by sending money to cybercriminals 
“you’ll only confirm that ransomware works and there is no guarantee you’ll get the 
decryption key you need in return” (No More Ransom 2018).
According to Wicks et al. (1994), companies must be adaptable in a fast, ever- 
changing business environment if they wish to survive and thrive. With this in mind, 
we encourage businesses to respond readily to ransomware attacks from black hats. 
In an ideal situation, the faster the decryption key is to hand, the shorter the down-
time period. In a situation where a decryption key is not available, and a business 
explicitly refuses to engage in negotiation talks with the black hat, the business is 
not only prolonging downtime, they are potentially worsening the financial impact 
of the attack. Depending on the severity of the attack, such action could affect the 
long-term sustainability of the firm and the ultimate goal of the firm, which is sur-
vival (Engster 2011). Going back to stakeholders’ interests and the understanding 
that businesses have a responsibility to consider stakeholders’ interests in their 
decision- making process, an explicit refusal to engage with black hat demands does 
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not align with the interests of all stakeholders simply because of the financial impact 
of downtime, which can put the survival of the business in jeopardy.
Due to the limitations of this chapter, we assume for the sake of argument that 
the black hat’s motivations are financial gain and they stick to their end of the ran-
som (i.e.) when the ransom is paid, they provide the decryption key and do not share 
or sell the encrypted data. Based on this assumption, we argue that companies have 
a responsibility to stakeholders (save for black hats) to reduce the potential collat-
eral damage (i.e.) economic, reputational and psychological damage that a ransom-
ware attack can cause. We suggest that businesses can do this by (1) having the 
knowhow to consult the decryption tools available and (2) when it becomes clear 
that decryption keys are unavailable, being able to open up negotiation talks with 
the black hat with a view to reducing the ransom demanded and, thereafter, be will-
ing to pay the ransom at a reduced price.
Our analysis of stakeholder’s interests has brought to light both the interests of 
the stakeholders and the conflicts of interest that arise in both grey hat and black hat 
ransomware attacks. After analysing the listed interests and conflicts, we argued 
from a care perspective that businesses have a responsibility to their stakeholders to 
communicate and negotiate with grey hats in respect of establishing a reasonable 
timeframe within which the business can patch the discovered vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, we argued that businesses have a responsibility to engage with black 
hats and negotiate a lower ransom when it becomes clear that no decryption key is 
available. It is noteworthy to mention that in advocating communicating and nego-
tiating with black hats, we are not condoning black hat behaviour; we are simply 
offering businesses a short-term ethical solution to a much larger problem. The 
larger problem exists for many reasons which do not fall within the scope of this 
chapter.
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Abstract Ethical questions have always been crucial in health care; the rapid dis-
semination of ICT makes some of those questions even more pressing and also 
raises new ones. One of these new questions is cybersecurity in relation to ethics in 
health care. In order to more closely examine this issue, this chapter introduces 
Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of biomedical ethics as well as additional 
ethical values and technical aims of relevance for health care. Based on this, two 
case studies—implantable medical devices and electronic Health Card—are pre-
sented, which illustrate potential conflicts between ethical values and technical aims 
as well as between ethical values themselves. It becomes apparent that these con-
flicts cannot be eliminated in general but must be reconsidered on a case-by-case 
basis. An ethical debate on cybersecurity regarding the design and implementation 
of new (digital) technologies in health care is essential.
Keywords Autonomy · Beneficence · Electronic health cards · Implants · Justice · 
Nonmalefience · Principlism
7.1  Introduction: The Value of Health
In the preface of his book The value of life (1985: xv) bioethicist John Harris writes, 
with a dash of sarcasm, that
[n]ot very long ago medical ethics consisted of two supremely important commandments. 
They were: do not advertise; and avoid sexual relations with your patients. At about the 
same time as doctors were doing their best to obey these commandments, moral philoso-
phers were more concerned with the meaning of words than with the meaning of life. Now, 
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not just doctors but all health care professionals are interested in ethical questions as they 
relate to medical practice […].
The questions Harris addresses are of fundamental character: the value of life, 
the beginning and end of life, euthanasia, and the like. Most astonishingly, health is 
not mentioned at all in the table of contents, although the whole book is dedicated 
to providing arguments that protecting the life and health of their patients is the 
most important responsibility of physicians and other health care professionals, 
since health is seen as the most important prerequisite of a good life.
In Western culture, at least since the time of ancient Greece, there has been a 
great deal of thought given to the value of health for a good and successful life. Even 
after more than 2500 years, the Hippocratic Oath still has an important significance 
for medical action; the value of health, not only throughout Western intellectual his-
tory, is a recurring theme. It is probably no exaggeration that health, despite all the 
problems inherent in a precise definition of this term, enjoys high priority world-
wide. Given this importance, it cannot be surprising that in order to protect health, 
the WHO has formulated access to it as a central human right.
If health actually is an important, if not the most important, value to human 
beings, then a health care system being able to provide effective and efficient help 
in case of medical problems also is most valuable—from an individual as well as 
societal point of view. That immediately raises the question of who must be obliged 
to provide for the necessary resources to maintain an effective health care system 
(e.g. Daniels 1985; Harris 1988). Although we do not discuss the benefits and bur-
dens or moral justifications of different ways to maintain and finance an effective 
and efficient health care system, justice and fairness will be an important issue in 
what follows. The provision and maintenance of cybersecurity in health care can be 
very resource-intensive; this raises the question of who has to pay for these resources.
Health care systems most obviously need huge amounts of resources—according 
to the WHO in 2015, US $7.2 trillion worldwide was spent on health care. This 
amounts to 10% of the 2015 global GDP. At the same time, in many countries pro-
viding these resources is becoming more difficult because political or economic 
factors, as present in most countries with aging populations, make it difficult to 
finance their respective health care system. Therefore, as Nancy Lorenzi (2005: 2) 
puts it, “[a]lmost every major economy in the world experiences the effects of the 
high cost of health care, and many, if not most, national and regional governments 
are in some stage of health care reform”. Although this was being said more than a 
decade ago it is still valid—and it is to be expected that it still will be valid in the 
years to come.
Attempts to reform existing health care systems most often include the develop-
ment and implementation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in 
order to support the provision of effective and efficient health care services. In other 
words, ICT shall be employed to reduce or at least stabilise the costs of health. One 
of the main purposes of ICT systems in health care is the administration of informa-
tion about patients and treatments that “[…] is a vital but complex component in the 
modern health care system. At a minimum, health care providers need to know a 
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patient’s identity and demographic characteristics, recent and distant medical history, 
current medications, allergies and sensitivities, chronic conditions, contact informa-
tion, and legal preferences.” (McClanahan 2007: 69) However, McClanahan also 
stresses that “[t]he increased use of electronic medical records has created a substan-
tial tension between two desirable values: the increased quality and utility of patient 
medical records and the protection of the privacy of the information they contain”.
At the same time, “[i]mprovements in the health status of communities depend 
on effective public health and health care infrastructures. These infrastructures are 
increasingly electronic and tied to the Internet. Incorporating emerging technolo-
gies into the service of the community has become a required task for every public 
health leader”. (Ross 2003: v) In other words, stakeholders (see Chap. 6 for an 
example of a comprehensive stakeholder identification) such as patients, health care 
professionals, health care providers, or insurance companies are confronted with 
competing or even contradictory aims such as increasing efficiency, reducing costs, 
improving quality, and keeping information secure and confidential (cf. Fried 1987). 
Employing new technologies in health care therefore creates new value conflicts 
(see Chap. 3) or at least makes old conflicts and problems more visible or increases 
their urgency.
Simultaneously, other moral values also shall be protected and supported, either 
as fundamental moral values in European societies and/or as moral values (see 
Chap. 3), which are constitutive for the relationship between patients on the one 
side and health care professionals on the other. Conflicting or even contradictory 
aims and values raise moral concerns, since it has to be decided which aim and 
which value should be prioritised. To illustrate this, studying the conflict between 
beneficence and autonomy—both are important moral values within and outside the 
medical sphere —can be of assistance: When ICT is deployed in the health sector, 
it shall be aimed at ensuring that patients themselves determine when which infor-
mation is revealed to whom—password protection and encryption are common 
measures to achieve this aim. However, in emergencies, when patients are no longer 
able to make this decision, there is now a risk that important medical information 
will no longer be accessible.
Moreover, it might be very helpful to share medically relevant patient informa-
tion widely among health care professionals to improve the quality and efficiency of 
treatment. The goal of protecting patients’ privacy and autonomy, however, may be 
at odds with this aim. In addition, in scholarly debates it is often mentioned that to 
provide cybersecurity it might be necessary to compromise privacy (see also Chap. 
10). This can occur, for example, when non-personal health information on the 
Internet is only accessible if potential users of this information have to disclose their 
identity. It is argued that the respective platforms are better protected against attacks 
because the identity of the attackers could be determined. The problem here, how-
ever, is that anonymous searching, for example for information on diseases that are 
socially stigmatised, would then no longer be possible.
Such conflicting aims raise particular concern because it is obvious that both the 
protection of patients’ privacy as well as the security of information systems and 
patient data must be important objectives in health care. Without privacy, trust 
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among patients and health care professionals necessary for medical treatment is 
jeopardised (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2009: 288ff.) and without the certainty 
that patient data will not be tampered with or stolen, treatment itself is at risk.
Approaching cybersecurity in health, in the second section we first discuss the 
relevant moral principles, values and technical aims relevant for the health domain. 
To illustrate the complexity of these issues, in the third section we present case stud-
ies from health practice. We furthermore explain in detail the conflicts that have 
emerged, which are examples of the broad spectrum of existing conflicts and trade- 
offs in health care. Finally, we outline the relationship between moral values and 
cybersecurity in health care. In the fourth section, we draw a brief conclusion.
7.2  Principles, Moral Values and Technical Aims
7.2.1  Principlism as a Starting Point of Ethical Analysis
Those involved in scholarly and professional debates concerning biomedical ethics 
will be familiar with autonomy, beneficence and justice: Together with nonmalefi-
cence these values—or more accurately ‘principles’—can be seen as core moral 
aims, as particularly emphasised in Beauchamp and Childress’ considerations on 
the foundations of biomedical ethics (see also Chap. 4). Their book Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (2009) first published in 1977 is a groundbreaking text. The core 
features of their approach—‘principlism’—involves four moral principles, namely 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice, which are pertinent to a par-
ticular moral situation; furthermore, they use their specification, balancing and 
(deductive) application to create a bridge between the moral situation and the rele-
vant principles.
It must be stressed that principlism is far from an indisputable tenet in biomedi-
cal ethics; its weaknesses include neglect of emotional and personal factors that are 
inherent in specific decision situations, oversimplification of the moral issues, and 
excessive claims of universality (e.g. Clouser and Gert 1990; Hine 2011; McGrath 
1998; Sorell 2011). Nevertheless, principlism remains highly influential for schol-
arly thinking about ethical issues arising (not only) in the health domain (e.g. Reijers 
et al. 2018). Hence, we use principlism as the starting point of our ethical analysis 
concerning cybersecurity in health.
As already mentioned, Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of biomedical 
ethics are respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice, the defini-
tions of which can be briefly summarized as follows (cf. Loi et al. 2019):
 – Respect for autonomy as a negative obligation means avoiding interfering in 
other people’s freely made decisions. Understanding respect for autonomy as a 
positive obligation means informing people comprehensibly and thoroughly 
about all aspects of a decision, for example about its consequences. Respect for 
autonomy also may “[…] affect rights and obligations of liberty, privacy, confi-
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dentiality, truthfulness, and informed consent […]” (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009: 104).
 – The principle of nonmaleficence is derived from the classic quote “above all, do 
no harm” which is often ascribed to the Hippocratic Oath. As Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009: 149) state, “[…] the Hippocratic oath clearly expresses an obli-
gation of nonmaleficence and an obligation of beneficence”. At the heart of this 
principle is the imperative not to harm or ill-treat anyone, especially patients.
 – Beneficence must be distinguished from nonmaleficence. According to 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009: 197), “[m]orality requires not only that we 
treat persons autonomously and refrain from harming them, but also that we 
contribute to their welfare.” Consequently, care must always be taken to ensure 
that actions that are intended to be benevolent do indeed contribute to a benefit; 
the advantages and disadvantages, risks and opportunities as well as the costs 
and benefits of those actions must therefore be weighed up.
 – Justice as a principle is even more difficult to grasp than the other three princi-
ples, since the different existing theories of justice produce very different results. 
For the purposes of our considerations, justice is to be translated as a guarantee 
of fair opportunities and the prevention of unfair discrimination, for instance 
based on gender or ethnicity. Justice also means that scarce resources should not 
be wasted; in addition, these resources often have to be provided by others, for 
example by the insured (cf. McCarthy 1987), so that economic use is required.
As Beauchamp (1995: 182) emphasises, “[t]he choice of these four types of 
moral principle as the framework for moral decision making in health care derives 
in part from professional roles and traditions.” Hence, it should be considered that it 
might have repercussions on the principles as a framework for moral decision mak-
ing in health care if professional roles and traditions change in time. It is most obvi-
ous that new technologies contribute to such changes.
7.2.2  Technical Aims Mapping to Ethical Principles
Despite justified criticism, we chose to use principlism as a starting point of our 
ethical analysis because its four moral principles can be mapped to the important 
aims of the employment of ICT in health care, which are efficiency and quality of 
services, privacy of information and confidentiality of communication, usability of 
services and safety (this idea was first developed by Christen et al. 2018; see also 
Fig. 7.1). The definitions of these four aims can be summarised as follows:
 – Efficiency and Quality of Services: One of the main purposes of ICT systems in 
health care is the administration of information in order to increase the efficiency 
of the health care system and to reduce its costs. Improvements in health care in 
qualitative terms refer, for instance, to new services that provide treatment or 
processes with better health-related outcomes. Big Data, the collection and 
 sharing of as much health related data as possible, might be used to establish new 
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insights regarding diseases and possible treatments (e.g. Vayena et al. 2016). In 
this regard, quality and efficiency of services map to the principle of beneficence. 
Efficiency of services map also to the principle of justice insofar as services con-
tribute to the economic use of resources, in this way diminishing the risk of 
unfair allocations.
 – Privacy of Information and Confidentiality of Communication: Using ICT to 
process patient data creates a moral challenge in terms of quality on the one hand 
and privacy and confidentiality on the other hand—yet both are important aims 
in health care. In particular, privacy is often seen as a prerequisite of patients’ 
autonomy and therefore privacy maps to the principle of autonomy. Privacy and 
confidentiality are also foundations of trust among patients on the one hand and 
health care professionals on the other.
 – Usability of Services: Usability can be defined as “[…] the degree of effective-
ness, efficiency, and satisfaction with which users of a system can realize their 
intended task” (Roman et  al. 2017: 70). With regard to health, users can be 
patients, medical staff and/or administrators, which have different degrees of 
ICT competences, depending on personal attitudes and socio-demographic vari-
ables (Kaplan and Litewka 2008). Usability of services map to the principle of 
nonmaleficence since poor usability can hurt people (e.g. Magrabi et al. 2012; 
Viitanen et al. 2011). Thus, usability, quality and efficiency are interrelated since 
reduced usability may compromise quality and efficiency. Usability of services 
additionally maps to the principle of justice in that usability for all kinds of users 
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Fig. 7.1 Technical aims mapping to ethical principles
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 – Safety: Safety can be defined as the reduction of health-threatening risks. Safety, 
quality, efficiency and usability are interrelated, but they do not align, because 
safety measures might reduce the efficiency and usability of services and there-
fore quality. Safety maps to the principle of nonmaleficence as well as to the 
principle of beneficence.
The four technical objectives mentioned above are composed of various sub-
goals. For instance, accessibility, availability, responsibility and transparency can be 
considered part of safety. Another example is universal design as “design-for-all, 
barrier-free design, transgenerational design, design-for-the-broader-average, or 
design-for-the-nonaverage” (Sandhu 2000: 80) that can be understood as part of 
usability. A detailed ethical analysis of case studies requires a very thorough exami-
nation of what subgoals make up the above mentioned technical aims in each case—
this can be understood as a “specification” in the sense that Beauchamp and 
Childress understand it in relation to their ethical principles. This kind of specifica-
tion is important not only for the technical requirements, but—as will become 
apparent—also for the identification of moral values that could be affected by tech-
nical aims.
7.2.3  Other Moral Values
The findings of an extensive structured literature search (Christen et  al. 2017; 
Yaghmaei et al. 2017: 9–17) show that, beside the four principles, additional moral 
values are affected by cybersecurity in health care. These values may often have a 
connection to Beauchamp and Childress’ principles, but, to different extents, they 
go beyond them. The most relevant ones with regard to cybersecurity in health care 
are freedom and consent, privacy and trust, dignity and solidarity, and fairness and 
equality.
 – Privacy and Trust: Privacy plays a crucial role, not least because of the use of 
constantly growing amounts of data (Big Data). Privacy of patients shall be guar-
anteed, also with particular regard to the sensitive nature of health-related data. 
Risks such as uncontrolled access by third parties, disclosure of data and the like 
are to be eliminated. Patients must be able to trust new health technologies, pro-
fessionals and the health care system in general. In other words, they must be 
certain to be protected from harm, which is connected to the principle of 
nonmaleficence.
 – Freedom and Consent: Freedom includes both the unrestricted choice of (non-)
use of new technologies as well as the unhindered choice of how and for which 
purposes new technologies are being used. To achieve this, patient consent must 
be recognised as an important factor in health care. This refers, in contrast to 
presumed consent, to informed consent. The idea of informed consent and the 
general freedom of use and freedom of choice emphasises the principle of 
autonomy.
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 – Fairness and Equality: An important value in terms of health is fairness in treat-
ment. This includes access for all patients to all types of treatment, regardless of, 
for instance, their ethnicity and social background. This is closely linked to the 
principle of justice, but emphasises the protection against subtle unfair treat-
ments, e.g. special consideration for people with a lack of skills, knowledge or 
abilities: Patients with limited health and technical literacy should be treated 
equally compared to those who know how to operate health technology. 
Everybody must be protected from unfair treatment, discrimination and stigma-
tisation; vulnerable groups shall not be excluded. Fairness and equality are 
closely linked to the principle of justice.
 – Dignity and Solidarity: Human dignity is a major democratic and European 
value. Dignity must always be maintained, regardless of technical innovations, 
necessary moral compromises and limited resources. While dignity in its abstract 
form is difficult to grasp and primarily addresses the individual, solidarity 
describes a societal value in a more concrete way: the interpersonal commitment 
of individuals and groups who have both responsibility and benefits as a com-
munity, e. g. in a health insurance system and public welfare. Both dignity and 
solidarity, especially in relation to health and cybersecurity, are tied to the prin-
ciple of beneficence.
These ethical principles and additional values are often both interlinked and in 
conflict with each other. In addition, there is the different use of terms: Privacy, for 
example, appears as part of an ethical principle, a technical aim and a moral value. 
Privacy as technical aim refers to data protection whereas Beauchamp and Childress 
consider privacy as a specification of the principle of autonomy. This ambiguity 
again demonstrates the importance of a detailed analysis of moral principles and 
values on the one hand and technical aims on the other.
7.3  Case Studies
7.3.1  Cardiac Pacemakers and Other Implantable Medical 
Devices
7.3.1.1  Brief Description of the Case
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) are employed with the intention of improving 
the quality of a patient’s life. Implants such as cardiac pacemakers, insulin pumps, 
biosensors and cochlear implants offer therapeutic, monitoring and even life-saving 
benefits: medical treatment can be made more precise, efficient, customised and 
flexible (Burleson and Carrara 2014, 1  f.; Ransford et  al. 2014, 157/167  f.). An 
increasing number of IMDs are wirelessly networked and can be connected to other 
devices to, for example, monitor functionality, set parameters, exchange data or 
install software updates.
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However, for some years, there have been reports about the dangers of implant-
able medical devices. In addition to the risk of unintentional loss of function due to 
defects, the connectivity of IMDs leaves them open to malicious attacks. Examples 
of such possible attacks are (Baranchuk et al. 2018: 1285 f.; Coventry and Branley 
2018: 48 f.; Mohan 2014: 372, Ransford et al. 2014: 158/161 f.):
 – Unauthorised access to sensitive data, and their manipulation or further misuse 
such as identity theft.
 – Spread of malware and viruses to interconnected devices and system networks.
 – Manipulations of the devices to, for instance, modify the automatic insulin out-
put or the impulse rate of a cardiac pacemaker.
 – Switching off devices, which can endanger the health or, in the worst case, even 
the life of the person carrying the device.
Although there have been no real incidents known to date, for years, hackers, 
security experts, and scientists have been illustrating the vulnerabilities of IMDs: 
Jerome Radcliffe presented a talk at the Black Hat conference in 2011 at which he 
explained how he was able to get access to implanted insulin pumps through reverse 
engineering (Radcliffe 2011); Barnaby Jack showed his successful hack in order to 
control pacemakers (Burns et al. 2016: 70); and Pycroft et al. (2016) discussed the 
actual possibilities of ‘brainjacking’ neurological implants. In 2017, the FDA pub-
lished a safety communications issue in which it announced that almost half a mil-
lion cardiac pacemakers must get a software update “[…] to reduce the risk of 
patient harm due to potential exploitation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities […]” 
(FDA 2017). In one of the most recent cases, Billy Rios and Jonathan Butts explained 
in the abstract of their Black Hat 2018 presentation that they “[…] provide detailed 
technical findings on remote exploitation of a pacemaker system [sic!], pacemaker 
infrastructure, and a neurostimulator system. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities 
allow for the disruption of therapy as well as the ability to execute shocks to a 
patient.” (Rios and Butts 2018) Already some years ago, this issue received special 
public attention when the media widely reported that the wireless function of then 
US Vice President Dick Cheney’s pacemaker was deactivated due to security risks 
(e.g. Vijayan 2014).
Although dangers posed by attacks on IMDs should not be underestimated, their 
occurrence is, due to the complexity of such attacks, not yet too realistic: First, 
depending on the type of data transmission, a short distance may be required, not 
least because of the already difficult energy provision of IMDs. Second, the motiva-
tion to potentially risk the lives of implant users need to be given; if it was a matter 
of financial gain through access to personal data, other cyberattacks would serve a 
better purpose. Experts expect a greater risk of malware and viruses affecting medi-
cal networks including connected implants (Baranchuk et al. 2018, 1287; Burleson 
and Carrara 2014, 2–5; Coventry and Branley 2018: 49–51).
Different factors contribute to the lack of security. In addition to the risks posed 
by interconnectivity, there are other technical difficulties: Digital implants are sup-
posed to have a long lifetime circle to minimise invasive treatment. Therefore, and 
due to the required small size and lightweight of medical devices, battery capacity 
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and storage space are very limited, which often results in weak or missing encryp-
tion; outdated, weak or even no virus protection; and/or in the lack of regular soft-
ware updates. The latter in particular creates the risk of endangering patients’ health 
and/or life caused by malfunctions or breakdowns of a device due to the problem of 
outdated and insecure software used with IMDs (Burleson and Carrara 2014: 1/4; 
Fu and Blum 2013: 36; Mohan 2014, 372 f.; Ransford et al. 2014: 162/166–169). 
The development of effective regulations to improve the security of IMDs has 
proven to be difficult as well: Several administrative bodies (e.g. the FDA, see 
Woods 2017) have been working on such regulations and on certification systems 
for years without successfully covering all eventualities. Due to the complex combi-
nation of various technical factors and different actors, the definition of responsibili-
ties and requirements regarding IMDs seems to be quite difficult and often comes 
with a huge time delay with regard to technical improvements (Burns et al. 2016: 
70 f.; Cerminara and Uzdavines 2017: 311 f.; Coventry and Branley 2018: 48).
7.3.1.2  Conflicting Ethical Values
The following analysis of possible moral conflicts demonstrates that there are not 
just management problems that contributes to these conflicts but that competing 
moral values or different value hierarchies on the part of stakeholders increase the 
insecurity of IMDs. Furthermore, as already pointed out, moral values can also 
conflict with technical requirements.
IMDs serve the primary aim of increasing the physical safety of patients. Wireless 
IMDs are designed to enable the continuous monitoring of vital parameters and 
faster communication with health care professionals both routinely and in emer-
gency cases. While this faster access aims to enable health care professionals to use 
medical data more quickly, efficiently and flexibly to perform successful treatment, 
lack of transparency about who and under what circumstances can access what 
information does not ensure patient consent and control (Mohan 2014: 372). In 
addition, a key problem is that patients do not have direct access to information 
stored in IMDs, particularly in the case of so-called ‘closed-loop-devices’, although 
these data could inform them about their own body and health status (Alexander 
2018; Ransford et al. 2014: 165–167).
If patients think that they might have little or no control over their own health- 
related data, that could, in the long run, contribute to a loss of confidence in health 
technology as well as in health care professionals. Because IMDs can be attacked 
and personal data stolen, patients may perceive danger for themselves and their data 
and thus for privacy and trust. Furthermore, there is the risk that implant users will 
be discriminated against as a consequence of unauthorised access to sensitive data, 
their uncontrollable use and disclosure to third parties. (Burleson and Carrara 2014: 
1f; Coventry and Branley 2018: 48, Ransford et al. 2014: 158).
Another possible negative effect on patients’ trust is the lack of a clear attribution 
of (moral) responsibility to the various stakeholders involved (e.g. manufacturers and 
designers, health care professionals and insurance companies, legislators and regula-
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tors), who pursue different interests and are not always primarily focused on patients’ 
well-being (Alexander 2018; Baranchuk et al. 2018: 1285 f.; Burns et al. 2016: 72).
If patients were to decide who exactly has access to their IMD or if the access 
would be at least (through technical or regulatory measures) more protected, how-
ever, other problems (in addition to the ones mentioned above) would arise:
Requiring users to authenticate to a device before altering its functionality is a boon for 
security, but it introduces risks in case of an emergency. A medical professional may need 
to reprogram or disable a device to effectively treat a patient. […] [E]ncryption or other 
strong authentication mechanisms could make such emergency measures impossible if the 
patient is unconscious or the facility does not possess a programming device with a required 
shared secret. (Ransford et al. 2014: 170).
In this case, the effective use and safety of the IMD would be in jeopardy. The 
conflict between usability and security does not only occur with the use by health 
care professionals. In the case of an open-loop system in which patients have access 
to the information stored in the device, their literacy level must be considered to 
ensure that patients with little technical knowledge and understanding for security 
do not suffer disadvantages. The degree of dependency and the level of risk must 
also be considered (Alexander 2018; Ransford et al. 2014: 164 f.).
7.3.2  Electronic Health Card (eHC) in Germany 
and Elsewhere
7.3.2.1  Brief Description of the Case
Conflicts with regard to cybersecurity are often related to privacy and data protec-
tion (e.g. Fernández-Alemán et al. 2013; see also Chap. 10). However, there are 
other types of conflicts. For instance, reaching a high level of cybersecurity might 
be very expensive. In a health care system financed on a solidarity basis, as it exists, 
for instance, in many European states, such costs would be passed on to all insured 
persons and thus potentially make the health care system more expensive for all. In 
health care systems where every person insures her own risk, as in the United States 
for example, it could be the case that only those who are willing and able to pay for 
expensive security would be able to enjoy the benefits of appropriately secured tech-
nology. This might raise concerns regarding social justice. As mentioned above, 
cybersecurity can also conflict with usability and accessibility. Despite these poten-
tial difficulties, there are high hopes for the use of ICT in health care, in particular 
regarding electronic health records and electronic health cards. This is demonstrated 
with reference to the German eHealth Card (eHC):
As part of the German health-care reform, the current health insurance card is being 
upgraded to an electronic health card. On it, data on patient investigations, drug regulations, 
vaccinations and emergency data are stored. The aim is among other things to improve 
medical care and the prevention of drug incompatibilities and duplication of investigations. 
(Jürjens and Rumm 2008)
7 Cybersecurity in Health Care
150
The development of an eHC in Germany was already discussed for the first time in 
2004. Technical development then began in 2006, but in 2009 the project was halted 
(Tuffs 2010) because it was feared that the costs and benefits were no longer in 
reasonable proportion to each other. There was also a great deal of resistance, par-
ticularly on the side of physicians. Now, in 2019, the nationwide introduction of the 
German eHC has yet to begin (cf. Stafford 2015).
In particular, German physicians are quite sceptical with regard to the eHC, since 
it is feared that its deployment will result in huge costs and increase the workload of 
physicians and health care personnel: “The cost-benefit factor plays an important 
role in the implementation process, because—in the opinion of many physicians—
the financial effort for acquiring and maintaining the system does not sufficiently 
outweigh the resulting benefit” (Wirtz et al. 2012: 659). As Ernstmann et al. (2009: 
185) write, “[…] the ratings of perceived usefulness are rather low, i.e. physicians 
are not aware of useful aspects of the new technology or do not judge the established 
aspects as useful in their practice.”
It is difficult to make accurate statements about whether this dissatisfaction has 
improved, as there is little practical experience with the eHC to date. A large-scale 
study (Schöffski et al. 2018) shows that many practitioners are still sceptical about 
the benefits. Although it is emphasised that the validity of the insurance status can 
be determined more reliably by the eHC—which is an important (cyber)security 
aspect—the administrative effort has not decreased. Since the functional capabili-
ties of the eHC have also been very limited to date, it is still not possible to prove 
any medical benefit. Some scholars (Deutsch et al. 2010; Klöcker 2014) assume that 
these attitudes result from the perception of different aims on the part of the stake-
holders; this would strengthen the assumption that technical, medical and ethical 
values or principles often compete or conflict with each other, especially in the 
health care sector. Although not discussed in detail here, it should be added that 
economic considerations play a dominant role in this particular case, which may 
also compete with other goals and values.
This rather sceptical attitude changes if it is assumed that the functional scope of 
the eHC is supplemented by the storage of a so-called emergency dataset, which, for 
example, would make it considerably easier for emergency physicians to provide 
first aid more accurately (Born et al. 2017). Since the medical benefit for physicians 
and, of course, for patients is most obvious, other considerations such as privacy, 
data protection and the like seem to be pushed into the background.
At the same time, at least to some stakeholders, benefits such as increased secu-
rity are less obvious: “The efficiency of the system is considered as critical by the 
physicians, particularly in terms of data security and potential misuse of data. The 
primary concern of the physicians is the unauthorised access of a third party to 
stored data.” In addition, “[r]egarding the introduction of the eHC to date, most 
physicians have criticized the very opaque communication and poor instruction on 
the subject” (Wirtz et al. 2012: 651). Or, to put it in other words (Ernstmann et al. 
2009: 181): “Primary care physicians rate their involvement in the process of the 
development of the technology and their own IT expertise concerning the techno-
logical innovation as rather low.”
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The German eHC is based on a decentralised ICT infrastructure; its security fea-
tures are strongly dependent on online network connections between end-user termi-
nals and servers. Only if such connections are available all security features can be 
fully used—two-factor authentication with PIN and eHC, for example, only works if 
there is an online connection between the terminal and the server. Without being 
online, end-user terminals can still be used, but with reduced security. In such cases, 
the application of the eHC comes with a potential conflict of (cyber-)security on the 
one hand and usability on the other (Jürjens and Rumm 2008). Since the provision of 
mobile Internet has improved since 2008, this problem may have been mitigated. The 
example shows, however, that cybersecurity builds on infrastructures that are not 
always and universally available—this might raise questions of social justice.
7.3.2.2  Conflicting Ethical Values
In addition to the obvious conflicts of moral values that could arise from the high 
infrastructural costs for the introduction of the eHC, this brief description already 
illustrates that there are other areas of conflict that should be examined in more 
detail.
Beyond the issue of unfair distributed economic burdens, which raise moral con-
cern with regard to social justice, the deployment of the German eHC as well as 
similar ICT infrastructures in other countries might be accompanied with another 
issue concerning discrimination. Due to security considerations, e.g. to protect med-
ical data against misuse and unauthorised access, most of these infrastructures 
employ encryption and password protection of sensitive data. Laur (2014) mentions 
that “[w]hile some people have already difficulty remembering a PIN (especially 
elderly and disabled people), having many more passwords that are intended to 
protect them could put them at risk of disclosure, loss or stealing.”
Although Laur refers to electronic health records in general, the problem also 
applies to the German eHC in particular: The eHC not only consists of a database, 
but its core components are a PIN and a credit card-sized chip card for two-factor 
authentication. Patient data (apart from the emergency dataset) can only be accessed 
if the chip card and PIN are used simultaneously. For elderly and/or handicapped 
people, for instance the visually impaired, using the eHC could be difficult. It is 
very likely that the persons concerned will create their own work-arounds, for 
example by writing PINs on the eHC or by disclosing them to health care personnel, 
which will certainly reduce the level of data protection, privacy and security of 
those persons. In such cases, a personal relationship of trust, which was originally 
intended to be replaced by technology, regains importance. From an ethical perspec-
tive, this does not necessarily have to be evaluated negatively, but it demonstrates 
that security measures can have ambivalent consequences and might raise concerns 
with regard to equality. Furthermore, it must be considered that in the large study of 
Schöffski et  al. (2018), usability was not really examined. This raises questions 
regarding the consideration of stakeholder groups such as handicapped or elderly 
people and their needs.
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7.3.3  Cybersecurity and Ethics in Health: A Tentative 
Summing-Up
It must be stressed that there is a long history behind the collection, storage and use 
of patient data. During that time, moral rules or moral orders developed to manage 
this data conscientiously and according to the interests of all stakeholders, but these 
rules related to data storage in paper files. The introduction of new technologies for 
storing and processing patient data, such as the electronic patient record or the eHC, 
will undoubtedly affect traditional moral and legal rules “governing health records, 
for example, consent and access rules, responsibility for data quality, liability for 
negligence, mistakes and accidents” (Garrety et al. 2014: 72); they will certainly be 
called into question by the new possibilities. In the future, we will have to prove 
whether these changes should be called “disruption of moral orders” (Garrety et al. 
2014). Nevertheless, (digital) technologies and their possibilities force us to pay more 
attention to how moral rights and obligations change with the use of technology.
The case studies described above should already demonstrate that in terms of 
cybersecurity, the design and application of new technologies in health care affect 
numerous principles, goals and moral values that are in competitive, conflicting or 
exclusive relationships. Without striving for completeness, the conflicts among tech-
nical aims and moral values and/or among different moral values should be briefly 
mentioned again: security vs. usability, safety and usability vs. privacy and trust, 
efficiency and quality of service vs. freedom and consent, and security vs. benefi-
cence. It is likely that in many cases, conflicts can be mitigated or even completely 
resolved by skilful technical design or by adapting organisational processes. 
However, it is equally likely that in some cases no such simple solutions are avail-
able. Beauchamp and Childress have often been criticised for not providing a clear 
hierarchy of principles; this, as often denounced, leaves the prioritisation of princi-
ples to the discretion of the decision-makers. However, it could well be that in many 
conflicts this is all that can be achieved. It is therefore one of the most important tasks 
of the value-based design of technology to make considerations transparent that lead 
to a decision. This makes it possible for decisions to be reconstructed, questioned 
and, if necessary, revised later on. In addition, there is often a demand that as many 
stakeholders as possible be involved in the value-based design of technology so that 
their expectations, demands and fears could be considered (Hennen 2012). However, 
it should be kept in mind that the participatory design of  technology itself raises 
moral concerns that cannot always be answered adequately (Saretzki 2012).
7.4  Conclusion
Verbeek (2006: 362) writes that “[l]ike a theater play or a movie […] technologies 
possess a “script” in the sense that they prescribe the actions of the actors involved. 
Technologies are able to evoke certain kinds of behaviour […] Technological 
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artefacts can influence human behaviour, and this influence can be understood in 
terms of scripts.” Verbeek (2006: 361) thus stresses that it is necessary to explore 
technology’s normative aspects because “[w]hen technologies coshape human 
actions, they give material answers to the ethical question of how to act. This implies 
that engineers are doing ‘ethics by other means’: they materialize morality.” As a 
consequence, we must learn that “[…] information systems are intentionally or 
unintentionally informed by moral values of their makers. Since information tech-
nology has become a constitutive technology which shapes human life it is impor-
tant to be aware of the value ladenness of IT design.” (van den Hoven 2007: 67).
The statements above aim to provide an initial insight into how moral values can 
conflict with each other in the design and use of medical technology, as well as how 
technical design decisions can come into competition with moral values. It is to be 
expected that an investigation of further case studies would reveal other and more 
conflicts not considered here. Following the concepts of ‘value sensitive design’ 
(VSD, e.g. Friedman 1996; Friedman et  al. 2013) and ‘responsible research and 
innovation’ (RRI, i.e. Burget et  al. 2017; Stahl et  al. 2014), every research and 
development project must therefore ensure that a comparable detailed analysis takes 
place in order to detect and then avoid such conflicts.
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Abstract This chapter provides a political and philosophical analysis of the values 
at stake in ensuring cybersecurity for critical infrastructures. It presents a review of 
the boundaries of cybersecurity in national security, with a focus on the ethics of 
surveillance for protecting critical infrastructures and the use of AI. A bibliographic 
analysis of the literature is applied until 2016 to identify and discuss the cybersecu-
rity value conflicts and ethical issues in national security. This is integrated with an 
analysis of the most recent literature on cyber-threats to national infrastructure and 
the role of AI. This chapter demonstrates that the increased connectedness of digital 
and non-digital infrastructure enhances the trade-offs between values identified in 
the literature of the past years, and supports this thesis with the analysis of four case 
studies.
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One of the first duties of a national state is defending national security, which is the 
protection of its citizens, economy and institutions. Originally, national security 
pertained protection from military threats, but nowadays its scope is broader and 
includes security from terrorism and crime, security of economy, energy, environ-
ment, food, critical infrastructure, and finally cybersecurity. In this chapter, we 
tackle the ethical challenges posed by cybersecurity in national security and, in 
particular, the security of critical infrastructures. The critical infrastructures of a 
state are the physical, non-physical and cyber resources or services that are funda-
mental to the minimum functioning of a society and its economy. Reliable ICT 
networks and their services, which are critical infrastructures, are crucial in ensur-
ing public welfare, economic stability, law enforcement and defence operations. 
Societies increasingly depend on public ICT networks and their services. The stabil-
ity, safety and resiliency of the cyberspace is a national security issue, as the vulner-
abilities of the cyberspace can be exploited to impair or destroy the critical 
infrastructures of a state, which highly rely on ICT networks and services.
In the national security sphere, state actors such as the police and national secu-
rity agencies have privileged access to ICT services, in order to enforce the law and 
carry out defence operations and countermeasures to terrorism. However, the privi-
leged access of government agencies to ICT services may endanger values that are 
pivotal for contemporary societies. Cybersecurity measures at the national level 
may create a condition of discrimination by affecting people’s access to some 
resources or services, have economic implications that affect fairness, influence 
freedom of expression, limit people’s autonomy and violate privacy (see also Chaps. 
3 and 4). For this reason, the identification and discussion of the ethical issues and 
value conflicts involved in cybersecurity at the national level is fundamental to 
assist national security organisations. In this contribution, we answer this need by 
providing the main ethical issues and potential value conflicts that should be consid-
ered by every national security organisation when carrying out cybersecurity initia-
tives, with a specific focus on the vulnerabilities to which critical infrastructures are 
subject. The aim of this chapter is to raise awareness about cybersecurity values, 
and to stimulate idea generation and discussion regarding values of cybersecurity in 
the national security domain.
8.2  Review of the Literature on Cybersecurity 
in the National Security Domain
We identified the ethical issues at stake in cybersecurity in the national security 
domain in the papers selected in the literature review on cybersecurity and ethics by 
Yaghmaei et al. (2017). We then constructed a network of the ethical values involved 
and of their possible tensions within the network. As a starting point, we categorised 
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the papers by identifying value conflicts of cybersecurity initiatives. We further 
marked ethical issues and values that were either supportive or in conflict with 
security, as the latter is the core value of cybersecurity. On the basis of that categori-
sation, we delineated a set of ethical issues and conflicting values.
In our review of the papers on cybersecurity in the national security domain, 
two topics are mostly investigated. The first is the urgency for nations to develop 
strategies, frameworks, and suitable legal policies to defend and protect from cyber- 
attacks. The second topic is the difficulty and complexity of handling cyber-attacks 
countermeasures, which is because cyber-attacks overcome national borders and 
because interconnectivity, even though it boosts economic growth and makes peo-
ple’s life easier, nonetheless makes ICT networks and systems more vulnerable to 
attacks.
In the papers reviewed, cybersecurity is considered the top priority in dealing 
with terrorism and a necessary complement to national security strategies. Much of 
the literature indicates that national cybersecurity strategies need to be mindful of 
national cultures and ethical and technical values and at the same time compatible 
with international strategies and the global nature of the Internet.
The main ethical issues and conflicting values in national cybersecurity strate-
gies that the authors of the reviewed papers have identified are shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 The main ethical issues and value conflicts in the literature on national cybersecurity 
strategies
Ethical issue Core value
Conflicting 
value
“Technology that was considered as a key contributor in 
progress of any country has evolved into a nightmare in 




“Growing pressure for government to develop capacities 






“Cyberspace enables cooperation and conflict in nearly 
equal measure” (Demchak 2011)
Security Equity
“Focus on state’s security crowds out consideration for 
security of an individual resulting in detrimental effect of 
the whole system” (Dunn Cavelty 2014)
Individual security State security
“lawyers face dilemma because of the insufficient and 
vague cyber legislations are incompatible to deal with 




“Infrastructure is owned and operated by private rather 
than public entities” (Hiller and Russell 2013)
Security Surveillance
“Growth of criminal activities with the increased use of 




“Value of information increase so as well the efforts of 




“Information and communication technologies go beyond 
national boundaries” (Phahlamohlaka 2008)
Security Protection of 
data
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In the next sections, we provide a detailed list of ethical issues and conflicting 
values regarding cybersecurity in national security that were found and discussed in 
Yaghmaei et al. (2017).
8.2.1  Ethical Issues That Emerged in the Literature
Cyber Terrorism/Cyber Warfare Sekgwathe and Talib (2011: 171) argue that 
“Cyber-crime is typically understood to consist of accessing a computer without 
the owner’s permission, exceeding the scope of one’s approval to access a com-
puter system, modifying or destroying computer data or using computer time and 
resources without proper authorisation. Cyber-terrorism consists essentially of 
undertaking these same activities to advance one’s political or ideological ends.” 
There is a twofold link between terrorism and the Internet. First, the Internet has 
become a forum for terrorist groups and individual terrorists, both to spread their 
messages of hate and violence, as well as to communicate with one another and 
their sympathisers. Second, individuals and groups have tried to attack computer 
networks, including those on the Internet; these acts are described as cyber terror-
ism or cyber warfare (Bucci 2012). Phahlamohlaka (2008) argues that the security 
risks associated with information and communication technologies, which go 
beyond national boundaries, are not fully in line with the value of data protection 
of all states. To avoid cyber warfare, the author contends that there is a need to 
develop and implement agile security-related ICT policies that mitigate the value 
conflict between data protection and security in the national security domain. 
Building on this value conflict, Deibert (2011) discusses the growing pressure on 
governments to develop capacities to fight cyber wars. He observes (2011: 1) that 
“today’s deteriorating cyber-environment poses immediate threats to the mainte-
nance of online freedom and longer-term threats to the integrity of global commu-
nications networks”.
Cyber-Espionage Cyber espionage is the use of electronic capabilities to illegally 
gather information from a target. For all nations, the information technology revolu-
tion quietly changed the way governments operate. The asymmetrical threat posed 
by cyber-attacks and the inherent vulnerabilities of cyberspace constitute a serious 
security risk confronting all nations. The achievements of cyber espionage—to 
which law enforcement and counterintelligence have found little answer—hint that 
more serious cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures are only a matter of time 
(Geers 2010a). Nevertheless, national security planners should address all threats 
with method and objectivity. As dependence on IT and the Internet grows, govern-
ments should make proportional investments in network security and incident 
response to the cyber espionages (Geers 2010b; Lehto 2013).
Lack of Cyber Law The literature review reveals that legality problems play an 
important role in cybersecurity in the national security domain. Lawyers are faced 
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with insufficient and vague cybersecurity legislations, which are incompatible with 
the requirements for effectively dealing with cyber-crimes (Faqir 2013; see also 
Chap. 5), as we will see in the case study of Exodus in the final section of this 
chapter. At the same time, cyber laws have become more critical than before in data 
and information security, as one can see in the growth of cyber-criminal activities. 
Hui et al. (2007: 11) argue that “... digital crimes (e-crimes) impose new challenges 
on prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of the corresponding 
offences”. Widely accessible systems should be made in a manner that enables one 
to detect and investigate digital crimes in a more efficient and effective way.
Cyber Awareness Raising awareness about cyber-security threats and vulnerabili-
ties and their impact on society has become vital, but it seems to be missing in the 
society, if compared to the leadership that the governments of nations try to estab-
lish. By raising awareness, individual and corporate users can learn how to behave 
in the online world and protect themselves from typical risks. Awareness activities 
occur on an ongoing basis and use a variety of delivery methods to reach broad audi-
ences. The awareness raising, however, varies across countries. Security awareness 
activities may be triggered by different events or factors, which may be internal or 
external to an organisation. Major external factors include recent security breaches, 
threats and incidents, new risks, updates of security policy and/or strategy. Examples 
of the internal factors are new laws and new governments.
Profiling In profiling, people are approached, judged or treated in a certain way 
because they have characteristics that fit a certain profile and are associated with 
certain other traits. Profiling is not addressed explicitly in the identified literature, 
but it is implicitly mentioned in four papers. Profiling is used for a wide range of 
purposes and by various actors. It is employed by police or security agencies to find 
criminals or terrorists, by airport security to decide whom to check more carefully, 
by companies to target certain consumers, and by banks in deciding to whom to give 
a loan. As these examples already suggest, sometimes profiling serves security 
objectives. At the same time, profiling may inflict all kinds of undeserved harm on 
people, from nuisance to false accusations to even, in extreme cases, unjustified 
imprisonment. Thus, profiling can create tension between values such as non- 
discrimination and absence of bias, on the one hand, and security, on the other. 
Although profiling may involve privacy violations—as personal information is 
gathered to fit somebody into a profile—the main issue at stake is not privacy. 
Rather, the issue is that a generalisation is made on the basis of limited information 
about a person. This generalisation is based on statistical information regarding a 
group to which a person belongs. However, in virtue of the probabilistic nature of 
such information, the latter may say nothing about a person. As a consequence, 
profiling may lead to stereotyping and discrimination, as has occurred in the use of 
facial recognition technologies by the police and security: such systems are less 
accurate for certain groups (Klare et al. 2012) and may lead to the discriminatory 
treatment of people (Introna and Wood 2004; Garvie et al. 2016), as we will see in 
the third case study that we present.
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8.2.2  Value Conflicts Identified in the Literature
Privacy/Protection of Data ↔ Security A critical issue in cyberspace lies in the 
inability of companies and private businesses to exchange information with the gov-
ernment. This causes insufficient information collection, skews analysts’ results, 
and prevents the states from collecting sufficient data on cyber-attacks and develop-
ing better defenses (McNally 2013). The cyber-attacks on Google illustrate the vul-
nerability of information stored in the cloud, online surveillance and private sector 
collaboration with government agencies against global terrorism. Hiller and Russell 
(2013) argue that cyber infrastructure is mainly owned and operated by private enti-
ties instead of public ones. Therefore, the states should select the most effective 
cybersecurity strategy and regulate the private sector to reduce overall cybersecurity 
risk and address the privacy concerns on cyberspace. We delve into this value con-
flict in the case study of Exodus. Furthermore, counter-terrorism measures and tools 
that tackle cyber-crime often invade privacy in the most brutal ways. At the same 
time, lack of personal online security leads to breaches of privacy. Security is thus 
an essential part of enabling privacy in the national security domain, especially with 
regards to data security, data protection, data ownership, access control, and infor-
mation and computer security.
State Security ↔ Individual Security Dunn Cavelty (2014) discusses a lack of 
focus on individuals in the efforts of states to achieve security in the building of ICT 
and other critical infrastructures. As a result, he argues, state security is not aligned 
with individual security. In fact, the focus on state’s security crowds out consider-
ation for the security of individuals. The result is a detrimental effect of the whole 
system: the state actors militarise cyber-security and override the different security 
needs of individuals in the cyberspace.
Connectivity ↔ Security The urgency for nations to develop strategies, frame-
works or suitable legal policies to defend and protect from cyber-attacks is dis-
cussed in several papers. At the same time, as mentioned, it is often contended that 
cyber- attacks beyond borders are increasingly difficult and complex to handle.
Accessibility ↔ Security With lower costs associated with information accessibil-
ity and retrieval, more consumers and producers have access to global markets and 
transnational communication. Many Internet users, however, are not fully aware of 
cyber threats and they are not trained to protect themselves against these threats, 
thus becoming vulnerable to online exploits and increasing insecurity in 
cyberspace.
Connectivity ↔ Equity of Access Globally interconnected digital information and 
communication underpin almost every facet of modern society and its critical infra-
structure. However, not everyone in society has the same degree of access to infor-
mation and communication technology. From the literature review, it emerged that 
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inclusion and equity of access, consumer and producer accessibility to global mar-
kets, transnational communication, learning, and entertainment should be guaran-
teed to all, without causing exclusion, along with connectivity.
Confidentiality ↔ Trust Confidentiality prevents the disclosure of information to 
unauthorised individuals or systems. The impact of cyber-threats could reduce pub-
lic confidence and damage reputation of Internet transactions. Thus, assuring a 
trusted and resilient information and communications infrastructure is needed to 
protect privacy.
8.2.3  The Gap in the Literature
We observed that the examined literature fails to emphasise to a sufficient degree 
that cybersecurity in national security involves numerous conflicting values. By 
contrast, the literature generally tends to focus on only one value (e.g. security, pri-
vacy, connectivity). Moreover, two topics that are highly relevant for ethics in 
cybersecurity at the national level are overlooked in the articles we reviewed: limita-
tion of democratic values and creation of power imbalances.
With regards to the risk that cybersecurity may limit democratic values, on sev-
eral occasions, governments and security agencies have required access to encrypted 
communication such as that on WhatsApp for security reasons, e.g. to detect and 
avoid potential terrorist attacks. Opponents of such access do not only point to pri-
vacy considerations but also to the fact that encrypted communication that cannot be 
accessed by governments and their agencies might be important for the democratic 
process and support opposition movements in countries with totalitarian or suppres-
sive regimes. A similar issue has arisen in relation to the Tor network. The latter is 
a free software and an open network that supports users in protecting themselves 
against traffic analysis, which is a form of network surveillance that threatens free-
dom and privacy. In the aftermath of the hacking of the Democratic Party during the 
U.S. elections, it transpired that a Dutch private Tor server had probably been used 
in the hacking. The Tor server was owned by Rejo Zenger, an employee of Bits of 
Freedom. Bits of Freedom is a Dutch digital rights organisation which focuses on 
privacy and freedom of communications in the digital age. Although Zenger recog-
nises that Tor servers can be misused by hackers, and are in that sense a threat to 
cybersecurity, he believes that this is a price worth paying, not only for reasons of 
privacy but also because these servers may be crucial for whistle blowers to reveal 
abuses. Again, the value that is at stake here is not just privacy but also a range of 
civil liberties that are seen as crucial for democracy and the democratic process.
The second value issue that is neglected in the literature but relevant for cyberse-
curity in the national security domain regards economic and political power imbal-
ances. Economic monopolies or oligarchies are often considered undesirable, and in 
democracies, the balance of the political power between citizens and their govern-
ment is a fundamental goal. It is acknowledged that maintaining certain power 
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 balances is important for a healthy economy and for democratic politics. What 
seems to be less recognised is that the possession of information about others and 
their behaviour is an increasing source of power in the information age. In fact, 
organisations that collect or possess large amounts of (personal) data may increas-
ingly have power over other actors, which may lead to the disruption of existing 
power balances and the creation of new ones. The alteration of power balances 
pertains to companies such as Google or Facebook that collect large amounts of 
data about users and consumers, but also to governments and security agencies that 
may collect large amounts of data about citizens, and to providers of cybersecurity 
technologies, as these activities may involve accessing highly sensitive data. It 
should be noted that the accumulation of large amounts of data in the hands of a few 
may lead to power imbalances and may be problematic even if such data are ano-
nymised, or if people have given their informed consent for the collection, storage, 
and use of their data. Consequently, even when privacy concerns are properly 
addressed, the accumulation of large amounts of data in the hands of a few may be 
considered problematic for economic as well as political reasons.
8.3  Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure
There are many definitions of critical infrastructures, which mirror cultural trends 
and historically evolving political needs (Office of the [US] President 2003; Federal 
Register 1996; Maglaras et al. 2018; Moteff and Parfomac 2004; Commission of the 
European Communities 2006). The common features of all these definitions include 
the idea that infrastructures are general purpose means to different kinds of human 
activities, in particular economic activities, but also activities necessary to protect 
security and health. One could compare critical infrastructures to the skull and 
bones of a body, to its blood vessels, to its nervous system: in short, to its vital 
organs, which need to be in place and work well for every action of the human body 
to be performed efficiently and painlessly.
Although nowadays all the systems that are comprised in critical infrastructure 
rely on ICT networks and services, they are not equally sensitive to attacks through 
cyber means. For example, hospitals and telecommunication systems, energy, bank-
ing and finance, and postal sectors, all rely on cyberinfrastructure to a such a degree 
that makes them obvious targets to an attacker.
We find that the definition of what counts as a cyber-attack to infrastructure is 
ambiguous, hence we introduce a classification of attacks by means of two orthogo-
nal conceptual distinctions, leading to four distinct kinds of cyber-attacks to infra-
structure. The types of attacks to critical infrastructure can be distinguished on the 
basis of the means of attack, as mere cyber-attacks vs. attacks with a physical com-
ponent (physical or cyber-physical) and on the basis of the outcome damage, which 
can be physical (or physical and functional) vs. purely functional (see Table 8.2). 
We now describe the four possible combinations of means of attack and damage and 
all kinds of cyber-attacks.
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First, in terms of the damage caused by the attack, we can distinguish physical or 
physical-functional (1) from merely functional attacks (2). In our definition, when 
the attack is merely functional (2), the only object that gets destroyed is information. 
Although malfunctioning and disruption of services may follow from the attack, 
there is no physical damage. In a physical attack (1), the attacked object is “persons, 
property or infrastructure attacked through cyberspace” (Roscini 2017: 103). We 
can make this distinction more precise by appealing to a criterion that has been sug-
gested in the law of armed conflict. According to this criterion, a cyber operation 
counts as a physical attack if “restoration of functionality requires replacement of 
physical components” (Schmitt 2013: 108). The criterion is controversial in its orig-
inal legal function as a measure of attack severity legitimising a military response, 
because it treats as an attack the physical destruction of a single server but not the 
incapacitation of an object (e.g. civilian power station) for days (Roscini 2017). 
However, our question here does not concern the justification of acts of wars, thus 
the distinction is far less problematic in our context. We merely need it to rigorously 
distinguish purely functional (2) from physical attacks, which typically have func-
tional consequences (thus the label physical or physical-functional, in 1). Any attack 
that causes physical damage to infrastructure belongs to the column 1, irrespective 
of the means of attack (which can be also be purely software-based, as in the Stuxnet 
case, see below).
Second, in terms of means of attack, we shall distinguish a ‘merely cyber’ attack 
(B), for example through a virus or trojan, from a physical attack (A). Ordinary 
physical attacks to physical infrastructure causing physical damage (A1), e.g. shoot-
ing a missile to bring down a bridge or throwing poison in the water pipes may not 
belong to the realm of cybersecurity. However, some such attacks do, for example, 
the use of drones hacked or guided by malicious AI to carry explosives in the prox-
imity of a dam. An instance of A2 (physical attack without physical damage) can be 
the use of graphite bombs, which spread extremely fine carbon filaments over elec-
trical components that cause fully recoverable physical damage to the infrastruc-
ture: a short-circuit and a disruption of the electrical supply (Roscini 2017). This 
clearly counts as a cybersecurity threat, and it may not count as a physical attack 
according to our definition, as it is possible that no physical component needs 
replacement. An example of B1 is Stuxnet, the virus targeting the Siemens software 
that operated the uranium enrichment facility in Iran, in which the attacked objects 
were the turbines themselves, not just the information in the system. In this case, the 
means of the attack, unlike the case involving drones, were merely informational (a 
piece of software), but the goal was to physically damage the turbines. Cell B2 
comprises attacks that disrupt the informational infrastructure of a country, without 
Table 8.2 Types of attacks on critical infrastructure
Damage → 1. Physical or physical-functional 2. Merely functional
Means of attack ↓
A. Physical or cyber-physical A1 A2
B. Merely cyber B1 B2
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causing physical damage as defined. This includes, for example, DDoS attack that 
disrupt the processes of critical systems as well as the use of social media bots to 
spread dissent and convey political messages (Brundage et al. 2018). Any substan-
tial and long perpetuated attack of the functioning of the Internet, when it does not 
cause physical damage to machineries or people, falls in category B2. An example 
is the sustained DDoS attack against the Chinese national domain name resolution 
registry on 25 August 2013, which interrupted or slowed down connectivity (Roscini 
2017) without any lasting physical damage.
Therefore, the same critical infrastructure, e.g. the Internet, can be attacked by 
causing physical or merely functional damage, i.e. by targeting respectively its 
hardware or software components (Roscini 2017). The Internet is also vulnerable to 
both physical and ‘merely cyber’ means of attacks, e.g. missiles destroying servers 
and DDoS attacks, respectively. In all cases, the main impact on the population is 
that Internet connectivity is reduced, slowed down or made sloppy.
In all four kinds of attack to critical infrastructures, the vulnerable attack surface 
gets broader and broader due to digitisation—which means increased data avail-
ability and connectedness—and the development of AI—which obviously leads to 
augmenting the technological infrastructure for data collection and data analysis. 
We discuss two phenomena that are related to this issue, in the next section: first, the 
embedding of industrial control systems into public communication infrastructures. 
The traditional relative isolation and peculiar constitution of these information and 
communication systems has declined as business has turned to exploit peer-to-peer 
communications, real time monitoring, and lately, smart grids built through the 
Internet of Things and other services provided through the Internet (Maglaras et al. 
2018). This has implications for cybersecurity, as we will see. The second phenom-
enon is the diffusion of AI, which has three implications for the cybersecurity of 
national infrastructure. First, the widespread availability of new cyber-physical sys-
tems, which can be exploited by novel attacks, for example causing self-driving cars 
to crash (Brundage et al. 2018); this is typically a physical and functional attack; 
second, the vulnerability that follows from the embedding of AI in critical infra-
structures itself, which makes them vulnerable to both functional and physical- 
functional (à la Stuxnet) attacks; third, the possibility of using AI to enhance the 
scale and/or sophistication of attacks (both purely cyber as well as cyber-physical) 
against the critical infrastructure itself.
8.3.1  Cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems
The threat of cyber-attacks to infrastructure is capable of motivating the state to 
enhance its cyber capabilities. Unfortunately, some countermeasures of the state do 
not lead to enhancing the country’s cyber defences directly, but rather enhancing 
investigative and retaliatory capabilities. State officials may recognise that there are 
structural limits that prevent improving the cyber defences of some critical 
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infrastructures to the degree needed by national security objectives, or at least, there 
are such limits for any society that is not ready to renounce the efficiency advances 
brought by increased connectedness through ICT and AI. As Maglaras et al. point 
out, these limits are due to the current industrial control system network, which is a 
“unique environment, that combines large scale, geographically distributed, legacy 
and proprietary system components” (Maglaras et  al. 2018: 43). In a sense, the 
combination in the same network of ad hoc programmable logical controllers and 
proprietary systems (unconventional solutions) with well-documented protocols 
and off-the-shelf hardware solutions (conventional solutions) is the worst of all 
worlds from the point of view of cybersecurity. While unconventional solutions 
(which are still in place) may be poorly understood by cybersecurity specialists, the 
use of conventional ones threatens to undermine the obscurity of previous configu-
rations, which are used to protect them from simple attacks (Maglaras et al. 2018). 
The combination of both solutions in the same network means that although the 
benefit of obscurity may be significantly reduced, it will still be very costly to guar-
antee high levels of security to such systems, as it requires ad hoc solutions.
The challenge in improving the strictly defensive cybersecurity programme of 
industrial control systems may lead, as a logical response by concerned politicians, 
to enhancing the capabilities of attack and surveillance by state agencies. This can 
be considered a strategy of prevention of attacks to critical infrastructure, and per-
haps even retaliation, which appears all the more necessary since its protection is so 
challenging from a technical and financial perspective. The enhancement of preven-
tion, which is achieved through surveillance, is, however, in a trade-off with citi-
zen’s privacy. The development of retaliation capabilities is in tension with the 
prospects of long-term cyber peace. Moreover, the technology risks escaping from 
direct control of the government and may create inequities in citizens’ capacity to 
protect privacy and render privacy a luxury good. In other words, our hypothesis is 
that, considering national security as an integrated socio-technical system, the fol-
lowing socio-political chain (C) of events may be in place:
C1. Enhanced connectivity of critical infrastructure ➔ increased vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure ➔ increased political incentive to enhance prevention 
against internal (e.g. domestic terrorists) and external (e.g. enemy states) threats
Furthermore, the causal chain may continue in two distinct branches, one domes-
tic and one that starts with foreign and may have domestic implications as well:
C1A. Increased political incentive to enhance prevention against internal threats ➔ 
greater threats to citizens’ privacy and freedom ➔ increased inequity in the pro-
tection from surveillance
C1B. Increased political incentive to enhance prevention against external threats ➔ 
cyber-offensive capabilities to be used against foreign enemies ➔ increased dis-
trust between states
C1B may in turn lead to a causal chain that reinforces the nefarious effects of 
C1A, namely:
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C1C. Increased distrust between states ➔ development of cyber-offensive capabilities 
(e.g. zero-day exploits) ➔ possible misuse of cyber-offensive capabilities ➔ 
greater threats to citizen’s privacy and freedom ➔ increased inequity in the pro-
tection from surveillance
In conclusion, there appears to be a trade-off between, on the one hand, the 
efficiency granted by embedding industrial control systems in larger and more 
general- purpose networks and by using off-the-shelf and more general-purpose 
information technology and, on the other, the capability to protect such systems 
from attacks. This conflict leads to further trade-offs if the states decide to protect 
infrastructure by developing preventive and retaliation offensive cyber capabilities.
8.3.2  AI and Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure
AI enhances the capabilities of attackers to affect the informational infrastructure of a 
society, as AI technologies are in general dual use (Brundage et al. 2018). For exam-
ple, face-recognition and the ability to generate synthetic pictures and audios, or to 
manipulate existing ones, can be used to disrupt, among others, political processes. 
Recently, the literature on cybersecurity has turned its attention to the cyber vulnera-
bilities emerging from: (a) the increased use of AI in cyber-physical systems that, if 
hacked or repurposed, can pose novel threats to critical infrastructure; (b) the increased 
use of AI in critical infrastructure itself; and (c) the use of new AI-powered tools to 
launch more powerful attacks against critical infrastructure (Brundage et al. 2018).
An instance of (a) is the use of self-driving cars. Their AIs create opportunities 
for attacks through adversarial examples that cause crashes. If the attack is of suf-
ficiently wide scope, it can be configured as an attack to a country’s road networks, 
which are a critical infrastructure. Another example is the repurposing of commer-
cial AI systems as physical weapons against infrastructure. For example, commer-
cial drones and self-driving cars could be used to deliver explosives against 
physical infrastructures such as the electric grid, dams, hospitals, schools, etc. 
(Brundage et al. 2018). These attacks all fall into case A1 in our fourfold classifi-
cation. Examples of type (b) derive from the fact that AI-augmented services are 
vulnerable to AI-specific attacks such as adversarial examples (Brundage et  al. 
2018). One case concerning a specific critical infrastructure, namely hospitals, is 
the possibility of adversarial attacks against diagnostic tools employing AI 
(Finlayson et al. 2019). These are instances of B2  in our classification. Finally, 
example of type (c) concerns the use of AI to enhance attacks against critical infra-
structure. The autonomy of AI increases the potential damage that a single person 
may be able to cause (Brundage et al. 2018). The literature describes cases of both 
A1 and B2 cyber-attacks. Distributed attacks by networks of coordinated robotic 
systems (swarming attacks) such as drone swarms may be enabled by multi-agent 
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swarming networks, which are an instance of AI (Brundage et  al. 2018). Face-
recognition, navigation and planning algorithms are similar enhancements of 
robotic systems (Brundage et  al. 2018), which can be used to launch physical 
attacks (A1) to infrastructures. Moreover, AI can be used to enhance the search of 
software vulnerabilities (Brundage et al. 2018; King et al. 2019), thus increasing 
the scale or sophistication of attacks to the software embedded in infrastructure. 
The effect can be functional disruption (B2) or physical damage (A1) when the 
infrastructure in question relies on information and communication technology for 
its functioning or safety.
In conclusion, the widespread availability of AI, which is a dual use technology, 
enhances the capabilities of attackers, by “alleviating the trade-off between scale 
and efficacy of attacks” (Brundage et al. 2018: 6) and by enabling new kinds of 
attacks, such as swarming attacks coordinated by AI frameworks.
8.3.3  Value Conflicts in the Use of AI in Cybersecurity 
in the National Security Domain
As discussed in the previous section, AI is taking both an attacking and defensive 
role in cybersecurity. One of the clearest demonstrations was the DARPA Cyber 
Grand Challenge of 2016, with AI systems able to both identify and patch vulnera-
bilities (King et al. 2019; Taddeo 2019). Some AI cybersecurity defences are famil-
iar, such as spam filters and malware detectors. Other examples are defence drones 
and the use of AI in criminal investigations and terrorism (Brundage et al. 2018). 
The recent literature has identified three significant value conflicts concerning AI: 
(1) security vs. privacy, (2) non-discrimination vs. security, and (3) short-term secu-
rity vs. long-term security in cybersecurity between nation states.
The first value conflict concerns the use of AI-empowered technology such as 
facial recognition or social network analysis (Brundage et al. 2018) for purposes of 
national security defence. The employment of AI in a defensive and preventive role 
may enable a faster identification and response to threats, but it will not protect 
society from the threat of authoritarian abuse of the cyber domain by states 
(Brundage et al. 2018). As AI is more pervasively used for image, video and text 
recognition by state agencies, the traditional trade-off of cybersecurity mentioned in 
Sect. 8.2.2 (Privacy/Protection of Data ↔ Security) is exacerbated. Moreover, AI 
can be employed to better identify and profile citizens in relation to their online 
behaviour, for example through biometric profiles based on the way in which users 
move their mice (Taddeo 2019).
The conflict between non-discrimination and security is due to the biases and 
discriminations in AI, by which one means either indirect discrimination/disparate 
impact, which leads to certain groups (e.g. races, religions) being negatively affected 
by the outcome of the facially neutral algorithms, or unequal accuracy, which is the 
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different balance in false positive/false negative rates for different groups (Zafar 
et al. 2017; Chouldechova and Roth 2018). All kinds of systems employed for pro-
filing dangerous individuals and predicting threats are affected by indirect discrimi-
nation and/or unequal accuracy. This is not due exclusively to biases in data 
collection, but also to unavoidable trade-offs between different kinds of biases 
(Chouldechova 2016; Kleinberg et al. 2016) and between bias-removal techniques 
and the accuracy or efficiency of the prediction, or classification, in question (Berk 
et  al. 2017; Corbett-Davies et  al. 2017). We examine a case study of the ethical 
conflict between non-discrimination and security in the next session.
The third value conflict is a tension between the short-term goal of enhanced 
security, which may be also promoted by cyber defences (Brundage et al. 2018), 
and the negative side-effects of such reliance in the long-term (Brundage et  al. 
2018; King et al. 2019; Taddeo 2019). While the current confidence of experts in 
these systems is low (Brundage et  al. 2018), improving such systems has been 
recommended (Brundage et al. 2018), and it may be speculated that the AI testing 
of cybersecurity will greatly enhance cybersecurity and reduce the value of zero-
day exploits (Taddeo 2019). Among the side-effects is, first, the fact that AI-based 
defences may also have unattended vulnerabilities (Brundage et al. 2018). Second, 
if AI testing of cybersecurity proves more accurate than the human testing in the 
short term, then a human deskilling problem follows, namely the risk that “delegat-
ing testing to AI could lead to a complete deskilling of experts [which] would be 
imprudent” (Taddeo 2019: 188). Third, there is the risk that AI-enabled cyber 
weapons will be used in national active cyber defence strategies, i.e. in order to 
retaliate or create deterrence (Taddeo 2019). Some scholars have argued that the 
use of AI-enabled cyber weapons by states, for purposes of retaliation and deter-
rence, will lead to a cyber arms race from which all involved parties will lose in 
terms of their national security (Taddeo and Floridi 2018). Thus, scholars have 
advocated the adoption of an international regime of norms regulating state behav-
iour in cyber space (Taddeo 2018; Taddeo and Floridi 2018). However, consensus 
on such norms for the specific case of AI is unlikely to be reached soon, witnessing 
the failure of governmental actors to agree on more general principles of cyber-
space behaviour (see Chap. 18). For at least two decades, governments and schol-
ars alike have been advocating a regime of responsible behaviour in cyberspace 
(see Chap. 18) of which norms concerning AI can be considered an extension. 
Similar proposals include common norms of collaboration and information sharing 
between states (see Chap. 13), in order to build and strengthen trust, and/or higher 
investments in the security and resilience of digital infrastructure, which reduce the 
benefit that can be derived from such attacks. In a similar vein, Lucas (in this vol-
ume) has placed emphasis on creating the conditions for the emergence of practices 
and customs that confer more stability and predictability of the behaviour of states 
in the cyber domain. This could be facilitated, he suggests, by promoting public-
private partnership in cyberspace and investing in international cooperation, to 
identify malevolent cyber actors.
E. Viganò et al.
171
8.4  Case Studies of Cybersecurity in the National Security 
Domain
In what follows, we illustrate four case studies that are related to one or more ethical 
issues in cybersecurity at the national level that we tackled in this chapter. First, we 
present a case of cyber retaliation against a critical infrastructure, which threatens 
cyber peace (see also Chap. 13). Subsequently, we describe two cases of surveil-
lance technologies that governments are pursuing to enhance their cyber capabili-
ties, which may be misused against the governed. Finally, we address the case of 
some morally problematic cybersecurity threats exploited by governments against 
enemy states or internal opponents.
8.4.1  Iranian Attack to the US Power Grid System (Counter- 
Measure to Stuxnet)
In 2013, some hackers breached the control system of a dam near New York through 
a cellular modem and infiltrated the U.S. power grid system, gaining enough remote 
access to control the operations networks of the power system. The hackers targeted 
Calpine Corporation, a power producer with 82 plants operating in 18 states and 
Canada. Opening a pathway into the networks running the U.S. power grid was not 
difficult as the infrastructure was outdated and its ICT network was not sufficiently 
protected (Thompson 2016). Previously, various cyber-attacks from Russia and 
China to networks tied to the U.S. power grid were discovered, but in the case of the 
dam near New York, the hackers gathered much more data: passwords to connect 
remotely to the power grid’s networks and detailed engineering drawings of net-
works and power stations from New York to California. Potentially they would have 
been able to shut down generating stations and cause blackouts, but their infiltration 
was discovered before they started damaging the power grid. The digital clues that 
were gathered pointed to Iranian hackers (Thompson 2016). In the same period, 
hackers linked to the Iranian government attacked American bank websites. These 
attacks were Iran’s retaliation for Stuxnet.
It is likely that the infiltration into Calpine’s network was part of the Iranian coun-
ter-attack and thus it can be considered a case of cyber warfare. The Calpine case 
shows that the exploit of vulnerabilities in the ICT systems by governments produces 
a cyber arms race. In fact, while the Stuxnet attack did not harm innocent civilians, 
the data gathered by the hackers attacking Calpine would have harmed civilians, if the 
plan had been completed. Furthermore, the aim of the Stuxnet attack was considered 
a worthy one by the majority of the international community, as it consisted in pre-
venting Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, even though it raised several moral 
concerns (Baylon 2017). A final ethical issue that characterises the Calpine case is the 
tension between resource investment and security: enhancing the network security of 
energy infrastructures is a costly operation that requires significant investments.
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8.4.2  Hacking of Citizens’ Telephone with Exodus
In many countries in Europe and in the U.S., law enforcement and investigation can 
legally hack the devices of targets if required by a court order. In Italy, the police 
used Exodus, which is a spyware for smartphones, to gather data from criminals’ 
cell phones (e.g. their telephone book, call and browsing history, GPS position, text 
messages, audio recordings of the phone’s surroundings, etc.) and to send com-
mands to the infected cell phone via a port and a shell. Exodus was uploaded in 
more than 20 Android applications on the official Google Play Store, which were 
mostly apps to receive promotions and marketing offers or to improve the smart-
phone’s performance. Thus, these apps attracted and were downloaded by innocent 
people. Their phone was infected because Exodus installed itself on any phone 
without validating that the target was legitimate, whereas it should have checked the 
devices’ IMEI to verify if the phone was intended to be targeted. Moreover, the port 
that was opened by Exodus could be exploited by anyone on the same Wi-Fi net-
work, thus enabling the hacking of the infected phone to third parties. Google 
declared that less than 1000 mobile phones of Italian customers were infected 
(Franceschi-Bicchierai and Coluccini 2019).
In such a case we see, first, the opposition between national security in the form 
of the fight against crime, which is the aim pursued by the Italian state police and 
magistrates, versus the practical realisation of this aim. The latter involved innocent 
people and the violation of their privacy for no legitimate reason, since they were 
not under investigation. Furthermore, these people were rendered more vulnerable, 
as following the infection their mobile phone could be hacked by potentially every-
one. Second, we observe a tension between legality and security, as the Italian legal 
framework on cybersecurity is not keeping pace with the new technologies adopted 
in criminal surveillance. The 2017 Italian law regulating legal spyware and its 2018 
integration are too vague and do not address the need to protect the overall security 
of a targeted telephone. The results of such legal framework is that Exodus could 
be equated with old physical surveillance devices such as hidden microphones, 
whereas it is much more invasive (Franceschi-Bicchierai and Coluccini 2019). The 
society that the State police hired to develop Exodus is to be held responsible for 
infecting non-targeted people, as it deliberatively uploaded the apps with Exodus 
on Play Store, most likely in order to use innocent customers as oblivious experi-
mental subjects for its software. Thus, it is likely that Exodus’s failure to check the 
target’s IMEI was not a programming error. Finally, Apple adopts filters that pre-
vent  malware from slipping onto its store that are stricter than those employed by 
Google. Apple’s higher level of control protects its customers but has repercussions 
on the prices of Apple devices. This means that citizens’ privacy is not equally 




8.4.3  ‘Biased’ Face Recognition Systems
Face recognition systems (FRSs) are software used by police departments and air-
port security to respectively identify suspects and collect information regarding pas-
sengers with criminal records. The main reason why FRSs are increasingly employed 
by state agencies is that the task of finding a ‘face in the crowd’ or identifying a 
suspect from pictures of known offenders is a difficult task that requires effort. The 
FRSs automate this task and thus free government employees for more valuable 
tasks. FRSs are highly desirable as a biometric for digital surveillance as they are 
silent, non-invasive, and above all they are the only biometric techniques currently 
used by law enforcement that do not require the explicit consent of the subject. 
However, the performance of FRSs is highly reduced in an uncontrolled ‘face-in- 
the-crowd’ environment, in the case of a large database, and if there is an elapsed 
time between the database image and the probe image (Introna and Wood 2004).
The first ethical issue raised by the implementation of FRSs in general is the 
reduction of citizens’ privacy, as FRSs can use the data from any CCTV camera 
system, for the sake of security. The second ethical issue is that FRSs were found to 
have lower performances on certain demographic groups: females, Afro-Americans, 
and young people (Klare et al. 2012), thus generating a form of discrimination. In 
the U.S., the criminal justice system and law enforcement are already affected by 
racial disparities, as black people are more scrutinised than white people by the 
police. FRSs may exacerbate this disparity as they increase the frequency that an 
innocent Afro-American suspect will come under police scrutiny (McCullon 2017). 
FRSs are increasingly employed by state agencies even because they should not be 
subject to the biases of human vision; they should be neutral, as they are technologi-
cal artefacts. However, they are designed by humans in a specific sociotechnical 
context. This means that the biases of the algorithms of FRSs can be present in 
every phase of the algorithm design, from the selection of the data to the translation 
of the goal of the algorithm into mathematical constructs, to the selection of the tests 
that verify the performance of the algorithm (Loi et al. 2019). Hence, intentional 
attention to fairness in algorithm design is required for systems to overcome human 
biases and really achieve the equal treatment of individuals before the law.
8.4.4  Government Buying Zero-Day Exploits
Nowadays, cyber warfare comprises the practice of government agencies in buying 
zero-day exploits in the grey market. Prominent buyers of zero-day exploits are the 
governments of the U.S., Brazil, U.K., India and Israel. As these transactions occur 
in the grey markets and governments buy them in order to attack other countries or 
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opponents, these purchases are secret, and mentioning a specific real case is not 
possible. However, it is possible to delineate the dynamics of such transactions, 
thanks to the disclosures of hackers trading with government agencies (Perlroth and 
Sanger 2013).
The zero-day exploits can be used as a form of weapon, as they can disrupt and 
destroy computers and their network. The targets can be critical infrastructure and 
services vital to the economy, public health and national security of a country. 
Government buying vulnerabilities protect their national security by threatening 
that of other countries. The paradoxical consequence is that if each government 
seeks the vulnerabilities of the other governments in order to protect itself, in the 
long run each one will be less secure. This practice is an instance of the conflict 
between short-term security and long-term security (the third value trade-off of AI 
in national cybersecurity). The zero-day exploits can also be used by governments 
to monitor the activity of political dissenters, thus violating the privacy of these 
persons. The zero-day exploits per se are not harmful (Dunn Cavelty 2014); it is the 
purpose of their use that can be moral or immoral. A further ethical tension regard-
ing governments buying vulnerabilities is between the hackers’ business aim to 
maximise profits and the government’s duty to ensure adequate cyber defence 
(Baylon 2017). Furthermore, cybersecurity should be a public good, but the govern-
ments buying zero-day exploits have to follow the logic of market. Lastly, as zero- 
day exploits are kept secret, they may benefit few people and empower institutions 
that are already powerful.
8.5  Conclusion
This chapter provided a political and philosophical analysis of the values at stake in 
ensuring cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. We applied a bibliographic analy-
sis of the literature until 2016 to identify and classify cybersecurity value conflicts 
and ethical issues in national security. We then interpreted the recent literature as 
suggesting that the increased connectedness of digital and non-digital infrastructure 
enhances the trade-offs between the values we identified in the literature of the past 
few years. This is due primarily to two phenomena: first, the embeddedness of an 
individual control system in conventional networks and technological solutions and, 
second, the diffusion of AI, which broadens the attack surface (e.g. self-driving cars 
and other robots) and enhances the capabilities of hackers and crackers. We pre-
sented four case studies that show the trade-offs involving security in cybersecurity 
at the national level—which is the core value of cybersecurity—and the values that 
most frequently conflict with that: non-discrimination, equity, privacy, and long- 
term security.
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Abstract The goal of this chapter is to provide a conceptual analysis of ethical 
hacking, comprising history, common usage and the attempt to provide a systematic 
classification that is both compatible with common usage and normatively adequate. 
Subsequently, the article identifies a tension between common usage and a norma-
tively adequate nomenclature. ‘Ethical hackers’ are often identified with hackers 
that abide to a code of ethics privileging business-friendly values. However, there is 
no guarantee that respecting such values is always compatible with the all-things- 
considered morally best act. It is recognised, however, that in terms of assessment, 
it may be quite difficult to determine who is an ethical hacker in the ‘all things 
considered’ sense, while society may agree more easily on the determination of who 
is one in the ‘business-friendly’ limited sense. The article concludes by suggesting 
a pragmatic best-practice approach for characterising ethical hacking, which reaches 
beyond business-friendly values and helps in the taking of decisions that are respect-
ful of the hackers’ individual ethics in morally debatable, grey zones.
Keywords Cracker · Black hats · Hacking · Hacktivism · Script kiddies · 
Pentesters · Taxonomy · True hackers · White hats
9.1  Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to provide a conceptual analysis of ethical hacking. The 
chapter begins (Sect. 9.2) with a historical introduction, describing how the term 
hacking and different denominations for different varieties of hacking have been 
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introduced in everyday, journalistic and technical language. Section 9.3 introduces 
our proposal of a systematic classification, one that fulfils adequate descriptive pur-
poses and that maps salient moral distinctions into the different denominations of 
hacker types. It does so by proposing an initial taxonomy (inspired by common 
usage) and subsequently revising it by adding further nuances, corresponding to 
further evaluative dimensions. Section 9.4 discusses the concept of ethical hacking, 
revealing a fundamental ambiguity in the meaning of ‘ethical’ as an attribution to 
hacking. It presents our main thesis, namely that ‘ethical hacking’ refers to a limited 
view of ethics which assumes the pre-eminence of business-friendly values and that 
hacking that is ethical, all things considered, may not be ‘ethical hacking’ according 
to the common usage of the term. We recognise, however, that in terms of assess-
ment, it may be quite difficult to determine who is an ethical hacker in the ‘all things 
considered’ sense, while society may agree more easily on the determination of who 
is one in the ‘business-friendly’ limited sense.
9.2  What Actually Is a ‘Hacker’?
Almost every week mass media communicates about hackers having stolen thou-
sands of passwords and other sensitive private information. It is commonplace to 
read articles about hackers having taken advantage of system vulnerabilities to 
bypass security barriers in order to fraudulently access private and company net-
works. The current understanding of the term ‘hacker’ is influenced by the news, 
and this twists the original definition of what a hacker is (Fig. 9.1).1
Today’s perception of the term ‘hacker’ tends to be reduced to ‘black hat’ and 
‘cyber-criminal’. This has not always been the case, and the term ‘hacker’ conveys 
a much broader meaning.
9.2.1  Hackers in the Early Days
In the 1960s and 1970s, typical hackers were not really driven by malicious intent. 
They were often supportive of strong (ethical) values, broader than computer secu-
rity issues, such as democracy or freedom of speech. At the same time, computers, 
not to mention networks, were still in an early stage of development. The economic 
weight of computer related business was trifling in comparison to today’s influence 
of GAFAMs2 in the global market. Criminal opportunities were limited. Early hack-
1 As C.C. Palmer wrote: “Instead of using the more accurate term of ‘computer criminal’, the media 
began using the term ‘hacker’ to describe individuals who break into computers for fun, revenge 
or profit. Since calling someone a ‘hacker’ was originally meant as a compliment, computer secu-
rity professionals prefer to use the term ‘cracker’ or ‘intruder’ for those hackers who turn to the 
dark side of hacking.” (Palmer 2001: 770)
2 The GAFAM acronym stands for Web main players, namely, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon 
and Microsoft.
D.-O. Jaquet-Chiffelle and M. Loi
181
ers were often students with special programming skills. They were dreaming of a 
world where information would be free and openly shared, a world where hackers 
would belong to a fair community and would collaborate to build a better and more 
secure digital environment. They could be enthusiastic and appreciative about the 
aesthetic and the inherent beauty of an optimal programming code (e.g. using the 
least amount of memory). They were playing pranks and challenging each other, 
hoping for peer recognition. Cracking the passwords of their institution was not 
seen as an illegal activity (and usually was not illegal at that time), but as a playful 
challenge with no malicious intent. They were adept at the so-called hacker ethic—
including sharing information, mistrusting centralised authorities, and using com-
puters to make a better world—which is not to be confused with what is called 
‘ethical hacking’ nowadays. We sometimes refer to these early hackers as adherent 
to the programming subculture, or as true hackers.
9.2.2  Hackers in the 2000s
With the development of computers, networks, the Internet and our modern infor-
mation society, information has become one of the most valuable assets. Information 
is the raw resource that boosts Google and Facebook. Information leads to knowl-
edge and new forms of identities, which, in turn, allow targeted advertisement. Such 
valuable assets create new criminal opportunities and incentives, and need to be 
protected. The time when computers were a safe playground for geeks with 
Fig. 9.1 Word cloud around ‘hackers’
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insignificant economic consequences at stake seems far away. Hacking has become 
a business; a very serious one at that.
From the 1960s to the 2010s, we can therefore observe a shift in the nature of 
hacking incentives: ideological incentives have been replaced by economic ones 
(Fig. 9.2).
Ethical values at stake have evolved accordingly. In the 1960s, they were essen-
tially described by the so-called hacker ethic. With the development of the Internet, 
of e-commerce and the increasing economic weight of information, freely shared 
information as well as many early ideological ethical values entered into conflict 
with economic-related ethical values, in particular regarding the protection of infor-
mation ownership.
9.2.3  Modern Hackers
Modern computer hackers are usually defined as skilled programmers and computer 
experts who focus on software, computer and network vulnerabilities. There is a pleth-
ora of terms available to distinguish them: white hats, black hats, grey hats, pen testers, 
ethical hackers, crackers and hacktivists, to mention the most important ones. Some 
categories of modern hackers do not even require significant expertise. Indeed, script 
kiddies are non-expert hackers who run programs and scripts developed by other, more 
expert hackers (Barber 2001). Modern hackers are categorised not only according to 
their expertise, but also according to the (ethical) values they adhere to or not. Legal 
values are often implicitly emphasised in this classification (see also Fig. 9.3).
Early hackers were categorised according to their expertise through peer recog-
nition, and were adherent to values described in the hacker ethic. Today, ‘hacktiv-
ists’ still consider IT vulnerabilities as opportunities to promote a cause, a political 
opinion or an ideology. The group Anonymous is a typical heterogeneous group of 
hacktivists. In her best-seller (Olson 2013), Parmy Olson shows a large variety of 
profiles and incentives within Anonymous. However, most modern hackers use IT 
vulnerabilities for malicious purposes to commit fraud and make money. Some 
modern hackers strictly conform to applicable laws, whereas the majority does not 
really care.
Modern hackers can have a broad spectrum of incentives for their activities. 
According to Richard Barber, white hats are “[s]ecurity analysts and intrusion 
detection specialists […] [who] spend their time—just as police or intelligence 
 analysts do—researching the technologies, methodologies, techniques and prac-
tices of hackers, in an effort to defend information assets and also detect, prevent 
and track hackers” (Barber 2001: 16). White hats do respect applicable laws. In a 





Fig. 9.2 Shift in the 
hackers’ incentives
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computers, networks and the IT infrastructures from the bad guys, the so-called 
black hats or crackers.
According to Sergey Bratus, by contrast, black hats “act for personal gain and 
without regard for possible damage” (2007: 72). According to Technopedia (n.d.), a 
black hat is “a person who attempts to find computer security vulnerabilities and 
exploit them for personal financial gain or other malicious reasons”. They might 
also have other motivations such as cyber vandalism for example. Their values lead 
to illegal activities.
Grey hats are hackers whose intentions are not fundamentally malicious, but who 
accept irregular compliance with the law to reach their objectives, which distinguishes 
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Fig. 9.3 White hats, black hats, grey hats and script kiddies (Note that the outer layer refers to one 
predominant motivation (not the exclusive one). For example, not only grey hats, but also white 
hats as well as black hats may have fun in doing their activities or enjoy taking a challenge. White 
hats might also look for peer recognition)
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Grey hats might also share some incentives with white hats and so-called true 
hackers: personal fun, peer recognition, intellectual challenges, etc. However, they 
do not really share the original hacker ethic.
To represent true hackers, as well as hacktivists, we need a third perpendicular 
dimension where the legal perspective only plays a secondary role (Fig. 9.4).
Many different definitions are used for terms categorising modern hackers. These 
definitions are not always fully compatible. They bring different nuances. There is a 
need for a more systematic classification.
9.2.4  Today’s Hackers
We have already emphasised a shift in hackers’ incentives from the 1960s to the 
2010s. Since the beginning of the 2000s, information grew as a valuable asset and 
created new economic incentives for cyber-criminals. In our modern interconnected 
society, we now observe a new shift: information tends to also increasingly become 
a societal asset too (Fig. 9.5).
Nowadays, our whole society heavily depends on information and information 
technologies: transport and communication systems, medical facilities, SCADA 






























Fig. 9.4 A third dimension to represent true hackers and hacktivists
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government activities and voting systems, commercial exchanges and payment 
infrastructures, security-oriented surveillance technologies, or even military control 
systems.
With the advent and the development of smart cars, autonomous drones, smart 
medical devices and the Internet of Things, our physical world is becoming even 
more intertwined with the virtual one. To mimic a famous slogan,3 what happens on 
the Internet does not necessarily stay on the Internet anymore. Lives are at stake. 
The very functioning of our society now relies on the Internet. A disruption of 
Internet services and other information infrastructure can paralyse a whole country. 
This creates a new paradigm and extra incentives for hacking activities. As a direct 
consequence, we observe the emergence of new categories of hackers: state- 
sponsored hackers, spy hackers or even cyber-terrorists. The target can be an indi-
vidual, a company, a facility, an infrastructure or even a state. Whereas black hats 
foster cyber-crime and cyber-security countermeasures, state-sponsored hackers or 
cyber-terrorists have given rise to new concepts such as cyber-war, cyber-defence 
and cyber-peace.
9.3  Towards a More Systematic Hackers’ Classification
As pointed out, different meanings of the term ‘hacker’ coexist in the context of 
computerised systems. The term seems to have evolved since the 60s and describes 
very different realities nowadays. True hackers, adept at the so-called hacker ethic, 
are disappointed by today’s mainstream usage of the term ‘hacker’. They do not 
want to be considered in the same category as security breakers and 
cyber-criminals.
However, in the earliest known appearance of the term ‘hacking’ in the context 
of computerised systems (Lichstein 1963)—which appeared in the MIT student 
newspaper The Tech on 20 November 1963—the pejorative connotation is already 
present.
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Traditional dictionaries are of limited assistance in refining the meaning of the 
term ‘hacker’ in the context of computerised systems. In fact, this word has numer-
ous different meanings in the English language. The Merriam-Webster dictionary 
provides four definitions for a hacker (“Hacker | Definition of Hacker by Merriam- 
Webster” n.d.):
 1. : one that hacks4
 2. : a person who is inexperienced or unskilled at a particular activity (a tennis 
hacker)
 3. : an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer
 4. : a person who illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers with information 
in a computer system
Curiously, the second definition seems completely opposite to the typical com-
mon understanding as it emphasises the inexperience of the hacker at a particular 
activity.
The last two definitions better capture the main meanings in the context of this 
chapter. The third one is general and covers most of the modern categories of hack-
ers, whereas the last one is close to what we call a black hat or a cracker.
The American Heritage dictionary gives similar definitions for a hacker 
(“American Heritage Dictionary Entry: Hacker” n.d.):
 1. (a) One who is proficient at using or programming a computer; a computer 
buff.
 (b) One who uses programming skills to gain illegal access to a computer network 
or file.
 2. One who demonstrates poor or mediocre ability, especially in a sport: a weekend 
tennis hacker.
Those definitions only describe large categories of hackers. We need to delve 
deeper into subtle differences to distinguish between the many terms used nowa-
days to characterise hackers in the context of computerised systems and eventually 
to precisely define what an ethical hacker is.
A more systematic classification requires, as a first step, a taxonomy, i.e. the 
creation and definition of classes with clear identities. A second stage of classifica-
tion is ascription, i.e. placing each hacker into its class. Ascription corresponds to 
the identification of a hacker as belonging to a specific class. Identification itself is 
a “decision process attempting to establish sufficient confidence that some identity- 
related information describes a specific entity in a given context, at a certain time” 
(Pollitt et al. 2018: 7). When the entity is a person, i.e. for people identification, the 
identification process relies on authentication technologies in order to corroborate 
4 The verb ‘to hack’ has numerous meanings. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the 
first definition is “to cut or sever with repeated irregular or unskillful blows” which has nothing to 
do with computer hacking.
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(or to exclude) the fact that the given identity-related information describes this 
person in the given context, at the time of reference, with sufficient confidence.
Authentication technologies are classified themselves into four categories, 
namely:
 – Something you know
 – Something you are
 – Something you do
 – Something you have
A key aim of this paper is to develop a classification of (modern) hackers, related 
to categories of authentication technologies.
9.3.1  A First Taxonomy
In order to reach a new systematic classification of (modern) hackers, different per-
spectives can be chosen. A first approach consists in defining classes according to 
hacker’s expertise (its scope and its level) and to hacker’s values (his/her objectives 
and moral principles). Expertise can be seen as a collection of internal resources—
something that the hacker knows—while values followed by the hacker can be seen 
as an internal attitude—something that the hacker is. Those classes are defined in 
compliance with the first two categories of authentication technologies (Table 9.1).
Hacker’s expertise is defined by both its scope and its level. It corresponds to 
what the hacker knows and is able to do. The scope considers the expertise environ-
ments (OS, protocols, network, etc.), the objects covered by this expertise—those 
being physical (computers, phones, medical devices, smart cars, drones, etc.) or 
virtual (websites)—as well as the tools and programming languages mastered. The 
level of expertise appears to be a decisive criterion within hackers’ communities to 
grant access to peer recognition. Next to their technical skills, some hackers might 
possess social engineering expertise. This might appear to be useful for black hats 
in order to bypass physical or logical security measures.5 Social engineering can be 
5 Social skills may also be useful for white hats, when testing again the possibility of black hat 
hackers’ intrusions.
Table 9.1 A first 
classification based on 
expertise and legal goals
High expertise Low expertise
Legal goals White hats –
Illegal goals Black hats Script kiddies
Unlegala goals Grey hats
True hackers
Hacktivists
aUnlegal qualifies a value that is neither legal nor 
illegal
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used to gain a first internal access into a company computer network, for example. 
However, social engineering requires significant social skills, and not all hackers are 
social engineering experts. Hackers can be geeks. In his book (Marshall 2008: 1), 
Angus Marschall humourously defines a geek as “a nerd with social skills, and an 
extrovert geek looks at your shoes when he/she is talking to you.” Conversely, most 
social engineering experts are not hackers. However, they can work together, typi-
cally under the direction of the same entity, a conductor.
Hacker’s values encompass both his/her objectives and his/her moral principles. 
Hacker’s objectives can be noble: make the digital realm a better and more secure 
place; they can be ideological: promote political views and ethical values (freedom 
of speech, democracy); they can be self-oriented (fun, personal intellectual chal-
lenge, peer recognition); and they can be malicious (information theft, money extor-
tion, vandalism). Hacker’s moral principles define the limits, if any, that they respect 
while trying to reach their objectives. These limits can be legal and/or ethical. They 
can also be personal or related to a particular community.
To give an example based on this first classification, we only consider both the 
expertise level (high or low) and the legal nature of hacker’s goals. We use illegal to 
qualify a goal which is not legal—typically a value related to malicious intentions—
and unlegal to qualify a goal which is neither legal, nor illegal in nature, for example 
‘to have fun’ or ‘to make the world a better place’.
9.3.2  A Second Taxonomy
We can extend the first taxonomy to develop a finer classification (Table 9.2). In our 
attempt to determine a more systematic classification of modern hackers, a second 
approach consists in considering not only the internal resources (expertise) and the 
internal attitude (values), but also external attitudes, as well as the external resources 
hackers have access to. Following the analogy with authentication technologies, the 
external attitude corresponds to something the hacker does and the external resources 
to something that he or she has.
The external attitude describes the modus operandi. Hackers’ modi operandi are 
numerous. Actions can be potential or actual. Some hackers will act according to 
what they are able to do, as long as this is compatible with their goals. Others will 
stop as soon as their actions could become illegal or incompatible with some moral 
principles. Hackers’ targets belong either to the physical world (smart objects, com-
puters, networks, critical infrastructures, banks) or to the virtual one (e-commerce, 
Table 9.2 Analogy between 
authentication technologies 
and criteria to classify 
hackers
Resources Attitude
Internal Something you know Something you are
Expertise Values
External Something you have Something you do
Tools Modus operandi
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e-banking, websites, crypto-currencies). These targets span from individual proper-
ties, to companies or even to country-level assets. Hackers can work alone, in (crim-
inal) networks or in state-sponsored groups. They can work for themselves or as 
mercenaries on behalf of a conductor.
In the economic paradigm, hackers can be classified according to three catego-
ries, namely what they know (their expertise, i.e. their internal resources), what they 
are (their values, i.e. their internal attitude) and what they do (their modi operandi, 
i.e. their external attitude). In the societal paradigm, hackers are also characterised 
by what they have (their tools), i.e. the external resources they have access to. 
Indeed, state-sponsored hackers can have access to classified information and wea-
ponised zero-days, to sneaking, eavesdropping or deep packet inspection tools. 
More traditional hackers usually do not have access to these resources. Some state- 
sponsored hackers might even have privileged access to specific locations: Internet 
backbone or other key physical IT-infrastructures. State-sponsored hackers can 
work directly for a government, e.g. if they belong to a government agency. 
Alternatively, they might work for official companies selling hacking products and 
services to governments. Eventually, they might also belong to mercenary groups 
selling their services to governmental or non-governmental organisations.
In this second taxonomy (see also Fig. 9.6), a white hat is a skilled programmer 
and computer expert who looks for vulnerabilities in software, protocols, OS, com-
puters and servers, in other physical or virtual devices, and in network systems in 
order to improve the IT-security of a system. As a principle, he or she abides by 
applicable laws. He or she will stop any action as soon as it has the possibility of 
becoming illegal. A white hat might work alone and disclose vulnerabilities to the 
legitimate owner of the targeted system, with or without a financial compensation. 
Most of the time, white hats are professional hackers employed by IT-security com-
panies, the clients of whom are other companies that need their own IT-security to 
be assessed. Pen testers are white hats specialised in penetration tests using the cli-
ent’s IT-infrastructure. All pen testers are white hats, but not all white hats are pen 
testers. Indeed, a white hat might decide to analyse the code of some specific open 
source software without being mandated by its developer or by any third party.
Black hats are skilled programmers and computer experts who look for vulner-
abilities in software, protocols, OS, computers and servers, in other physical or 
virtual devices, and in network systems in order to support their malicious inten-
tions. They do not abide by ethical values and do not respect laws. Black hats typi-
cally use bugs and exploits to gain unauthorised access to a computer system or an 
IT-infrastructure with both malicious intent and, typically, illegal means. They aim 
to steal sensitive information, and personal or corporate data. They attempt to trick 
users or companies in order to get money transferred to accounts they have access 
to. They might work alone, belong to professional criminal networks or act as mer-
cenaries by selling their services to such networks or a conductor (crime-as-a- 
service). All black hats are cyber-criminals, but not all cyber-criminals are black 
hats. Indeed, many cyber-criminals do not have much expertise. They are not hack-
ers themselves; rather, they buy and use tools or services developed by black hats.
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Grey hats are skilled programmers and computer experts who look for vulnera-
bilities in software, protocols, OS, computers and servers, in other physical or vir-
tual devices, and in network systems in order to have fun, to play around, to solve a 
challenge, to be granted peer recognition, or to improve the IT-security of a system. 
Usually their intentions are not malicious and financial gain is not their main incen-
tive. They might comply with their own moral principles that can differ from the 
original hacker ethic. They do not necessarily respect applicable laws, which distin-
guishes them from white hats.
Below we select the level of abstraction to describe the intentions and voluntary 
constraints of the different types of hackers at the right level of abstraction in order 
to distinguish them more analytically. For example, a hacktivist may share attributes 
with a black hat or a grey hat if he/she breaks the law, while pursuing ideological 
objectives (not personal gain). Grey hat hackers may also pursue apparently mali-
cious goals, ideological or personal objectives (e.g. fun, etc.) while disregarding law 
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Fig. 9.6 Crackers, pen testers and social engineering experts
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altogether, but who, unlike black hats, do not aim at committing crimes. One possible 
way to distinguish white, grey and black hats is in terms of their relation to the law 
and organisations or individuals:
 – A white hat acts legally and tries to be trustworthy for companies or other organ-
isations that (may) purchase his or her services.
 – A black hat acts both illegally and maliciously, e.g. against a victim (a company 
or another organisation or an individual), either alone or within a criminal 
network.
 – A grey hat does not attempt to be trustworthy for companies or organisations; he 
or she may act illegally when required to pursue his or her goal. However, he or 
she does not act maliciously and attempts to minimise harm and avoid unneces-
sary harm.
For example, a grey hacker motivated by ideological goals (e.g. the love of jus-
tice) may illegally break the security system of a political party to highlight inade-
quate privacy protections, but refrains from downloading data, publishing them and 
causing (serious) harm. Nonetheless, he acts illegally (in most jurisdictions) because 
he lacks the consent of the attacked party and may also cause some harm (e.g. repu-
tational harm for the party), which is ‘offset’ by the broader benefit for the party 
members’ deriving from the awareness of the vulnerability, so the act could be seen 
as being prevalently benevolent.
Crackers6 are black or grey hats who perform computer and system break-ins 
without permission. As a consequence, their activities are illegal. Phreakers are 
phone crackers.
Note that such descriptions correspond to hackers described as personae, or 
social roles, not to flesh and bone individuals. It is logically possible for the same 
individual to sometimes act as a white hat and sometimes as a grey hat hacker in 
incognito. However, such an individual would have to keep those identities—cor-
responding to the different persona, the white and the grey hat—completely sepa-
rated for the public eye. Indeed, the reputation as a grey hat hacker undermines all 
grounds for trustworthiness that are essential to being employed as a white hat 
hacker. Of course, it is also theoretically possible for an individual to transact from 
one personae to another one: e.g. from being a black hat to becoming a white hat 
hacker. To be credible, however, such role changes would have to be understood as 
a ‘full conversion’ by others—a change in the overall motivational set of the indi-
vidual. Moreover, the conversion may not be sufficient to make the individual trust-
worthy. Indeed, many security companies would not hire a former black hat. For 
example, at least until 2001, IBM had a policy to “not hire ex-[black hat]-hackers” 
(Palmer 2001: 772).7 The television series ‘Mr Robot’ (Mr. Robot n.d.) tells the story 
6 Some authors consider black hats and crackers as equivalent terms. We introduce here some dis-
tinctions. In particular, we consider that crackers might be grey hats acting for fun with no malicious 
intent.
7 This may have been the case up to 2001; the authors were not able to determine if a change of 
policy occurred since then.
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of an individual who routinely switches between the roles of a white-, grey- and even 
black-hat hacker, even in the course of the same day. However, the character has an 
unstable personality and is schizophrenic.
9.3.3  Ethical Hacking
Ethical hackers8 are white hats mandated by clients (companies) who want their 
own IT-security to be assessed. They abide by a formal set of rules that protect the 
client, in particular its commercial assets. All pen testers are ethical hackers, but 
ethical hackers do not limit themselves to penetration tests. They can use other tools 
or even social engineering skills to stress and evaluate their client’s IT-security (see 
also Fig. 9.7).
An ethical hacker will try to act similarly to a black hat but without causing any 
tort to the company. He will look for vulnerabilities that could be exploited by mali-
cious hackers, both in the physical world and in the virtual one. In ethical hacking, 
the conductor of the attack is the target itself or, more precisely, the target’s repre-
sentative who mandated the ethical hacker to stress and assess the target’s IT-security. 
In comparison, the conductor of a black hat’s attack is never the target itself, but 
either the black hat or a third party—different from the target—if the black hat acts 
as a mercenary.
Ethical hackers adopt a strict code of conduct that protects their relationship with 
their clients and their client’s interests. Such a code of conduct sets a frame for their 
attitude. It describes rules that the ethical hacker must abide by. These rules prevent 
the ethical hacker from taking any personal advantage of his relationship with his 
client. This fosters the creation of a trusted relationship similar to the special rela-
tionship between a medical doctor and his or her patients, or between a lawyer and 
his or her clients. The client’s trust is of utmost importance in order for the ethical 
hacker to get the contract and to be granted permission to maybe successfully pen-
etrate the system. Indeed, during the course of such an attack, the ethical hacker 
might discover trade secrets or other very sensitive data about his or her client’s 
activities, as well as personal data about employees. The company needs to trust that 
the ethical hacker will not misuse his or her potential privileged access into its 
IT-infrastructure in order to introduce backdoors or to infringe privacy, neither dur-
ing the mandate, nor after the contract is fulfilled.
The typical content of such a code of conduct contains rules which guarantee that 
the ethical hacker:
 – will get written permission prior to stressing and assessing his or her client’s 
IT-security
 – will act honestly and stay within the scope of his or her client’s expectations
8 Some authors consider white hats, pen testers and ethical hackers as equivalent terms. In this 
chapter, we introduce some slight distinctions.
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 – will respect his or her client’s as well as its employees’ privacy
 – will use scientific, state-of-the-art and documented processes
 – will transparently communicate to his or her client all the findings as well as a 
transcript of all his or her actions
 – will remove his or her traces and will not introduce or keep any backdoor in the 
system
 – will inform software and hardware vendors about found vulnerabilities in their 
products
These rules also aim at protecting the ethical hacker and making his or her work 
legal de facto. Different curricula even propose training and certifications in order 
for a hacker to become a certified ethical hacker (CEH).
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Fig. 9.7 Ethical hackers
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9.4  Is ‘Ethical Hacking’ Ethical?
Ethical issues are evaluated according to a collection of ethical values and moral 
principles in regards to objectives and behaviours in a specific context.
9.4.1  Inethical, Unethical and Ethical Hacking
Inethical hacking can be defined as hacking that does not abide by any ethical value. 
Inethical hacking does not imply unethical behaviour, but removes ethical barriers 
and in doing so increases the risk of actual unethical behaviour. Greed is not an ethi-
cal value or a moral principle. Black hats typically perform inethical hacking that 
leads to unethical behaviour. However, what is ethical hacking fundamentally? Is it 
hacking that respects at least an ethical value? Certainly not, as such a hacking 
might infringe other fundamental ethical values. Indeed, intuitively, in order for 
hacking to be deemed ethical it should respect at least the most important ethical 
values at stake, balanced in a reasonable way. Therefore, non-inethical hacking is 
not necessarily ethical.
Precisely defining ‘ethical hacking’ in a fundamental, context-independent way 
is not a trivial matter, if even possible. We could start to define prima facie unethical 
hacking as hacking that infringes at least one ethical value or moral principle in an 
actual context. Prima facie means that the hacking seems unethical, although it may 
cease to appear so after a thorough examination of the issue. By contrast, the ultima 
facie ethical or unethical choice considers all relevant reasons, also those pulling in 
opposite directions, and tries to determine what is best all things considered. The 
‘all things considered’ best act is the choice that is supported by most reasons, or by 
the strongest ‘undefeated’ reason, including all moral reasons, if any, bearing on the 
matter (Scanlon 1998). Under this logic, non-prima facie unethical hacking would 
be hacking that respects all ethical values and moral principles in that context. It 
makes sense to consider that any non-prima facie unethical hacking is ethical. 
However, should we require hacking to be non- prima facie unethical in order to be 
deemed ethical? This would lead to an overly restrictive definition. Indeed, with 
such a restrictive definition of ethical hacking, almost no hacking could be deemed 
ethical. In practice, we often face competing ethical values. Not all ethical values 
can be respected simultaneously; they need to be prioritised in regards to objectives 
and behaviors in a specific context. Therefore, a general concept of ethical hacking 
should not be reduced to non-prima facie unethical hacking as it would lead to a 
useless definition.
The prima facie unethical category can be further sub-divided into three 
categories:
 1. Morally problematic: when at least one value is violated; however, the action 
may be justified ‘all things considered’.
 2. Non (ethically) optimal (weakly unethical): when the action is not the best one, 
considering all ethical reasons bearing on the issue.
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 3. Ethically impermissible (strongly unethical): when there is a strong moral reason 
not to perform the action; e.g. the action violates an important moral duty (what 
Immanuel Kant refers to as a ‘perfect duty’), e.g. the duty corresponding to 
another person’s moral right.9
This distinction is mirrored in terms of a normative moral psychology, specifying 
the emotions that a morally decent person should feel in correspondence to each 
category of cases: hacking that is morally wrong in the strong sense (i.e. impermis-
sible) should evoke feelings of blameworthiness by others and moral guilt by the 
moral agent. Morally problematic hacking may not even be unethical ultima facie, 
and may reasonably lead to no moral blame and no feelings of moral remorse; how-
ever, some have argued that it may lead to some kind of moral regret (Williams 
1981, 27–28). Non-ethically optimal hacking is unethical (ultima facie) but in a 
weaker sense compared to ethically impermissible hacking; it may then justifiably 
lead to moral remorse and regret.
We have mentioned the idea of the all things considered (morally) best choice. 
Note that in a case of value conflict, a pluralist society may not agree with a single 
way of balancing and resolving trade-offs between values in practice. As an exam-
ple of disagreement on balancing, consider supporting trust in cybersecurity vs. 
achieving justice. Both values could be in conflict when a white hat hacker discov-
ers proof of unethical behaviour, or possible signs of crimes by a company during 
pen testing. In order to be trustworthy, the hacker should not act in any way against 
the interest of the company and cannot, for example, blackmail the company, in 
order to induce it to stop a weakly unethical practice. Moreover, a white hat should 
avoid any investigation—even pursuing the signs of a possible crime—which is out 
of the scope of his or her mandate. Moreover, such an investigation might lead to 
discoveries that further reinforce the conflict between promoting justice and being 
trustworthy, e.g. the discovery of a strongly unethical practice by the company. We 
can assume that companies would have a counter-incentive to hire the services of 
penetration testers unless they trust them to promote their own interests in any 
 circumstance, creating a trusted relationship similar to the relationship between a 
medical doctor and a patient, or between a lawyer and her client. We might also 
claim that widespread and protected trust in the services of white hat hackers is 
necessary to achieve good levels of cybersecurity for society at large, which is ethi-
cally desirable, in utilitarian terms.
It could be argued that this ‘favouring trust between white hat hackers and com-
panies’ should include companies that do not have a perfectly blank sheet in terms 
of ethics and legal behaviour. This is in conflict with another strong value: the goal 
of achieving immediate justice and of protecting possible victims of a crime or of a 
strongly unethical treatment. Therefore, it is not clear if a penetration tester should 
always reveal strongly unethical behaviour or clues of crimes to the public, or if he 
9 An imperfect moral duty is a duty like the duty to do charity. Wheres—Kant maintained—we all 
have a duty to charity, the duty is not perfect in the sense that we have discretion concerning when, 
how, and to whom we act charitably. Act-utilitarianism rejects the distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties, because according to act-utilitarianism the acts that maximise aggregate utility 
are both right and dutiful and all other acts are wrong and impermissible in the context.
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or she should at least threaten to do it, in order to give the company an incentive to 
address the problem.
The way the term ‘ethical hacking’ is used appears to presuppose a clear and 
unilateral solution to the problem of value balancing: the solution that gives the high-
est priority to (a) refraining from acting against the interests of the company hiring 
the services of the hacker, (b) only acting within boundaries that have been explicitly 
consented to, and (c) fulfilling the expectations of the client in a way that preserves 
the white hat hacker’s reputation for trustworthiness.10 It seems that these three con-
ditions do not conflict in practice. A so-called ‘ethical hacker’ enjoys the contractual 
freedom to act in ways that would be illegal if they had taken place without the 
consent of the party hiring his or her services. He/she acts in a trustworthy way 
because, in addition to that, he or she acts conscientiously towards the party placing 
trust in him or her (Becker 1996). We may add to this ‘respecting the law’; respect-
ing all law in the pertinent jurisdictions, not only the law of private property.
As mentioned above, an ‘ethical’ hacker could face situations involving a trade- 
off between, on the one hand, preserving trust in himself or herself and white hat 
hackers in general and, on the other hand, achieving justice or other ethical values 
directly, in the short term. Note that the trade-off between trustworthiness and other 
ethical values could be solved differently depending on the legal framework in 
which the white hat hacker operates. Suppose that the hacker operates in a jurisdic-
tion with a law that mandates the white hacker to violate a confidentiality agreement 
should he or she establish proof of serious crimes. In this case, the individual choice 
of the hacker to act against the interest of the company hiring him or her, e.g. by 
revealing proof of strongly unethical behaviour (which happens to also be illegal), 
would not in itself undermine trust. Indeed, trust relies on rational expectations and 
we could claim that a company could not rationally expect a hacker to protect its 
interests when this is explicitly prohibited by the law. Note, however, that the legal 
framework itself would make some companies less likely to rely on white hat hack-
ers to enhance their cybersecurity, since some companies may prefer to run 
 cybersecurity risks rather than giving others legal opportunities to reveal their ille-
gal and/or strongly unethical activities.
To maximise the incentive to rely on white hat hackers, society could pass laws 
allowing and requiring them, like lawyers, priests and medical doctors, to maintain 
confidentiality about all behaviours, including crimes, discovered in the course of 
their professional activities. In such a context, a hacker would undermine trust by 
revealing clues, or even proof of illegal activities by firms. Note, however, that this 
is not the same as acting strongly unethically: the severity of the unethical behaviour 
discovered could make it the case that all things considered, the choice involving a 
breach of trust is the most ethical (ethically optimal), or even the only ethical (mor-
ally required) choice. Nothing guarantees that the (most, or only) ethical way to act 
is always the legal way to act.
It should also be noted that in choosing between these two legal frameworks, 
society, or its elected representatives, have to choose a trade-off point between 
10 For the link between trust, trustworthiness and reputation see (Pettit 1995).
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different, equally legitimate, social values. The choice involves a balance between, 
on the one hand, maximising incentives to rely on white hat hackers or, on the other 
hand, discovering some serious crimes in the short term. Societies may make this 
choice based on their understanding of where the utilitarian optimum lies, but some 
societies may also adopt legislation reflecting non-utilitarian considerations. For 
example, the public discussion of a case in which a white hat hacker had a legal duty 
to keep an ugly crime confidential may turn public opinion against confidentiality 
protection, irrespective of whether it is the utility-maximising solution. A society 
may be moved by moral indignation to adopt legislation less protective of compa-
nies, even if the rationally expected result is that unethical companies will not hire 
ethical hackers and thus expose their clients to more risks.
In the previous section, we presented the well-established concept of ethical 
hackers (white hats mandated by clients who want their own IT-security to be 
assessed, and who abide by a formal set of rules that protect the client, in particular 
its commercial assets.) Ethical assessment in this context prioritises honesty towards 
the client, as well as legal and commercially-oriented values. However, other ethical 
values could interfere with these prioritised values. If the company which IT-security 
is assessed has some ultima facie (weakly or strongly) unethical activities, is it ethi-
cal to reinforce its IT-security? What about if its core business is deemed to be 
ultima facie unethical, in the strong sense (morally impermissible)? This shows the 
limit of an automated analysis of ethical behaviour based on a standard set of rules. 
So-called ethical hackers might perform ethical hacking in the context of their 
trusted relationships with their clients, while this same ethical hacking appears 
unethical (weakly or strongly) if we take a broader perspective.
This ethical problem cannot be solved by simply prescribing absolute respect of 
the law of a country. As highlighted above, nothing in the world guarantees that the 
‘all things considered’ best act is always compatible with the laws of the country in 
which the ethical hacker operates.
Legislation might prioritise trust relations between hackers and companies above 
all other values.11 However, it is possible—at least logically—that considerations of 
trust and trustworthiness do not override, or defeat, any other consideration in every 
context.12 Hence, the ‘all things considered’ best act may sacrifice trust and trust-
worthiness.13 Therefore, a hacker who is ethical—in the sense of doing the best ‘all 
things considered’ act—is not necessarily an ‘ethical hacker’ according to the ordi-
11 Maybe, it (correctly) identifies this policy as the one promoting the utilitarian optimum—maxi-
mum aggregate utility—in the long term.
12 Even if preserving trustworthiness maximises long-term utility, for it may even be the case that 
the best moral view is not utilitarian.
13 If the ultimately right morality is not utilitarian morality, the morally right act can be one that 
violates a policy that has a rule-utilitarian justification (the policy that would optimise utility in the 
long run). It is even conceivable that the morally best/right act for social morality (the morality 
behind laws and public policies) and for individual morality are different acts, because the two 
moralities differ, due to constraints (e.g. of impartiality, objectivity, inter-subjectivity, integrity) 
that apply with different force in the two cases. If this unfortunate moral hypothesis is correct, 
individuals in high-stake roles are condemned to face hard-to-solve moral dilemmas occasionally. 
See Sect. 4.2.
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nary definition, which presupposes both actions to be lawful and acting in a way that 
proves trustworthiness to mandating firms.
Actually, the well-established concept of an ‘ethical hacker’ is misleading. In 
some ways, it is a misappropriation of the term ‘ethical’. The expression ‘trustworthy 
for business and lawful hacker’ would fit better. Indeed, the rules that the ethical 
hacker has to abide by are fundamentally business-oriented. They foster economic- 
compliant ethical behaviour,14 and they create a clear trust-enabling distinction 
between ethical hackers and black hats. They also protect ethical hackers in making 
their activities legal de facto. However, these rules do not consider the possibility of 
ethical issues competing with the need of a trusted relationship and a protection of 
economic interests. Often, ethical hackers essentially agree to stay faithful to their 
client whatever the client’s activity is. This creates an inviolable trusted relationship 
similar to the relationship between a lawyer and his or her client, or between a priest 
and his faithful. Is it ethical to keep secret (and protect) the illegal activities of a cli-
ent? In utilitarian terms, it depends on the existence or not of a greater public interest 
to improve companies’ IT-security even at the cost of covering critical non- ethical 
behaviours. Even if it were not a matter of public interest, covering critical non-ethi-
cal behaviour may simply be irreconcilable with reasonable individual moralities 
(e.g. of a more deontological type). Some ethical hacking companies introduce a 
provision allowing them to report observed illegal activities, at least if questioned by 
the police in the course of an investigation.
Any practical definition of ethical hacking should incorporate the existence of 
possible competing ethical values, even within a fixed context (see also Chap. 3). In 
other words, hacking could be deemed ethical when it sufficiently respects ethical 
values and moral principles at stake in regards to objectives and behaviours in a spe-
cific context. This provides a practical definition of ethical hacking. We are not sug-
gesting that this definition should replace the ordinary one. The most important 
purpose fulfilled by having a new definition is to distinguish both concepts. One 
possibility would be to use ‘trustworthy for business and lawful hacker’ and ‘ethical 
hacker’ to distinguish both of them. An alternative would be to use ‘ethical hacker’ 
in the usual (business-oriented) way and invent some other label for the sufficiently 
‘all things considered’ ethical hacker instead. This new definition—as well as ethical 
assessment actually—is intrinsically vague, subject to interpretation and context- 
dependent. This emphasises the fact that ethical evaluation cannot be reduced to an a 
priori assumption that business-oriented values should take priority, and the qualifi-
cation of ethical should not be limited to a narrow definition of professional ethics.
14 This behavior may, or may not, be optimal in utilitarian terms (it is often very difficult to deter-
mine what maximises utility in the long term and some economic behavior may be harmful, all 
things considered). Even if it is optimal in utilitarian terms, it may not be ethical, if, as many people 
think, utilitarianism is not the right ethical theory.
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9.4.2  Competing Ethical Values
Ethical evaluation, like any evaluation process, produces values that can be fed into 
a decision process (Pollitt et al. 2018: 8). The values resulting from an evaluation 
process are not restricted to numbers. They can be impressions, feelings, opinions 
or judgments. In her axiological sociology essay (Heinich 2017), Nathalie Heinich 
identifies three ways to attribute a value: measurement, attachment, judgement. An 
ethical evaluation is typically of the third kind: some form of judgement. The deci-
sion process following an ethical evaluation usually allows or does not allow an 
action, an activity or a behaviour to be pursued.
A priori, the ethical assessment of relevant ethical values related to hacking 
could perform an ethical evaluation of all four criteria used to classify hackers (see 
also Table 9.2):
 – hacker’s expertise
 – hacker’s tools
 – hacker’s values
 – hacker’s modus operandi
However, a hacker’s expertise is knowledge. It is ethically neutral and does not carry 
out direct ethical issues. Tools available to the hacker are not relevant from an ethical 
standpoint either. This does not mean that hacking tools do not create ethical issues. 
Indeed, the creation or not of some hacking tools, e.g. weaponised zero- days, leads to 
important ethical issues at a societal level: on the one-hand, weaponised zero-days 
allow countries to develop cyber-weapons to dissuade potential enemies, on the other 
hand, unpatched vulnerabilities—if discovered by or made available to black hats—can 
endanger large scale IT-systems. The WannaCry worldwide ransomware attack that 
shut down UK hospitals and numerous systems in May 2017 shows the impact of such 
a weaponised zero-day falling into criminal hands (Mohurle and Patil 2017).
Eventually, only the hacker’s values and modus operandi need to be ethically 
assessed by the evaluator. Note that the evaluator can be either the hacker or another 
person.
The result of an ethical evaluation depends on the evaluator’s expertise, on the 
available information, and on his or her way of handling and processing this informa-
tion, as well as on his or her own criteria and values’ prioritisation and interpretation. 
State-sponsored hackers, for example, might be deemed ethical if the evaluator pri-
oritises values of the sponsoring state, whereas these same hackers might be consid-
ered simultaneously unethical by evaluators living in the targeted country. The 
interpretation of the facts (state-sponsored actors do not necessarily follow tradi-
tional white hats’ rules; they typically try to introduce and keep backdoors in the 
targeted system; they might use zero-days and not divulge them to the developers) 
really depends on the evaluator’s perspective, interpretation and prioritised values.
Ethical evaluation parameters also present similarities with the four classes of 
authentication technologies (Table 9.3).
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The evaluator’s level of expertise allows a distinction to be made between an 
ethical opinion and an ethical expert evaluation (Heinich 2017). The information 
available to the evaluator might change over time, possibly resulting in new conclu-
sions. This is in particular true when a so-called ethical hacker penetrates his or her 
client’s infrastructure and discovers ethically sensitive new information. The way 
the evaluator processes the information relates to quality procedures and best prac-
tices; it influences the confidence in the conclusion. The core of the evaluation 
resides in the evaluator’s own prioritisation of (competing) values at stake.
When addressing ethical hacking, we should consider at least three collections of 
possibly competing ethical values (see also Fig. 9.8): one at a personal level (hack-
er’s own perspective), one at a business level (company’s perspective) and one at a 
societal level (global perspective). Ethical conflicts can happen within one of these 
collections or between some of them.
So-called ethical hackers can ethically evaluate their own attitude, i.e. their val-
ues and their modus operandi, and they probably will because they chose not to use 
their expertise for malicious purpose. The code of conduct that ethical hackers have 
to abide by strongly focuses on the collection of values at a business level. Therefore, 
these values must belong to the own hacker’s ethical values and moral principles. 
Already at this stage, competing ethical values can appear if, for example, protect-
ing an employee’s privacy (whose emails reveal that he is blackmailed by a com-
petitor’s board member) conflicts with transparently communicating all the findings 
to the mandating client. Generally speaking, it will be easier to assess if a hacker is 
ethical in the narrow (and usual) sense of the term, which assumes the priority of 
business-oriented moral values.
Table 9.3 Similarities 
between authentication 
technologies and ethical 
evaluation parameters
Resources Attitude
Internal Something you know Something you are
Expertise Values prioritisation
External Something you have Something you do







Fig. 9.8 Potential conflicts 
between collections of 
possibly competing ethical 
values
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Ethical hackers also have their own values and moral principles at a personal 
level. They might share some of the original hacker ethic. If their ethical values 
conflict with those at a business level, their ethical evaluation of the situation will 
depend on the prioritisation of the values. A strong personal ethical value or a well- 
established important societal value might prevail on any other business-related 
value and lead to breaking the code of conduct. This is in particular true if the ethi-
cal hacker unveils critical non-ethical behaviours within the company. In this case, 
the evaluation of whether the hacker is ethical will be significantly more complex. 
It is likely to achieve reasonable disagreement, even between equally well-informed 
persons, concerning what is the ethically optimal act in a given context. There might 
be no pre-established harmony between values—e.g. no way to maximise fairness 
and aggregate well-being at the same time—(Berlin 1991; Nagel 1991; Raz 1986). 
Moreover, even individuals who rely on monistic moral views (e.g. utilitarianism, 
which recognises only utility, understood as well-being) and single-rule based 
moralities (e.g. again utilitarianism: maximise aggregate well-being in the long 
term) may disagree on what the actual best choice turns out to be (see also Chap. 4 
for a discussion of ethical frameworks in cybersecurity).
Note that our argument does not rely on a rejection of ethical realism or cognitiv-
ism. Realism is entailed by the view that the question concerning ‘the all things 
considered best choice’ can be objective, because it is determined by moral objec-
tive facts existing independently of mental states (beliefs, attitudes, emotions) about 
the choice in question. Cognitivism is entailed by the view that these objective 
moral reasons, or facts, are not facts about what (all, or the majority) of people actu-
ally want to be the case. The key point is that, even conceding that morality is 
grounded in objective facts independent of will of any agent, it may be in fact 
extremely difficult to determine what the morally best choice is.
9.4.3  A Pragmatic Best Practice Approach
Pen-test companies and other IT-security hiring white hats face a competing values 
dilemma (see also Chap. 15). On the one hand, they need to create a trusted relation-
ship with their clients. On the other hand, they need to respond and even anticipate 
their employees’ ethical expectations. There is certainly no perfect solution to solve 
this dilemma, as ethical evaluation has an intrinsic personal component, is subject 
to interpretation and is context-dependent.
As explained above, companies hiring ethical hackers develop a code of conduct 
that reinforces the business-related ethical behavior of their employees, guarantees 
that their hacking activities are compliant with applicable laws and fosters a trusted 
relationship with their clients.
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As already mentioned, some ethical hacking companies have introduced a provi-
sion allowing them to report observed illegal activities, at least if questioned by the 
police in the course of an investigation.
To minimise the inherent risks related to the competing values dilemma, an 
active European pen-test company with about 40 employees created an internal 
ethical committee. This ethical committee is composed of three employees, freely 
elected by all employees. Company board members are not allowed to be elected in 
order to avoid business-related biases in the ethical evaluation. Any employee can 
submit his or her ethical concerns about an upcoming project if this employee fears 
that participating in such a project could create a conflict with his or her own values 
or moral principles, or with other societal ethical values. Members of the ethical 
committee are in a position to make an independent ethical evaluation. Their deci-
sion is binding and cannot be challenged, neither by the direction nor by the other 
employees. If the committee decides to block a project, the company will stop it 
independently from having financial consequences.
This example illustrates a possibility to anticipate potential competing ethical 
values in order to avoid employees breaking their code of conduct or leaving the 
company. Such an approach enriches and strengthens the concept of ethical hacking 
and goes beyond a rule-based definition. It promotes an ethical evaluation that is not 
reduced to an automated process or a checklist, and allows a fine interpretation of 
the context and a more subtle ethical evaluation, as well as context-dependent 
decisions.
9.5  Conclusion
The term ‘hacker’ has many different meanings, even within the context of comput-
erised systems. It should not be amalgamated with that of a cybercriminal only. In 
this chapter, in order to capture a much broader perception of the term and to 
describe its nuances more faithfully, we developed a new systematic and neutral 
classification based on four categories: the hacker’s expertise (his or her internal 
resources), the hacker’s own values and moral principles (his or her internal atti-
tude), the hacker’s modus operandi (his or her external attitude), and the tools and 
information that he or she has access to (his or her external resources). These four 
categories can be related to the four categories of authentication technologies: 
something that the hacker knows, something that the hacker is, something that the 
hacker does, and something that the hacker has.
The term ‘ethical hacker’ in its wide acceptance appears to be misleading and a 
misappropriation of the term ‘ethical’. Particular pluralist societies, those that recog-
nise that different ethical values are valid and there is no single simple way of mea-
suring or ranking them, are likely to disagree on what is the morally best behaviour 
for a hacker to adopt in every given circumstance. The expression ‘business- oriented 
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ethical hacker’ would fit better. Moreover, it gives the false impression that it is suf-
ficient for hacking activities to abide by a list of fixed rules in order to be deemed 
ethical. Ethical evaluation cannot and should not be reduced to a checklist of rules to 
abide by those rules that are legal and/or ethical. This is especially true in contexts 
where at-the-edge hacking opportunities are sometimes in a grey zone which is not 
covered by current laws, e.g. for spy and state-sponsored hacking activities.
The creation of a code-of-conduct with rules to abide by is a welcome and neces-
sary step in order to support ethical hacking. However, it is not sufficient. Other 
mechanisms—such as internal ethical committees—have to be created within the 
pen-test companies or the Gov-CERT units in order to allow a finer interpretation of 
each context, a more subtle ethical evaluation, and context-dependent decisions.
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Abstract This chapter provides an overview on state actor’s opinions and strate-
gies relating to cybersecurity matters. These are addressed on the EU level as well 
as on the level of the individual European Member States while the focus is on 
legislation, policy and political approaches to cybersecurity. In this context, many 
different measures and approaches are taken both in the Union and nationally to 
streamline knowledge, resources, and measures to combat cybercrime. Furthermore, 
the role of the new European data protection framework is addressed, and it is 
explained why data protection has a close relationship to security matters. The main 
tensions and conflicts in relation to IT and cybersecurity are depicted, which evolve 
primarily around the frequently negative effect of IT and cybersecurity measures on 
the rights of data subjects. However, the issue of governmental surveillance is also 
addressed, with its implications for the fundamental rights of European citizens. 
Solution approaches to align the two domains of data protection and cybersecurity 
are explored, since cybersecurity incidents often involve the loss or compromise of 
an individual’s personal information. To this end, overlaps and synergies are exam-
ined that seem promising for a more holistic approach to cyber threats. For instance, 
this could be achieved by applying principles such as data protection by design and 
default in IT more thoroughly. In addition, methodologies of data protection impact 
assessments as well as a more broad deployment of technical and organisational 
measures while using well-known information security best practices and standards 
can help to enhance cybersecurity across the European Union.
Keywords European Union · General data protection regulation · State actors · 
Surveillance
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Within the European Union, the EU Member States have a crucial role in maintain-
ing and fostering Cybersecurity by policy regulations and institutional work. It has 
been widely acknowledged that Cybersecurity needs to be addressed in earnest to 
mitigate the risks of the increasing digitisation nationally, as well as within Europe 
and globally. These risks mostly affect European citizens in their everyday lives, but 
can also affect industries and nation states alike. Notably, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) countries published in July 2016 a Cyber Defense Pledge, 
which recognises security threats and reaffirms the support and enhancement of the 
cyber defenses of their national infrastructures and networks.1 This chapter provides 
an overview on the correlating cybersecurity opinions and presents various state 
actor’s strategies to address cybersecurity on EU as well as on the national level 
within the European Union (see also Chap. 5). In this context, state actors are under-
stood here as official governmental institutions at EU and EU member state levels. 
Furthermore, solution approaches for cybersecurity issues are examined, which do 
not aim only to address merely the security perspective but also to integrate the data 
protection perspective. As for the research methodology for this chapter, only little 
insight could be drawn from literature and studies. Therefore, our sources consist 
mostly of legislation, policy documents, official statements and other information 
directly coming from the above-mentioned state actors.
10.2  Cybersecurity Strategies at the European Union Level
Cybersecurity threats are a global issue, a fact that was recognised by the EU and its 
individual institutions relatively early. Furthermore, it was accepted that this issue 
can only be addressed via global responses, necessitating international communica-
tion, harmonised legislation and effort coming from both the public and private 
sectors. Nonetheless, cybersecurity matters have a quite complex nature, making a 
unified approach sometimes difficult. Working towards resolving this difficulty, the 
European Commission issued a communication already in 2001 addressing Europe’s 
transition to an information society. This communication referenced a number of 
already existing approaches and proposed some further action items in order to 
protect information and communication infrastructures. It called for a comprehen-
sive policy initiative, a unified definition of cybercrime, more in-depth communica-
tion with different stakeholders, and more R&D funding to address such threats.
1 NATO (2016): This pledge entails a general commitment of NATO to allocate adequate resources 
nationally, foster interaction of stakeholders and improve awareness and understanding of cyber-
security threats overall, including in education and training of NATO and Alliance forces. It is 
meant to reinforce collaboration and better exchange of best practices across the Alliance, includ-
ing with the EU.
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With the drafting of its Cyber Security Strategy in 2013, the EU had detailed its 
earlier position regarding cooperation and communication related to cybersecurity 
matters (European Commission, COM 7 Feb 2013). Based on this position, the 
Commission committed itself to launching a new public-private partnership on 
cybersecurity with industry to better equip Europe against cyber-attacks and to 
strengthen the competitiveness of its cybersecurity sector. This occurred as a com-
mon platform, called the ‘NIS Platform’ (platform on network and information 
security solutions), in order to develop incentives for the adoption of secure ICT 
solutions and to increase the cybersecurity performance of ICT products used in 
Europe. This platform was most active in 2013 and 2014, where it involved the 
European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) as well as various 
public and private stakeholders. Its purpose was to achieve insight into possible 
technical guidelines, recommendations, industry standards and general information 
exchange to enhance cybersecurity.
More concrete legislative action by the European Union followed, such as 
Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification of European critical infrastructures, or a 
directive on the security of network and information systems, which got adopted in 
2016.2 While the former is aimed at critical information infrastructure protection, the 
latter foresees rules, preconditions, and measures meant to ensure a high common 
level of NIS across the Union. Furthermore, the European Commission encouraged 
the European member states to make the most of the NIS coordination mechanisms 
enabled by this legislative act (COM 2016). So far, the NIS Directive has been 
addressed for national transposition in a multitude of European Member States.3
In 2015, the European Commission released its Digital Single Market Strategy, 
which also reinforced the importance of trust and security in digital services and in 
the handling of personal data (COM 2015). In the outcome of its mid-term review 
published May 2017, the Commission identified cybersecurity challenges as one of 
three main areas where further EU action would be needed.4 Therefore, the 
Commission adopted a cybersecurity package in 2017. This package consists of a 
number of various recommendations and calls for action. An example would be rec-
ommendations related to the establishment of stronger and better networked institu-
tions concerned with cybersecurity on EU level as well as on national EU Member 
States level. Moreover, it entails the endorsement of an EU-wide cybersecurity cer-
tification scheme, ideas for optimised incident responses, a call for legislation and 
frameworks focused on combatting fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment in order to reduce cyber-crime, as well as joint EU responses to malicious 
2 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concern-
ing measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the 
Union. This is in the following abbreviated as NIS Directive.
3 See for more detail the Directive 2008/114/EC overview page of the EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114
4 European Commission, press release: ‘Digital Single Market: Commission calls for swift adop-
tion of key proposals and maps out challenges ahead’, Brussels, 10 May 2017. The other two areas 




cyber activities on diplomatic level. Moreover, the Commission calls for better inter-
national cooperation on cybersecurity (including EU and NATO), fostering the 
development of cybersecurity skills both for civilian and military professionals, and 
for a set-up of a cyber-defence training and education platform (COM 2017: 2).
Based on these recommendations, the ENISA, founded in 2004, is endorsed as a 
core European Union Cybersecurity Agency to play a crucial role mainly by provid-
ing information and guidance, e.g. on cyber crisis management.5 In June 2019, the 
EU Cybersecurity Act came into force which establishes a permanent mandate for 
the ENISA with increased responsibilities and resources. Moreover, this legislative 
act reinforces the previously proposed EU-wide cybersecurity certification frame-
work for ICT products and regulates its governance.6 Alongside the European 
Commission and ENISA, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) of the 
Council of Europe7 represents the state parties to the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime. The consultation of the T-CY aims at facilitating the effective use and 
implementation of the Convention, the exchange of information and the consider-
ation of any future amendments. The T-CY has published a number of different 
assessments and reports on cybercrime.8 All these institutions at the European level 
aim to achieve comprehensive and harmonised governance of cybersecurity-related 
issues, whereby efforts are undertaken in various areas, such as policy/legislation, 
finances and operational measures. Yet, those institutions still struggle with divisive 
factors on the national, pan-European and extra-European/transatlantic level, mostly 
caused by the diverging willingness of the EU member states to commit resources, 
the lack of clarity regarding the understanding of cybersecurity and cybercrime, and 
partially significant disparities in governance strategies and focus. The European 
Union has acknowledged those difficulties already by beginning several initiatives 
to address cyber threats. Therein, a strong focus lies on strengthening the resilience 
of democracy, especially by measures to enhance the security of the electoral infra-
structure and campaign information systems. Moreover, guidance on the applica-
tion of EU data protection law will be pursued further as well as legislative proposals 
to foster EU Member States coordination on cybersecurity matters (COM 2018: 1). 
For example, on 12 September 2018, the European Commission made a proposal 
for a regulation to pool resources and expertise in cybersecurity technology, which 
involves creating a network of National Coordination Centres for cybersecurity 
cooperation, research and innovation (COM 2018b).
5 See e.g. the ENISA overview of recommended publications on that matter: https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/topics/cyber-crisis-management?tab=publications
6 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications 
technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity 
Act).
7 The Council of Europe (CoE) is not an official EU body, but a human rights organisation that was 
established in 1949 after World War II. It now comprises 47 member states, 28 of which belong to 




10.3  Cybersecurity Strategies at the National Level
At the national level, the EU member states have developed their own cybersecurity 
strategies, the goals of which correlate with those of the EU strategy, with varying 
detail and a focus on specific aspects. For example, Luxembourg’s cybersecurity 
strategy foresees a number of important objectives for the country, plus an addi-
tional action plan naming in detail the responsible authorities, as well as the antici-
pated timeframe for realisation. These objectives include strengthening national 
cooperation (also with the academic and research sphere), increasing the resilience 
of digital infrastructures, the determination of measures to fight cybercrime, the 
implementation of norms, standards certificates, labels and frames of references for 
government and critical infrastructure requirements. Furthermore, this strategy rec-
ommends and calls for the information, training, and awareness of cyber risks 
(Luxembourg 2015: 23ff). In an update in 2018, this was emphasised further, 
demanding that measures be taken to strengthening public confidence in the digital 
environment and that digital infrastructures get protected better (Luxembourg 2018: 
15ff). Therein, the Luxembourg 2018 strategy is one of the few newer ones in com-
parison to other EU Member countries.9
As an example of a larger country, France’s cybersecurity strategy focuses on 
specific details in some areas, such as increasing the security of state information 
systems (including the development of cybersecurity requirements for public con-
tracting and support), providing local assistance to victims of cyber-malevolent 
acts, measuring cybercrime, and protecting the digital lives, privacy and personal 
data of French citizens. Moreover, France’s approach to eliminate and mitigate 
cybersecurity threats includes operational mechanisms for international administra-
tive assistance and educational measures, the support of security services and prod-
ucts, and knowledge transfer including the education of the general public. However, 
for the individual objectives mentioned, the French strategy does not provide action 
items as detailed as the Luxembourg one (France 2015: 15, 21ff, 26f, 31ff).
As already mentioned, it is proving difficult that many countries still have a dif-
ferent understanding of what the terms ‘cybersecurity’ and ‘cybercrime’ mean and 
convey in scope, if they have such a tangible understanding at all. For instance, 
Spain has a rather strong focus on the country’s capability to investigate and pros-
ecute cyber terrorism and cybercrime, yet its cybersecurity strategy does not specify 
which kind of acts and deeds are exactly considered a cybercrime (Spain 2013: 11, 
29). As for Croatia’s cybersecurity strategy, it provides a definition of cybercrime, 
yet this definition is rather broad and vague (Croatia 2015: 16). Thus, there are large 
differences in the level of detail and commitment made in those national cybersecu-
rity strategies. This issue will probably require some time, additional pan-European 
communication and a stronger harmonisation effort for remedy.
9 For direct comparison per country, the ENISA provides an interactive EU map with detail infor-




Most of the EU member states have established institutions dedicated to cyber-
security issues, such as for example the German BSI (Federal Office for Information 
Security). This institution is tasked with investigating current IT security risks and 
creates yearly situation reports of the IT security landscape in Germany. It also 
functions as a cyber-defence centre and reporting office for security incidents. 
Together with another institution, the BBK (Federal Office of Civil Protection and 
Disaster Assistance), the BSI provides an Internet platform for the protection of 
critical infrastructures.10 The German operators of critical infrastructures in the sec-
tors of energy, information technology and telecommunications, water and nutri-
tion, are required to report security incidents to the BSI and to demonstrate legal 
compliance every 2 years by providing a detailed protection concept corresponding 
with the state of the art.11 Other operators (not active in the aforementioned sectors) 
can make such reports on a voluntary basis.
Besides institutions like the BSI, many EU countries have national expert groups 
focusing on security incidents, which are organised in computer emergency response 
teams (CERTs), sometimes also called computer emergency readiness teams or 
computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs). They are cross-linked glob-
ally and across the EU, offering warnings and problem resolution on security issues, 
especially involving product security teams from the government, commercial and 
academic sectors.12
However, when it comes to addressing cybersecurity nationally and on institu-
tional level, there are many open questions with regard to coherent policy and strat-
egy decisions (see also Chap. 18). For example, there might be issues of competence 
area conflicts and institutional mission dichotomies in relation to the German BSI, 
which pursues both offensive as well as defensive goals. Moreover, other institu-
tions have been established by the German government in 2017 and 2018 that are 
now tasked with developing offensive as well as defensive cybersecurity strategies 
and measures. For example, the German government established the ‘Zentrale Stelle 
für Informationstechnik im Sicherheitsbereich (Zitis)’ in August 2017, which aims 
to develop new tools for law enforcement and intelligence (Beuth 2017). 
Furthermore, in August 2018, it was announced that a new cybersecurity agency 
will be established that will be concerned with research on cybersecurity and key 
technologies (Hegemann 2018). Whereas Germany, as only one of many EU coun-
tries, serves just as an example here, this illustrates how governments struggle with 
effectively determining, coordinating and institutionally streamlining potentially 
overlapping or even conflicting competence areas.
10 https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/TheBSI/Functions/functions_node.html
11 Artikel 8a Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Gesetz or 
BSIG).
12 See the information website of the global CERT association platform FIRST (Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams): https://www.first.org/about
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10.4  The EU Data Protection Framework Addressing 
Cybersecurity
Already in 2013, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) Peter Hustinx com-
mented both the European Cyber Security Strategy and the NIS Directive in an opinion, 
highlighting that a high level of Internet security will also improve the security of per-
sonal information. Nonetheless, the EDPS highlighted that there is a threat of cyberse-
curity measures interfering with individuals’ rights to privacy and the protection of their 
personal data. He called for ensuring that every cybersecurity measure deployed com-
plies with article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Thus, all relevant fundamental rights should be considered in the EU’s Cybersecurity 
Strategy, which includes all its implementing actions (EDPS 2013: 4). In 2015, the fol-
lowing EDPS in office, Giovanni Buttarelli, further emphasised this demand in a fol-
low-up opinion on the topic of national security in 2015 (EDPS 2015: 3).
By that time, the EU has also acknowledged that the protection of individual’s 
personal information needs to be improved. This is a major reason why the EU trig-
gered its reform process for its data protection framework, while a new regulation 
on privacy and electronic communications is still underway. By the time of writing 
this book chapter, the legislative proposal of the Commission and the amendments 
suggested by the Parliament and the Council are still within the Trilogue process, 
without any clear progress forecast.13
As for the European data protection reform so far, the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon and 
the now binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights14 enabled the European 
Commission to trigger a legislative reform process in January 2012. With the inten-
tion of harmonising the fragmented legal data protection framework across the 
European Union (COM 2012), this data protection reform produced two instru-
ments coming into force on 27 April 2016, namely the:
 – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)15
 – Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, inves-
tigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of crimi-
nal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA16
13 The draft proposal has been made by the European Commission on 10 January 2017. For more 
information, see: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-eprivacy-regulation
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, pp. 1–22.
15 The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is the main framework directly appli-
cable in the EU member states. It is in the following abbreviated as GDPR.
16 In contrast to the GDPR, the regulatory instrument for the police and justice sectors comes in 
form of a directive, which needs to be transferred into correlating national law by the European 
countries. It is in the following abbreviated as Directive (EU) 2016/680.
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Both the GDPR, as well as Directive (EU) 2016/680, became applicable by 25 
May 2018.
From a data protection perspective, the responsibilities of the data controllers are 
most relevant in the context of cybersecurity. According to Art. 4 no. 7 GDPR, con-
trollers are those entities determining the purposes and means of the processing. 
These responsibilities include the legal obligation of controller(s) and processor(s) 
to effectively implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to pro-
tect the personal information they intend to collect and process (GDPR, Art. 24(1) 
and 28(1); Directive (EU) 2016/680, Art. 19(1) and 22(1)).
The individually necessary technical and organisational measures may vary 
depending on the case, situation and state of the art in specific areas. Thereby, they 
can entail preventive as well as reactive security measures such as access control, 
encryption, data separation, records of processing activities, technical and organisa-
tional procedures for backup and restore, or data breach notification procedures, 
while this list is not conclusive. Typical standards already known in classical IT 
security, such as ISE/IEC 27001, can also be considered.
Especially noteworthy are Article 32 GDPR and corresponding, Article 29  in 
Directive (EU) 2016/680, which manifest specified requirements to ensure the secu-
rity of processing. These also mention exemplary measures, such as e.g. pseud-
onymisation or measures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
resilience of systems and services in the context of personal data processing.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the responsible controller has to con-
duct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA, see Art. 35 GDPR and Art. 27 
Directive (EU) 2016/680). Yet it is very important to note that while the risks assess-
ment as known classical in IT security, the data protection perspective is very differ-
ent. For example, IT security departments of companies are used to assess risks 
based on which financial or reputation damage for the company could be expected. 
But in a proper data protection based risk assessment, the perspective of the con-
cerned data subject is paramount. A number of aspects play a role, such as the 
nature, scope, context and purpose of the processing, the inherent risks of varying 
likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of the concerned data subjects, 
as well as the state of the art and implementation costs of the needed measures. In 
cases where the processing is deemed to result in a high risk to the rights and 
 freedoms of natural persons, an additional data protection impact assessment must 
be conducted (GDPR, Art. 35; Directive (EU) 2016/680, Art. 27).
Based on these assessments, the controller is required to determine the concrete 
technical and organisational measures needed to sufficiently protect the personal 
data. Specific examples of technical and organisational measures are also made in 
both legal frameworks in various places, such as pseudonymisation, encryption, the 
proper documentation of processing operations, access control and logging.17 Such 
17 See for those examples in the GDPR: Articles 6 (4) e (Lawfulness of processing), 30 (Records of 
processing activities), while the Directive (EU) 2016/680 has in parts even more technically spe-
cific requirements e.g. for logging, access control and other security measures, cf. Articles 25 
(Logging) and 29 (Security of processing).
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measures can also be part of a data protection by design and by default approach as 
also demanded by the respectively applicable legal frameworks (GDPR, Art. 25; 
Directive (EU) 2016/680, Art. 20).
Beyond the preventive and reactive technical and organisational measures to pro-
tect the data, controllers and processors are required to make data breach notifica-
tions under certain circumstances and within specific timeframes. According to 
Article 4 (12) GDPR, ‘personal data breach’ means a breach of security leading to 
the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, 
or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed. Therefore, 
the GDPR directly refers to security incidents with a negative effect on the protec-
tion of personal data, which may also play a role within the cybersecurity domain. 
According to Article 33 GDPR, a notification of a personal data breach to the super-
visory authority is required no later than within 72 h, unless a risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons is unlikely. However, if there is a high risk (see Art. 34 
GDPR), the notification must also be made directly to the data subject without 
undue delay, unless specific technical and organisational measures are in place to 
render the personal data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access 
it, such as encryption. Moreover, a notification may be omitted if the controller has 
taken subsequent measures to ward off this high risk, or if the notification would 
involve disproportionate effort. However, in the latter case, a public communication 
or similar measure may be required of the controller nonetheless.
In contrast to the formerly applicable Directive 95/46/EC, non-compliance is 
now more likely to lead to negative consequences for the controllers, since they are 
now required to demonstrate compliance with the legal framework.18 The compe-
tent data protection supervisory authorities now have increased enforcement pow-
ers due to the new legal framework, which includes a broader range for fine 
amounts. Therefore, it might be advisable for each data controller to establish an 
effective data protection management procedure within the own organisation. 
Moreover, making use of yearly security checks, audits and best practices in tech-
nology, such as penetration tests and performance indicators, seems to be reason-
able to demonstrate compliance.
10.5  Tensions Between Cybersecurity and Data Protection
Cybersecurity is a matter of concern not only in the context of police and national 
security, or solely for EU-located state actors. Instead, it is a global issue, motivat-
ing private and state actors alike to think about optimal cybersecurity strategies in 
order to mitigate risks (see e.g. Atlantic Council 2017). Therein, governmental strat-
egies and policies relating to cybersecurity matters strongly concern the European 
citizens in such a way as cybersecurity incidents often involve the loss, compro-
mise, or unauthorised disclosure of their own personal information.
18 See e.g. articles 24 (1), 25 (1) + (2), 28 (1) + (3) (e), 30 (1) (g) + (2) (d), 32 (1) GDPR.
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With regard to cybersecurity challenges in general, the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) developed a taxonomy classifying 
different threat types and individual threats at various level of detail. The purpose of 
this taxonomy is to establish a point of reference in a living structure (ENISA 
2016a). According to this document, a number of high-level threat types have been 
identified, such as physical attacks, unintentional damage/loss of information or IT 
assets, disaster (natural, environmental), failures/malfunction, outages, eavesdrop-
ping/interception/hijacking, nefarious activity/abuse and legal. Many of these 
threats are closely linked to the cyber domain, for example hacking, Internet of 
Things (IoT), botnets, ransomware or doxxware (ENISA 2016a, p 8ff).
The World Economic Forum (WEF), a Swiss non-profit foundation committed to 
bringing business, political, academic and other leaders together for dialogue on 
global, regional and industry agendas, has also taken a stance on cybersecurity. 
From their perspective, incidents can cover a very wide spectrum, ranging from e.g. 
hacking and blackmail encryption to data or identity theft. They can be caused by 
the most diverse entities for a number of different reasons, and with varying, often 
unforeseeable impact. Furthermore, the WEF identified in its Global Risk Report 
2017 twelve key emerging technologies playing a role in the cybersecurity land-
scape of the future. These are: 3D printing, advanced materials and nanomaterials, 
artificial intelligence and robotics, biotechnologies, energy capture, storage and 
transmission, blockchain and distributed ledger, geoengineering, ubiquitous linked 
sensors, neuro-technologies, new computing technologies such as quantum com-
puting or neural network processing, space technologies, and virtual and augmented 
realities (WEF 2017: 42).
An example of a typical cybersecurity incident affecting a broad range of the 
world population could be the so-called Mirai botnet. This malware was created 
and distributed in 2016 by students in the US who originally wanted to gain advan-
tages in the online game Minecraft by creating a large-scale distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack. However, the botnet got out of control and infected a large 
number of IoT devices worldwide, such as IP cameras and home routers. This 
attack and the distribution of the malware was possible because Mirai exploited the 
fact that customers and users of IoT devices rarely change the manufacturer’s 
default usernames and passwords on their newly bought machines. Once infected, 
an IoT device would become part of the botnet, being remotely controlled for 
large-scale network attacks. In October 2016, the attack got to a point where it 
almost completely brought down the Internet in the entire eastern United States. 
The device owners themselves seldom noticed the malware infection because the 
machine continued to function normally, except for some lagging response time 
and increased usage of Internet bandwidth.
Therefore, many different technology areas both in the civilian as well as in the 
governmental spheres are affected by cybersecurity incidents, making appropriate 
responses crucial in order to succeed in ensuring the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of those technologies.19 This also includes the personal data of 
19 This was explicitly acknowledged by the European Union in COM (2013, p. 3).
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individuals which is being collected and processed by digital technologies, and 
which may be exposed to risks.
While private actors may conduct cyberattacks for monetary or social motives, 
governmental activities usually extend to wider dimensions, which include Law 
Enforcement Agency (LEA) cyberspace activities for purposes of crime investiga-
tion or prevention, as well as further intelligence activities focused on national secu-
rity (see also Chap. 12). The targeted entities can also be varied, whereas the attack 
of critical infrastructure is to be considered the most concerning for all countries 
worldwide, closely followed by attacks on the governmental structures themselves, 
e.g. by various types of election fraud (see also Chap. 11).
When focusing on governments specifically as potential cybersecurity attackers, 
the use of so-called surveillance-oriented security technologies (SOSTs) plays a 
significant role. Many states, also within the EU, allow to varying degrees and with 
different preconditions the deployment of such technologies (e.g. Pietrosanti and 
Aterno 2017), which is often criticised by the media and human rights activists.20 
Media reports about technology used by governments to infiltrate citizen’s devices 
brought into discussion their inherent risks of misuse and bias, usually coming 
along with a severe lack of transparency.
One example is the governmental deployment of software that infiltrates citi-
zen’s devices to gain access to communications and files. In Germany, a Trojan 
Horse malware (named ‘Bundestrojaner’, translated: ‘Federal Trojan’ or ‘State 
Trojan’) was discovered by the German Chaos Computer Club (CCC) in 2011 
which employed surveillance functionalities on targeted devices. The software was 
enabled for backdoor remote control and was proved to generally weaken the secu-
rity of the targeted device. The revelation of the use of this malware triggered a 
significant public debate around the legality of such technologies in democratic 
societies (CCC 2011; see also Chap. 15).
Also criticised often by medias and civil rights organisations is the use of so- 
called zero-day exploit acquisition by governmental institutions to gain leverage in 
the field of domestic as well as foreign intelligence. Such approaches have received 
critical attention due to making the whole IT landscape more insecure, while leaving 
security loopholes open for the obtainment and potential exploitation not only by 
agencies with lawful national security interests, but also by malicious outsiders.21
In this context, also relevant is the general debate around so-called ‘lawful access’ 
of police as well as intelligence agencies. Many such institutions have long been 
demanding access to encrypted devices via backdoor functionalities. Thereby, legal 
obligations imposed on companies to implement such access might in future affect 
all types of software and even hardware. Furthermore, the impact of weakened 
20 Cf. Amnesty International (2017). The report heavily criticises the digital surveillance of 
European governments as negatively affecting the cybersecurity of citizens’ devices.
21 A recent example is the theft of some of the US National Security Agency’s most powerful espio-
nage tools by the Shadow Brokers group. These were hoarded by the NSA’s TAO (Tailored Access 
Operations) department, yet outsiders from the mentioned hacking group published them in August 
2016, causing significant media reaction. See e.g. Nakashima (2016).
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encryption permeates all deployment sectors, including the financial sector, due to 
the increasing use of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Similar to zero-day exploits, 
there is some risk of proliferation beyond the LEA sphere. Furthermore, the legal 
and factual preconditions for the access to encrypted information are not always 
clear, requiring clarification. Among security experts, there seems to be a growing 
recognition of the need to establish mandatory warrants and additional safeguards 
against misuse (Bellovin et  al. 2014). However, even beyond the mere scientific 
area, encryption has been acknowledged as presenting a number of different chal-
lenges for the criminal justice sector.
In November 2016, the Council of the European Union22 proposed the launch of 
a reflection process on such challenges, led by the European Commission (Council 
of the European Union Presidency 2016: 7). Encryption was then further addressed 
in the Council Meeting on the 8th and 9th December 2016, at which the Ministers 
acknowledged that this is an area to be approached carefully to take into account the 
risks to privacy and cybersecurity.23 Furthermore, the ENISA published an opinion 
paper on encryption in December 2016, coming to the conclusion that weakening 
encryption to enable lawful interception is not an optimal approach. The ENISA 
explicitly warned of unintended consequences, e.g. weakening digital signatures, 
and recommended some further benefits and risks analysis, as well as a more in- 
depth exploration of alternatives before any legislative actions should be taken 
(ENISA 2016a: 5). Similarly, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE)24 published an opinion already in 2014 on security and surveil-
lance technologies, highlighting the dangers of such technologies. It highlighted 
that whereas foreign state actors may pose a problem, it should not be forgotten that 
the deployment of intrusive surveillance technologies domestically is risky as well. 
Therefore, European and democratic principles and values must be considered care-
fully (EGE 2014: 87ff).
Therefore, specifically in the national security context, it ultimately comes back 
to the question of boundaries and which goals domestic surveillance should be 
allowed to pursue, considering the necessity and proportionality of measures (Austin 
2015). This however, is not an issue reserved exclusively to the matter of backdoors 
in encryption but to all governmental activities involving SOSTs. Especially with 
the increasing use of Big Data analysis tools by LEAs, there is much concern related 
22 The Council of the European Union is an official EU body, whose members are the ministers 
from each EU country, based on the respective policy areas that are addressed. It should not be 
confused with the European Council, which is another EU body consisting of the 28 EU member 
state government leaders, the European Council President and the President of the European 
Commission. The European Council defines the EU’s strategic short- and long-term policy agenda. 
For the sake of completeness, confusion should also be avoided with the Council of Europe (CoE) 
that was mentioned above in this chapter.
23 Outcome of the 3508th Council meeting, document 15391/16 and press release 67 by the Justice 
and Home Affairs department, section ‘Criminal justice in Cyberspace’, Brussels, 8th and 9th 
December 2016, p. 7.
24 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies is an independent advisory 
body of the President of the European Commission.
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to citizens having only limited possibilities to defend themselves against any mis-
treatment or security risks based on algorithmic-founded suspicion. The same 
counts not only for LEA activity in the context of specific crime prevention or inves-
tigation, but also for intelligence in the interest of national security.
Naturally, all intelligence institutions aim to use IT vulnerabilities to target indi-
viduals and organisations endangering national security. However, depending on 
their competences and objectives, these institutions may sometimes have several, 
contradicting goals. For instance, it appears doubtful whether both SIGINT25 and 
COMSEC26 missions can be pursued by the very same institutions without trigger-
ing unexpected internal dichotomies regarding cybersecurity issues.
In conclusion, discrepancies between offensive and defensive strategies are par-
ticularly striking with regard to any legislative acts requiring technology to generally 
undermine the privacy and security of citizen’s computers and communications. This 
is evident when observing the on-going political and public debate around govern-
ments collecting personal information of their citizens (see also Fig. 10.1). Examples 
are the EU-level and national controversies around data retention, counter- terrorism 
legislation, and the expansion of intelligence services’ competences and coopera-
tion. Combating crime and terrorism definitely plays a role in the political and legis-
lative landscape of the European member countries and will continue to do so.
10.6  Recommended Realignment and Solution Approaches
It is increasingly acknowledged that the cybersecurity issues landscape can change 
very fast, leaving policy-makers, data protection and cybersecurity experts at a stra-
tegical and operational disadvantage. The increase of interconnectedness in the 
digital era also means an increase of involved actors and recipients of data, with ever 
greater networks of entities and stakeholders involved. More data also leads to more 
25 Signals Intelligence, for example getting access to the content of people’s emails.
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possibilities of analysis with big data tools, thus scaling up risks of re-identification 
of individuals, profiling and disrupted power balances. Furthermore, there is a 
growing recognition that cybersecurity risks do not only come from the outside, but 
malicious insiders may cause significant damage as well.27 Within the cybersecurity 
domain, the effectiveness of offensive measures taken mostly by governmental 
actors is often questioned. This is due to doubtful allocation of cybersecurity attacks 
and related insecurities regarding accurate forensic evidence to target the true 
attackers for retaliation purposes.28 Therefore, some cybersecurity experts advise 
focusing more on defensive strategies in order to protect valuable assets. This is 
where the above-mentioned implementation of technical and organisational mea-
sures required by new European data protection framework may contribute to better 
protected devices and systems.
The responsibilities of the controller and processor entities as well as principles 
such as data protection by design and default (GDPR, Art. 25; Directive 2016/680, 
Art. 20) are focused strongly on either eliminating or at least mitigating any risks for 
the personal information of individuals, regardless of the type of attack. This is a 
considerable approach because even though the cybersecurity domain provides 
much collaboration and information on the national level of the EU member coun-
tries, it still lacks a clear, organised mandate to enforce the implementation of pro-
tective measures on the European level.
Against this background, the national DPAs publish their own statements and 
opinions on cybersecurity issues to bring in their perspective. In 2015, the French 
national data protection authority Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des 
Libertés (CNIL) published an analysis of personal data protection in the context of 
cybersecurity. It found that privacy is a crucial aspect in the digital era and that a 
more holistic approach to both cybersecurity and privacy is sorely needed, while 
baseline security rules have not yet been sufficiently established (CNIL 2015: 14ff; 
see also Chap. 14). In July 2017, the CNIL published its stance on encryption, stat-
ing that the protection of the confidentiality of communications is essential to 
 maintain the balance between the protection of an individual’s personal data, tech-
nological innovation and monitoring. Especially with regard to the Edward Snowden 
NSA mass surveillance revelations, robust encryption solutions would contribute to 
the security of the whole digital ecosystem, whereas backdoors would endanger 
citizens, organisations and states alike (CNIL 2017). In 2018, the CNIL published a 
guideline related to the security of personal data, giving recommendations related to 
specific technical and organisational measures that controllers and processors may 
take (CNIL 2018). In Italy, the Italian DPA strives for better cooperation with other 
Italian governmental institutions concerned with cybersecurity.29 The Information 
27 See ENISA Threat Landscape Report (2018a), subchapter 3.9 about insider threats, pages 64ff.
28 This was explicitly acknowledged by many cybersecurity experts, also abroad, see as an example 
the cybersecurity policy/approach of the US Obama administration (Marks 2017).
29 See the following article on askanews.it: ‘Cyber security, protocollo Garante-Dis su dati person-




Commissioner of the United Kingdom (ICO UK) also focuses on information secu-
rity, detailing on his website the relevant technical and organisational measures 
required by the national and EU data protection frameworks.30 Moreover, the ICO 
UK regularly publishes current data security incident trends, covering various issues 
relating to information security in the cyber domain. Therein, the ICO differentiates 
per sector, such as justice, education, finance, insurance and credit, general busi-
ness, local government, legal, and health sector. Examples of issues mentioned are 
cryptographic flaws (e.g. failure to use HTTPS), exfiltration of data, key-logging 
software, phishing, cybersecurity misconfiguration (e.g. inadvertent publishing of 
data on website), loss/theft of an only copy of encrypted data or the loss/theft of an 
unencrypted device, diverse DDoS and others.31
Many institutions within the EU, at both national and European levels, recom-
mend taking initial steps for IT systems and networks with the definition of pro-
cesses, the close monitoring of their execution, supplemented by preventive and 
reactive measures compliant with the state of the art.32 This includes the consider-
ation of information security best practices and standards, such as ISO, COBIT or 
ITIL. From a data protection perspective, the above-mentioned technical and organ-
isational measures often correlate and their implementation should be much more 
prevalent in many areas and sectors.
Essential from data protection perspective is the conduct of a data protection 
impact assessment (DPIA) in advance of certain intended personal data processing 
operations. The GDPR regulates in Article 35 (1) that a DPIA is required when “a 
type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the 
nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons […]”. Many national DPAs in 
the EU have developed own DPIA methodologies.33 However, some of these meth-
odologies have their own shortcomings and weaknesses. For example, some fail to 
properly determine what a risk actually is, or reduce the assessment to a mere risk- 
based IT security approach which lacks the fundamental rights perspective required 
by the EU data protection laws. An example of a methodology integrating this per-
spective is the German Standard Data Protection Model (SDM), which has a strong 
fundamental rights underpinning and which has been acknowledged by all national 
30 See the ICO website information: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-
protection-regulation-gdpr/security/
31 These examples come from the reports of the July–September 2016 period (https://ico.org.uk/
action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-trends/) and of the Q4 2017/18 (https://ico.org.uk/
action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-trends/).
32 This is also reflected in the private sector as well, reacting to the governmental encouragement. 
See for example the recommendations of the industry-sector-driven ECSO (2016, chapter 6).
33 See e.g. the ICO UK guidelines on their website: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-




data protection supervisory authorities in Germany.34 It is based on protection goals 
that build and extend upon classic IT security goals35 (see also Chap. 2), but can still 
be linked directly to the applicable data protection framework.36 The underlying 
concept was developed much earlier than the GDPR (Hansen et al. 2015) yet it still 
provides a methodology that is based on the GDPR directly and thus is useable all 
across the EU. Briefly summarised, three additional data protection goals supple-
ment the IT security focused ones, namely: unlinkability (data minimisation), inter-
venability and transparency (see also Fig. 10.2).
These additional, privacy-focused goals can be used together with the classic IT 
security goals to assess and evaluate data protection and data security objectives and 
risks. The objective is to map the (often rather vague and broad) legal requirements 
of the European data protection framework to more concrete functional and organ-
isational requirements. Therefore, the above mentioned SDM approach for a DPIA 
seems to be a candidate methodology to broaden the view of IT security and to be 
aligned with the perspective of personal data protection.
Howsoever, regardless of which DPIA methodology is being used, it must always 
be aimed at determining the necessary operational measures to resolve data protec-
tion issues (GDPR, Art. 35(7)). Furthermore, it requires the responsible entity to 
consider the whole processing lifecycle, including all data, formats, IT systems, 
processes and functions.
While addressing both security and data protection, it appears reasonable not to 
invent the wheel anew but to refer to known standards and instruments such as ISO/
IEC 27001 and/or code of conducts, as well as to process-oriented approaches (plan, 
do check, act). Since technological and security challenges are continuously evolving, 
34 See Germany (2016)  – Unanimously and affirmatively acknowledged (under abstention of 
Bavaria) by the 92. Conference of the Independent Data Protection Authorities of the Bund and the 
Länder in Kühlungsborn on 9–10 November 2016. See for a very first English version: https://
www.datenschutzzentrum.de/sdm/. A second and improved English version is currently in the 
works.
35 The classic ‘CIA triad’ (abbreviation for the protection goals confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability).
36 Germany (2016), see the pages 23 ff. for the direct linkage of the individual protection goals to 
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it is advisable to earnestly assess the whole lifecycle of IT product manufacturing 
processes. Such processes usually range from design, development, testing, procure-
ment, operation, management, and to the product phase-out and deployment. All of 
these stages need to be subjected to security risk assessments and countermeasures 
deployment (ENISA 2018a: 21). To this end, an effective assignment of clear respon-
sibilities, time periods, as well as a prioritisation of measures implementation should 
be the primary goal. To plan, implement and evaluate processes, procedures and mea-
sures in an optimal way, a data protection management system should always make 
clear cross-references to an eventually already existing IT security management sys-
tem (ISMS) to avoid divergences, conflicts, contradictions and unnecessary overlaps.
Moreover, a close observation of the still active legislative process for the future 
ePrivacy Regulation is advisable since it will be relevant for the area of electronic 
communications. The original European Commission draft37 has been criticised sig-
nificantly by relevant stakeholders in the data protection domain, such as the Article 
29 Working Party38 and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS 2017). 
What might matter most in the context of cybersecurity and more general IT secu-
rity issues is that the draft has been found faulty for vagueness in the scope defini-
tion. Also, for having weakened requirements in relation to information about 
security risks and data breaches, as well as regarding privacy by design and by 
default in comparison to the GDPR. Thus, it provides a lack of consistency.39
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Chapter 11
Freedom of Political Communication, 
Propaganda and the Role of Epistemic 
Institutions in Cyberspace
Seumas Miller
Abstract This article provides definitions of fake news, hate speech and propa-
ganda, respectively. These phenomenon are corruptive of the epistemic norms, e.g. 
to tell the truth. It also elaborates on the right to freedom of communication and its 
relation both to censoring propaganda and to the role of epistemic institutions, such 
as a free and independent press and universities. Finally, it discusses the general 
problem of countering political propaganda in cyberspace and argues, firstly, that 
there is an important role for epistemic institutions in this regard and secondly, that 
social media platforms need to be redesigned since, as they stand and notwithstand-
ing the benefits which they provide, they are a large part of the problem.
Keywords Applied ethics · Epistemic institutions · Epistemic norms · Fake news · 
Hate speech · Knowledge · Objectivity · Propaganda · Social media
11.1  Introduction
Social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, are used by billions of com-
municators worldwide, as are search engines such as Google. The advent of these 
tech giants, or at least of the technology upon which they rely, has enabled the moral 
right to communication to be exercised on a scale hitherto undreamt of and, as a 
consequence, led to unprecedented flows of information and opinion, globally as 
well as locally. However, these developments have gone hand in hand with an expo-
nential increase in the spread of fake news, hate speech and propaganda (Cocking 
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and van den Hoven 2018; see also Chap. 12). Of particular relevance to this article 
on political communication, the advent of the tech giants has enabled extremist 
political groups, such as Islamic State to flourish, facilitated interference in the dem-
ocratic process by foreign powers (e.g. in the US presidential elections by Russia), 
and turbo-charged virulent politically motivated hate speech leading, in some 
instances, to murder and mayhem, as in the recent case of attacks on Rohingya 
Muslims following hate speech on Facebook that emanated from the Myanmar 
military.
Recent revelations concerning data firm Cambridge Analytica’s illegitimate use 
of the data of millions of Facebook users highlight the ethical issues arising from 
the use of machine learning techniques in relation to social media for political pur-
poses. Cambridge Analytica is, or was—the revelations brought about its demise—
a firm that used machine learning processes to try to influence elections in the US 
and elsewhere by, for instance, targeting ‘vulnerable’ voters in marginal seats with 
political advertising (Grassegger and Krogerus 2016). Of course, there is nothing 
new about political candidates and parties employing firms to engage in political 
advertising on their behalf, but if a data firm has access to the personal information 
of millions of voters, and is skilled in the use of machine learning techniques, then 
it can develop detailed, fine-grained voter profiles that enable political actors to 
reach a whole new level of manipulative influence over voters. The ethical conse-
quences are potentially far reaching. One set of ethical issues pertains to privacy and 
confidentiality; illegitimate access on the part of Cambridge Analytica to private 
information and, in the case of Russian hackers hacking into the democratic party’s 
emails, to confidentiality. Another set of ethical issues pertains to institutional cor-
ruption; corruption of the democratic process. A further set of ethical issues pertains 
to national security; the use of machine learning techniques by foreign powers, such 
as Russia, to favour one candidate over another in the service of their own political 
agenda, e.g. to sow discord in liberal democratic polities. Such manipulative politi-
cal influence over users of social media utilising a combination of new technologi-
cal tools, such as machine learning, and psychologically based, manipulative 
marketing techniques raises more directly the emerging ethical issue of the tension 
in cyberspace between freedom of communication, on the one hand, and the need to 
restrict certain forms of political propaganda on the other.
It is agreed by all that the dissemination of fake news, hate speech and extremist 
propaganda on the Internet and on social media in particular is a bad thing and 
should be curtailed, if not prohibited, albeit giving effect to this is easier said than 
done. However, a host of difficult practical ethical problems arise at this point. Who 
ought to decide what is fake news and what is fact—the tech giants themselves? 
Who ought to decide what counts as hate speech, and on the basis of what criteria? 
Should all political propaganda be prohibited and, if not, which should be prohib-
ited, which permitted and on what basis? Doubtless, Islamic State’s YouTube video 
clips of beheadings and incitements to murder should be prohibited, but what of the 
propaganda disseminated by right wing groups who might not advocate the over-
throw of the state or the murder of innocents but, nevertheless, do disseminate polit-
ical perspectives at odds with liberal democratic values, such as tolerance of 
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minorities, and in doing so rely heavily on false claims, half-truths and racial and 
other long standing prejudices—thereby undermining liberal democratic institu-
tions, including epistemic institutions.
What do I mean by epistemic institutions (Miller 2010)? The term ‘episteme’ 
refers, of course, to knowledge. Therefore, epistemic institutions are those institu-
tions that have as a principal institutional purpose the acquisition and/or dissemina-
tion of knowledge (understood broadly so as to include factual knowledge, reasoning 
processes such as induction and deduction, evidence-backed economic, political 
and ethical perspectives, and understanding). Accordingly, epistemic institutions 
include schools, universities and media organisations responsible for news/com-
ment. They also include private or government research laboratories, think tanks 
and, for that matter, intelligence agencies.
These practical ethical questions mentioned above presuppose answers to some 
more fundamental theoretical questions. For instance, can the distinction between 
politically motivated fake news, hate speech and propaganda, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, factual and other objective claims and perspectives actually be 
sustained? What is the nature and extent of the moral right of freedom of communi-
cation? Who ought to be the decision-makers in relation to determining what is fake 
news, hate speech and political propaganda in cyberspace. More specifically, who 
ought to be the decision-makers in relation to determining when such communica-
tions ought to be prohibited?
In this article, my concern is with countering politically motivated fake news, 
hate speech and propaganda while respecting the moral right to freedom of com-
munication. In the first section, I offer definitions of fake news, hate speech and 
propaganda respectively. As we shall see, these phenomena have at least one impor-
tant feature in common; they are not truth-aiming (in a certain sense). In the second 
section, I elaborate on the right to freedom of communication and its relation to 
epistemic institutions. In the third and final section, I discuss the general problem of 
countering political propaganda in cyberspace and the role of epistemic institutions 
and social media platforms in this enterprise.
11.2  Fake News, Hate Speech and Propaganda
The definition of fake news is contested and, therefore, the following definition is 
necessarily somewhat stipulative (Lynch 2016a). News by definition purports to be 
true or, in the case of visual images and the like, purports to be an accurate represen-
tation of reality, even if it is in fact false. However, news items are frequently dis-
seminated on the Internet by persons who do not endorse them; indeed, on occasion, 
by persons who explicitly state at a later time that they are false. Here I use the term 
‘fake news’ to refer to news that is in fact false and not believed by its originator—
as opposed to subsequent disseminators—to be true. Accordingly, on this definition, 
news that is false and believed to be false by its originator is fake news, but so is 
news that is false and neither believed nor disbelieved by its originator is to be true. 
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This is because news by definition—and whether it is in fact true or false—purports 
to be true. Thus, whatever its originator believes or does not believe, he or she pres-
ents the news item as being true.
Fake news is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is false and yet, given 
the communicative reach of the Internet, and of social media—and the use of auto-
mated dissemination techniques, e.g. bots—it is likely to be believed by many, even 
if disbelieved by many others (or, at least, their beliefs are suspended). I note 
that somewhat paradoxically the credibility of fake news on social media platforms, 
notably Facebook, is enhanced by the co-presence on these platforms of objective 
news emanating from high quality news outlets, such as the New  York Times. 
Secondly, especially in the case of an ongoing series of mutually supportive, politi-
cally motivated, fake news items, there are likely to be untoward political conse-
quences arising from large numbers of people believing such news items, including 
potentially the undermining of democratic processes that rely on voters making 
judgments based on facts rather than falsehoods.
It is sometimes suggested that ultimately there is no important distinction 
between fake news and factual news and, as a corollary, politicians, academics, 
news media and other disseminators cannot provide objective communicative con-
tent of high quality since the notion of such objective truth or of a fact of the matter 
independent of representations is itself meaningless or hopelessly naïve; accord-
ingly, one media or other report cannot be of higher quality than another by virtue 
of being correct or more accurate or more balanced. It is further suggested that the 
reasons for this are manifold, and they include: the fact that communicative content 
is a representation and, as such, always reflects a standpoint; that mechanisms of 
media communication necessarily mediate, and therefore distort; that quality is sim-
ply in the eye of the beholder; and so on. There is not the space to deal with all these 
kinds of arguments in detail, though it is not difficult to show that they do not dem-
onstrate the strong position they are intended to (Bok 1978). Suffice it to say here 
that the notion that we cannot aim at truth, and on occasion approximate to it, and 
the notion that every piece of analysis and comment is as good as every other, is 
self-defeating and, if accepted, would render communication pointless. It is a pre-
supposition of communication in general, including both linguistic communication 
and visual representation, that there is a truth to be communicated or some fact of 
the matter to be represented, and that on many occasions this is achieved. If this 
were not so, communication of news would be rendered pointless and cease to take 
place. Thus, it would be pointless, because not objectively true, to report that on 
9/11 two planes were flown by terrorists into the Twin Towers building in New York 
City killing some 3000 people. Likewise, it would be pointless to show footage of 
the planes flying into the towers and the subsequent collapse of the towers; pointless 
because (allegedly) there was no fact of the matter. Moreover, it is a presupposition 
of comment and analysis that not every piece of analysis and comment is as good as 
every other one, since there is always as least one which is regarded by the com-
municator as inferior, namely that which is the negation of the one put forward, e.g. 
that terrorists did not fly and planes into Twin Towers and did not kill anyone.
S. Miller
231
While the distinction between fake news and factual claims is relatively clear- 
cut, notwithstanding claims to the contrary, distinctions, firstly, between politically 
motivated hate speech and strident pejorative criticism, and, secondly, between, 
political propaganda and political comment/opinion, are more problematic.
The definition of hate speech is contested. Let us, assume, however, that it is 
speech that incites hatred against some group (Waldron 2012)—or, at least, is 
intended to do so and has some reasonable chance of doing so. Accordingly, hate 
speech is to be distinguished from strident pejorative criticism insofar as the latter 
is truth-aiming, i.e. has truth as an end in itself. By contrast, hate speech is not truth- 
aiming in this sense; the truth is only of interest in so far as it can serve to incite hatred.
Hate speech does not necessarily incite violence or other serious crimes, albeit 
these may well be longer term, indirect consequences of hate speech. The hate 
speech of interest to us here is politically motivated hate speech; speech that incites 
hatred against a target group and is performed in order to serve some political pur-
pose, e.g. a right-wing politician seeking to get elected by vilifying immigrants 
belonging to a minority ethnic group. Naturally, politically motivated hate speech, 
often features abusive language, and manifestly incites hatred against the target 
group. However, sometimes it is couched in moderate language and consists in 
advocating particular policies ostensibly based on facts (‘facts’ which turn out to be 
false or highly misleading). In the latter cases context is all important if the speech 
in question is properly to be regarded as hate speech. Consider, for instance, a right- 
wing politician’s speech advocating that immigrants from a certain racial group 
should be sent back to their homeland and that there should be a ban on any further 
immigrants from that group, on the grounds that, as he falsely claims, the immi-
grants in question are mostly criminals and/or welfare recipients. Suppose this 
speech is disseminated via social media and on a targeted basis to members of an 
audience likely to be receptive to these views in part because of their pre-existing 
prejudice. The speech is racially discriminatory and, given its pattern of dissemina-
tion and its ultimate intention, i.e. to incite racist sentiment in the service of a politi-
cal agenda (let us assume), it arguably constitutes hate speech.
In the light of this definition of hate speech as speech intended to incite hatred, 
and having a reasonable chance of doing so, it is clear that politically motivated hate 
speech is potentially harmful not only to individual and groups who are the object 
of its attack, and not only because it is likely to be false, but because it is likely to 
sow discord in a liberal democratic polity and, for that matter, in authoritarian states. 
As is the case with fake news, hate speech in cyberspace is especially problematic, 
given the communicative reach of the Internet and social media platforms in 
particular.
Political propaganda is, I suggest, communication in the service of a political 
ideology (Ellul 1973). Therefore, political ideology is the more fundamental con-
cept. Accordingly, we need a serviceable account of political ideology and one that 
enables a distinction to be maintained between ideology, on the one hand, and the 
more generic notion of systems of political ideas, on the other.
Firstly, it is important to note that in order for something to be an ideology it 
must comprise a set of systematically connected beliefs, assumptions or claims. 
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Moreover, this systematically connected set of beliefs or claims must if it is an ide-
ology be susceptible of instantiation; and if it is instantiated it must be instantiated 
in the minds of a group of people. Such a group must constitute a community (of 
sorts) and not simply a set of unrelated individuals. The notion of an (instantiated) 
ideology, then, is the notion of a shared set of beliefs and claims. Furthermore, the 
key constitutive elements of the system are beliefs and claims cannot be too strongly 
emphasised, since it is sometimes supposed that the key constitutive elements are 
actions, at other times appearances, and at still other times that these elements are 
words or concepts. However, an ideology cannot consist of actions, social practices 
and the like per se since unlike beliefs or claims, actions are not about the world and 
are not true or false; but it is a constitutive feature of an ideology that it be about the 
world, and that it be true or (more likely) false. Nor can an ideology comprise 
appearances per se, even though the way the world appears to be may bring about 
false beliefs and indeed ideological beliefs. Here a perceptual analogy may be use-
ful. A stick placed in water has the appearance of being bent and may cause the 
perceiver to believe that it is in fact bent. Yet from the fact that the world appears to 
a subject to be a certain way it does not follow that the subject believes that the 
world is the way it appears to be. We do not, for example, believe that the stick is 
bent, although it certainly appears to us to be bent. However, if appearances are not 
necessarily accepted as true by a subject then they cannot be constitutive of ideolo-
gies, for if someone adopts an ideology then the person accepts its content as being 
true. Again, it is surely clear that it is only beliefs and claims, as opposed to unitary 
items such as words or concepts, that constitute commitments to this or that view of 
the world, and as such can be true or false. By contrast, words and concepts as such 
do not constitute such commitments and make no truth claims. Thus, the word ‘uni-
corn’ is consistent with there being or not being unicorns; however, the belief ‘there 
are unicorns’ is a commitment to the world being a certain way and is true if the 
world is that way and false if it is not.
Secondly, I suggest that for any systematically connected set of shared beliefs to 
count as an ideology it must have a certain kind of origin. In particular, the existence 
of the ideology cannot ultimately be caused by the world being as the ideology says 
it is. Thus a particular systematically connected set of beliefs (say liberalism) would 
qualify as an ideology on our definition if it were brought into existence not by the 
world being as liberalism says it is, but rather was fashioned as an expedient account 
of things by the economically ascendant classes.
Thirdly, I suggest that to count as a political ideology, a set of beliefs must serve 
some kind of political purpose. It might, for example, have the purpose of under-
mining or, alternatively, of preserving the political status quo.
Finally, it should be noted that there is a high probability that an ideology will be 
false, given that its causal origin cannot be the world being the way the ideology 
says it is, and given that it must serve some or other political purpose. That said, it 
is important to keep in mind that political ideologies typically consist in part in 
truths, as well as falsehoods and half truths, and rely in part on legitimate griev-
ances. If not, they are likely to have little or no credibility.
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However, core or constitutive elements of a political ideology are likely to be 
false or fanciful, e.g. the classless society, the Caliphate. Moreover, the propagation 
of an ideology relies on falsehoods, half-truths and hate speech. Modern  propaganda 
is likely to rely on a suite of psychologically based, manipulative marketing tech-
niques and fake news disseminated on the Internet. Aside from the constitutively 
ideological components of an ideology, i.e., its content, ideology impacts itself 
causally on communication and thought, by way of permeation, by implication, and 
by being presupposed. Accordingly, and notwithstanding what was claimed above, 
actions, practices, appearances and so on can be used to convey ideological content.
Sometimes processes of permeation, implication and presupposition enable the 
ideology to influence while going undetected. Consider an advertisement consisting 
of a video clip of a well-dressed, handsome man ostentatiously smoking an identifi-
able brand of cigarette, standing next to an expensive car, and making the statement 
‘That is a fine car’. Here, there may be an (as it were) non-political-ideological core 
belief: the conviction that in virtue of its being mechanically sound and fuel- 
efficient, the car is fine. However in addition to this non-ideological core belief, and 
overlaying it, may be ideological beliefs, such as the belief that the car is fine, not 
simply in virtue of being mechanically sound but also in virtue of being socially 
prestigious because expensive. Here a core of non-ideological meaning is perme-
ated by ideological meaning: in effect, a consumerist ideology is being sold. In 
addition, of course, there is the implication that smoking this particular brand of 
cigarette goes hand in glove with having prestige.
A further kind of example entails the notion of a presupposition as well as impli-
cation, albeit there is no attempt to conceal the ideological message. Consider for 
instance the statement, ‘all Crusaders are mortal’ uttered in the context of an extrem-
ist jihadist diatribe. Here there is a crude ideology presupposed, viz. that the world 
is divided up into Christians who are loathsome and Muslims who are not. In addi-
tion, the reference to mortality implies that Christians can and should be killed.
A final important point needs to be kept in mind. Propaganda on its own has little 
political effect. If it is to undermine, for instance, a liberal democracy it needs to be 
a component of an integrated package comprising the existence of a felt grievance 
against some group, such as injustice suffered at the hands of the political elite, a 
technological means for wide dissemination, (e.g. printed matter, social media) and, 
at least in conflict situations, some form of kinetic capacity (e.g. armaments), and 
strategy (e.g. terrorism) (Ingram 2016). Needless to say, as is the case with fake 
news and hate speech, the unprecedented communicative reach afforded by the 
Internet and social media platforms to propagandists have greatly increased the 
potential impact of political propaganda.
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11.3  Freedom of Communication, Truth and Liberal 
Democracy
Notwithstanding the individual, collective and institutional harms caused by politi-
cally motivated fake news, hate speech and propaganda—not to mention their inher-
ent epistemic and moral undesirability—there are good reasons not to enact laws to 
prohibit them entirely, although these reasons are consistent with placing some legal 
restrictions on them. For instance, most would agree that there should be laws 
against incitements to violence. Naturally, it does not follow from this that there 
should not be individual, collective and, indeed, institutionally based opposition to 
fake news, hate speech and propaganda. The historically most important reason for 
not enacting laws to prohibit fake news, hate speech and propaganda is the moral 
right to freedom of communication (Schauer 1981).
There are two especially salient arguments for freedom of communication and, 
relatedly, freedom of intellectual inquiry, the first associated with the English phi-
losopher John Stuart Mill (1869), the second (loosely) associated with the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1956). (I do not mean to imply that these arguments 
are the only ones advanced by these philosophers, much less that the versions of 
them I propound below are precise renderings of the work of these philosophers.)
According to Mill, new knowledge will only emerge in a free marketplace of 
ideas. If certain ideas are prevented from being investigated or communicated then 
the truth is not likely to emerge, since those suppressed ideas may in fact be the true 
ones. I note that the notion of a market place in play here might need to be somewhat 
loosely construed so that, for instance, Wikipedia might be understood as a market 
place in so far as there are no barriers to participation by adding or correcting infor-
mation, although there are no buyers and sellers in the conventional sense. I take it 
that Wikipedia involves a form of collective epistemic action or, as I term it, joint 
epistemic action (Miller 2018). It relies on the epistemic (knowledge) contribution 
of multiple actors.
Let us look more closely at this argument, restricting ourselves to political ideas 
in the sense of politically relevant factual claims, hypotheses, unsubstantiated 
claims, interpretations and theories, the epistemic resolution of which call for occa-
sionally complex processes of reasoning and justification to be undertaken in a pub-
lic forum such as, in recent times, the Internet and social media platforms. Here, 
Mill appears to rely on a distinction between rational inquiry and justification on the 
one hand—a possibly solitary activity—and freedom of communication on the other.
This argument needs to be unpacked (Miller 2000). I suggest the following ren-
dering of it.
(1) Freedom of communication is necessary for rational inquiry.
(2) Rational inquiry is necessary for knowledge.
Therefore: (3) Freedom of communication is necessary for knowledge.
The argument is valid and premise (2) is plausible in relation to the sort of knowl-
edge at issue here. What of premise (1)?
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The justification for (1) is evidently that rational inquiry requires: (i) a number of 
diverse views or perspectives (possessed by different persons and different interest 
groups) and; (ii) a substantial amount of diverse evidence for/against these views 
(available from different sources). Moreover, (iii) regarding (i) and (ii), there is no 
single (a) infallible and (b) reliable authority.
Note that Mill’s argument for freedom of inquiry—understood as rational inquiry 
in a context of freedom of communication—is instrumentalist or means/end in its 
form. The claim is not that freedom of inquiry is good in itself, but rather that it is a 
means to another good, namely knowledge and, it should be added, the knowledge 
of interest to us here and, for that matter, to Mill is collective knowledge generated 
by joint epistemic action. The notion of collective knowledge in play here is (roughly 
speaking) that of knowledge shared among members of a population, be the popula-
tion a polity, a global audience or, for that matter, an academic community (which 
is probably a segmented global community). (It is then an open question—as far as 
Mill’s argument is concerned—whether or not knowledge is an intrinsic good, or 
merely a means to some other good. By contrast, I assume that knowledge is an 
intrinsic good.) To this extent, the moral weight to be attached to freedom of inquiry 
is weaker than it would be by the lights of an argument, which accorded freedom of 
inquiry the status of an intrinsic good or fundamental moral right.
The second argument for freedom of inquiry is not inconsistent with the first but 
is nevertheless quite different. Specifically, it accords freedom of inquiry greater 
moral weight by treating it as having the status of a fundamental moral right. This 
second argument—or at least my own neo-Kantian rendering of it—relies on a 
wider sense of freedom of intellectual inquiry, one embracing not only freedom of 
thought and reasoning but also freedom of communication and discussion. The 
argument begins with the premise that freedom of intellectual inquiry thus under-
stood is a basic, as opposed to derived, moral right. Here the term ‘intellectual’ is 
intended to be taken in its original Latin-based sense of pertaining to understanding, 
as opposed to its modern rarefied sense of pertaining to those matters that can only 
be understood by experts or ‘intellectuals’. Intellectual inquiry is a human practice 
that should not be the preserve only of academics and other experts. This is not to 
say that academics and others with specialist or more developed levels of under-
standing ought not to be accorded due respect as epistemic authorities. Climate 
scientists are a case in point.
Thus conceived, freedom of intellectual inquiry is not an individual right of the 
ordinary kind. Although it is a right which attaches to individuals, as opposed to 
groups per se, it is not a right which an individual could exercise by him/herself. 
Communication, discussion and intersubjective methods of testing are social, or at 
least interpersonal, activities. However, it is important to stress that they are not 
activities, which are necessarily relativized to certain designated social groups. In 
principle, intellectual interaction can and ought to be allowed to take place between 
individuals in interpersonal and communal, including on-line, settings irrespective of 
whether they belong to the same social, ethnic or political group. In short, freedom 
of intellectual inquiry, or at least its constituent elements, is a basic moral right. Note 
that being a basic moral right it can, at least in principle, override collective interests 
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and goals, including national economic interests and goals. Hence, the dilemmas that 
can arise between, for instance, security and freedom of communication.
If freedom of intellectual inquiry is a basic moral right then, like other basic 
moral rights such as the right to life and to freedom of the person, it is a right that 
all humans possess and it is a right that should be protected in liberal democracies 
in particular. Here, we need to be clearer on the relationship between the basic 
moral right to freely engage in intellectual inquiry on the one hand, and knowledge 
or truth on the other.
The term ‘knowledge’, as used in this context, embraces not only information but 
also understanding. Note also that in order to come to have knowledge in this sense, 
one must possess rational capacities, i.e. capacities that enable not only the acquisi-
tion of certain kinds of information, e.g. via a Google search, but especially the 
development of understanding. Here the term ‘rational’ is broadly construed. It is 
not, for example, restricted to deductive and inductive reasoning. This point holds 
irrespective of whether the communicative context is offline or online, the coffee-
house or Twitter, and notwithstanding the advantages and disadvantages—and ulti-
mate intellectual upsides and downsides (Lynch 2016b)—of some of these modes 
of communication over others, e.g. lengthy single speeches to a small audience 
versus brief tweets to thousands.
Freedom of intellectual inquiry and knowledge, in this extended sense of knowl-
edge, are not simply related as means to end, but also conceptually. To freely inquire 
is to seek the truth by reasoning. Truth is not an external contingently connected end 
which some inquiries might be directed towards if the inquirer happened to have an 
interest in truth, rather than, say, an interest in falsity or (a la Derrida) playfulness. 
Rather, truth is internally connected to intellectual inquiry. An intellectual inquiry, 
which did not aim at the truth, would not be an intellectual inquiry, or at least would 
be defective qua intellectual inquiry. Moreover, here aiming at truth is aiming at 
truth as an end in itself. (This is not inconsistent with also aiming at truth as a means 
to some other end.) In other words, an alleged intellectual inquiry which only aimed 
at truth as a means to some other end would not be an intellectual inquiry or would 
be defective qua intellectual inquiry, since for such a pseudo-inquirer truth would 
not be internal to his/her activity. Such a pseudo-inquirer is prepared to abandon—
and indeed would have in fact abandoned—truth-aiming if, for example, it turns 
out, or if it had turned out, that the means to his or her end was not after all truth, but 
rather falsity.
Furthermore, to engage in free intellectual inquiry in my extended sense involv-
ing communication with, and testing by, others, is to freely seek the truth by reason-
ing with others. Intellectual inquiry in this sense is not exclusively the activity of a 
solitary individual. Moreover, here reasoning is broadly construed to embrace 
highly abstract formal deductive reasoning at one end of the spectrum and informal 
(including literary) interpretation and speculation at the other. Furthermore, it 
embraces ordinary political discourse among non-specialists as well as technical 
discourse among experts, and discourse attempting to bridge these divides, e.g. 
between scientists and ordinary citizens on climate change.
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There are, of course, methods of acquiring knowledge which do not necessarily, 
or even in fact, involve free inquiry, e.g. my knowledge that I have a toothache, or 
my knowledge that the object currently in the foreground of my visual field is a 
table, but these taken in themselves are relatively unimportant items of knowledge 
as far as public discourse is concerned, and certainly as far as epistemic institutions 
such as the press and universities are concerned. (Obviously, other items of knowl-
edge of the same species can be very important in the context of some intellectual 
inquiry e.g. an inquiry into whether a recently developed drug eases pain or an 
inquiry into ordinary perception.)
Given that freedom of intellectual inquiry is a basic moral right, and given the 
above described relationship between intellectual inquiry and truth (or knowledge), 
we can now present our second argument in relation to freedom of intellectual 
inquiry (Miller 2000). This argument in effect seeks to recast the notion of freedom 
of intellectual inquiry in order to bring out the potential significance for liberal 
democratic polities, in particular, of the Kantian claim that freedom of intellectual 
inquiry is a basic moral right.
 (1) Freedom of intellectual inquiry is a basic moral right.
 (2) Freedom of intellectual inquiry is (principally) freedom to seek the truth by 
reasoning with others.
 (3) Freedom to seek the truth by reasoning with others is a basic moral right.
Our discussion has yielded the following plausible propositions. First, the kind of 
knowledge in question is typically attained by reasoning with others (whether con-
ducted offline or on-line, whether in the coffee house or via Twitter etc.). Second, to 
engage in free intellectual inquiry is to seek truth (or knowledge) for its own sake. 
Third, freely seeking the truth (or knowledge) for its own sake, and by reasoning 
with others, is a basic moral right.
Let us grant the existence of a basic moral right to freely pursue the truth by 
reasoning with others. The political implications of this are threefold. Firstly, liberal 
democracies, in particular, need to ensure that this moral right of members of the 
citizenry is respected, indeed cultivated. As Mill stressed, the ability to exercise this 
right, and the habit of exercising it, are preconditions of liberal democracy. Secondly, 
liberal democracies need to ensure that this right is institutionally embedded in 
epistemic institutions in particular. For instance, the exercise of the moral right to 
freely pursue the truth by reasoning with others is a central feature of universities 
(Miller 2010). Naturally, the truths in question are sometimes ones difficult to 
acquire without intellectual training of various kinds, e.g. empirical methods. Again, 
the moral right to pursue the truth by reasoning with others is a central feature of 
media organisations functioning as the so-called Fourth Estate (Miller 2010) or, at 
the least, ought to be a central feature of these organisations even if it is often not 
(Gore 2007). Naturally, the truths in question pertain to matters of public interest 
and are often subject to political contestation. Thirdly, liberal democracies need to 
ensure that public discourse, including in cyberspace, is conducted in accordance 
with the conventions in part constitutive of the exercise of the moral right to freely 
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pursue the truth by reasoning with others, e.g. the convention to aim at the truth, 
conventions governing evidence collection and analysis. Here, there is a need for 
qualifications when the communication in question is understood to be of an infor-
mal or casual kind, e.g. between Facebook friends, or when the communicators are, 
say, children. I note that fake news, hate speech and propaganda flout these conven-
tions—although they are parasitic on them (see below)—and are antithetical to the 
proper exercise of the right itself (the right to freely pursue the truth with others) . 
Accordingly, the question that now arises is how political propaganda (including 
politically motivated fake news and hate speech) is to be countered.
11.4  Epistemic Institutions, Market-Based Social Media 
Platforms and Combating Propaganda
Effectively countering political propaganda—including political propaganda 
impregnated with fake news and hate speech—is a complex undertaking. For one 
thing, as noted above, determining what is propaganda and what is not is problem-
atic, especially given that, as shown above, non-ideological content often only 
implies or is permeated by ideology. For another thing, it is inconsistent with the 
liberal democratic value of freedom of communication to prohibit all propaganda, 
all fake news or even all hate speech. Moreover, as is to be expected, different lib-
eral democracies take a different view on where to draw the line here. The US does 
not prohibit hate speech (unless it directly incites serious crimes such as violence) 
whereas many EU jurisdictions do (Waldron 2012). This is, of course, not to say 
that propaganda might not be curtailed (with necessarily being prohibited), as is 
the case with advertising. Cigarette advertising, for instance, is curtailed without 
being prohibited in many jurisdictions, e.g. no cigarette ads on TV or on sites 
accessed by children.
However, even if the legal issues could be contended with (on the basis, in part, 
of cogent ethical analysis) and agreed to nationally, and perhaps globally —since 
international regulations might be required for certain platforms and content—there 
remains the enforcement problem. Consider extremist jihadist propaganda that 
incites violence and, as such, is prohibited. According to J. M. Berger, for instance, 
extremist jihadist propaganda has three dimensions: content; dissemination meth-
ods; identity (Berger 2017). Accordingly, in the case of extremist jihadist propa-
ganda, social media sites can be quickly taken down, undermining that particular 
dissemination method. On the other hand, terrorist attacks themselves continue to 
be widely reported in the local and global media, thereby giving oxygen to terror-
ists. Moreover, there are more sophisticated and, potentially, more effective meth-
ods of dissemination of propaganda. For example, the targeting of ‘vulnerable’ 
groups by state actors such as Russia. As mentioned above, these can make use of 
large data banks and machine learning techniques to build profiles and target the 
vulnerable. Such methods are not so easy to counter, although providing adequate 
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protection of personal information held by social media companies, such as 
Facebook, would be a good start.
Directly countering content with counter-messaging, e.g. counter-messaging 
espousing liberal democratic values, may have a limited effect on those susceptible 
to propaganda, whether fundamentalist Muslims or those with extreme right views. 
After all, it is these groups’ felt alienation from liberal democracy that is in part the 
source of the problem. Successful propaganda, as was suggested above, is always 
anchored in part in reality (but is also vulnerable to the communication of reality, 
i.e. facts inconsistent with its content—inconvenient truths” [Gore 2007]). 
Accordingly, there is likely to be a need to address felt grievances, at least to the 
extent that they are justified, e.g. if in part based on economic injustice. Naturally, 
propaganda can be countered by counter-propaganda, disinformation campaigns 
and the like, as frequently happens in war-time, for instance. However, there is 
something inherently morally problematic in liberal democracies eschewing a com-
mitment to truth (notably facts), evidence-based rational inquiry and open discus-
sion, in favour of propaganda, i.e. fake news, half-truths, manipulation, hate 
speech(?) etc. Moreover, this strategy might ultimately be counter-productive and 
simply end up devaluing the liberal democratic currency.
What of identity? Certainly an appeal to national, religious, ethnic, racial, class 
or other identity and an attempt to drive a wedge between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is an 
important feature of political propaganda. The propaganda in question might or 
might be unlawful, depending on the nature of it and the jurisdiction in which it is 
disseminated. Given legal limitations or enforcement problems what is the way for-
ward here? Naturally, if a polity has processes and pursues policies that are just 
(both procedurally and substantively), inclusive (e.g. of marginalised groups) and 
effective (i.e. have beneficial outcomes) then this will mitigate the harms of identity 
focused propaganda. However, as is the case with other strategies, this strategy 
while necessary is not sufficient. It is not a silver bullet. Moreover, when the identi-
ties in question are national identities and the ‘us-them’ wedge is being driven by 
their own governments, e.g. the Russian government in the Baltic states, the Chinese 
government in respect of foreign states who oppose its policies in the South China 
Sea, or the United States under the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ policy, 
then this strategy is unlikely to succeed even if it can be implemented to some extent.
In the context of the legal limitations and/or enforcement problems confronting 
the enterprise of countering political propaganda (including politically motivated 
fake news and hate speech), and assuming that counter-propaganda, disinformation 
and the like are not a morally acceptable option, I want to suggest a different strat-
egy; a strategy which should be seen as complementary to the other strategies 
already mentioned. In doing so, I draw attention to three somewhat neglected, 
related, underlying conditions that facilitate political propaganda, namely: (1) the 
strength of epistemic norms in a population targeted by propaganda; (2) the intel-
lectual health of the epistemic institutions in that population, and; (3) their degree of 
embeddedness in, and influence on, the population that hosts them.
I note at the outset the importance of maintaining not only the distinction insisted 
upon above between propaganda and knowledge acquisition/dissemination 
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(typically a species of joint epistemic action), but also between knowledge acquisi-
tion/dissemination and entertainment, e.g. soap operas, cartoons. The latter does not 
generally purport to be true. However, the emergence in recent decades of infotain-
ment, including in cyberspace, is corrosive of this distinction; a point I cannot pur-
sue further here. While insisting on the distinction between propaganda and 
knowledge acquisition/dissemination, it is also important to draw attention to a cen-
tral aspect of their relationship; propaganda is parasitic on knowledge  acquisition/
dissemination and the epistemic norms that underpin it. Fake news, for instance, 
purports to be true; otherwise, it would have little effect. However, while pretending 
to comply with the epistemic norm of aiming at the truth, it flouts it; it is not required 
by its originator to be true and, indeed, its originator often knows it is false—it 
is a lie.
As with many parasites, propaganda undermines the health of its host while 
simultaneously relying on the continued existence of its host. Accordingly, propa-
ganda is a species of corruption: institutional corruption (Miller 2017). If success-
ful, propaganda corrupts epistemic norms within a population and may also corrupt 
epistemic institutions, notably media organisations responsible for news/comment 
which lack independence from an authoritarian government or which are subject to 
powerful and pervasive financial pressures tending to cause them to espouse, for 
instance, a virulent form of capitalist ideology. On the other hand, propaganda, 
being parasitic on epistemic norms, is susceptible to criticism for failing to live up 
to the epistemic and, importantly, moral standards it purports to be complying with. 
It purports to be true and hence is discredited when shown to be false. Propagandists 
fail to meet moral standards not simply because they fail to comply with epistemic 
standards by being incorrect or insufficiently attentive to the evidence, but because 
they are dishonest; they pretend to be aiming at the truth while actually telling lies. 
Accordingly, propagandists can be criticised not only for being incorrect, but also 
for being dishonest; indeed, for being corrupt. The charge of corruption is more 
likely to generate moral disapproval and, ultimately, rejection among members of a 
population than are purely epistemic offences.
In a liberal democratic polity, epistemic institutions, notably the free and inde-
pendent press, and schools and universities, have a key role in combating propa-
ganda, or so I suggest. Epistemic institutions, such as schools and universities, have 
a key role in building resilience to propaganda, whether it be on-line or off-line 
propaganda, by cultivating the skills and habits of rational inquiry and, relatedly, the 
development of well-informed, rationally defensible, political perspectives among 
children and adults. Moreover, epistemic institutions, such as a free and indepen-
dent press and universities, have a key role in not only ensuring that the citizenry is 
reflective and well informed, but also in helping to ensure that public discourse, 
whether on-line or off-line, is conducted in accordance with the epistemic norms 
constitutive of free and open rational inquiry; consistent with the proper exercise of 
the right to freely pursue the truth by reasoning with others. For instance, experi-
enced investigative journalists based in well-resourced newspapers, such as the New 
York Times, are the source of much of the important news to enable informed opin-
ions on the part of voters. Moreover, those responsible for politically motivated fake 
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news, hate speech and, more generally, propaganda can be held to account by a free 
and independent press. Consider, in this connection the British Broadcasting 
Commission (BBC). The BBC is both independent of government and, as a public 
broadcaster, independent of private sector companies. Moreover, its news division 
is a well-resourced, epistemically sound, genuinely public communicator, as 
opposed to an epistemically suspect or narrowcast communicator—or platform 
facilitating the dissemination of epistemically suspect, narrowcast content. It is a 
genuinely public communicator by virtue of having a UK national and a global 
audience composed in part of most of the key national and international opinion 
makers and most of the other influential public communicators. As such, it is well- 
positioned to hold governments and powerful private sector actors alike to account.
Here I note that the widely held view that the advent of the Internet and of social 
media platforms, such as Facebook, Google, Twitter and the like, has rendered tra-
ditional epistemic institutions, such as a free and independent press, redundant has 
proven to be incorrect. Contrary to this view, the advent of global social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube has led, as mentioned above, to 
an exponential increase in the spread of fake news, hate speech and propaganda and, 
as a consequence has undermined the practice of rational inquiry and the existence 
of well-informed political perspectives among the citizenry, and done so in part by 
undermining epistemic norms and in part by undermining the strength and influence 
of epistemic institutions e.g. by enabling the dissemination of propaganda, fake 
news and hate speech on a vast scale. Moreover, these giant tech companies have 
failed to adequately self-regulate in a manner that ensures that the content on their 
platforms complies with epistemic norms. Indeed, the tech giants often disavow 
responsibility for these untoward developments by arguing that they are merely 
platforms and not publishers of the noxious content in question. More generally, the 
commercial interests of the tech giants tend in practice to override their stated com-
mitments to the public good and, in particular, to upholding epistemic norms in 
respect of the content their platforms support.
There are at least four salient features of the developments just described. First, 
the social media platforms are in fact platforms rather than publishers. They provide 
communication infrastructure and, in this respect, they are akin to telephone com-
panies. An important consequence of this is that they can escape legal liability for 
illegal content supported by their platforms. Second, there is the extraordinary com-
municative reach of the technology. Third, there is the global institutional character 
of the tech companies. Fourth, there is the embeddedness of these technology plat-
forms that ought to serve the collective good in market-based institutions whose 
business model is to provide ‘free’ access in return for the provision of private data 
that can be exploited commercially.
What is called for at this point is a strategy for the institutional redesign of the 
giant tech companies. Here there are a number of guiding principles. These princi-
ples should be understood against a background assumption that the tech companies 
and the technology they use have provided enormous communicative and epistemic 
benefits and these should not be sacrificed; the baby should not be thrown out with 
the bathwater. In so far as the giant tech companies are to remain market-based 
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companies, they need to respect the principles of free and fair competition; accord-
ingly, they might need to be downsized to achieve this, although the presence of 
Chinese-based tech giants, such as Tencent and Baidu, complicates matters here. In 
so far as they are infrastructure providers of platforms then each must be redesigned 
to ensure that it provides the required public good; commercial considerations can-
not be allowed to trump its provision of the public good, as is allowable in the case 
of an ordinary commercial enterprise considered on its own (as opposed to as one 
actor in a market-based industry (Miller 2010)). This may require them to be trans-
formed into public utilities. Thirdly, regulation of content to ensure compliance with 
epistemic norms is a task that cannot be left to the tech giants themselves or, at least, 
cannot be left to them in the absence of legal liability in the circumstance that they 
fail adequately to ensure this compliance, i.e. in the absence of their having the legal 
status of publishers. Arguably, this task needs to be performed by an external, inde-
pendent institution, albeit it is a task that should be paid for by the tech companies 
themselves and/or their advertisers or others who use their platforms. Here it is 
important to distinguish between holding someone and/or some organisation legally 
liable for publishing illegal content—and, in the absence of a publisher other than 
the tech giants providing the platforms, this might need to be the tech giants them-
selves—and ensuring the compliance of communicative content with epistemic 
norms by means of, for instance, an editorial process. The latter process of epis-
temic quality assurance includes more than ensuring that legal requirements are 
met. A final point concerns the business model that involves the provision of a ser-
vice in return for handing over one’s private information. Recent EU regulation 
(General Data Protection Regulation) has been enacted, among other reasons, to 
ensure informed consent on the part of those who might be asked to provide private 
information in return for a service. Such legislation might ultimately undermine this 
business model.
11.5  Conclusion
In this article, I provided definitions of fake news, hate speech and propaganda, 
respectively. These phenomena are corruptive of epistemic norms. I also elaborated 
on the right to freedom of communication and its relation both to censoring propa-
ganda and to the role of epistemic institutions. Finally, I discussed the general prob-
lem of countering political propaganda in cyberspace and argued, firstly, that there 
was an important role for epistemic institutions in this regard and, secondly, that 
social media platforms needed to be redesigned since, as they stand and notwith-
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Chapter 12
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare: 
The Ethical Paradox of ‘Universal 
Diffidence’
George Lucas
Abstract In lieu of the present range of rival and only partial ethical accounts, this 
essay proposes an underlying interpretive framework for the cyber domain as a 
Hobbsean state of nature, with its current status of unrestricted conflict constituting 
a ‘war of all against all’. The fundamental ethical dilemma in Hobbes’s original 
account of this “original situation” was how to bring about the morally required 
transition to a more stable political arrangement, comprising a rule of law under 
which the interests of the various inhabitants in life, property and security would be 
more readily guaranteed. Hobbes described opposition to this morally requisite 
transition as arising from ‘universal diffidence’, the mutual mistrust between indi-
viduals, coupled with the misguided belief of each in his or her own superiority. His 
is thus a perfect moral framework from which to analyse agents in the cyber domain, 
where individual arrogance often seems to surpass any aspirations for moral excel-
lence. With this framework in place, it is briefly noted that the chief moral questions 
pertain to whether we may already discern a gradual voluntary recognition and 
acceptance of general norms of responsible individual and state behaviour within 
the cyber domain, arising from experience and consequent enlightened self-interest 
(As, for example, in the account of emergent norms found in Lucas (The ethics of 
cyber warfare. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017)), or whether the interests 
of the responsible majority must eventually compel some sort of transition from the 
state of nature by forcibly overriding the wishes of presumably irresponsible or 
malevolent outliers in the interests of the general welfare (the moral paradox of 
universal diffidence).
Keywords Cyber conflict · Cyber vandalism · Cyber warfare · State-sponsored 
hacktivism · Stuxnet
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12.1  Introduction
….in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; 
Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. …Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of 
body and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in 
body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference 
between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to 
himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. … For such is the 
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or 
more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as them-
selves:….from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure him-
self… till he see no other power great enough to endanger him…. (Thomas Hobbes 
(1651/1968, 183–185))
In this essay, I set out a case that our cybersecurity community is its own worst 
enemy, and that our security dilemmas, including serious moral dilemmas, have 
arisen mostly because of our flawed assumptions and methodology (modus ope-
randi). These include what Hobbes (1651/1968) termed “universal diffidence”—a 
devastating flaw shared by many individuals in the “state of nature” (which the 
cyber domain certainly is)—combined with a smug antipathy towards ethics and 
moral reasoning as irrelevant or unimportant dimensions of cybersecurity.
The cybersecurity communities of democratic and rights-respecting regimes 
encompass some of the most intelligent, capable and dedicated public servants one 
could imagine. However, our community is also rife with jealousy, competitiveness, 
insularity, arrogance and a profound inability to listen and learn from one another, 
as well as from the experiences of mistaken past assumptions. I wish to outline the 
specific impact of all of these tendencies on self-defence, pre-emptive defence, attri-
bution and retaliation in inter-state cyber conflict, alongside vulnerabilities intro-
duced in the Internet of Things (IoT) (arising especially from the inability to foster 
robust cooperation between the public/governmental and private spheres, and from 
the absence of any coordinated government or intergovernmental plan to foster such 
cooperation, leading to increasing reliance on civil society and the private sector to 
take up the security slack) (Washington Post 2018).
My discussion briefly ranges across vandalism, crime, legitimate political activ-
ism, vigilantism and the rise to dominance of state-sponsored hacktivism. I briefly 
examine cases of vulnerabilities unknowingly and carelessly introduced via the IoT, 
the reluctance of private entities to disclose potential ‘zero-day’ defects to govern-
ment security organisations; financial and ‘smart’ contractual ‘blockchain’ arrange-
ments (including bitcoin and Ethereum, and the challenges these pose to 
state-regulated financial systems); and issues such as privacy, confidentiality and 
identity theft. The goal is to enable a productive and constructive dialogue among 
both contributors and readers of this volume on this range of important security and 
ethics topics. I begin by commenting on the discipline and concerns of ethics itself 
and its reception within the cybersecurity community, including my earlier treat-
ment of ethics in the context of cyber warfare.
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12.2  Ethics and Individuals in the Cyber Domain
At first blush, nothing could seem less promising than attempting to discuss ethics 
in cyber warfare. Even apart from the moral conundrums of outright warfare, the 
cyber domain in general is often described as a ‘lawless frontier’ or a ‘state of 
nature’ (in Hobbes’s sense), in which everyone seems capable in principle of doing 
whatever they wish to whomever they please without fear of attribution, retribution 
or accountability. When it comes to human behaviour and the treatment of one 
another, human behaviour within the cyber domain might aptly be characterised, as 
above, as a ‘war of all against all’.
Upon further reflection, however, that grim generalisation is no more or less true 
than Hobbes’s own original characterisation of human beings themselves in a state 
of nature. The vast majority of actors in the cyber domain are relatively benign: they 
mind their own business, pursue their own ends, do not engage in deliberate mis-
chief, let alone harm, do not wish their fellow citizens ill, and generally seek only to 
pursue the myriad benefits afforded by the cyber realm: access to information, 
goods and services, convenient financial transactions and data processing, and con-
trol over their array of devices, from cell phones, door locks, refrigerators and toast-
ers to voice assistants such as Alexa and Echo, and even swimming pools.
Beyond this, there are some ‘natural virtues’ and commonly shared definitions of 
the Good in the cyber domain: anonymity, freedom and choice, for example, and a 
notable absence of external constraints, restrictions and regulations. These are 
things that cyber activists, in particular, like to champion, and seem determined to 
preserve against any encroachments upon them in the name of the ‘rule of law’. In 
essence, we might characterise the cyber domain as being colonised by libertarians 
and anarchists who, if they had their way, would continue to dwell in peace and 
pursue their private and collective interests without interference.
Like all relatively ungoverned frontiers, however, this Rousseauvian bliss is shat-
tered by the malevolent behaviour of even a few ‘bad actors’—and there are more 
than a few of these in the cyber domain. As portrayed in the forthcoming book by 
Australian cybersecurity experts Seumas Miller and Terry Bossomaier (2019), the 
principal form of malevolent cyber activity is criminal in nature: theft, extortion, 
blackmail, vandalism, slander and disinformation (in the form of trolling and cyber 
bullying), and even prospects for homicide (see also Chap. 11). The widespread 
chaos and disruption of general welfare wrought by such actors in conventional 
frontier settings (as in nineteenth century North America and Australia, for exam-
ple) led to the imposition of various forms of ‘law and order’. These ranged from the 
formation of a posse of ordinary citizens armed with legal authority, engaging in 
periodic retaliation against criminals, to the election of a Sheriff (or the appointing 
by government officials of a Marshal) to enforce the law and imprison law-breakers. 
The eventual outcome of such procedures and interim institutions ultimately led to 
the more familiar and stable institutions and organisations such as police, courts and 
prisons to effect punishment, protect the general population from wrong-doers and 
generally to deter crime.
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The control of such malevolent actors and the provision of security against their 
actions is not primarily a matter of ethics or moral argument (although important 
moral issues, such as interrogation, torture and capital punishment, do arise in the 
pursuit of law enforcement). Rather, as Aristotle first observed, for those lacking so 
much as a tincture of virtue, there is the law. Law, on Aristotle’s account, defines the 
minimum standard of acceptable social behaviour, while ethics deals with aspira-
tions, ideals and excellences that require a lifetime to master. On Hobbes’s largely 
realist or ‘amoral’ account, in point of fact, the sole action that would represent a 
genuinely moral or ethical decision beyond narrow self-interest would be the 
enlightened decision on the part of everyone to ‘quit’ the State of Nature and enter 
into some form of social contract that, in turn, would provide security through the 
stern imposition of law and order.
However law and order, let alone legal institutions such as the police, judges and 
courts, are precisely what the rank and file individual actors and non-state organisa-
tions (such as ‘Anonymous’) in the cyber domain wish to avoid. This is a very stub-
born illustration of widespread ‘diffidence’ on the part of cyber denizens. I look 
forward to seeing how Miller and Bossomaier (2019) address this dilemma.
12.3  Ethics and Inter-State Relations in the Cyber Domain
When we turn to international relations (IR), we confront the prospect of cyber 
warfare. The malevolent actors are primarily rogue nations, terrorists and non-state 
actors (alongside organised crime). The reigning theory of conflict in IR generally 
is Rousseau’s metaphorical extension of Hobbes from individuals to states: the the-
ory of international anarchy or ‘political realism’. There is one significant differ-
ence. Although the ‘state of nature’ for individuals in Hobbes’s account is usually 
understood as a hypothetical thought experiment (rather than an attempt at a genu-
ine historical or evolutionary account), in the case of IR, by contrast, that condition 
of ceaseless conflict and strife among nations (as Rousseau first observed) is pre-
cisely what is actual and ongoing.
Conflict between international entities on this account naturally arises as a result 
of an inevitable competition and collision of interests among discrete states, with no 
corresponding permanent institutional arrangements available to resolve the conflict 
beyond the individual competing nations and their relative power to resist one 
another’s encroachments. In addition, borrowing from Hobbes’s account of the 
amoral state of nature among hypothetical individuals prior to the establishment of 
a firm rule of law, virtually all political theorists and IR experts assume this condi-
tion of conflict among nations to be immune to morality in the customary sense of 
deliberation and action guided by moral virtues, an overriding sense of duty or 
obligation, recognition and respect for basic human rights, or efforts to foster the 
common good.
However we characterise conventional state relationships, the current status of 
relations and conflicts among nations and individuals within the cyber domain 
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 perfectly fits this model: a lawless frontier, devoid (we might think) of impulses 
towards virtue or concerns for the wider common good. It is a ‘commons’ in which 
the advantage seems to accrue to whomever is willing to do anything they wish to 
anyone they please whenever they like, without fear of accountability or retribution. 
This seems, more than conventional domains of political rivalry, to constitute a 
genuine war of all against all, as we remarked above, and yet this was the arena I 
chose to tackle (or perhaps more appropriately, the windmill at which I decided to 
tilt) in Ethics & Cyber Warfare (Lucas 2017). As Miller and Bossomaier note in 
their discussion of that work, I made no pretence of taking on the broader issues of 
crime, vandalism or general cybersecurity. The book itself was actually completed 
in September 2015. I predicted then, as Miller and Brossomaier do now, that much 
would change during the interim from completion to publication. That was certainly 
true from the fall of 2015 to the fall of 2018. The realm of cyber conflict and cyber 
warfare appears to most observers to be much different now than portrayed even a 
scant 2 or 3 years ago.
In the summer of 2015, while wrapping up that project, I noted some curious and 
quite puzzling trends that ran sharply counter to expectations. Experts and pundits 
had long predicted the escalation of ‘effects-based’ cyber warfare and the prolifera-
tion of cyber weapons such as the Stuxnet virus. The major fear was the enhanced 
ability of rogue states and terrorists to destroy dams, disrupt national power grids, 
and interfere with transportation and commerce in a manner that would, in their 
devastation, destruction and loss of human life, rival conventional full-scale armed 
conflict (see also Chap. 18). Those predictions preceded the discovery of Stuxnet, 
but that discovery (despite apparent U.S. and Israeli involvement in the develop-
ment of that particular weapon as part of ‘Operation Olympic Games’) was taken as 
a harbinger of things to come: a future cyber ‘Pearl Harbor’ or cyber Armageddon.
However, by and large, this is not the direction that international cyber conflict 
has followed (see also Chap. 13). Instead of individuals and non-state actors becom-
ing progressively like nation-states, I noticed that states were increasingly behaving 
like individuals and non-state groups in the cyber domain: engaging in identity 
theft, extortion, disinformation, election tampering and other cyber tactics that 
turned out to be easier and cheaper to develop and deploy, while proving less easy 
to attribute or deter (let alone retaliate against). Most notably, such tactics proved 
themselves capable of achieving nearly as much if not more political ‘bang for the 
buck’ than effects-based cyber weapons (which, like Stuxnet itself, were large, 
complex, expensive, time-consuming and all but beyond the capabilities of most 
nations).
In an article published in 2015 (Lucas 2015), I labelled these curious disruptive 
military tactics ‘state-sponsored hacktivism’ (SSH) and predicted at the time that 
SSH was rapidly becoming the preferred form of cyber warfare. We should consider 
it a legitimate new form of warfare, I argued, based upon its political motives and 
effects. It fit Karl von Clausewitz’s definition of warfare as politics pursued by other 
means. We were thus confronted with not one but two legitimate forms of cyber 
warfare: one waged conventionally by large, resource- and technology-rich nations 
seeking to emulate kinetic effects-based weaponry; the second pursued by clever, 
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unscrupulous but somewhat less well-resourced rogue states designed to achieve the 
overall equivalent political effects of conventional conflict. I did not maintain that 
this was perfectly valid, pleading only (with no idea what lay around the corner) that 
we simply consider it, and in so doing accept that we might be mistaken in our pre-
vailing assumptions about the form(s) that cyber conflict waged by the militaries of 
other nations might eventually take. We might simply be looking in the wrong direc-
tion or over the wrong shoulder.
Then the Russians attempted to hack the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The 
North Koreans downloaded the ‘Wannacry’ software—stolen from the U.S. National 
Security Agency—from the ‘dark web’ and used it to attack civilian infrastructure 
(banks and hospitals) in European nations who had supported the U.S. boycotts 
launched against their nuclear weapons programme. Really! How stupid were we 
victims capable of being? SSH had become the devastating ‘weapon of choice’ 
among rogue nations, while we had been guilty of clinging to our blind political and 
tactical prejudices in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence. We had been 
taken in; flat-footed; utterly by surprise.
At the same time, readers and critics had been mystified by my earlier warnings 
regarding SSH.  No one, it seems, knew what I was talking about. My editor at 
Oxford even refused me permission to use my original subtitle for the book: Ethics 
& The Rise of State-Sponsored Hacktivism. This analysis had instead to be buried in 
the book chapters. I managed, after a fashion, to get even! When the book was 
finally published in the immediate aftermath of the American presidential election 
in January of 2017, I jokingly offered thanks to my (unintentional) “publicity and 
marketing team”: Vladimir Putin, restaurateur Yevgeny Prigozhin, the FSB, PLA 
Shanghai Unit 61384 (who had stolen my personnel files a few years earlier, along 
with those of 22 million other U.S. government employees), and the North Korean 
cyber warriors, who had by then scored some significant triumphs at our expense. 
State-sponsored hacktivism had indeed, by that time, become the norm.
Where, then, is the ethics discussion in all this? The central examination in my 
book was not devoted to a straightforward mechanical application of conventional 
moral theory and reasoning (utilitarian, deontological, virtue theory, the ‘ethics of 
care’, and so forth) to specific puzzles, but to something else entirely: namely, a 
careful examination of what, in the IR community, is termed ‘the emergence of 
norms of responsible state behaviour’. This, I argued, was vastly more fundamental 
than conventional analytic ethics. Such accounts are not principally about deontol-
ogy, utility and the ethical conundrum of colliding trolley cars. They consist instead 
of a kind of historical moral inquiry that lies at the heart of moral philosophy itself, 
from Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant to Rawls, Habermas —and the book’s 
principal intellectual guide, the Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre.
The great puzzle for philosophers is, of course, how norms can be meaningfully 
said to ‘emerge?’ Not just where do they come from or how do they catch on but 
how can such a historical process be valid given the difference between normative 
and descriptive guidance and discourse? The entire discussion of norms in IR seems 
to philosophers to constitute a massive exercise in what is known as the ‘naturalistic 
fallacy’. In its original formulation by the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher 
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David Hume, the fallacy challenges any straightforward attempt to derive duties or 
obligations straightforwardly from descriptive or explanatory accounts—in Hume’s 
phraseology, one cannot (that is to say) derive an ‘ought’ straightforwardly from 
an ‘is’.
This is precisely what the longstanding discussion of emergent norms in IR does: 
it claims to discern action-guiding principles or putative obligations for individual 
and state behaviour merely from the prior record of experiences of individuals and 
states. This central conception of IR regarding what states themselves do, or tolerate 
being done, is thus a massive fallacy. That is to say, states may in fact be found to 
behave in a variety of discernible ways, or likewise, may in fact be found to tolerate 
other states behaving in these ways. Certain such behaviours—such as, famously, 
the longstanding practice of granting immunity from punishment or harm to a for-
eign nation’s ambassadors—may indeed come to be regarded as ‘customary’. 
However, that set of facts alone tells us nothing about what states ought to do, or to 
tolerate. We might claim to be surprised if a nation suddenly turns on an adversary 
state’s ambassadors by killing or imprisoning them. However, there are no grounds 
in the expectations born of past experience alone for also expressing moral outrage 
over this departure from customary state practice. Yet, these kinds of incidents 
(departure from custom) occur all the time, and the offending state usually stands 
accused of violating an ‘international norm of responsible state behaviour’. Perhaps 
they have, but there is nothing in the customary practice itself that provides grounds 
for justifying it as a norm—not, at least on Hume’s objection, unless there is some-
thing further in the way of evidence or argument to explain how the custom comes 
to enjoy this normative status.
Perhaps my willingness to take on this age-old question and place it at the heart 
of contemporary discussions of cyber conflict is why so few have bothered to read 
the book! Who (we might well ask) cares about all that abstract, theoretical stuff? It 
seems more urgent (or at least, less complicated and more interesting) either to dis-
cuss all the latest ‘buzz’ concerning zero-day software vulnerabilities in the IoT, or 
else to offer moral analysis of specific cases in terms of utility, duty, virtue and those 
infamous colliding trolley cars—merely substituting, perhaps, driverless, robotic 
cars for the trolleys (and then wondering, “should the autonomous vehicle permit 
the death of its own passenger when manoeuvring to save the lives of five pedestri-
ans”, and so forth).
In any event, in order to make sense of this foundational theory of emergent 
norms in IR, I found it necessary to discuss the foundations of just war theory and 
the morality of exceptions or exceptionalism (i.e. how do we justify sometimes hav-
ing to do things we are normally prohibited from doing?), as well as the IR approach 
to ‘emergent norms’ itself, as in fact, dating back to Aristotle, and his discussion of 
the cultivation of moral norms and guiding principles within a community of prac-
tice, characterised by a shared notion of the good (what we might now call a shared 
sense of purpose or objectives). Kant, Rawls and Habermas were invoked to explain 
how, in turn, a community of common practice governed solely by individual self- 
interest may nevertheless evolve into one characterised by the very kinds of recog-
nition of common moral values that Hobbes had also implicitly invoked to explain 
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the transition from a “nasty, brutish” state of nature to a well-ordered 
commonwealth.
I believe that these historical conceptions of moral philosophy are important to 
recover and clarify, since they ultimately offer an account of precisely the kind of 
thing we are trying to discern now within the cyber domain. That is, the transition 
(or rather, the prospect for making one) from a present state of reckless, lawless, 
selfish and ultimately destructive behaviours towards a more stable equilibrium of 
individual and state behaviour within the cyber domain that contributes to the com-
mon good, and to the emergence of a shared sense of purpose. Kant called this 
evolutionary learning process ‘the Cunning of Nature’, while the decidedly 
Aristotelian philosopher Hegel borrowed and tweaked Kant’s original conception 
under the title, ‘the Cunning of History’. Their argument is very similar to that of 
Adam Smith and the ‘invisible hand’: namely, that a community of individuals 
merely pursuing their individual private interests may come nevertheless, and 
entirely without their own knowledge or intention, to engage in behaviours that 
contribute to the common good, or to a shared sense of purpose.1
Finally, in applying a similar historical, experiential methodology to the recent 
history of cyber conflict from Estonia (2007) to the present, I proceeded to illustrate 
and summarise a number of norms of responsible cyber behaviour that, indeed, 
seem to have emerged, and caught on—and others that seem reasonably likely to do 
so, given a bit more time and experience. Even the turn away from catastrophic 
destruction by means of kinetic, ‘effects-based’ cyber warfare (of the catastrophic 
kind so shrilly predicted by Richard Clarke and others) and instead towards SSH as 
the preferred mode of carrying out international conflict in cyber space, likewise 
showed the emergence of these norms of reasonable restraint. Such norms do far 
less genuine harm, while achieving similar political effects—not because the adver-
saries are ‘nice’, but because they are clever (somewhat like Kant’s ‘race of devils’, 
who famously stand at the threshold of genuine morality).
This last development in the case of cyber war is, for example, the intuitive, 
unconscious application by these clever ‘devils’ of a kind of proportionality crite-
rion, something we term in military ethics the ‘economy of force’, in which a mis-
chievous cyber-attack is to be preferred to a more destructive alternative, when 
available—again, not because anyone is trying to ‘play nice’, but because such an 
attack is more likely to succeed and attain its political aims without provoking a 
harsh response. However, such attacks, contrary to Estonia (we then proceed to 
reason) really should be pursued only in support of a legitimate cause, and not 
directed against non-military targets (I am not happy about the PLA stealing my 
personnel files, for example, but I am—or was, after all—a federal employee, not a 
private citizen—and in any case, those files may be more secure in the hands of the 
PLA than they were in the hands of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management). And 
thus is the evolutionary emergence of moral norms, Kant’s ‘cunning of nature’ (or 
1 It bears mention that MacIntyre himself explicitly repudiated my account of this process, even 
when applied to modern communities of shared practices, such as professional societies. I detail 
his objections and our discussions in the book itself.
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Hegel’s ‘cunning of history’) at last underway. Even a race of devils can be brought 
to simulate the outward conditions and constraints of law and morality—if only 
they are ‘reasonable’ devils. (I apologise if I find the untutored intuitions and moral 
advances of those ‘reasonable’ and clever devils more morally praiseworthy than 
the obtuse incompetence of my learned colleagues in both moral philosophy and 
cybersecurity, who should already know these things!)
12.4  Privacy, Vulnerability and the ‘Internet of Things’
Oddly, and despite all the hysteria surrounding the recent Russian interference in 
the electoral affairs of western democracies, this makes cyber warfare among and 
between nations, at least, look a lot more hopeful and positive from the moral per-
spective than the broader ‘law and order’ problem in the cyber domain generally. 
Reasonably responsible state actors and agents with discernable, justifiable goals, 
finally, act with greater restraint (at least from prudence, if not morality), than do 
genuinely malevolent private, criminal actors and agents (some of whom apparently 
just want to see the world burn). Here, what might be seen as the moral flaw or fail-
ing of ‘universal diffidence’ is the reckless, thoughtless manner in which we enable 
such agents and render ourselves vulnerable to them through careless, unnecessary 
and irresponsible innovations within the IoT.
What I mean is this: technically, almost any mechanical or electrical device can 
be connected to the Internet: refrigerators, toasters, voice assistants like Alexa and 
Echo, ‘smart’ TVs and DVRs, dolls, ‘cloud puppets’ and other toys, baby monitors, 
swimming pools, automobiles and closed-circuit cameras in the otherwise-secure 
corporate board rooms—but should they be? Do they really need to be? Moreover, 
does the convenience or novelty thereby attained justify the enhanced security risks 
those connections pose, especially as the number of such nodes on the IoT will soon 
vastly exceed the number of human-operated computers, tablets and cell phones? 
This appears to be a form of incipient, self-destructive madness.
Miller and Bossomaier, in their forthcoming book on cybersecurity, offer the 
amusing hypothetical example of GOSSM: the “Garlic and Onion Storage and 
Slicing Machine”. This imaginary device is meant to be stocked with raw onions 
and garlic, and will deliver chopped versions of such conveniently, on demand, 
without tears. The device’s design engineers seek to enhance its utility and ease of 
use by connecting it via the Internet to a cell phone app, providing control of quanti-
ties in storage in the machine, fineness of chopping, etc. The app connects via the 
cellphone to the Internet. When the owner is in the supermarket, GOSSM alerts the 
owner via text message if more garlic or onions should be purchased. The device is 
simple and handy, and costs under $100 and thus typifies the range of devices con-
tinually being added (without much genuine need or justification) to the Internet.
However, in order to provide all that web-based functionality at low cost, the 
machine’s designers (who are not themselves software engineers) choose to enable 
this Internet connectivity feature via some ready-made open-source software 
12 Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare: The Ethical Paradox of ‘Universal Diffidence’
254
 modules, merely tweaking them to fit. The device is not designed to operate through 
the owner’s password-protected home wireless router. Instead, it links directly to the 
user’s cell phone app, and hence to the Internet, via the cellular data network. Its 
absence of even the most rudimentary security software, however, makes it, along 
with a host of other IoT devices in the user’s home, subject to being detected online, 
captured as a zombie and linked in a massive botnet, should some clever, but more 
unreasonable devil choose to do so.
In October 2016, precisely such a botnet constructed of IoT devices was used to 
attack Twitter, Facebook and other social media along with large swaths of the 
Internet itself, using a virus known as Mirai to launch crippling DDoS attacks on 
key sites, including Oracle’s DYN site, the principal source of optimised Domain 
Name Servers and the source of dynamic Internet protocol addresses for applica-
tions such as Netflix and LinkedIn. More recently, in April of 2018, a new Mirai- 
style virus known as ‘Reaper’ was detected, compromising IoT devices in order to 
launch a botnet attack on key sites in the financial sector.2
Such events are little more than nuisances, however, when compared with pros-
pects for hacking and attacking driverless cars, or even the current smart technology 
on automobiles, aircraft and drones. Meanwhile, a new wave of industrial espionage 
has been enabled through hacking into the video cameras and smart TVs used in 
corporate boardrooms throughout the world to listen in to highly confidential and 
secret deliberations ranging from corporate finances to innovative new product 
development. We have done all this to ourselves, with hardly a thought other than 
the rush to make exotic functionality available immediately (and leaving the secu-
rity dimensions to be backfilled afterwards).
Meanwhile, the advent of quantum computing (QC) technology is liable to have 
an enormous impact on data storage and encryption capacities. Should QC become 
a reality, the density of storage will increase dramatically, enabling vast amounts of 
data (even by today’s standards) to become available for analysis and ‘data mining’, 
while vastly increased process speeds will enable hackers to break the codes of even 
the most sophisticated encryption software presently available. Encrypted https:// 
sites, currently the backbone of Internet commerce, will quickly become outmoded 
and vulnerable. E-commerce itself, upon which entire commercial sectors of many 
of the most developed nations depend at present, could grind to a halt.
One likely victim of new security breaches attainable by means of these compu-
tational advances would likely be the ‘blockchain’ financial transactions carried out 
with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, along with the so-called ‘smart contracts’ 
enabled by the newest cryptocurrency, Ethereum. The latter, for example, is an 
open-source, public, blockchain-based distributed computing platform and operat-
ing system featuring smart contract (scripting) functionality, which delivers pay-
ments when some third-party, publicly verifiable condition is met.
2 Zack Whittaker for Zero Day (5 April 2018): https://www.zdnet.com/article/new-mirai-style-
botnet-targets-the-financial-sector/ (last access July 7 2019)
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This newest cryptocurrency claims to offer total financial transparency and a 
consequent reduction in the need for individual trust in financial transactions, elimi-
nating (on the one hand) any chance of fraud, censorship or third-party interference. 
However, as implied above, the opportunities for hacking and disruption of such 
transactions, creating instability in the currencies and enabling fraud and theft, are 
likely when increased use of such currencies and transactions are combined with the 
enhanced power of quantum computing. Preventing that sort of cybercrime, how-
ever, would rely on a much more robust partnership between the private and govern-
ment sectors, which would, in turn, appear to threaten users’ privacy and 
confidentiality. Thus, the prospective solution to the new vulnerabilities would para-
doxically impede one of the main present benefits of these cyber alternatives to 
conventional banking and finance.
Interestingly, we have witnessed Internet firms such as Google, and social media 
giants such as Facebook and Twitter, accused in Europe of everything from monop-
olistic financial practices to massive violations of privacy and confidentiality. 
However, these same private firms, led by Amazon and Google in particular, have 
taken a much more aggressive stance on security strategy than have many demo-
cratic governments in Europe and North America. Meanwhile, for its part, the U.S. 
government sector, from the FBI to the National Security Agency, has engaged in a 
virtual war with private firms such as Apple to erode privacy and confidentiality in 
the name of security by either revealing or building in encryption ‘back doors’ 
through which government agencies could investigate prospective wrong-doing. 
The private firms have been understandably reluctant to reveal their own ‘zero-day’ 
vulnerabilities in new software and products, lest doing so undermine public confi-
dence in (and market for) their products.
Their reluctance to do so has only increased in light of a growing complaint that 
the entire international government sector (led by the U.S. under President Trump) 
seems to have abandoned the task of formulating a coherent and well-integrated 
strategy for public and private security. A coherent cyber policy would require, at 
minimum, a far more robust public-private partnership in cyber space (as noted 
above), as well as an extension of the kind of international cooperation that was 
achieved through the 2001 Convention on Cyber Crime (CCC), endorsed by some 
sixty participating nations in Bucharest in 2001. We need that kind of public-private 
partnership extended across national boundaries to enable the identification, pursuit 
and apprehension of malevolent cyber actors, including rogue nations as well as 
criminals. In the absence of such a collaborative agreement at present, trolls, hack-
ers, vigilantes, and rogue nations are enjoying a virtual field day.
Instead, in an effort to counter these tendencies and provide for greater security 
and control, European nations have, as mentioned, simply sought to crack down on 
multinational Internet firms such as Google, while proposing to reassert secure 
national borders within the cyber domain itself. Generating border controls in this 
featureless and currently nationless domain is presently possibly only through the 
empowerment of each nation’s CERT (computer emergency response team) to con-
struct Internet gateway firewalls. Such draconian restrictions on cyber traffic across 
national borders are presently the tools of totalitarian regimes such as China, Iran 
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and North Korea, which do indeed offer ‘security’ entirely at the expense of indi-
vidual freedom and privacy.
All of the concerns sketched above number among the myriad moral and legal 
challenges that accompany the latest innovations in cyber technology, well beyond 
those posed by war fighting itself.
12.5  Our Own Worst Enemy
In light of this bewildering array of challenges, it is all too easy to lose sight of the 
chief aim of ‘the Leviathan’ (strong central governance) itself in Hobbes’s original 
conception. That goal was not simply to contain conflict but to establish a secure 
peace. It is perhaps one of the chief defects of the current discussion of cyber con-
flict that the metaphor of war (as well as the discussion of possible acts of genuine 
warfare) has come to dominate that discourse (see also Chap. 13). However, our 
original intention in introducing the ‘state of nature’ image was to explore the pros-
pects for peace, security and stability—outcomes which hopefully might be attained 
without surrendering all of the current virtues of cyber practice that activists and 
proponents champion.
But if peace is ultimately what is desired in the cyber domain, our original 
Hobbesean problem or paradox remains its chief obstacle: namely, how are we to 
transition from the state of perpetual anarchy, disruption, and the ‘war of all against 
all’ within the cyber domain in a manner that will simultaneously ensure individual 
privacy, security, and public confidence? In that domain, as we have constantly wit-
nessed, the basic moral drive to make such a transition from a state of war to a state 
of peace is almost entirely lacking. Advocates of greater law and order are meta-
phorically ‘shouted down’ by dissidents and anarchists (such as the vigilante group, 
Anonymous) or their integrity called into question and undermined by the behaviour 
of organisations such as WikiLeaks.
For my part, I have not been impressed with the capacities of our most respected 
experts, in their turn, to listen and learn from one another, let alone to cooperate or 
collaborate in order to forge the necessary alliances to promote and foster the peace 
that Hobbes promised through the imposition of law and order. Instead, as in the 
opening epigram from the Leviathan on diffidence, each such expert seems to think 
himself or herself to be the wisest, and to seem more interested in individual glory 
through competition with one another for the limelight than in security and the com-
mon good.
The case of the discovery of Stuxnet provides a useful illustration of this unfor-
tunate inclination. Who was the first to finally discover the escape of this worm from 
Nantez Laboratories? Was it cybersecurity expert Ralph Langner (as he claimed in 
September 2010),3 VirusBlokADA’s Sergey Ulasen 3  months earlier (as most 
3 See Langner’s TED Talk in 2011 for his updated account: https://www.ted.com/speakers/ralph_
langner (last access July 7 2019).
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accounts now acknowledge),4 Kaspersky Labs (as Eugene Kaspersky still claims),5 
Microsoft programming experts (during a routine examination of their own 
Programmable Logic Controller [PLC] software)6 or Symantec security experts 
(who, to my mind, have issued the most complete and authoritative report on the 
worm; Fallieri et al. 2011)? All have gone on record as having been the first to spot 
this ‘worm in the wild’ in 2010.
Furthermore, what about the phenomenon of state-sponsored hacktivism? It 
belatedly garnered attention as a strategy and policy following the U.S. election 
interference, but had been ongoing for some time prior. Cybersecurity experts in 
Western countries utterly missed this advent, and did not know at first what to make 
of it when it was discovered, as they continued to hysterically hype the coming 
‘Cyber Armaggedon’. No planes have fallen from the sky as the result of a cyber- 
attack, nor have chemical plants exploded or dams burst in the interim—but lives 
have been ruined, elections turned upside down and the possible history of human-
ity forever altered. In my own frustration at having tried for the past several years to 
call attention to this alteration of tactics by nation-state cyber warriors, I might well 
complain that the cyber equivalent of Rome has been burning while cybersecurity 
experts have fiddled.7
How many times must we fight the wrong war, or be looking over the wrong 
shoulder, before we learn to cooperate rather than compete with one another for 
public acclaim? Each of us may think himself or herself the wisest, but wisdom 
itself seems to lurk in the interstices of the cyber domain: in the shadows, among 
those who act and those who humbly discern instead. We can and must do better. 
The fate of the welfare of human kind—certainly a moral imperative worthy of 
consideration—hangs in the balance.
4 See the account, for example, on the “Security Aggregator” blog: http://securityaggregator.
blogspot.com/2012/02/man-who-found-stuxnet-sergey-ulasen-in.html (last access July 7 2019).
5 See the Kaspersky Labs video presentation detailing their discovery and analysis of the worm, 




04706&action=view (last access July 7 2019).
6 See the account offered in the Wikipedia article on Stuxnet: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Stuxnet#Discovery (last access July 7 2019).
7 In April 2017, only a few weeks after the appearance of my own book on this transformation (n. 
1), General Michael Hayden (USAF Retired), former head of the CIA, NSA, and former National 
Security Adviser, offered an account of the months of consternation within the Executive branch 
during the period leading up to the U.S. presidential election of November 2016, acknowledging 
that cybersecurity experts did not at the time no what to make of the Russian attacks, nor even what 
to call them. I had just finished a 7-year stint in federal security service, teaching and writing on 
this topic for the members of that community, evidently to no avail. His 2017 annual Haaga Lecture 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s “Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law” (CERL) 
can be found at: https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/media.php (last access July 7 2019).
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Chapter 13
Cyber Peace: And How It Can Be Achieved
Reto Inversini
Abstract This contribution investigates elements of cyber conflicts and attacks to 
determine the current state of cyber peace. The first section examines the current 
state of the Internet and whether or not it is in a state of cyber war. It analyses the 
classical concept of peace and war and determines which elements can be adapted 
to the digital sphere and where such a transformation can be problematic. The term 
‘cyber peace’ is then defined and the components that make such a state possible 
identified. The last section discusses the different roles and their responsibilities to 
reach and preserve a state of peace in the digital sphere, coming to the conclusion 
that the Internet is not in a state of cyber war but more in a state of negative or 
unstable peace. To protect the Internet as a critical infrastructure from being abused 
as a new battleground, this chapter suggests moving towards a state of stable peace, 
and proposes increasing the security and resilience on a technical level and building 
up trust between all actors, ranging from the individual to the state level.
Keywords Attribution · Collaboration and information sharing · Confidence- 
building measures · Cyber conflict · Cyber espionage · Cyber war · Digital 
sabotage · State-sponsored actors · Trust and confidence
13.1  Cyber Conflicts of Today
Cyber war is an often-used term in current media and scientific publications. There 
is much controversy regarding whether it is something real or likely to happen in a 
near future or if it is a chimera originating from a misunderstanding of the digi-
tal sphere.
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Richard A. Clarke argues that the preparation for cyber war has already begun 
and that powers such as the U.S., China or Russia are making efforts to plan for such 
actions:
It is cyberspace and war in it about which I speak. On October 1, 2009, a general took 
charge of the new U.S. Cyber Command, a military organization with the mission to use 
information technology and the Internet as a weapon. Similar commands exist in Russia, 
China, and a score of other nations. (Clarke 2010, p. x–xi)
Thomas Ridd, in contrast, argues that cyber war did not take place and is unlikely 
to happen soon:
It is meant rather as a comment about the past, the present, and the likely future: cyber war 
has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that 
it will disturb our future. (Rid 2013: xiv)
Both authors use well-known events such as the Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks in Estonia in 2007 (Schmidt 2013), but come to different conclu-
sions. Both lines of arguments have their strengths but also their shortcomings. 
However, we neither have a clear definition of what cyber war is nor do we know 
enough about the implications such a war would have. Therefore, we prefer to use 
the term ‘cyber conflict’.
Whether events from the past such as the DDoS attacks in Estonia, digital sabo-
tage such as Stuxnet (de Falco 2012) or ransomware outbreaks such as NotPetya1 
are already warlike situations is not the crucial question. In contrast, it is of pivotal 
concern how we avoid such incidents or even more devastating attacks in the future. 
In the following, we introduce a concept to make the Internet a more secure and 
peaceful place.
We can divide the moral aspects of war roughly into one of these three catego-
ries: Pacifism, Real-ism and Just War (Walzer 1978; Orend 2006). Pacifism denies 
any morality to war, and a pacifist must refrain from any involvement in a war. 
Realism believes that war by itself is something amoral and we can neither judge 
war, nor can it be guided by moral principles. The Just War theory claims that under 
certain circumstances, a war may be justified and there are rules to follow to start 
and lead a war in a morally acceptable way. It goes back to Greek and Roman phi-
losophers and lawyers and since then has evolved and was influenced by Christian 
theology. There have been many wars that did not fulfil the Just War principles and 
the Just War Theory has been debated and needs adaptions (Brough et al. 2007). 
Nevertheless, it forms the base of current international norms such as the UN 
Charter, The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention. Therefore, we use the 
concept of Just War as the basis for this chapter.
1 Crowdstrike, NotPetya Technical Analysis; https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/petrwrap-ransom-




War would need to follow several principles2 to be justified and not violate inter-
national law:
 – There must be a cause for war that must be declared by a legitimate authority.
 – War must be waged with the right intentions and a just cause.
 – The probability of success must be determined; there must be a justifiable ratio 
between gain and loss and it must be the last resort.
These principles form the Jus ad Bellum, the right to go to war. The guiding 
principles of Jus ad Bellum are difficult to adapt to cyber space:
 – In order to declare war, one must know one’s enemies. This is relatively easy in 
the physical world even though the number of cases where states hide behind 
mercenary organisations is rising because it allows them to deny any direct 
involvement. There are more difficulties inherent in identifying the attackers in 
the digital sphere: Most states deny any involvement in actions that might be 
considered as acts of war in the cyber space. It is easy to hide behind proxies, to 
place false flags and to act on behalf of someone else. Attributing attacks cor-
rectly is therefore one of the most important things to address in the digital 
sphere.
 – The Jus ad Bellum allows a country only to go to war if the chances of success 
are high enough, especially regarding the estimated number of casualties. The 
probability of success and the number of fatalities are difficult to predict as there 
are many unknown factors that influence the outcome and because casualties can 
also be indirect.
 – Only national self-defence and humanitarian need are considered acceptable 
causes for war. To exercise the right of self-defence, a nation-state needs to prove 
that the event is an armed attack that threatens the state’s sovereignty and inde-
pendence and that another state conducted the attack. In the context of incidents 
in the digital domain, situations exist where the impact may be obvious such as 
disruptive or destructive attacks against critical infrastructures, but the problem 
of who is to blame for an attack remains.
 – An important part of the Jus ad Bellum is the concept of territorial and political 
sovereignty of a state. If a state’s sovereignty is in danger, the state has the right 
to defend itself. Political sovereignty can be easily endangered, but it is difficult 
to define the threshold where such attacks would justify the right of self-defence. 
The attackers may try to destabilise a state, e.g. by spreading wrong information 
or by attacking the political system. This can be done by influencing elections, 
either by manipulation of the infrastructure or by digitally intruding a disfa-
voured party. The influencing of public opinion and even elections is nothing 
new and has been done before the digital era. However, with the use of social 
media, it has become much easier to directly or indirectly influence large parts of 
a country. The concept of territorial sovereignty is important but difficult to adapt 
2 Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base, Jus ad Bellum, https://www.beyondintractability.org/
essay/jus_ad_bellum (last access July 7 2019).
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to the digital sphere, as there are no physical borders, notably when dealing with 
distributed systems or applications that use any kind of cloud technology. 
Scholars and practitioners have written The Tallin Manual on behalf of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE; Schmitt 2017). It 
describes how international law can be applied to cyber conflicts. Rule 81 states 
that “Cyber operations are subject to geographical limitations imposed by the 
relevant provisions of internal law applicable during an armed conflict (Schmitt 
2017: 378).” In the second part of the rule, the authors state that these restrictions 
may be difficult to implement: “Restrictions based on geographical limitations 
may be particularly difficult to implement in the context of cyber warfare. For 
instance, consider a cyber-attack using cloud computing techniques. Data used to 
prosecute the attack from one State may be replicated across servers in a number 
of other States, including neutral States, but only observably reflected on the 
systems where the attack is initiated and completed (Schmitt 2017: 378).”
If we consider the goals of a traditional war, there are some interesting differ-
ences between a traditional war and a cyber-conflict:
 – A traditional war has the goal of conquering territory, accessing resources or 
gaining political control over the adversary.
 – In the digital sphere, no defined territory exists, and digital battles are not about 
gaining resources. However, a digital war may be used as a supportive element 
of a traditional war to seize territory or resources. This may be a sign that in most 
cases, hostile digital actions are part of a larger scenario that also includes more 
traditional elements of war.
 – It is possible that we will only observe actions in the digital domain when a state 
wants to gain political control over another state. This leads us back to the con-
cept of political sovereignty, which will become increasingly important.
We believe it is likely that most hostile actions in the digital sphere will not take 
place in the context of officially declared wars. This is not a result of the ongoing 
digitalisation but reflects a more general trend: As Fazal states, there has been a 
sharp decrease of war declarations since the 1950s:
From 1950 on, by contrast, the number of wars remained about the same, but the number of 
wars accompanied by declarations declined dramatically—to three. Declaring war—an 
institution that has typically accompanied the outbreak of hostilities since at least the 
Roman Empire—appears to have fallen out of states’ repertoire of behaviors. (Fazal 2012: 
557–558)
If we consider this and accept the difficulty of attribution beyond any reasonable 
doubt, we do not expect that countries will declare war formally, especially for 
cyber operations. Without a war declared and without an independent and accepted 
attribution, the prerequisites of Jus ad Bellum are not fulfilled. In the future, more 
situations that resemble a war or are characterised by high tensions will emerge, but 
they will not meet the criteria mentioned above.
This is why we include not only the case of declared war into our considerations 
but any action that violates the sovereignty of a state. Rule No 4 of the Tallin Manual 
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states that no violation of the sovereignty of another state is acceptable (Schmitt 
2017: 16–18): “A state must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sover-
eignty of another state.”
The comments to Rule No 4 describe various cases where the experts agree that 
a violation had occurred such as if the cyber operation damages an infrastructure on 
the territory of another country (Schmitt 2017: 18) or if governmental functions of 
a state are impaired by a cyber-operation of another state (Schmitt 2017: 22). One 
basic precondition of a violation of sovereignty is that it must be attributable to 
another state. This gets progressively complicated as governments hire mercenary 
groups to carry out attacks in the digital sphere. This allows a country to deny any 
direct involvement in a conflict.
Using so-called cyber proxies (Maurer 2018) or cyber mercenaries can be attrac-
tive to governments as they provide expertise and plausible deniability that a state 
has any direct involvement. In the past, we have seen two types of such actors: 
hacktivist and commercial organisations. Mostly, actions performed by such groups 
may be illegal from a penal point of view but cannot be considered as acts of war. 
However, there are actions that increase the tension between conflicting parties and 
that lead to an escalation into a warlike situation. It is likely that the use of such 
groups will rise as their use is too tempting for governments. They can be a cheap 
yet effective alternative to regular soldiers acting in the cyber space and provide 
more deniability in case an attack is discovered and analysed. George Lucas (2017: 
28) believes that the danger of such groups is underestimated and may pose a seri-
ous threat in the future.
We believe the use of such organisations will increase the likelihood that warlike 
situations will be of longer duration without a formal war being declared, as such 
groups tend to engage in war for their own benefit (political influence or commercial 
interests). During wars that relied largely on mercenary armies such as the 30 Years 
War, at least a part of the financing of the soldiers was done by robbing civilians. 
Even though not directly comparable, the overlapping of digital crime and state- 
sponsored hacktivism resembles this situation and might get progressively impor-
tant, as states could offer impunity to cyber criminals in return for digital attacks 
which are in the interest of the state. The authors of the Tallin Manual explain that 
non-state actors cannot violate the sovereignty of a state but that the targeted state 
may nevertheless react to harmful attacks following international law (Schmitt 
2017: 18). We believe the differentiation between state and non-state actors is 
becoming increasingly difficult. This uncertainty might eventually lead to situations 
with a high risk of escalation if a state responds with force to attacks of non-state 
groups and, by doing so, violates the sovereignty of another state.
Although we believe it is wrong to infiltrate other networks to gain information 
illegally, such attacks are not necessarily acts of war. Espionage has always existed, 
even during peace times and sometimes it has even helped to preserve peace: It gave 
the other party information about what the enemy has planned and thus improved 
the predictability, which helps to define the course of action. However, the uncon-
trolled use of espionage may destroy trust. As cyber espionage seems to become 
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epidemic, state actors should be cautious and should refrain themselves from too- 
frequent spying.
13.2  Cyber Peace
The contrastive term of cyber war is ‘cyber peace’. Often, peace is defined in a 
negative way as the absence of war. Boulding defines peace in both ways:
The concept of peace has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, peace 
signifies a condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associ-
ated with mature relationships, gentleness and love. On the negative side, it is conceived as 
the absence of something, the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war. (Boulding 
1989: 3)
We define cyber peace in a manner that considers both aspects. We should not 
define peace just by the absence of conflict and war, as these elements may be visi-
ble in the physical world but not in the digital sphere.
Peace can have various states that are defined in different ways, e.g. by Alexander 
George (1998: p. ix) as precarious, conditional and stable, by Miller (2017) as cold, 
normal and warm, or by Kacowicz et al. (2000) as negative peace, stable peace and 
pluralistic security communities. These definitions have much in common. We use 
the definition by Kacowicz et al. (2000: 21):
A zone of negative peace (mere absence of war) is one in which peace is maintained only 
on an unstable basis and / or by negative means such as threats, deterrence or lack of capa-
bilities to engage in violent conflict at a certain time. (…) A zone of stable peace (no expec-
tations of violence) is one in which peace is maintained in on a reciprocal and consensual 
basis. (…) A pluralistic security community of nation-states, with stable expectations of 
peaceful change, is one in which member states share common norms, values and political 
institutions; sustain a common identity; and are deeply interdependent.
13.2.1  Current State of Cyber Peace
The Internet is still in the zone of a negative peace: Current operations are not very 
violent, but there is an imminent risk of an escalation.
We may understand the current state of the Internet in a similar way as the fron-
tier area in the Wild West. The absence of regulation, the quick emergence of new 
ways to earn money, and the fact that most effective security for the participants 
does not come from the state but from private organisations are all elements that 
show similarities with a booming frontier town. We have witnessed the rapid devel-
opment of new technologies and the emergence of a new and global form of crimi-
nality and state sponsored espionage and even destructive attacks. However, in most 
cases, the damage was still limited and often it was not inflicted on purpose but was 
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a collateral effect caused by underestimating the interconnectivity of the Internet 
and the low security precautions.
A good example of the uncertainty about the current state of the Internet, and 
whether we are already near a state of cyber war is the aforementioned NotPetya 
case. There has been considerable discussion over whether this attack could already 
be considered as an act of war. While NotPetya caused substantial damage, we 
believe it is not an act of war as it lacks most of the prerequisites we have mentioned 
above. NotPetya is a malware that is based on the leaked National Security Agency 
(NSA) exploit ‘Eternal Blue’. One hypothesis is that NotPetya was aimed at infra-
structure elements in the Ukraine. It spread like wildfire and hit many big organisa-
tions such as Merck or Maersk. This was possible because systems were neither 
patched against known vulnerabilities nor isolated from other networks. However, 
governments and media treated the case like a hostile action that was at least at the 
border of an act of cyber war.3 This case displays a few interesting elements:
 – If a state stores and uses 0-day vulnerabilities,4 there is a risk that someone else 
uses it against e.g. critical infrastructures.
 – In most cases, attackers exploit bad security practices.
 – For affected organisations, it is often favourable to make the attack bigger than it 
was to distract attention from its own failure to secure its systems properly.
NotPetya was an attack with a big disruptive effect that endangered many organ-
isations and—under bad preconditions—could have been the starting point of an 
escalation. However, this attack was only possible because organisations neglected 
basic security and not because the attack was remarkably skilful. We can therefore 
learn from this case that with proper security precautions, attacks become much 
harder to conduct and the risk of collateral damage drops. As many critical infra-
structure elements are being connected to the Internet without appropriate security 
controls, offensive actions are often perilous, as no-one can limit actions to the 
intended target. To maintain a stable cyber peace, information and communication 
technology (ICT) operators must assume their responsibility for building and main-
taining secure and resilient systems.
Attacks with a global impact are possible and there is a high risk associated with 
this. As no specific de-escalation procedures for the digital sphere are in place on the 
state-level, the risk of an escalation which eventually could lead to hostilities exists 
and we should not underestimate it. If too many unfavourable political elements 
come together, such an attack might be the starting point for a rapidly escalating 
situation that nobody ever intended but that could cause a lot of harm.
3 The Independent, Britain has entered ‘new era of warfare’ with Russian cyber-attacks, Defense 
Secretary warns; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/russia-cyber-attacks-notpe-
tya-gavin-williamson-defense-secretary-putin-hacking-ransomware-a8212801.html (last access 
July 7 2019).
4 A 0-day vulnerability is a vulnerability that has not yet been publicly disclosed and for which no 
security patches yet exist but that is known to persons and organisations that are willing to exploit 
it. Day 0 refers to the day the programmer/manufacturer of the software affected learns about the 
vulnerability.
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The Internet is currently in a state of a negative peace. We have a good chance to 
move towards a stable peace if we can increase collaboration and trust between the 
different actors. We should act on different levels to stabilise the cyber space and to 
reduce the likelihood and impact of hostile actions.
13.2.2  How to Achieve a State of Stable Cyber Peace
It is not reasonable to believe war and conflicts can be completely avoided in the 
near future. However, it is possible to reduce the likelihood and the impact of con-
flicts, both in the real world and in the digital world, thus moving from the state of 
a negative peace to a stable peace. Luckily, there are already several elements in 
place that will help us achieve this goal (see also Chap. 18):
 – All participants are highly interdependent, which leads to some degree of 
restraint in attacking others, as there might be a backlash on their own network.
 – Common norms (the Internet protocols) and values (the Netiquette5) are in place 
and widely accepted.
 – There are defensive organisations working together and trying to increase the 
security and stability of the Internet: Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERT) exist on various levels ranging from organisational CERTs to National 
CERTs. Sometimes they even form permanent, supra-national groups such as the 
European Government CERTs group (EGC6) where various national CERTs of 
Western Europe co-operate and share information about digital threats.
To achieve a stable peace, we must invest in defensive measures on all levels. 
While offensive capabilities may serve as a deterrence because the attacker fears 
retaliation, defensive measures reduce the likelihood and the impact of a successful 
attack. In the following, we highlight the two most important components of a sta-
ble cyber peace: security (including resilience) and trust.
On a technical level, security and resilience are the most important factors that 
help us reduce the likelihood and impact of digital attacks. The higher the security 
and resilience are, the more trustworthy the infrastructure is. Trust is important as 
the glue between the actors in the digital sphere and is important for collaboration 
and confidence. Based on security and trust, states have enough reason to exclude 
the risk of being attacked from their top priorities because enough protocols, pro-
cesses and treaties are in place that form a stable peace.
5 Netiquette RFC
6 European Government CERT Group
R. Inversini
267
13.3  Security and Resilience
Security defines the technical and organisational measures that are implemented to 
reduce the risks to the digital infrastructures of a country. Resilience is a close rela-
tive but also includes passive elements and is more geared towards withstanding and 
quickly recovering from attacks. While an attacker only needs to make one single, 
successful attack with reasonable costs and low risk, defending all the critical infra-
structure of a country is extraordinarily hard to achieve. In contrast to the nuclear 
arms race, cyber-attacks are not that devastating, even though one should not ignore 
the potential impact of a cyber-attack due to collateral damage and unwanted esca-
lation. This may lead to a much quicker and light-headed execution of such attacks 
and a lower rate of mutual deterrence. It is possible to recover from such an incident 
if proper design and planning of defence is in place. As Joseph Nye puts it: 
“Redundancy, resilience and quick reconstitution become crucial components of 
defence” (Nye JS Jr 2018: 5).
Large parts of the Internet are vulnerable to attacks, starting with routers and data 
centre switches that have received no security patches for years, to outdated operat-
ing systems and middleware up to content management systems and web applica-
tions that have many well-known vulnerabilities (see also Chap. 2). This gives 
adversaries the advantage of having many opportunities to attack systems, abusing 
them as jump points for their operations and thus covering their tracks. An attacker 
may choose between various attack vectors, infiltrate the systems and networks and 
achieve his goals. One single weak spot may be sufficient for the perpetrator to enter 
the network while the defenders need to guard many systems, often without ade-
quate resources. We can therefore conclude that there is a disequilibrium between 
offense and defence; or as George Lucas (2017: 127) states: “The advantage, as the 
cybersecurity experts themselves admit, always lies with the offense” (see also 
Chap. 12).
An illustrative example is the emergence of so-called Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices which are mass-produced cheaply; their users often connect them to the 
Internet with no security measures taken (e.g. keeping default passwords active). 
Criminals abused the resulting attack surface to build an enormous botnet (Mirai 
Botnet; Antonakakis M. et al. 2017), which successfully attacked one of the largest 
Domain Name System (DNS) providers (DynDNS). As many companies use the 
DNS services DynDNS provides, the attack led to outages in the U.S. and also in 
Europe. This case showed two things:
 – There is a huge number of vulnerable devices on the Internet that can be abused 
for attacks.
 – The centralisation of services often leads to a large impact of a successful attack 
and destroys parts of the design target of having a resilient Internet.
The disequilibrium between offense and defence is true at the moment, as the 
attacker has to find one weakness for a successful attack while the defenders must 
protect a plethora of systems, some of them being legacy systems that no longer 
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receive security patches. However, we are convinced that Joseph Nye’s statement is 
not true in its absoluteness, as there are also advantages on the defender’s side:
 – We should not underestimate the complexity of the attacker’s task: The defenders 
have a good oversight of their networks and are disposing over advanced moni-
toring systems. The attacker, in contrast, must peek through a keyhole (one or 
more infected systems) and try to sort out the interesting data and systems with-
out making too many errors and getting discovered.
 – Every attacker makes mistakes and the forensic exchange principle of Locard 
(Tilstone et al. 2006: 59) (“Every contact leaves a trace”) is also true in the digital 
sphere. It is up to the defender to find these traces as fast as possible to detect the 
attacker before severe damage occurs.
 – In case of attacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS), the attacker must 
have special knowledge not only about the overall functioning but over the actual 
implementation as well. It is a time and money-consuming task to achieve such 
knowledge and attackers can only do this if the price is worth it.
The advantage of the attacker should not lead to an arms race that neglects the 
defence (“why invest in defence, if the offense always has the advantage?”). In con-
trast, we must strengthen the overall security of Internet connected devices and the 
resilience of critical infrastructure. In many incidents, such precautions would have 
prevented or at least delayed the attack. The better the security, the higher the price 
for successful attacks becomes and thus this makes attacks less likely. It also helps 
to reduce the probability and impact of collateral damage that has not been intended 
by the attacker but could lead to a dangerous escalation by itself.
With digital sabotage, one of the biggest advantages in the digital sphere lies in 
the fact that restoration of the destroyed IT infrastructure can often be done fast and 
without high costs. However, this requires a well-thought design of infrastructure 
and data as well as the usage of technologies for the rapid restoration of data. This 
is extremely important for critical infrastructure such as electricity, water and health 
services. The emphasis lies on the term quick restoration, as a restore procedure that 
would take days is often too long, notably in organisations where timely access to 
current data is crucial, such as hospitals. It is also essential to separate the different 
data stores so that an attacker who destroys (encrypts, deletes or modifies) data can-
not access the second storage with the data that is going to be restored. While these 
requirements are challenging, there are technical options to building and operating 
such a system. One interesting case has been documented in a hospital in the USA 
where the management decided to pay the ransom even though backups would have 
been available.7 However, restoring all data and systems would have taken too long, 
as the outbreak of the ransomware had been very widespread throughout the hospi-
tal’s network. It gets more difficult if the digital attack leads to physical damage, 
e.g. of devices that are overloaded by the attackers. To reduce such impacts, the user 
7 Bleeping Computer, Hospital Pays $55 K Ransomware Demand Despite Having Backups, https://
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hospital-pays-55k-ransomware-demand-despite-hav-
ing-backups/ (last access July 7 2019).
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must not blindly interconnect the digital sphere with the physical world but should 
have well-defined gateways. The user should always define reasonable boundaries 
that trigger an alert or force a system to go into a ‘fail-safe’ state and wait for a 
human intervention.
We would therefore like to emphasise the importance of building up strong and 
resilient infrastructures that are designed and operated by organisations with mature 
security processes. We believe there must be an incentive by the state to lead the 
development of digital technologies in the right direction as there is still too little 
stimulus for enterprises to write secure software. This can either be on the regulat-
ing side, by enforcing minimal security standards for every device connected to the 
Internet, or by having better product liability for software.
13.4  Trust and Confidence
Trust is a crucial element for inter-personal relationships or between smaller groups 
of people that share common values and follow common goals. Interpersonal rela-
tionships form the base of any stable peace in a society and between nations. The 
better the citizens know and trust each other, the greater the confidence between 
their nations is. It forms the base for security, collaboration and information sharing 
for their mutual benefit.
There already exist many trust relationships between persons working in the 
domain of cybersecurity who collaborate across national and cultural borders and 
are building invisible trust networks globally. To build up such a trust relationship, 
collaboration and sharing of information must be fostered on all levels between all 
participants. This raises the bar for successful attacks, thus making them more 
unlikely. Trust is the key precondition for collaboration and sharing of information. 
Without trusting someone, no-one shares valuable information, and without sharing 
information, it is difficult to increase the trust level between individuals and organ-
isations. We therefore propose to work together and share information in areas 
where a common understanding already exists. A good example is the domain of 
combatting cyber-crime, where we can begin to build up the trust and then also 
increase the collaboration in areas that are much more sensitive, such as state- 
sponsored activities.
The collaboration and sharing of information must take place on various levels:
 – Between states: There are some promising efforts such as EGC (Group of 
European Government CERTs) or IWWN (International Watch and Warning 
Network). However, much of the collaboration happens only between partners 
that share the same values and often already have some kind of political alliance. 
This is understandable and only underlines the importance of trust. There is a 
broad understanding that in law enforcement an urgent need to exchange infor-
mation in a much quicker way exists. There are international agreements such as 
13 Cyber Peace: And How It Can Be Achieved
270
the Convention of Cyber Crime of the European Council that help to improve the 
situation (see also Chap. 18).
 – Numerous interest groups and volunteer organisations are already fostering the 
exchange of information between individuals, non-profit organisations and com-
mercial organisations. We must support these efforts, as many of these persons 
and organisations have a deep understanding of how the digital sphere works and 
are the best bet for effective and efficient measures to secure the Internet.
 – Critical infrastructures are crucial for the safety and stability of a society. Without 
a reliable provisioning of electric power, water, food and health care, societies 
are rapidly destabilised. We must improve information exchange between the 
critical infrastructures not only within a nation’s border but also throughout the 
sectors on an international level.
Trust forms the confidence between the various actors, who can be confident that 
no unexpected acts of violence might occur and that there is a common perception 
on how actors react in certain situations. Without confidence, states and organisa-
tions are constantly on guard, watching out for hostile actions. In an area as compli-
cated as cyber space, chances for misinterpretations and escalations are particularly 
high. The lack of confidence that no other nation will use digital weapons against 
one’s own nation is also something that describes the current situation rather well. 
We must have a mutual basic level of confidence that no unexpected behaviour takes 
place. This can be achieved by defining and implementing confidence-building 
measures (CBMs):
The ultimate goal of CBMs is to strengthen international peace and security by reducing 
and eliminating causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding, and miscalculations. (Healy 
et al. 2014)
The effects of a full-scale cyber conflict are not that clear even if the potential for 
damage might be huge. We should therefore not neglect the risk of an unplanned 
and unwanted escalation. Even though not directly comparable, we can gain impor-
tant insight from the era of the Cold War, with its danger of an imminent nuclear 
war. Joseph Nye (2011) summaries the similarities between that era and our time of 
cyber conflicts as follows (Nye JS Jr 2011):
 – superiority of offense over defence
 – use of weapons for tactical and strategical purposes
 – possibilities of first and second use scenarios
 – possibility of automated responses
It is challenging to define what a digital weapon is: Although it is rather clear for 
the case of nuclear weapons, this is much more difficult in the digital sphere: Many 
things that can be considered as cyber weapons have their origins in dual-use goods 
(this is especially true for vulnerability scanners and similar tools).
One of the most important and successful measures implemented for reducing 
the likelihood of a nuclear war were CMBs. We believe that CBMs could reduce the 
probability of an escalation in a cyber-conflict as well. In the following, we try to 
deduce similarities and differences for CMBs in the digital domain:
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 – To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to exchange information about 
troops, assets and their movements. This helps to avoid incorrect assumptions 
about the capacities of the other party and may help to reduce the speed of an 
arms race. This is much more difficult to achieve in the digital world, as most 
nations keep their capabilities secret and as there is an overlap between intelli-
gence services, ‘traditional’ troops and unofficial combatants.
 – Exchange of personnel/conducting joint exercises: This helps to build up a per-
sonal relationship between the participants that supports to build up trust. To 
some extent, this is already being done as many cybersecurity professionals meet 
at regular intervals and on conferences. However, for military troops, this mostly 
exists between friendly countries or allies such as NATO and not between poten-
tial adversaries.
 – Improving predictability helps gauge unclear and fierce situations in a better 
way. This reduces the likelihood of unwanted escalations and helps to contain 
difficult situations quickly and efficiently.
 – Enhancing transparency of involved parties leads to a better understanding of a 
conflict and reduces the risk of inadvertent escalation. Even though satellite sur-
veillance and other reconnaissance helped to improve transparency in large clas-
sical conflicts, there are still situations where the involvement is not clear and 
where parties indirectly take part in a conflict, such as during the Ukraine crisis. 
In the digital sphere, this is even more demanding as there it is nearly impossible 
to verify which parties are involved in a digital operation.
 – Military actions against critical infrastructure or against civilians should be 
restricted. During conflicts between two states, there are many regulations in 
place to reduce casualties of civilians and to spare infrastructures such as hospi-
tals. In the digital sphere, this is much more complex, as it is often unclear 
whether a resource belongs to a legitimate target, to a civilian or even to a hospi-
tal. We must accept that there is always a large risk of unwanted collateral dam-
age due to the strong interdependencies on the Internet. This should lead all 
participants to refrain from offensive actions as much as possible.
Confidence partly relies on the capability to trace down the identity of an attacker 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This leads us again to the problem of attribution in 
cyberspace. Evidence is hard to gain and tracks often end at legislative borders. 
Additionally, attackers can introduce wrong traces that point to another Nation/
organisation (‘false flags’) which may lead to false accusations and in what follows 
to increased tensions and even real conflicts. Therefore, it is important that parties 
not involved in the conflict and with enough reputation, technical skill and indepen-
dence are responsible for the attribution so that the public and the involved parties 
both accept the verdict. This is extremely challenging. Apart from some approaches 
in an early stage (e.g. a proposal by Microsoft for such an attribution organisation8), 
we are far away from such a situation. A correct attribution is pivotal to respond 
8 Microsoft, an attribution organisation to strengthen trust online, https://query.prod.cms.rt.micro-
soft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW67QI (last access July 72,019).
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with force against the adversary, but traces are seldom obvious and unambiguous. 
Any attacker may insert enough information to blame someone else for the attack. 
This also bears the risk that state sponsored groups are more willing to attack for 
various reasons. If they can seed false traces, politicians might use such false flag 
operations to justify offensive actions during a political crisis.
Even though we have shown how difficult it is to build up higher confidence 
between potential adversaries in the digital sphere, first steps have been made in this 
direction:
 – A good example is the establishment of the first multilateral cybersecurity related 
agreement by the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) 
in 2013.9
 – A second set of CBMs was decided upon in 2016.10
It is beneficial for the security of the Internet and all its participants if policy 
makers continue on this path and increase their efforts to reach a stable cyber peace.
13.5  Roles and Responsibilities
We cannot achieve cyber peace without everyone taking their own share of respon-
sibility. We do not describe every actor and his or her role in detail but rather men-
tion a few cornerstones:
13.5.1  Policy Makers
We need to differentiate between policy making on an international level and on a 
national level. On an international level, multinational organisations such as the 
United Nations Organisation (UNO) or Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) are important actors that can forge a path to a cyber 
peace in the longer term. For short-term and operational issues, we propose strength-
ening existing organisations such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
(FIRST) and Trusted Introducer (TI). These already have a strong understanding of 
how the Internet works and are not subject to quickly changing political situations.
Similar to the case of nuclear weapons, one strategy could be that an increasing 
number of states decide to refrain from possessing digital weapons with destructive 
capabilities or at least to guarantee they are abstaining from the first use of such 
9 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE, Permanent Council Decision No. 
1106; www.osce.org/pc/109168 (last access July 7 2019).
10 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE, Permanent Council Decision No. 
1202; www.osce.org/pc/227281 (last access July 7 2019).
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weapons. Although this might be an interesting approach, it is also very difficult, as 
such a treaty can hardly be controlled and as there is a big overlap between the tools 
state-sponsored organisations and criminal groups are using. At the very least, states 
should define and adhere to rules of engagement in the digital world that ensure no 
state attacks the critical infrastructures of another state in order to avoid causing 
civilian casualties.
States are strongly challenged when it comes to digital crime and state sponsored 
actions. As these actors operate from different locations and have their infrastruc-
ture in various countries that they may change swiftly, a purely national approach is 
doomed to fail in most cases. The most efficient way to address these problems is 
via international cooperation. A step forward has been taken by the Convention on 
Cybercrime. Its aim, set out in the preamble, is to pursue a common criminal policy 
aimed at protecting society against cybercrime by adopting appropriate legislation 
and fostering international co-operation.11 Initially driven by the Council of Europe, 
57 other countries have signed and ratified the treaty as of 2018.
On the national level, many nations have been developing National Cybersecurity 
Strategies. Policy makers should try to strengthen the defence before investing in 
offensive capabilities. Even though many countries try to overcome their weak-
nesses by having offensive capabilities, we believe this is not a well-thought-out 
approach. It assumes that in the case of an attack it is clear who is attacking (which 
seldom is the case) and that striking back can solve the problem and does not lead 
to an escalation with much collateral damage. One of the best investments any 
nation can do is making the Internet, and the systems connected to it, more secure 
and resilient. We therefore encourage policy makers to focus on the hard ground-
work of securing the Internet and not so much on building cyber commands and 
capabilities that cannot address the underlying problems.
The state should be in charge of providing reasonable security for everyone and 
free of charge by ensuring basic Internet security and resilience as well as combat-
ting criminal groups. All citizens must be able to use the Internet free of fear and 
with a low risk of being the victim of an attack. This is one of the most important 
tasks a state must fulfil. If it fails in doing so, only persons and organisations with 
enough financial and/or intellectual resources can protect themselves. This would 
violate any principle of fairness and the state would risk losing its monopoly on the 
use of force, which is a basic principle of any constitutional state.
13.5.2  The Society
As a society, we must adapt our own perception of risks and values to the new digi-
tal era. We should be careful when we are transferring concepts of the traditional 
world into the cyber domain and should always question their suitability. The gen-
erations to come will have a better understanding of the risks involved, as they are 
11 Council of Europe, Treaty No. 185, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conven-
tions/treaty/185 (last access July 7 2019).
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growing up using these technologies. We should foster this by not only teaching the 
technology but also the values associated with it. Societies should try to understand 
the Internet as a common good of humankind and not as something restricted to 
state or cultural boundaries.
13.5.3  The Private Sector
It is difficult to draft one role for all companies, as these are very diverse. In any 
case, they must secure their systems according to best practices and should avoid 
trying to reduce costs by using insecure systems, applications and procedures.
If a company has a critical role in a society, such as being part of the health care 
or energy sectors, there are additional points it must adhere to: Its IT department 
must protect the systems and data against any kind of sabotage and disruption and 
fulfil requirements set up by the regulator; it needs to detect intrusions quickly and 
needs to provide effective security incident response and recovery procedures; and 
it should closely monitor the threat landscape and be capable of quickly adapting to 
new threats.
Companies that sell security products and services have special roles and respon-
sibilities as well. Without commercial security companies, the Internet would be 
much more dangerous and unstable as they provide security products that help 
organisations and individuals protecting their networks and systems. However, 
there are companies that act as mercenary groups or that export digital weapons into 
areas of conflict. These groups may put a stable peace in danger. We propose having 
guidelines about ethical behaviour that are co-developed and complied with by 
security companies. We believe that self-regulation is a promising approach, but 
that in case of a violation of these guidelines, sanctions are also necessary.
13.5.4  The Individual
Due to the high degree of interconnection, every participant on the Internet has a 
special responsibility towards the other users. If someone does not properly secure 
his system or application, he or she might be abused as a first attack vector for 
actions that eventually lead to substantial damage. The following scenario shows a 
possible sequence of events:
 – A poorly secured website of a local restaurant is hacked by a state-sponsored 
attacker group.
 – Employees of a nearby-located critical infrastructure (CI) repeatedly visit this 
restaurant and its webpage to read the current menu.




 – The intruders have now gained their first foothold in the network of the CI and 
they can use the server for the exfiltration of the stolen data. It is difficult for 
intrusion detection systems to recognise such traffic, as it is expected and already 
known.
As it is not a workable solution that everyone taking part on the Internet can take 
full responsibility for securing his or her systems, all actors on higher levels must 
try to absorb these risks by implementing additional safeguards.
13.6  Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the current state of the Internet as a negative yet unsta-
ble peace and demonstrated the most important components for reaching a stable 
peace. These components require increasing confidence and trust between all par-
ticipants, which is mainly a political and psychological topic. The elements formed 
around security and resilience are more focused on technology but also include 
strategic, political and economic elements.
We can achieve a stable cyber peace if most participants consider the Internet as 
being a space shared with others that has comprehensible and documented rules to 
protect its users from damage —be it physical or digital. This leads to the need for 
an international system of norms, rules of engagement, best-practices and respon-
sible behaviour of individuals, enterprises and states.
It is important to note that there are already many safeguards and processes in 
place. These limit the actions and the impacts of state-sponsored actors and of crim-
inals, and help secure the Internet in approaching a state of a stable cyber peace. 
This multi-level approach attempts to solve the problems where the chances are 
highest for doing so. Shackelford describes this as a “polycentric” approach:
Private-sector cybersecurity best practices, along with national, bilateral, and regional bod-
ies acting as norm entrepreneurs that are identified throughout this study are together con-
ceptualized as components of a ‘polycentric’ approach to promoting a global culture of 
cybersecurity. (Shackelford 2017: 7)
We believe it is crucial to keep and foster this approach and to extend it as much 
as possible to ensure peace on the Internet and to prevent actors from using it as a 
new battleground. It is important to not try to transfer concepts and procedures from 
the physical world to the digital sphere without questioning their suitability. Even 
though it is very unlikely that the Internet will be a sphere without conflicts, we can 
nonetheless make it much more secure and resilient. This reduces the likelihood of 
devastating attacks, which in turn could lead to a dangerous escalation. Every step 
we make towards a more stable peace in the digital sphere helps protect the Internet, 
critical infrastructures and our society as a whole.
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Abstract This chapter introduces privacy and data protection by design, and 
reviews privacy-enhancing techniques (PETs). Although privacy by design includes 
both technical and operational measures, the chapter focuses on the technical mea-
sures. First, it enumerates design strategies. Next, it considers privacy-enhancing 
techniques that directly address the hide strategy, but also aid in implementing the 
separate, control and enforce strategies. Specifically, it addresses PETs for: (1) 
identification, authentication and anonymity; (2) private communications; (3) 
privacy- preserving computations; (4) privacy in databases; and (5) discrimination 
prevention in data mining.
Keywords Anonymisation · Cryptography · Digital signatures · Privacy · Privacy- 
enhancing techniques · Statistical disclosure control
14.1  Introduction
Applying cybersecurity mechanisms is essential to the protection of digital assets, 
whether they be personal, industrial or commercial. Current cybersecurity (and 
safety) measures include the collection of data from several points to detect, and 
potentially foresee, anomalies that can be attributed to malicious behaviour (e.g. 
cyberattacks). Collecting these data can, in some cases, encroach on the privacy of 
citizens. The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 states that the 
collection and processing of personal data for cybersecurity reasons is legitimate; 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
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however, it is still subject to the rest of requirements of the regulation, such as con-
sent, transparency and adequate protection (see also Chaps. 5 and 10).
This chapter introduces privacy and data protection by design and reviews 
privacy- enhancing techniques (PETs). Although privacy by design includes both 
technical and operational measures, we focus here on the technical measures.
Therefore, the analyses within this chapter can empower both cybersecurity ser-
vice providers and general service providers to design systems that are compliant 
with the GDPR, in addition to achieving other benefits. For example, while personal 
data can only be held by a controller for a limited period of time, anonymised data 
are no longer considered personal data and thus they are outside the scope of 
GDPR.  Hence, anonymised data can be handled much more freely: they can be 
shared and stored indefinitely, which in particular enables exploratory, collaborative 
and long-term studies.
14.1.1  Design Strategies
Privacy and data protection by design can be achieved by applying certain design 
strategies (see also Chap. 2). We next enumerate the eight design strategies intro-
duced by Hoepman (2014).
 1. Minimise. System designers should ensure that only the minimal necessary per-
sonal information is collected.
 2. Hide. This strategy implies that the confidentiality of collected data is ensured, 
either by encrypting, pseudonymising or anonymising data in transit or in 
storage. 
 3. Separate. Personal data should be stored and processed in a distributed way.
 4. Aggregate. Storage of individualised data should be restricted as much as possi-
ble and be replaced by aggregates whenever feasible.
 5. Inform. Respondents should be made aware of what information about them is 
being collected and processed and for which reasons.
 6. Control. Respondents should be able to consult, modify and delete the informa-
tion about them.
 7. Enforce. Privacy policies should be put in place and enforced.
 8. Demonstrate. Data controllers ought to document all collection and analysis pro-
cesses conducted on personal information.
The remaining sections of this chapter enumerate privacy-enhancing techniques 
that directly address the hide strategy but also aid in implementing the separate, 
control and enforce strategies. Note that some of the techniques described render 
data unlinkable to individuals, that is, they turn personal data into data that are no 
longer personal.
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14.2  Identity, Authentication and Anonymity
Identity, authentication and access control are central components of secure sys-
tems. It is important that data assets be accessible only to authorised parties. On the 
one hand, a sound authentication and authorisation infrastructure prevents data 
breaches. On the other hand, it allows responsibilities to be attributed in case of a 
breach, which contributes to a transparent data processing environment.
Several methods exist to verify the identity of individuals, that is, to authenticate 
them. Some of them allow for the authentication of users without disclosing their 
identity.
14.2.1  Digital Signatures
In paper documents, handwritten signatures guarantee the authenticity of the docu-
ment, and the signer cannot repudiate it. Moreover, the paper support gives some 
protection against manipulation: deletions and additions can be detected, at least by 
an expert. Digital signatures were created in order to guarantee the authenticity and 
integrity in the case of electronic communications, and to avoid their repudiation. 
Digital signatures were made possible by the deployment of public-key encryption. 
In addition, digital signatures and the public key infrastructure can be used to pro-
vide authentication of individuals.
If both sender and receiver share some information, an alternative to digital sig-
natures are message authentication codes (MACs). They are based on keyed crypto-
graphic hash functions, and they can be used to guarantee the integrity of the 
message. MACs are commonly used in the context of symmetric encryption com-
munications, where sender and receiver share a secret key.
Next, we enumerate specific classes of digital signatures that enable authentica-
tion while being compatible with some user anonymity.
14.2.1.1  Blind Signatures
Blind signatures (Chaum 1983) are considered particularly useful for electronic 
payment systems, electronic voting schemes and token-based access control mecha-
nisms; a user may obtain a signature (e.g. a signed coin from a bank) such that the 




14.2.1.2  Group Signatures
In a group signature scheme (Chaum and Van Heyst 1991), a set of users, called 
members of the group, can issue signatures of arbitrary messages on behalf of the 
group. A verifier can check the validity of the signature using the group public key. 
The main interest in this kind of signature is that it ensures the privacy of signers 
against potential verifiers, because a potential verifier cannot distinguish two sign-
ers from the same group.
A requirement of group signatures is the support for membership revocation of 
misbehaving members without the need to update the group public key. To facilitate 
member revocation, some members, called group managers, are endowed with the 
capability to revoke membership.
14.2.1.3  Identity-Based Signatures
Identity-based signature schemes, theorised in Shamir (1984) and with the first con-
crete protocol, based on the Weil pairing, shown in Boneh and Franklin (2001), 
allow public keys to be arbitrary strings of some length, called identities. These 
strings are associated with a user and reflect some aspect of her identity, e.g. her 
email address. The corresponding secret key is then computed by a trusted entity 
taking as input the user’s identity and, possibly, some other secret information, and 
is sent to the user through some secure channel. Identity-based public key signature 
schemes offer considerable flexibility in key generation and management.
14.2.1.4  Attribute-Based Signatures
Attribute-based signatures generalise identity-based signatures in that, instead of 
having the users’ identities as credentials, they use properties, or attributes, of the 
users as the latters’ credentials (in the attribute-based setting, the identity is one 
more attribute of the user). Attribute-based signatures were introduced by Shanqing 
and Yingpei (2008), inspired by previously existing attribute-based encryption 
schemes, such as the one in Goyal et al. (2006). In attribute-based signatures (and 
encryption) schemes, the users receive private key shares associated with their cre-
dentials, such as their name, age, country of residence, having or not a driving 
licence, place of work, etc. Digital signatures are produced with respect to some 
function of the users’ credentials, typically called a policy.
For example, a drugstore may accept drug prescriptions only if they are issued by 
medical doctors or by nurses with a long working experience. In this scenario, pre-
scriptions could be digitally signed under the policy role = “medical doctor” OR 
(role = “nurse” AND experience = “10 years”). The identity of the signer in this 
case is irrelevant.
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14.2.2  Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs (Ben-Or et al. 1988b) allow a prover to convince a verifying 
party of the truth of a statement without revealing any information other than the 
truth of the statement. In particular, if the statement requires the prover to hold some 
secret information, then the verifier does not learn this information—it is possible to 
prove knowledge of a secret without revealing the secret itself. Statements that only 
prove possession of a secret are known as zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. 
Proofs can be either interactive or non-interactive depending on whether the parties 
can communicate during the proof. In general, non-interactive proofs (Blum et al. 
1988) are considered more difficult since they cannot use interactive challenge- 
response protocols and they require the random oracle model or a common refer-
ence string between parties. Whereas zero-knowledge proofs can be rather 
inefficient, non-interactive proof systems built on bilinear groups (Groth and Sahai 
2008) are particularly efficient for group-dependent problems where the secrets are 
group elements or the exponents of a group element. As many useful cryptographic 
schemes are built using bilinear pairings, particularly functional encryption, such a 
proof system can be very useful for proving knowledge of a cryptographic secret 
without revealing it.
Zero-knowledge proofs can be used to authenticate users holding cryptographic 
devices, such as smartcards, without leaking any information about these users 
except that they hold a valid card.
14.2.3  Implicit Authentication
In implicit authentication, a server can authenticate users by checking whether 
their behaviour is compatible or similar enough to their past-recorded behaviour. 
In this context, the user’s behaviour can be modelled as a combination of features 
such as her browsing history, usual location, keystroke patterns, usually visible 
cell stations, etc.
In the study of Jakobsson et al. (2009), empirical evidence was given that the 
features collected from the user’s device history are effective to distinguish users 
and therefore can be used to implicitly authenticate them. The collection of these 
data, however, may be too privacy-invasive. Proposals such as those by Safa et al. 
(2014), Domingo-Ferrer et  al. (2015) and Blanco-Justicia and Domingo-Ferrer 
(2018) make use of homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation 




14.3  Private Communications
This section discusses the protection of communication channels. First, it describes 
end-to-end encryption, which provides confidentiality of communications. It then 
introduces anonymous channels. Having discussed mechanisms that allow users to 
be authenticated without revealing their identities, it is logical to discuss communi-
cation channels that do not reveal their address, which is also part of their identity.
14.3.1  End-to-End Encryption
End-to-end encryption refers to the encryption of messages exchanged by two or 
more parties without the intervention of a centralised server. The centralised server 
may exist and support the transport of the messages but all this server sees is 
encrypted content. This behaviour is the opposite of the traditional message 
exchange protocols, in which the messages are only encrypted while in transit from 
the parties to the central server or from the central server to the parties.
End-to-end encryption is typically supported by having all participants have a 
key pair from a public-key encryption scheme. The centralised server, in addition to 
supporting the exchange of messages, works as a public-key repository, where users 
can find the public keys of the users to whom they want to send messages. Once a 
user has obtained another user’s public key, she can use this public key to encrypt 
the messages, which will only be decryptable by the owner of the corresponding 
private key. A more efficient variant is for users to exchange random session keys 
for symmetric encryption by enciphering them under their public-private pairs and 
then encrypting the messages with a symmetric encryption scheme under these ran-
dom temporal session keys.
14.3.2  Anonymous Channels
Anonymous channels allow users to hide their address (e.g. the IP address) to the 
service provider they are communicating with. Examples of anonymous channels 
include mixnets and onion routing.
A mix network or mixnet is a routing protocol in which each of the network 
nodes shuffles (and re-encrypts) all received messages before sending them to the 
next node (Chaum 1981). The shuffling process is kept secret by each mix server. 
Additionally, the sender of the message might successively encrypt the message 
with each of the mix servers’ public keys. If that is the case, each mix server will 
have to decrypt each of the encryption layers (as if peeling an onion) until the final 
destination of the message. The ToR network (Dingledine et al. 2004) is an example 
of this operation.
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14.4  Privacy-Preserving Computations
This section describes mechanisms to perform computations on data while keeping 
the data private. The GDPR accepts encryption as a valid protection mechanism if 
the decryption keys are only available to those entitled to have them. However, most 
data analyses are incompatible with most encryption procedures: users typically 
require data in clear form to analyse them.
Nonetheless, the following encryption techniques do allow some computations 
to be carried out directly on encrypted data, and are usually part of larger systems, 
such as privacy-preserving data mining.
14.4.1  (Partially) Homomorphic Encryption
Some encryption schemes are homomorphic in nature. Given two ciphertexts 
encrypting two plaintexts, certain operations can be performed on the ciphertexts 
such that the result can be decrypted to produce the outcome of applying an opera-
tion (not necessarily the same) on the plaintexts themselves. Thus, some computa-
tions can be performed on encrypted data. Schemes that exhibit homomorphic 
properties for a specific operation are known as partially homomorphic encryption 
schemes. Examples of this class are those in ElGamal (1985) and Paillier (1999). 
On the other hand, if the set of permissible operations enable arbitrary computations 
to be performed, then the schemes are referred to as fully homomorphic (Gentry 
2009; Gentry et al. 2013). Although fully homomorphic schemes are in principle 
very powerful, currently available instances also involve very substantial overhead 
and storage expansion. For that reason, less powerful schemes, known as somewhat 
homomorphic, are sometimes preferred: under these schemes, the number of opera-
tions that can be performed on ciphertext before decryption will no longer succeed 
is limited.
14.4.2  Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation protocols allow a set of parties to compute a joint 
function of their inputs in a secure way without requiring a trusted third party. 
During the execution of the protocol the parties do not learn anything about each 
other’s input except what is implied by the output itself.
A general solution for the secure computation of functions among two players 
was introduced in Yao (1986). The main idea of these protocols was to describe the 
function as a circuit, and to compute every gate of the circuit in a secure way. This 
idea was extended to the multi-partite setting in Goldreich et  al. (1987). They 
showed how to create a secure multiparty computation protocol that allows playing 
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any game and does not leak any information if the majority of the participants are 
honest. These protocols are computationally secure. The first unconditionally secure 
multi-party computation protocols were presented in Ben-Or et  al. (1988a) and 
Chaum et al. (1988). These authors gave protocols to compute any arithmetic func-
tion in a secure way when at least two thirds of the parties are honest.
Two of the main open problems in secure multiparty computation are: (i) to relax 
the assumptions on the behaviour of the players, and (ii) to reduce the computa-
tional and communication costs of the protocols for interesting families of func-
tions. It should be observed that, in the general solutions described above, the 
computational costs of the protocol depend on the size of the circuit defining the 
function.
The most important properties of secure multiparty computation protocols are 
privacy and correctness. Another important property is fairness. A protocol is fair if 
there are no differences between the players when it comes to obtaining the output. 
That is, a protocol is fair if either everybody receives their output, or no one does.
14.5  Privacy in Databases
An alternative strategy to protect data is to make them no longer linkable to indi-
viduals, that is, to anonymise them. Anonymised data are no longer considered per-
sonal, and thus the legal restrictions that apply to personal data are lifted. This 
section describes the state of the art in data anonymisation techniques and models.
14.5.1  Respondent Privacy: Statistical Disclosure Control
Traditionally, national statistical institutes and government agencies have system-
atically gathered information about individual respondents, either people or compa-
nies, with the aim of using it for policymaking and also distributing it for public and 
private research that may benefit their country. The most detailed way to dissemi-
nate this information is by releasing a microdata set, essentially a database table, 
each of whose records conveys information on a particular respondent. Although 
these databases may be extremely useful to researchers, it is of fundamental impor-
tance that their publication does not compromise the respondents’ privacy in the 
sense of revealing information attributable to specific individuals. Statistical disclo-
sure control (SDC) is the discipline that deals with the inherent trade-off between 
protecting the privacy of the respondents and ensuring that the protected data are 
still useful to researchers.
Usually, a microdata set contains a set of attributes that may be classified as 
identifiers, key attributes (a.k.a. quasi-identifiers), or confidential attributes. 
Identifiers allow unequivocal identification of individuals. Examples are social 
security numbers or full names, which need to be removed before publication of the 
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microdata set. On the other hand, key attributes are those attributes that, in combina-
tion, may allow linkage with external information to re-identify (some of) the 
respondents to whom (some of) the records in the microdata set refer (identity dis-
closure). Examples include job, address, age, gender, height and weight. Last but 
not least, the microdata set contains confidential attributes with sensitive informa-
tion on respondents, such as salary, religion, political affiliation or health condition. 
Beyond protecting against identity disclosure, SDC must prevent intruders from 
guessing the confidential attribute values of specific respondents (attribute 
disclosure).
Several SDC methods have been proposed in the literature to protect microdata 
sets (Hundepool et al. 2012). Next, we briefly review the main ones.
14.5.2  Non-perturbative Masking
In SDC, masking refers to the process of obtaining an anonymised data set X’ by 
modifying the original X. Masking can be perturbative or non-perturbative. In the 
former approach, the data values of X are perturbed to obtain X’. In contrast, in non-
perturbative masking X’ is obtained by removing some values and/or by making 
them more general; yet the information in X’ is still true, although less detailed; as 
an example, a value might be replaced by a range containing the original value.
Common non-perturbative methods include:
 – Sampling. Instead of publishing the whole data set, only a sample of it is released.
 – Generalisation. The values of the different attributes are recoded in new, more 
general categories such that the information remains the same, albeit less 
specific.
 – Top/bottom coding. In line with the previous method, values above (resp. below) 
a certain threshold are grouped together into a single category.
 – Local suppression. If a combination of quasi-identifier values is shared by too 
few records, it may lead to re-identification. This method relies on replacing 
certain individual attribute values with missing values, so that the number of 
records sharing a particular combination of quasi-identifier values becomes 
larger.
14.5.3  Perturbative Masking
Perturbative masking generates a modified version of the microdata set such that the 
privacy of the respondents is protected to a certain extent while simultaneously 




 – Noise addition. This is the most popular method, which consists in adding a 
noise vector to each record in the data set. The utility preservation depends on the 
amount and the distribution of the noise.
 – Data swapping. This technique exchanges the values of the attributes randomly 
among individual records. Clearly, univariate distributions are preserved, but 
multivariate distributions may be substantially harmed unless swaps of very dif-
ferent values are ruled out.
 – Microaggregation. This groups similar records together and releases the average 
record of each group (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz 2002). The more similar 
the records in a group, the more data utility is preserved.
14.5.4  Synthetic Microdata Generation
An anonymisation approach alternative to masking is synthetic data generation. 
That is, instead of modifying the original data set, a simulated data set is generated 
such that it preserves some properties of the original data set. The main advantage 
of synthetic data is that no respondent re-identification seems possible since the data 
are artificial. However, if, by chance, a synthetic record is very close to an original 
one, the respondent of the latter record will not feel safe when the former record is 
released. In addition, the utility of synthetic data sets is limited to preserving the 
statistical properties selected at the time of data synthesis.
Some examples of synthetic generation include methods based on multiple 
imputation (Rubin 1993) and methods that preserve means and co-variances 
(Burridge 2003). An effective alternative to the drawbacks of purely synthetic data 
are hybrid data, which mix original and synthetic data and are therefore more flex-
ible (Domingo-Ferrer and González-Nicolás 2010). Yet another alternative is par-
tially synthetic data, whereby only the most sensitive original data values are 
replaced by synthetic values.
14.5.5  Privacy Models
For an anonymised data set X’ to be safe/private enough, it needs to be sufficiently 
anonymised. The level of anonymisation can be assessed after the generation of X’ 
or prior to it.
Ex post methods rely on the analysis of the output data set and, therefore, it is 
possible to generate a data set that is not safe enough according to a certain crite-
rion; several iterations with increasingly strict privacy parameters and decreasing 
utility may be needed. The most commonly used ex post approach is masking fol-
lowed by record linkage. Protection is sufficient high only if there is a sufficiently 
low proportion of masked records that can be linked to the respective original 
records they come from.
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On the other hand, the ex ante approach relies on privacy models that allow 
selecting the desired privacy level before producing X’. In this way, the output data 
set is always as private as specified by the model, although it may fail to provide 
enough utility if the model parameters are too strict.
14.5.5.1  k-Anonymity and Extensions
A well-known privacy model is k-anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney 1998), which 
requires that each tuple of key-attribute values be shared by at least k records in the 
database. This condition may be achieved through generalisation and suppression 
mechanisms, and also through microaggregation (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra 2005).
Unfortunately, while this privacy model prevents identity disclosure, it may fail 
to protect against attribute disclosure. The definition of this privacy model estab-
lishes that complete re-identification is unfeasible within a group of records sharing 
the same tuple of perturbed key-attribute values. However, if the records in the 
group have the same value (or very similar values) for a confidential attribute, the 
confidential attribute value of an individual linkable to the group is leaked.
To fix this problem, some extensions of k-anonymity have been proposed, the 
most popular being l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et  al. 2006) and t-closeness (Li 
et  al. 2007a). The property of l-diversity is satisfied if there are at least l ‘well- 
represented’ values for each confidential attribute in all groups sharing the values of 
the quasi-identifiers. The property of t-closeness is satisfied when the distance 
between the distribution of each confidential attribute within each group and the 
whole data set is no more than a threshold t.
14.5.5.2  Differential Privacy
Another important privacy model is differential privacy (Dwork 2006). This 
model was originally defined for queryable databases and consists in perturbing 
the original query result of a database before outputting it. This may be viewed as 
equivalent to perturbing the original data and then computing the queries over the 
modified data. Thus, differential privacy can also be seen as a privacy model for 
microdata sets.
An ε-differentially private algorithm is one that, when run on two datasets that 
differ in a single record, performs similarly (up to a power of ε) in both cases. That 
is, the presence or the absence of any single record does not significantly alter the 
output of the algorithm. Typically, ε-differential privacy is attained by adding 
Laplace noise with zero mean and parameter Δ(f)/ε, where Δ(f) is the sensitivity of 
the algorithm (the maximum change in the algorithm output that can be caused by a 
change in a single record in the absence of noise) and ε is a privacy parameter; the 
larger ε, the less privacy.
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14.5.5.3  Permutation Model for Anonymisation
The permutation model (Domingo-Ferrer and Muralidhar 2016) views all anonymi-
sation methods as being functionally equivalent to a two-step procedure consisting 
of a permutation step (mapping the original data set to the output of a reverse map-
ping procedure [Muralidhar et al. 2014]) plus a noise addition step (adding the dif-
ference between the reverse-mapped output and the anonymised data set). Since the 
ranks in the reverse-mapped version and in the anonymised version are the same by 
construction, the noise added in the second step needs to be small, since otherwise 
ranks would change. This shows that any anonymisation method basically amounts 
to permutation.
The most interesting feature, however, is that each subject/respondent can check 
whether a privacy model called (d,v)-permuted privacy is satisfied for his or her 
original record by the anonymised data set for some d and v of her choice; in plain 
words, each subject can check whether his or her response has been permuted 
enough in the anonymised data set. The subject only needs to know his or her origi-
nal record and the anonymised data set.
14.5.6  Redaction and Sanitisation of Documents
Document redaction consists of removing or blacking out sensitive terms in plain 
textual documents. Alternatively, when sensitive terms are replaced (instead of 
removed) by generalisations (e.g. AIDS → disease), the process is more generically 
referred to as document sanitisation (Bier et  al. 2009). Document sanitisation is 
more desirable than pure redaction, since the former better preserves the utility of 
the protected output. Moreover, in document redaction, the existence of blacked-out 
parts in the released document can raise awareness of the document’s sensitivity to 
potential attackers (Bier et al. 2009), whereas sanitisation gives no such clues.
In both cases, two tasks should be performed: (i) the detection of textual terms 
that may cause disclosure of sensitive information, and (ii) the removal or obfusca-
tion of those entities. Traditionally, the detection of sensitive terms has been tackled 
in a manual way. This requires a human expert who applies certain standard guide-
lines that detail the correct procedures to sanitise sensitive entities (National Security 
Agency 2005). Manual redaction has proven to be quite time-consuming and it does 
not scale to currently required levels of information outsourcing (Chakaravarthy 
et al. 2008; Bier et al. 2009).
In recent years, numerous automatic redaction methods have been proposed. 
Some approaches rely on specific or tailored patterns to detect certain types of infor-
mation based on their linguistic or structural regularities (e.g. names, addresses and 
social security numbers) (Sweeney 1996; Tveit et al. 2004; Douglass et al. 2005). 
Schemes such as Douglass et al. (2005) and Tveit et al. (2004) use more specific 
patterns to remove sensitive terms from medical records. These patterns are designed 
according to the HIPAA ‘Safe Harbor’ rules (Department of Health and Human 
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Services, USA 1996) that specify eighteen data elements which must be eliminated 
from clinical data in order to anonymise a clinical text. As an alternative to manually- 
specified patterns, several authors have proposed using trained classifiers that rec-
ognise sensitive entities. Yet others present a tool that focuses on the sanitisation of 
documents directly linked to certain companies (Cumby and Ghani 2011). The data 
to be detected include words and phrases that reveal the company the document 
belongs to.
Abril et  al. (2011) propose a general scheme that uses a trained classifier for 
Named Entity Recognition (NER) (i.e. the Stanford NER [Finkel et al. 2005]) to 
automatically recognise entities belonging to general categories such as person, 
organisation and location names. This mechanism suggests generalising sensitive 
entities instead of removing them from the sanitised document. The goal is to 
achieve a certain degree of privacy while preserving some of the semantics. Jiang 
et al. (2009) provide a theoretic measure (‘t-plausibility’) that guides the sanitisa-
tion process in order to balance the trade-off between privacy protection and utility 
preservation. Their scheme tries to preserve the utility of sanitised documents by 
generalising terms based on general-purpose ontology/taxonomy. Finally, Sánchez 
et  al. (2013) present a system that relies on information theory to quantify the 
amount of information conveyed by each term of the document. The latter work 
builds on Sánchez et al. (2012), where sensitive terms are generalised.
14.5.7  Data Stream Anonymisation
A data stream is a sequence of data items that become available over time. This type 
of dynamic data is common in some environments, such as sensor networks, web 
logs, etc. Data streams are quite different from static data sets. In particular, streams 
are potentially infinite, may be fast flowing and may require fast processing for 
anonymisation. Because of these particularities, anonymisation methods that target 
dynamic data must be specifically designed. Whereas there is a large body of SDC 
methods for static data, the disclosure risk control literature on data streams is lim-
ited. The existing proposals follow three main approaches: perturbative masking, 
non-perturbative masking and counterfeiting.
In the perturbative masking approach, some noise is added to conceal the real 
value of the records. Li et al. (2007b) devised a method by which the correlation and 
the autocorrelation of multivariate data streams is tracked in an attempt to identify 
a good trade-off between privacy and utility. Differential privacy has also been used 
to anonymise data streams in some constrained scenarios. In Dwork et al. (2010), a 
differentially private counter of the number of 1’s in a data stream is released at each 
step. This method was generalised in Bolot et al. (2013) to compute differentially 
private sums over restricted windows.
In the non-perturbative masking approach, one seeks to hide each record in the 
stream within a group of records. In the static data setting, k-anonymity and its 
extensions are well-known privacy models that follow this approach. In the work of 
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Cao et al. (2011a) and (2011b) these privacy models are adapted to streams. Since 
to make groups we need to accumulate records, this approach necessarily introduces 
some delay in the release of the anonymised stream. Quite recently, a perturbative 
adaptation of k-anonymity for streams, based on a primitive called steered microag-
gregation, has been introduced by Domingo-Ferrer and Soria-Comas (2017).
In the counterfeiting approach, a record is attempted to be hidden within a group 
of records. By hiding each record within a group of fake records, we avoid the delay 
inherent to the previous approach Kim et al. (2014). The main drawback is the over-
head introduced by the addition of fake records.
14.5.8  Owner Privacy: Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) tries to solve the following question: can 
we develop accurate data mining models without access to the data at the record 
level? Therefore, it consists of techniques for modifying the original data in such a 
way that the private data remain private even after the mining process (Verykios 
et al. 2004).
There are two radically different approaches to PPDM, namely, PPDM based on 
perturbation and PPDM based on Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). The first 
was introduced by Agrawal and Srikant (2000) in the database community. Its idea 
is that respondents (who do not wish to reveal the exact value of their respective 
answers/records) or controllers (who wish to engage in joint computation with other 
controllers without disclosing their respective data sets to each other) compute mod-
ified values for sensitive attributes in such a way that accurate statistical results can 
still be obtained on the modified data. PPDM based on perturbation is largely based 
on statistical disclosure control techniques.
PPDM based on SMC, which was introduced by Lindell and Pinkas (2000) in the 
cryptographic community, addresses the problem of several entities holding confi-
dential databases who wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their 
databases, without revealing unnecessary information. This type of PPDM is equiv-
alent to data mining in distributed environments, where the data are partitioned 
across multiple parties. Partitioning can be vertical (each party holds all records on 
a different subset of attributes), horizontal (each party holds a subset of the records, 
but each record contains all attributes) or mixed.
Using SMC protocols based on cryptography (many of these resort to homomor-
phic encryption) or on sharing perturbed information in ways that do not alter the 
final results often requires changing or adapting the data mining algorithms. Hence, 
each cryptographic PPDM protocol is designed for a specific data mining computa-
tion and, in general, is not valid for other computations. For example, a secure scalar 
product protocol based on cryptographic primitives is applied to privacy preserving 
k-means clustering over a distributed dataset by Vaidya and Clifton (2003) and 
Jagannathan and Wright (2005). Similarly, Du et al. (2004) and Karr et al. (2009) 
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propose different ways (none of them based on encryption) to securely compute 
matrix products, which permits obtaining privacy-preserving linear regressions.
A different PPDM scenario arises when a data controller wants to leverage the 
storage and also the computational power of untrusted clouds to process her sensi-
tive data. This setting was studied in the H2020 project ‘CLARUS’ (http://clarusse-
cure.eu) and solutions based on cleartext data splitting across several clouds have 
been proposed. Furthermore, protocols to compute scalar products and matrix prod-
ucts with minimum controller involvement and maximum cloud involvement have 
been given by Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2018).
14.5.9  User Privacy: Private Information Retrieval
Finally, we address the privacy of the users querying a database. A history of queries 
to a database, or to a web search engine, can be used by the database owner to learn 
the interests of users, that is, to profile them. In this scenario, we seek to protect 
users from unrequested profiling by database owners. Mechanisms to achieve this 
goal are collectively referred to as private information retrieval (PIR).
Initial works on PIR, such as Chor et al. (1995), model databases as vectors of 
entries. Users requesting information from the database do so by providing an 
index or a set of indices of the database vector. In this setting, PIR techniques aim 
to hide the indices provided by the users. However, these initial approaches have 
several shortcomings. First, they require collaboration from the database owner, 
something that cannot be ensured unless database owners have a clear incentive to 
do so. Second, to perfectly hide the queried database indices one would need to 
query all entries in the database and then filter the results locally, which is clearly 
inefficient for moderately sized databases and certainly unfeasible for big data-
bases. Finally, modelling a database as a vector and assuming that the user knows 
the indices where the desired information is stored is not applicable to most real 
databases, let alone web search engines.
Several solutions have been proposed to overcome such shortcomings. Domingo- 
Ferrer et al. (2009) propose a system named Goopir in which user queries are locally 
complemented with terms of similar frequency in the language (connected by OR 
operations). The responses are then filtered locally. TrackMeNot (Howe and 
Nissenbaum 2009) is a browser extension which periodically sends fake queries to 
web search engines so that the distribution of interests of the user is flattened and no 
useful profile can be extracted. Finally, other proposals such as the one by Reiter 
and Rubin (1998) make use of a P2P network in which users submit queries gener-
ated by other users to the web search engine, thus achieving the same results as 
TrackMeNot (flattened interest distributions) but without overloading the web 
search engines with fake queries.
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14.6  Discrimination Prevention in Data Mining
Other than privacy implications, automated data collection and processing may 
have a secondary negative impact, which is discrimination. Automated data mining 
is used in several services to derive association and classification rules, which are 
then applied to a variety of decisions, such as loan granting, personnel selection, 
insurance premium computation, etc. While an automated classifier may be seen as 
a fair decision-making tool, if the training data are inherently biased, the generated 
rules will result in potentially discriminatory decisions.
Some works tackle this issue by pre-processing the training data using tech-
niques akin to those from statistical disclosure control, but aimed at reducing the 
inherent bias in the data. Others act directly on the automatically mined rules, either 
by eliminating some of them or by generalising some of the conditions of these 
rules (Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer 2013; Hajian et al. 2014, 2015).
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Chapter 15
Best Practices and Recommendations 
for Cybersecurity Service Providers
Alexey Kirichenko, Markus Christen, Florian Grunow, 
and Dominik Herrmann
Abstract This chapter outlines some concrete best practices and recommendations 
for cybersecurity service providers, with a focus on data sharing, data protection 
and penetration testing. Based on a brief outline of dilemmas that cybersecurity 
service providers may experience in their daily operations, it discusses data han-
dling policies and practices of cybersecurity vendors along the following five top-
ics: customer data handling; information about breaches; threat intelligence; 
vulnerability-related information; and data involved when collaborating with peers, 
CERTs, cybersecurity research groups, etc. There is, furthermore, a discussion of 
specific issues of penetration testing such as customer recruitment and execution as 
well as the supervision and governance of penetration testing. The chapter closes 
with some general recommendations regarding improving the ethical decision- 
making procedures of private cybersecurity service providers.
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15.1  Introduction: Dilemmas of Cybersecurity Service 
Providers
Security software and service providers—usually private companies—play a piv-
otal role in cybersecurity as they provide the competences and tools for defending 
the IT infrastructure, devices and data of their customers. Individuals, companies 
and state agencies put a considerable amount of trust in the tools and services of 
cybersecurity service providers. Furthermore, those specialised companies often 
obtain deep insights into the IT infrastructure and information processes of their 
customers and—more generally—a deep understanding of cyber threats, which pro-
vides them with a special responsibility on how to handle such knowledge and cus-
tomer data. When cybersecurity service providers perform evaluations such as 
penetration testing, additional responsibilities come into play.
Complicating matters further, new dilemmas have emerged due to partially con-
flicting regulations, the possibility that some customers may break laws and the fact 
that state actors are increasingly involved in carrying out cyberattacks. We exem-
plify these challenges with a dilemma related to threat intelligence and malware 
detection capabilities of cybersecurity companies.
15.1.1  Example: Dealing with Governmental Malware
The use of malware by governments and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) for 
surveillance and other purposes is a widely accepted fact. In 2014, F-Secure’s CRO 
Mikko Hyppönen said: “If someone had come to me ten years ago and told me that 
by 2014 it will be commonplace for democratic Western governments to write 
viruses and actively deploy them against other governments, even friendly govern-
ments, I would have thought it was a movie plot. But that’s exactly where we are 
today” (Thomson 2014).
The reasons for governmental use of malware and other details of such opera-
tions vary widely, including, for example, terrorist activities investigations, espio-
nage or tracking opposition journalists. One early case is Magic Lantern (Martin 
2003), a keystroke logging software developed by the United States’ FBI. It could 
be installed remotely, via an e-mail attachment or by exploiting common operating 
system vulnerabilities. Already back then there were concerns expressed by antivi-
rus vendors “that FBI software reportedly designed for covert keystroke monitoring 
could fall into the wrong hands” (Jackson 2001).
In 2011, a well-established group of German hackers accused the German gov-
ernment of releasing a backdoor Trojan into the wild. Security firm F-Secure con-
firmed that the program included a keylogger and code that could take screenshots 
and record audio (e.g. for room surveillance; Bott 2011). The group reverse- 
engineered and analysed the program, which it called “a lawful interception mal-
ware program used by German police forces”. The malware also offered a remote 
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control or backdoor functionality for uploading and executing arbitrary other pro-
grams. The program’s behaviour went well beyond the ability to “observe and inter-
cept Internet based telecommunication” (in other words, wiretapping Internet-based 
telephony), which is allowed by German courts. In addition, significant design and 
implementation flaws essentially made all of the functionality available to anyone 
on the Internet. Figures published recently (2017) revealed that the top five coun-
tries originating use of malware and other cyber-attacks were USA, China, Brazil, 
India and Russia (Ley 2018).
However, improving malware and attack detection capabilities of cybersecurity 
solutions clearly complicates the development and operation of malware by state 
agencies. Already in 2001, the public disclosure of the existence of Magic Lantern 
sparked a debate as to whether anti-virus companies should detect the FBI’s key-
stroke logger or could agree to whitelist it. There were rumours that Network 
Associates (maker of McAfee anti-virus products at that time) had contacted the 
FBI following press reports about Magic Lantern to ensure their anti-virus software 
would not detect the program. Network Associates issued a denial, fuelling specula-
tion as to which anti-virus products might or might not detect government Trojans.
It is likely that the news that North Korea’s antivirus software whitelisted mal-
ware (Sharwood 2018) did not come as a surprise: “Just why North Korea’s govern-
ment wants software that won’t spot some viruses is not hard to guess: a totalitarian 
dictatorship can only sustain itself with pervasive surveillance and leaving a back-
door that allows viruses in would facilitate just that.” There is, however, little evi-
dence on how malware used by Western governments is treated by Western 
cybersecurity companies. Responding to a transparency plea from leading privacy 
and security experts in 2013, a number of leading antivirus firms stated that they had 
strict policies against aiding law enforcement by whitelisting spyware or building 
backdoors into their software. For example, Symantec stated: “We have a strict 
policy against whitelisting malware for law enforcement and governments globally. 
We have never received such a request from law enforcement” (Westervelt 2013). 
We should note, however, that some of the approached companies failed to respond 
to the plea (Schwartz 2013). The summary published by Bruce Schneier at that time 
was: “Understanding that the companies could certainly lie, this is the response so 
far: no one has admitted to doing so” (Schneier 2013).
In fact, a need to comply with a law or a court order to whitelist governmental 
malware will clearly leave cybersecurity companies with no choice. Situations can 
easily be imagined, however, when a difficult choice does exist, because there are 
no appropriate laws, because a cybersecurity vendor is approached by a LEA from 
a different state, or due to other reasons. Should the vendor plainly say ‘no’ to the 
whitelisting request? Alternatively, should it weigh the consequences of preventing 
or hampering the LEA operations against privacy of its customers, dangers of a 
potential use of the backdoor by cybercriminals, and other relevant factors, which 
may also introduce serious uncertainties in the decision-making?
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15.1.2  Dilemmas of Cybersecurity Service Providers
The example above is one of several dilemmas cybersecurity service providers may 
face in their daily operations, where often no clear legal guidance is provided. This 
is where ethical considerations come into play to find an optimal solution. In addi-
tion to the ‘whitelist governmental malware?’ question discussed above, the follow-
ing list provides further examples of such dilemmas:
 – Should questionable customers be protected? Not all customers of cybersecurity 
service providers may have good intentions; some may even be labelled ‘crimi-
nals’ with respect to certain legal systems. However, whether certain customers 
are considered ‘questionable’ may not in any case be clear, for example if they 
reside in authoritarian or totalitarian states and are surveyed for political reasons. 
Furthermore, cybersecurity service providers may also choose to collaborate 
with such states and thus may become instruments for questionable aims. 
Although the judicial system in which the cybersecurity vendor is operating (also 
with respect to export regulations or sanction regimes) may to a certain extent 
provide a framework for declining certain customers or allowing LEAs to moni-
tor their devices, handling such cases sometimes remains an issue of the com-
pany’s policy and attitude.
 – Should incidental findings be disclosed? Cybersecurity service providers have 
considerable access to the information flows of their customers in order to detect, 
for example, hostile intrusions. However, what should a cybersecurity vendor do 
when they find traces of a crime committed by a customer company when moni-
toring its network? To a certain extent, the legal code of the customer’s location 
may provide answers in such cases, e.g. when the crimes concern child pornog-
raphy or crimes against humanity. It must also be considered that some legisla-
tion may forbid disclosing such information. In-between those legal boundaries, 
a space for ethical choices remains.
 – Should illegal breaches be profited from? Some cybersecurity service providers 
(for example the Italian company ‘Hacking Team’) provide offensive technology 
to the worldwide law enforcement and intelligence communities; i.e. tools 
against which other cybersecurity vendors develop countermeasures. Sometimes, 
illegal breaches may reveal source-code of such offensive tools, which legally is 
considered a break of a trade secret. Should an antivirus company analyse the 
source code in order to improve their tools? Again, a clear legal regulation is not 
available for such cases and an ethical choice has to be made.
 – Should non-customers be informed about potential risks? Private cybersecurity 
service providers operate under constraints to optimise revenue. How should 
such organisations deal with findings that do not directly lead to an increased 
revenue? For example, should they inform victims even if these are not their 
customers? Although most cybersecurity vendors work in a commercial environ-
ment, they rely on the work of many volunteers. It is therefore recommended that 
a commercial security organisation gives something back to the community, be 
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it information or tools. To what extent are cybersecurity service providers able to 
contribute to the community and how can such behaviour be incentivised?
In the following, we do not further discuss such dilemmas in detail. Rather, we 
provide an overview of domains, where cybersecurity service providers should 
implement policies in order to handle challenging situations in an optimal way.
15.2  Domains for Policy Implementations
15.2.1  Customer Data Handling
Data handling is a fairly heavily regulated domain, especially if personal data is 
involved (see Chap. 5). Cybersecurity service providers operating under the regime 
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU have to fulfil the prin-
ciples stated within, in particular transparency. Cybersecurity vendors need to 
inform their customers of what data they collect, how they process it, for what pur-
poses, etc. To analyse this aspect, we distinguish between data emerging from con-
sumers (e.g. individuals buying an antivirus tool) and companies that usually make 
use of a broader spectrum of services.
Taking the practices at F-Secure as an example, consumer-related data can be 
differentiated into the following categories:
 – Client relationship data. This data is necessary to manage the relationship of the 
company with its clients, and to market and sell the company services to them or 
to the legal entity that they represent. Any company on the free market seeking 
customers will collect such data.
 – Service data. This data is automatically processed in order to provide the clients 
with the services that they requested. This also includes the data that the clients 
actively submit to the vendors when subscribing to their services. Again, any 
entity on the free market that sells services to customers will collect such data.
 – Security data. This usually concerns anonymous or pseudonymous data that the 
company needs to collect to keep the clients secure, for instance, execution 
details of certain programs on a client device or its networking activities.
 – Analytics data. This concerns additional anonymous or pseudonymous data that 
the companies collect to learn when and how their services are found and used, 
for example, which protection features of a specific security product are enabled 
by a specific customer or how many infections were detected and blocked in a 
given customer device.
Whereas data from the first two categories are ‘standard data’ that any company 
will collect from their customers, the last two categories refer to specific data sets 
only available to cybersecurity service providers. It is therefore recommended to 
place these data sets in their own ‘silos’ to ensure that, in particular, security data is 
processed separately from data of the other types. To defend against a specific 
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 malware, a cybersecurity vendor does not need to know whether a particular user 
has been infected with that malware. Rather, the company only needs to know that 
this new form of malware emerged, analyse it, and then provide countermeasures to 
all of their customers. Analytics data should be processed in pseudonymised form 
by default, hence enabling the sharing of data among developers without privacy 
risks to an individual. Service data (i.e. name, email-address and other identifiers) 
and analytics data are combined only based on specific rules, for instance, to make 
it possible to send a reminder to a customer which purchased but did not activate 
certain security service. Via access control policies, cybersecurity service providers 
ensure that their marketing people do not have access to the analytics data, and all 
the other departments have no access to the service data.
Corporate customers often use the same products as consumers; hence, the same 
types of data and policies as described above are relevant. However, corporate cus-
tomers may in addition use Advanced Threat Protection (ATP), vulnerability scan-
ning and other products that go beyond the standard Endpoint Protection paradigm, 
as they enhance corporate networks security. Separating the device identity from the 
security analysis is no longer sufficient for ATP products. Since anti-malware activi-
ties have moved from detecting malicious code to detecting malicious behaviour, 
protecting corporate networks requires more context for analysing device and user 
behaviour.
The above observation means that anonymisation and data separation are no lon-
ger a viable approach. Hence, to safeguard privacy, more focus needs to be put into 
alternative protection means such as sufficiently granular access control mecha-
nisms, security personnel activity logging or usage guidance. An increasingly typi-
cal occurrence is that security and service data of corporate security products are 
processed jointly, with a pseudonymisation that takes place between corporate cus-
tomers and a cybersecurity provider, as opposed to pseudonymisation within the 
provider’s systems. In particular, this means that the only way for a security pro-
vider to learn actual names of employees of a corporate customer under protection 
is to ask the customer’s Information Security department or management (this may 
be necessary, e.g., in a security incident investigation). To avoid further complica-
tions, analytics data (for product improvement purposes) is usually not collected 
from corporate security products.
Many cybersecurity vendors publicly state their privacy and data handling prin-
ciples and practices (one can find examples of such statements at https://www.f-
secure.com/en/web/legal/home and https://www.f-secure.com/en/web/legal/
privacy). To conclude this section, we would like to list the following—more techni-
cal—recommendations to keep in mind when working with different types of data:
 – Steps should be taken to ensure that the telemetry data collected and stored about 
security incidents and system configurations is always anonymous or 
pseudonymous.
 – The STRIDE model should be used (Swiderski and Snyder 2004), which stands 
for six categories of security threats: Spoofing of user identity, Tampering, 
Repudiation, Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak), Denial of 
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Service (DoS), Elevation of privilege. Threat analysis sessions should be con-
ducted when planning new data handling-related functionalities and reviewing 
their readiness.
 – The quality of pseudonymisation functionality and procedures should be ensured. 
The small amount of (e.g. marketing related) telemetry data which contains iden-
tifiable data must be pseudonymised before it can be used for analytics purposes, 
and the ability to reverse the pseudonymisation must be very strictly limited and 
controlled. Every effort should be made to remove personal identifiers from file 
paths and file names before they are made available for analytics systems and the 
pseudonymisation code should be concentrated to a common library as far as 
possible. Its performance should be reviewed regularly.
 – Unnecessary data should not be collected. Data collected should always be for a 
purpose. Review processes should be implemented to regularly check whether 
telemetry and other data is really needed and to stop collecting it if it is not.
 – Clear data management procedures should be implemented. Cloud accounts 
should by default be read-only and extra privileges should be required to be able 
to make even small changes there. Cloud service account boundaries (e.g. for 
Amazon Web Services accounts) should be used as a means to isolate more gen-
eral accounts from data accounts and maintain tight access control on who has 
access to which data. Encryption contexts should be used to limit the power to 
decrypt data.
It must be emphasised that such policies and principles would not resolve all 
problems that may arise in practice. For example, the highly desirable data integrity 
property may conflict with the rectification and erasure requirements defined by the 
GDPR.  Such a problem can arise if a user asks their cybersecurity provider to 
remove certain parts of security data collected from her or his machine. Satisfying 
the user’s request will effectively make the collected security data incomplete and 
possibly useless in incident investigations.
15.2.2  Information About Breaches
A sensitive issue for cybersecurity service providers is when they become a victim 
of a data breach themselves, as this may have a direct impact on their reputation. 
There are several incentives to ‘hack’ a cybersecurity vendor. For example, state 
actors may be interested in knowing malware detection mechanisms to be able to 
circumvent them for specific intelligence operations.
According to the GDPR, cybersecurity vendors that are active in the EU have a 
legal obligation to provide protection against “accidental or unlawful destruction, 
loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data”. Failure to 
fulfil the obligation may result in authority investigation or administrative fines.
It is therefore necessary that cybersecurity service providers have procedures for 
managing personal data breaches. This includes criteria for determining whether a 
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security incident constitutes a personal data breach according to the GDPR and 
procedures for decision-making and evidence preservation that must be followed 
when handling such breaches. We list here a number of practical considerations for 
handling personal data breaches that are relevant for a typical cybersecurity service 
provider:
 – All personal data breaches should be recorded, including suspected ones and 
confirmed false positives. Timestamped minutes detailing all the facts and 
assumptions should be included as well as the risk-based reasoning for whether 
to treat a specific incident as a personal data breach.
 – In a team managing a suspected personal data breach case, members of the Chief 
Information Security Office, Legal Department and Executive Team should be 
included.
 – When performing a risk assessment of a breach, the following factors should be 
considered: number of impacted individuals; data types; breach types (e.g. acci-
dental, unlawful), data protection mechanisms used for the affected data (e.g. 
was the data encrypted).
 – When making a decision to publish a Personal Data Breach Notification, the fol-
lowing factors should be considered: whether the identities of the affected parties 
and impact of the breach to them is known; whether the relevant aspects of the 
security incident and breach are known at a reasonable confidence level; whether 
taking extra investigation time would benefit the understanding of the breach or 
help limit its negative effects to the involved parties (data subjects, controller(s), 
and the cybersecurity service provider), or whether it would instead be likely to 
aggravate the situation; whether there are specific items that should be omitted 
when sharing information because disclosing those would aggravate the impact 
of a breach to the data subjects.
 – Unless a personal data breach is unlikely to result in risks to the rights and free-
doms of natural persons, the Supervisory Authority should be notified about the 
breach.
15.2.3  Threat Intelligence Activities
Threat intelligence is information that helps understand threats targeting organisa-
tions and citizens, in the past, at present and in the future. Thus, the production of 
threat intelligence is a core activity of cybersecurity providers for preventing, 
detecting and responding to threats to their customers and general public. Threat 
intelligence is what cyber threat information becomes once it has been collected, 
evaluated in an appropriate context (in particular, considering information source 
and reliability), and analysed through structured techniques, identifying similarities 
and correlations in vast quantities of data. Threat intelligence production is not an 
end-to-end-process; rather, it is a circular process whereby requirements are stated; 
data collection is planned, implemented and evaluated, the results are analysed to 
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produce intelligence, and the resulting intelligence is disseminated and re-evaluated 
in the context of new information and consumer feedback. The process is a cycle 
because it identifies intelligence gaps and unanswered questions, which prompt new 
collection requirements, thus restarting the intelligence cycle (Intel 2019).
In this circular process, regular access to—potentially sensitive—information is 
necessary for cybersecurity service providers, which obviously requires defined 
data management procedures. Ideally, cybersecurity vendors must ensure that they 
are open about what they collect, that only necessary data is collected, that they use 
it only for pre-defined and justified purposes and give it out only on a need-to-know 
basis for legally permissible and ethical use, that they keep it secure and destroy it 
when they no longer need it, and that sensitive pieces of data are removed or ano-
nymised whenever possible. In reality, however, they often face threat intelligence- 
related trade-offs and choices with no clearly defined rules.
We focus here on the potential privacy impact of threat intelligence activities. It 
is typical for cybersecurity vendors to collect publicly accessible data on the 
Internet, extract metadata from selected files collected on the Internet or received 
from various feeds (e.g. exchange with other vendors and research groups, see also 
Sect. 15.2.5), and analyse it all to gather more information for further pivoting and 
putting context around threats. In the collected data and extracted metadata, impor-
tant for incident investigations and research, Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII) may be found and, by connecting pieces of data from multiple online sources 
and samples, actual identities of persons targeted by the analysed threats may be 
discovered. For instance, public social media data and profiles, including names, 
locations, workplaces, etc., may be valuable when only very selected profiles are 
associated with possible attackers or attack targets. Alternatively, data extracted 
from decoy documents and malicious emails can be used for pivoting, threat attribu-
tion and the identification of attacked organisations, or URL strings and whois data 
related to threat campaigns may include names, physical and email addresses and 
organisation names.
It is crucial for cybersecurity service providers to ensure that such data are col-
lected and processed only for specific use cases and the goals of the research or 
investigation. The collected sensitive data should be assessed for relevance for the 
use case in question and, if found irrelevant, deleted immediately. Data relevant for 
the use case should be stored only as long as the use case continues to be relevant 
and preferably locally in researcher machines. If such data is ultimately stored in 
external services, appropriate safeguards must be designed and applied. If other 
organisations are involved in data collection (e.g. business or research partners), the 
process must be made transparent for all the parties and its privacy impact must be 
analysed. If collected data or produced intelligence are shared with others (e.g. with 
law enforcement agencies or cybersecurity research groups), Sect. 15.2.5 discusses 
the relevant considerations and practices. An important aspect of data sharing to 
consider is whether data are moved across borders and—if so—to what states.
We conclude this section with a simple piece of advice: Always consider care-
fully if your threat intelligence goals can be reasonably achieved with less identifi-
able data.
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15.2.4  Vulnerability-Related Information
Finding vulnerabilities in software or system configurations of their customers is 
among the key activities of cybersecurity service providers. However, if a vulnera-
bility has been found, defined processes are necessary for a proper response. Policies 
are required regarding documentation, handling, and what kind of and when vulner-
ability information is shared with other parties or made public. These policies 
include Security Advisory publishing and communication to ensure the controlled 
disclosure of security vulnerability information and appropriate balance between 
(a) letting the customers and partners know enough to protect themselves, and (b) 
communicating in a way that does not help attackers who want to exploit vulnera-
bilities. The following considerations should be remembered when preparing a 
security advisory on a vulnerability:
 – Appropriate sensitivity classification of the vulnerability-related information 
should be assigned and ensured before the public release.
 – Providing deep technical details about the vulnerability is typically more useful 
for persons who want to exploit it than for those who want to protect their sys-
tems, so unnecessary details should be avoided.
 – All affected products and versions should be listed even if no fix is provided for 
some of those. There should be openness about the fact that users of discontinued 
and unsupported versions are running vulnerable software and that the only way 
to secure their systems is to upgrade to a supported version.
 – It is always good to explicitly mention the product groups and versions that are 
NOT affected by the vulnerability.
 – If the vulnerability is found externally, how the reporter wants the credits to be 
stated should be checked. Some external parties may not want the credits to be 
stated publicly. Contact information should only be included if approved by the 
reporter.
 – Appropriate national CERTs can be informed before the issue becomes public, 
in particular, to communicate it to other CERT organisations around the world.
 – The correct preparation should be put in place for when the media calls!
One instrument to gain information about vulnerabilities in own software are bug 
bounty programs. Using such programs, individuals can receive recognition and 
compensation for reporting bugs in software, especially those pertaining to exploit-
able vulnerabilities. Such programs allow the developers to discover and resolve 
bugs before malicious actors become aware of them, preventing abuse. Many organ-
isations and companies have implemented bug bounty programs—and cybersecu-
rity vendors use such programs, too. Again, policies are necessary if cybersecurity 
vendors launch bug bounty programs to identify vulnerabilities in their own soft-
ware.1 In particular:




 – A group of experts has to be established for reviewing cases reported to a bug 
bounty program.
 – Rules for setting amounts of money to be paid for reported vulnerabilities need 
to be defined.
 – The up-to-date program conditions and details should be clearly presented on the 
vendor’s public website.
 – A procedure for communicating with the bug reporters has to be defined and 
followed.
 – Metrics for measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the program are impor-
tant for its business viability.
At first sight, bug bounty programs are beneficial, because they are a means to 
decrease the number of vulnerabilities while ensuring that independent analysts are 
compensated for their effort. However, such programs come with their own set of 
problems. High-profile companies have to dedicate sufficient manpower to the pro-
gram in order to triage the incoming reports. Moreover, bug bounty programs can 
be criticised because they create harsh working conditions due to high fluctuations 
in pay and a work model that is entirely driven by results.
15.2.5  Data Sharing with Peers
Threat intelligence and attack-related objects (so-called samples, which are primar-
ily malicious or unwanted programs, documents and other files, or URLs) that result 
from the activities of cybersecurity service providers can be shared with (usually 
only) a limited number of reputable and vetted partners in the cybersecurity domain 
to improve global cyberattack resilience. This enables faster and more accurate pro-
tection for customers of cybersecurity vendors and high-impact cybersecurity 
research. In this section, we present some simple principles and considerations in 
establishing exchange partnerships which are followed by many organisations and 
groups in the cybersecurity domain.
Very informal agreements often suffice between reputable partners in the cyber-
security industry and research, in particular if they meet the following criteria:
 – They are members of well-established groups, such as the Anti-Malware Testing 
Standards Organization (https://www.amtso.org/) and the Association of Anti- 
Virus Asia Researchers (https://aavar.org/), or they are represented in the 
Computer Antivirus Research Organization (http://www.caro.org/index.html).
 – They have no known misdemeanour in their track record, including activities that 
cast doubts over their ethics as an organisation.
 – They are involved in activities within cybersecurity, such as antivirus, security 
research, data protection and suchlike.
Depending on the sensitivity and type of information being exchanged and the 
partners’ background, a written signed agreement may also be concluded prior to 
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any exchanges. In any case, the following points are usually stated explicitly to 
avoid any doubts:
 – Samples and URLs must be handled in a safe manner.
 – Samples and URLs that are exchanged must not be re-shared as such without a 
clear additional contribution.
 – Samples and URLs must not be redistributed to untrusted parties.
 – Shared samples and URLs are free from compensation.
 – Each party is responsible for its own use of the exchanged material.
 – Each party is responsible for having the necessary rights and authorisations for 
this activity.
If a potential partner does not meet the criteria mentioned above, an extensive 
background check is usually carried out and the community is contacted for feed-
back regarding that organisation. A written agreement is always required in such 
cases prior to any exchanges to confirm the partner’s commitment to comply with 
the established terms and rules of sample and URL exchange.
On-demand sample and URL sharing is normally allowed with trusted individu-
als in the cybersecurity community without formal agreements in place as long as 
they comply with best practices in the safe handling of samples and URLs. In this 
scenario, PGP encryption is always the preferred option to avoid the risk of unin-
tended recipients being able to open exchanged packages.
As a part of such best practices, exchanged samples and URLs are never 
decrypted nor packaged on production machines, only in special safe environments. 
Furthermore, files inside packages should not have their original file extensions and 
package names must clearly describe their contents to prevent accidental execution. 
Samples and URLs marked as confidential, marked as illegal or containing poten-
tially private data (e.g. email addresses, usernames and passwords within a URL) 
are excluded from sharing by all responsible organisations and groups. Whenever 
feasible, the origin of exchanged objects and data is anonymised.
A good example of a formal intelligence sharing partnership is presented by 
Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA, https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/), a not-for-profit 
organisation working to improve the global digital ecosystem cybersecurity by 
enabling near real-time, high-quality cyber threat information sharing among its 
members. Members are granted access to the CTA’s automated platform for sharing 
timely, actionable, contextualised and campaign-based cyber threat intelligence 
which can be used to improve their products and services to protect their customers, 
and regularly share insights and best practices. All potential members undergo a 
thorough vetting process, and the CTA also considers their potential value to the 
Alliance along with any possible security risks.
CTA intelligence sharing is grounded in five guiding principles, as stated on their 
website (available at: https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/who-we-are/; last access 
July 7, 2019):
 1. “For the greater good. We protect customers, strengthen critical infrastructure, 
and defend the digital ecosystem. Our automated platform empowers members to 
share, validate and deploy actionable intelligence to customers in near-real time.
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 2. Time is of the essence. We prevent, identify and disrupt malicious activities by 
rapidly sharing timely, actionable intelligence and reducing the effectiveness of 
malicious actors’ tools and infrastructure.
 3. Context rules. We reward context sharing to identify indicators of compromise 
and provide useful information about those.
 4. Radical transparency. We attribute intelligence to the member who submits it, 
but anonymise any and all victim and sensitive data.
 5. You must give to receive. We require all members to share a minimum amount of 
intelligence with the alliance to prevent the free-rider problem.”
It is noteworthy that one of the key CTA’s rules states: “Affected entity’s data in 
shared intelligence must be anonymised”.
15.3  Special Considerations for Penetration Testing
Building systems that are absolutely secure from the beginning is virtually impos-
sible due to high complexity and limited resources. Security-relevant mistakes can 
also be made during deployment and operations. A common approach to reduce the 
resulting risk is to perform regular security assessments (see Chap. 2). Penetration 
tests are one type of such assessment (Bishop 2007). In a penetration test, white-hat 
hackers (also called ethical hackers; see Chap. 9) target productively used systems 
under realistic conditions in a systematic fashion. Testers use similar or the same 
tools and techniques as malicious actors. Penetration tests are usually carried out by 
specialised cybersecurity service providers. The result of a penetration test is a 
report with a list of security-relevant findings and their severity, often including the 
steps to reproduce (exploit) them.
Conducting a penetration test involves numerous ethical dilemmas. In the fol-
lowing, we survey selected challenges. We also provide guidance for ethical 
decision- making based on experience obtained in various engagements.
15.3.1  Order Initiation
Clients that request the services of a penetration testing provider may not be upfront 
with their intentions. For instance, a client might request a test of a particular ver-
sion of a product which is not in use in their organisation at all. However, it could 
very well be the case that the client secretly knows that this version is in use at 
another organisation, for instance a competitor. The client could also be a nation 
state agency involved in law enforcement or political espionage. Many penetration 
testers aspire to ‘improving security’ by improving defence measures and closing 
vulnerabilities. They would not be willing to help clients gain technical expertise for 
offensive activities. However, it is quite difficult to identify such cases. For instance, 
clients could pretend that they do not use the to-be-tested product because they are 
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in the middle of a buying decision and this particular product is one of the promising 
candidates.
Accepting such a job and delivering an in-depth report with details about found 
vulnerabilities could make the penetration testers complicit in conducting morally 
questionable activities. Depending on the financial situation at the penetration testing 
provider, rejecting such ambiguous assignments may not be an option. However, due 
to the information asymmetry between testers and clients, the testers can still influ-
ence the outcome and the potential harm resulting from their findings. For instance, 
they can refrain from creating and providing a working exploit and omit technical 
details to make it more difficult to write such an exploit based on their report. The 
ethical dilemma arises from the fact that it is now the testers who are not completely 
honest with their client, which is another facet of professional integrity.
Some penetration testers may research particular products independently (i.e. 
without a mandate by the vendor and without receiving payment) in their spare 
time. Such activities are often used to advertise the competencies of a penetration 
testing service provider. Typically, the testers will follow responsible disclosure 
procedures, i.e. notify the vendor about any security vulnerabilities (see Chap. 2), 
before a report with the results is published.
Several ethical dilemmas can be encountered during this process. Firstly, ven-
dors of high-profile products know that many penetration testing providers will 
scrutinise their products immediately upon release because of the comparatively 
large advertisement value of finding vulnerabilities in them. Effectively, this means 
that these vendors get high-quality penetration testing without having to pay for it. 
Should penetration testers react to this form of financial exploitation and refrain 
from testing the products of vendors that implement this approach to create an 
incentive for vendors to perform security testing on their own? Alternatively, should 
it be considered that consciously refraining from independent tests of particular 
vendors introduces a systematic disadvantage for the (large numbers of) customers 
of these vendors?
Secondly, during the responsible disclosure process, vendors may try to prevent the 
penetration testers from publishing a report of their findings at the end, which might 
result in a loss of reputation for the vendor. This can either be done by threatening the 
penetration testers with legal means or by offering them a well-paid engagement, 
which—of course—comes with a non-disclosure agreement that prevents the testers 
from reporting the findings publicly. Again, it is necessary to establish a balance 
between professional integrity and generating a steady stream of revenue.
15.3.2  Execution
During the execution of penetration tests, testers make many decisions with signifi-
cant technical and ethical implications. One of the most straightforward questions 
is: How aggressively should the test be conducted? More aggressive tests may 
uncover more vulnerabilities but may also create more harm (e.g. downtime). It is 
also interesting to ask how thoroughly a discovered vulnerability should be 
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demonstrated. Is it sufficient to state that a vulnerability gives full access to a data-
base with sensitive information of all employees or should the tester actually ‘go the 
extra mile’ and retrieve records from this database and include them in the final 
report to make it ‘juicier’? Although this may actually be required to stress the 
severity of a vulnerability, it can also be seen as an avoidable violation of privacy.
Many penetration tests involve ‘social engineering’ (Mitnick and Simon 2005). 
Here, employees of the penetration testing provider deceive employees of the client 
in order to assess their security awareness and compliance. Social engineering 
ranges from sending tailored spear-phishing mails or giving them calls, for instance 
“from the IT department that needs their password”, to entering the premises under 
the pretext of gaining physical access.
These interactions are problematic for both parties, client and service provider, 
and the ethics of social engineering are quite involving (Hatfield 2019). In contrast 
to searching for bugs in software, social engineering uncovers unprofessional 
behaviour in humans. It is all too easy to jump to the conclusion that the ‘problem’ 
can be resolved by replacing a particular employee who made a mistake. It may be 
difficult for a client to accept the more inconvenient explanation: a successful 
attempt at social engineering means, firstly, that the organisation lacks training pro-
cedures, and, secondly, that it lacks technical means such as strict access control and 
segmentation that limit the power that attackers can gain via social engineering. 
Therefore, engagements involving social engineering should always be imple-
mented in a way that ensures that the client’s employees do not face personal con-
sequences based on the results.
Social engineering is also challenging for testers. Not only does it involve lying 
to other humans, it means strategically deceiving and tricking them, with the explicit 
objective of making them fail. Testers might have to go to great lengths to build up 
sufficient trust with their ‘victims’ to be successful. Social engineering providers 
should establish clear boundaries of acceptable behaviour for such engagements 
and should offer dedicated training to their employees. Moreover, they should give 
employees the freedom to reject social engineering assignments.
The final stage of a penetration test is the creation of a report. Clients may have 
a political agenda, asking for a ‘green’ report that plays down the severity of the 
findings. Other clients may ask for the opposite: a ‘red’ report, for instance, as the 
basis to request more funding within their organisation or to discredit the work of 
colleagues or other units. Such negotiated and intentional modifications of the origi-
nal assessment conflict with professional integrity and are seldomly justifiable. 
However, the original message may also be modified unintentionally, for instance, 
when clients ask for a management summary without too many technical details. 
Such a ‘dumbed down’ report can be easily misinterpreted.
15.3.3  Supervision and Governance
In the previous sections, we discussed ethical dilemmas in the realm of penetration 
testing. How can service providers ensure that they act in a responsible fashion?
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First, penetration testing providers and their employees are in a powerful posi-
tion because of a significant information asymmetry. Only the testers know the full 
truth. Their employer and the client have to trust them that they report all findings 
accurately and completely. Although it may be possible to reproduce the actual find-
ings, it is difficult to verify their severity judgement, and virtually impossible to 
determine whether anything has been omitted or forgotten.
There are two ways of mitigating this information asymmetry between clients 
and providers. Firstly, clients can choose to engage different penetration testing 
providers to correlate their findings. Secondly, before the penetration test, clients 
can intentionally introduce vulnerabilities into their systems to test the abilities of 
the testers. A historic example of this approach is reported by Karger and Schell 
(2002) for the Multics system, who inserted malicious code in the system that was 
not uncovered even after the testers had been informed of its existence.
Even in the absence of such incentives, penetration testing service providers 
should work towards establishing a sense of work ethics and procedures that ensure 
high-quality work. For instance, it may make sense to pair up highly skilled junior 
security analysts with more experienced personnel to channel the curiousness and 
drive of the young and to avoid them overshooting the mark when they are ‘in the 
flow’. This is especially important because, as stated in Sect. 15.3.2, it may not be 
desirable to do everything that is technically possible during an attack, even though 
it may be very enticing.
Moreover, penetration testing providers should encourage their employees to 
reflect on the effects of their work on their clients and society at large as well as the 
way how they conduct it (i.e. whether the end result justifies the means). In addition, 
formal training, an open culture with informal meetings and discussions as well as 
opportunities for engaging with the community of security professionals may help 
penetration testers keep track of the right course.
Penetration testing providers should also consider institutionalising ethical deci-
sion making. One approach which seems to work well in practice consists of estab-
lishing an Ethics Board that is given authority to decide on the course of action in 
all morally questionable cases, ranging from whether or not to take an ambiguous 
engagement to operational questions during testing. Ideally, members of the Ethics 
Board should be elected by the workforce. Executive stakeholders may be members 
of the Ethics Board; however, they should be in the minority. Decisions of the Ethics 
Board should be binding for the company.
15.4  Conclusion: Improving Ethical Decision-Making
Policies, practices and recommendations explained in this chapter are an important 
instrument for cybersecurity service providers in order to ensure that the handling 
of sensitive data or operations is ethical and secure. However, not all dilemmas 
exemplified in the beginning of this chapter can be resolved by policies and guide-
lines. It remains important that cybersecurity vendors also develop some 
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competences in ethics (e.g. by providing their personnel with training in ethics) and 
an ‘ethical culture’ that supports the handling of unexpected situations. In several 
domains such as health care and business ethics, decision heuristics have been 
developed for an ethical assessment of problems (for example in computer science, 
see Linderman and Grillo 2006). Those decision heuristics usually involve a step-
wise procedure for analysing problems where no clear guidelines are available:
 1. Ethical sensing: As a starting point, an attempt should be made to answer the 
following question: What provokes ethical debate? Feelings of outrage, shame, 
guilt or bad conscience could be indicators of an ethical challenge.
 2. Gather the facts and legal framework of the case. This also includes identifying 
the relevant stakeholders and contextual information. It is desirable to include all 
perceptual perspectives of the participating experts to avoid bias.
 3. Identify the moral question and own positions/values. The goal of this step is to 
identify the ‘ethical core’ of the problem. Disclosing the personal values of the 
involved experts should also be integrated here—again to avoid (normative) bias.
 4. Analyse the arguments by using ethics frameworks. Examples for frameworks to 
be used are provided in Chap. 4 of this book.
 5. Develop options and decide. Here, developing several courses of action that lead 
out of an ‘either-or’ can be helpful. When evaluating and weighing arguments, 
one-sidedness in the argumentation patterns should also be identified and 
discussed.
 6. Implement the solution. This includes assessing the possibilities of implement-
ing the decision and taking measures for successful implementation. 
Communicative aspects (how is the decision communicated to whom?) should 
be considered as well. Finally, possible criteria for reassessment should be iden-
tified and examined to learn from the decision.
In addition to such decision heuristics, cybersecurity service providers should 
also consider implementing procedures for whistleblowing. Company insiders 
should have ways to raise their concerns without risking losing their employment or 
becoming the object of other sanctions. We have many great examples of high ethi-
cal standards of technology-minded people and we strongly encourage cybersecu-
rity vendors to support the ethical awareness and culture of their employees.
Finally, intensifying education and training about ethical decision-making is 
undoubtedly important for vendors of security products and services. However, it is 
equally important that ethics and security are much more deeply integrated into the 
education of software engineers, system designers and operators. After all, these 
roles make much more significant decisions with critical consequences for security 
and morality.
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Chapter 16
A Framework for Ethical Cyber-Defence 
for Companies
Salome Stevens
Abstract Private sector companies are becoming increasingly frustrated over the 
lack of effective solutions to growing criminal threats in cyberspace, leading to calls 
by security experts for a more active cyber-defence including offensive actions in 
cyberspace taken with defensive purposes in mind. However, should private compa-
nies use active cyber-defence measures or would they by such an act implicate 
themselves in illegal actions? As long as there is no specific regulation defining the 
legal grounds for active cyber-defence, the conventional doctrine of a right to self- 
defence may be the closest analogy within the physical realm. This chapter exam-
ines cyber-defence along the lines of a right to self-defence and concludes that the 
categorisation of passive and active does not allow for a thorough analysis of the 
legal and ethical justification of a specific defensive measure. Instead, a categorisa-
tion based on the effects of a specific measure is suggested. Along the lines of this 
effect-based categorisation—and considering the capabilities as well as the limits of 
the application of a right to self-defence to cyberspace—this chapter proposes some 
concrete recommendations for companies on how to define ethical cyber-defence 
within their security strategy.
Keywords Attribution · Necessity · Proportionality · Self-defence · Subsidiarity
16.1  Introduction
The number of cyberattacks have grown exponentially in recent years. As a conse-
quence, private companies have invested more resources into building a cybersecu-
rity strategy that uses digital tools to protect computer systems and networks from 
malicious intrusions. One way of doing this is the use of more active cyber-defence 
strategies (see for example Schmidle 2018). However, how far can a company go 
before it crosses the line and implicates itself into committing illegal actions? In the 
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absence of any legal regulation on the use of cyber-defence for private companies, 
this chapter examines cyber-defence along the lines of a right to self-defence within 
the physical realm. It begins with a straightforward question underlying this article: 
Should a company use active cyber-defence? It then examines cyber-defence from 
the perspective of a right to self-defence, which considers not only the final effects 
of a cyber-defence measure, but also the circumstances in which the measure is 
applied. The chapter concludes with some concrete recommendations for compa-
nies regarding what to consider when defining ethical cyber-defence within their 
security strategy.
16.2  Should a Company Use Active Cyber-Defence?
Whereas there have been a number of different attempts to classify cyber-defence, 
the distinction between ‘active cyber-defence’ and ‘passive cyber-defence’ is the 
most common one. There are differing definitions of what active and passive could 
mean in the context of cyber-defence. Denning and Strawser define active cyber- 
defence as any “direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effec-
tiveness of cyber threats (…)” and passive cyber defence as “all measures, other 
than active cyber defence, taken to minimise the effectiveness of cyber threats” 
(Denning and Strawser 2017: 3). However, if we examine cyber-defence from a 
right to self-defence, then the distinction between active– and passive defence 
becomes less relevant, as they can in principle both be legitimised under the right to 
self-defence and there are few cases where one would be obliged to revert to pas-
sive– defensive measures. For the above reason, we choose to add another descrip-
tion to the usual categorisation of passive and active defence; one which considers 
the effects of a specific measure rather than its characteristics. Therefore, a specific 
cyber-defence measure could either have the effect of breaking the law or not.
Returning to the categorisation of active and passive cyber-defence, some defen-
sive measures showing an active component are clearly against the law. Gaining 
unauthorised access to a computer system for example, or ‘hacking’ is illegal in 
most countries (on hacking see Chap. 8). Consequently, this is the case also for 
‘hacking back’. As a result, a company deciding to infiltrate another computer sys-
tem or network without the permission of the user or network owner is breaking the 
law in the same way the initial attacker does. The same could be said for such active 
defensive measures that destruct external networks or data. For this reason, we here 
categorise such cyber-defence measures that regularly break the law as being prob-
lematic cyber-defence measures.
Passive cyber-defence measures on the other hand, such as a firewall, an antivirus 
or an encryption program, would regularly not break any law, because they would 
not create any negative effects. We call these measures unproblematic.
However, more interestingly, some cyber-defence measures with an active com-
ponent could either be problematic or unproblematic depending on the manner in 
which they are used. Such defensive measures would fall within a grey zone, being 
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neither clearly problematic nor unproblematic. An Internet Protocol (IP) blocking, 
traffic deflection or a honeypot, for example, could be within the law if it does not 
inflict any harm on third parties. The same could possibly count for beacons or 
white-hat ransomware depending on the manner in which they are being applied 
(Hoffman and Nyikos 2018: 17–25, 51; for a conceptualisation of different defence 
measures see Chap. 2).
Consequently, our categorisation results in the distinction of three different 
groups: Defensive measures that are regularly unproblematic (marked in white in 
Table 16.1), defensive measures that may be problematic depending on their con-
crete application (marked in light grey in Table 16.1) and defensive measures that 
regularly fall within the category of problematic defensive measures (marked in 
dark grey in Table 16.1).
From this new effect-based categorisation of cyber-defence measures, we con-
clude that the question of whether a company may use active defence in its security 
strategy is formulated too broadly, and the fact that a defensive measure shows an 
active component does not directly imply its unlawfulness. Even if some active 
cyber-defence measures could imply a higher risk for companies (problematic mea-
sures marked in red in Table 16.1), the question of whether a specific active defence 
measure could break the law should be analysed on a case-by case-basis and demand 
the careful consideration of the potential effects it may cause in the given circum-
stances vis-à-vis the laws that may apply to a given situation. Such evaluation 
requires the consideration of direct as well as secondary or unintended effects that 
result from the application of a specific measure.
16.3  Applying Self-Defence to Cyber-Defence
The right to self-defence as considered in this chapter is incorporated in criminal law 
and aims to regulate the conduct of private citizens. As such it is to be distinguished 
from the concept of self-defence in international public law, which regulates the 
right of states to apply force in response to armed attacks. Self- defence—as defined 
Table 16.1 Application of a second layer of categorisation to cyber-defence
Unproblematic cyber-
defence measures










For example hacking 
back, disruption or 
destruction of external 
networks or data 
Passive cyber-defence Active cyber-defenceDefinition based on the 
characteristics of the 
cyber-defence measure
Definition based on the 
effects of the cyber-
defence measure
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in criminal law—can allow for the use of force against an attacker and thus render 
an otherwise illegal act lawful, provided it was necessary to defend one’s own inter-
ests. Self-defence is recognised by a majority if not all domestic legal systems and 
has found recognition as a legal principle in core disciplines of international law (on 
self-defence in international law see: Hessbruegge 2017). Common law jurisdic-
tions distinguish between defence of oneself, defence of others, and defence of 
property, while most civil law systems include all three concepts under the notion of 
legitimate self-defence (Hessbruegge 2017: 4). Although this chapter attempts to 
provide a holistic understanding on the ethical implications of cyber-defence, some 
of the following considerations may be based on the notion of self-defence under the 
Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) (see Art. 15–18 SCC).
If we are to apply the principle of self-defence to the categorisation of cyber- 
defence measures into problematic and unproblematic measures (cf. Sect. 16.4), 
then the parameters could shift once again. Whereas the categorisation in Sect. 16.3 
emphasises the final effect—the result—of an applied defensive measure, the para-
digm of self-defence considers the circumstances that led to the application of the 
said measure. As a result, even such active cyber-defence measures that fall within 
the category of problematic cyber-defence measures could in principle be justified 
under law and thus rendered lawful, provided they fulfil the requirements of an act 
of self-defence. To illustrate, consider a person using force against a thief to safe-
guard his or her property. Most people would approve of the defender’s act even if 
in principle it breaks the law. This is, of course, depending on how much force the 
defender applies. Whether the same could apply for a company’s security team 
using force on an attacker’s computer system or network to ward off a cyberattack 
is to be explored in the following sections.
16.4  Could Self-Defence Justify Cyber-Defence Otherwise 
Considered Unlawful?
Unsuprisingly, self-defence provisions were drafted for a physical realm, far before 
a scenario of active cyber-defence was foreseen, and up until today there has been 
no relevant case law on the application of self-defence to the realm of the cyber 
world. This is why it remains uncertain if and how the right to self-defence would 
apply to cyber-defence by a private company. It could be argued that the physical 
paradigm of self-defence is unsuited to draw the line between such cyber-defence 
measures that may be deemed acceptable under law and ones that should be forbid-
den by it. The argument fundamentally rests on the assumption that active cyber- 
defence is essentially different from any conventional case of self-defence, which is 
why the conventional self-defence doctrine cannot tackle the particularities of 




16.4.1  The Argument of Vigilantism
It has been argued that the particularities of active cyber-defence measures are such 
that they are never defensive but rather serve revenge goals or deter future attacks. 
This is why a majority of cybersecurity experts say that the right solution in response 
to a cyberattack is always be to leave the matter in the hands of law enforcement 
(see, for example, reader comments to Volokh 2007).
Self-defence is indeed to be distinguished from punishment. Whereas self- 
defence can only cover acts taken to prevent a harm, counteracting an attack may 
entail punishment. Actions of a punishing nature, except for a few exceptions 
regarding minor criminal offences, are generally not allowed by contemporary 
domestic criminal orders. This is so because they go against the state’s monopoly of 
the use of force. As a result, acts that are in breach of the state’s monopoly of the use 
of force are generally considered acts of vigilantism (see also Dittrich and Himma 
2005: 673 ff.).
In the realm of cyber-defence, this would mean that a legitimate act of defence 
must be able to stop an imminent unjust attack. If an applied technique of active 
cyber-defence cannot stop an imminent unjust attack, then it cannot be defensive but 
may, rather, be considered offensive (see also Denning and Strawser 2017: 11). The 
problem lies when such counteract is executed in a second moment, meaning when 
it is too late for it to be considered self-defence (see for example Fletcher 1989: 
201). To illustrate, let us consider active cyber-defence techniques used for attribu-
tion, namely the identification of the perpetrators of the hacking attack. In a number 
of cases, such techniques may be applied after an attack has occurred and may be 
used to report an attacker to the authorities or to send a strong message of deterrence 
to the attackers. Accordingly, such active cyber-defence techniques applied for the 
purpose of attributing the initial attack to the perpetrators may be said to have a 
primarily punishing or retaliatory nature rather than a defensive one (see also 
Himma 2004: 4). Thus, they would be unjustified under self-defence. This may, 
however, not be the case if the cyberattack is to be considered ongoing (on this point 
see Sect. 16.4.2) and if the attribution measure is applied with the aim of ending the 
attack. Furthermore, if we consider the blockage of traffic coming from a malicious 
IP address, then this active measure could in principle be defensive in nature.
Based on the above considerations, it would be premature to conclude that every 
measure of active cyber-defence would necessarily always have to be vigilant. In 
the end, it is precisely the aim of any self-defence provision to be outlined in such a 
way as to reliably draw the line between defensive and retaliatory measures. To 
define the defensive element of an act, it has to incorporate several indicative ele-
ments. An act can thus only be considered a case of self-defence if it satisfies the 
requirements of self-defence, namely if (1) It comes as a direct response to an immi-
nent unlawful attack (2) It is necessary to ward off the attack, and (3) The preserved 
interest is not disproportionate to the harm inflicted on the attacker (based on Art. 
15 SCC as commented in Niggli and Göhlich 2019a, b with further references). 
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16.4.2  The Argument of the Speed of Cyberattacks
If we take the example of the requirement of imminence of an attack, then we come 
across several situations where the term demands further clarification within a sce-
nario of active cyber-defence. One peculiarity of cyberattacks is their speed, which 
often outpaces human-dependent cyber-defence. In the case of encryption, for 
example, most ransomware can complete encryption within less than 1 min after 
intrusion. In the case of cyber-defence, this would mean that any justifiable active 
defence measure would have to happen within these couple of seconds before suc-
cessful encryption. It is unlikely that any human-dependent cyber-defence system 
could act timely in this case even if intrusion is detected before encryption is com-
pleted. The technical characteristics of the speed of such cyberattacks would thus 
render the proof of imminence of any cyber-defensive action close to impossible.
A similar line of argument could apply to preventive defensive measures, namely 
such measures that are applied in advance of an attack and aim to prevent an attack 
from happening. While the requirement of imminence does not oblige a defender to 
wait with the defensive action until it is too late to effectively defend oneself, the 
lawful application of a preventive defensive measure in cyberspace would essen-
tially require a company to have known about the attack in its planning phase. 
Considering the limitations of the legal possibilities of private companies to gather 
intelligence outside of their own network, it is unlikely that a company would be 
aware of a planned attack on itself to such a degree that a preventive counterstrike 
could comply with the requirement of imminence for a situation of self-defence 
(Stevens 2019: 326 ff. with further references).
Consequently, the requirement of imminence significantly narrows the scope of 
situations of cyberattacks in which self-defence could apply. Essentially,  self- defence 
in cyberspace would be limited to cyberattacks that imply the resilience of a cyber-
attacker within a company’s system or network for a prolonged period of time or to 
such attacks that entail some sort of persistent attacking behaviour, as for example in 
the case of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack or possibly even the intru-
sion sequences of a cyber kill chain (for a consideration of this argument see Stevens 
2019: 335 ff.; on the conceptualisation of a cyber kill chain see Chap. 2).
16.4.3  The Argument of the Harm to Innocent Third Parties
Because the right to self-defence relies essentially on the distinction between an 
attacker and innocent third parties, attribution is a central element of every case of 
self-defence. It answers the question of who is to be held responsible for an attack 
and consequently against whom a defensive measure may be justified. The nature of 
cyberspace, however, makes it particularly easy for attackers to hide their identity 
through third-party systems, which get hijacked for the purpose of initiating an 
attack. This is why in the realm of cyber-defence, an attack needs to be attributed on 
several levels: (1) It needs to be attributed to a specific computer or server; (2) The 
identified computer or server needs to be attributed to an owner or legitimate user(s); 
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and (3) The attack needs to be attributed to the specific person or organisation that 
is behind it.
The challenges connected to the attribution of cyberattacks thus puts active 
cyber-defence at particular risk of causing unintended damage to innocent third- 
party computer- or server users. In extreme situations, an active countermeasure 
against the source of a cyberattack could lead to the disruption or destruction of a 
hospital’s computer system, thereby indirectly causing physical harm or even death 
to patients who rely on the functioning of the hijacked computer system. Considering 
the risks of false attribution in cyberspace, it is argued that the best way to avoid the 
uncertainties related to the attribution of cyberattacks would be to completely forbid 
any problematic defence measure in cyberspace.
Generally speaking, self-defence does not justify harm inflicted on an innocent 
third-party. Its parameters are limited to acts directed against the person to which 
the attack can be attributed. However, in some particular circumstances, criminal 
behaviour against an innocent third-party may still be justified defence, for exam-
ple: (1) If the defender had no other way to ward of the attack and the preserved 
interest weights proportionally more than the harm caused to innocent third-parties 
(i.e. situation of necessity); (2) If the defender reasonably believed that the act was 
directed against the attacker and would not inflict harm on any innocent third-party 
(i.e. error of fact; putative self-defence).
Whereas situation 1 essentially relies on the parameters of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality of the applied defensive measure (cf. Sect. 16.4.4), situation 2 acknowl-
edges the uncertainty of a given situation and allows for a reasonable margin of 
error (cf. Sect. 16.4.5). The question would thus be whether the defensive act against 
a third party could fulfil the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality or 
whether it was the result of a reasonable error of fact in a given situation; both points 
discussed hereafter. It remains to be said that even if a right to self-defence could 
exclude criminal liability for a defensive act applied against a third party, the com-
pany could still face financial liability for the damage caused to the third party under 
tort laws. (based on Art. 52 II Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO)).
16.4.4  Subsidiarity and Proportionality
For an act to be considered defensive, it needs to be appropriate in view of the pre-
vailing circumstances. The appropriateness of an act is measured using the notions 
of subsidiarity and proportionality (based on Art. 15 SCC as commented in Niggli 
and Göhlich 2019a, b, n 28 ff. with further references). It cannot be said with cer-
tainty how a court would apply the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality 
to a case of cyber-defence as there is no relevant case law on this matter. However, 
subsidiarity would likely imply that the threat could not have been effectively averted 
or minimised using a less invasive measure or that the used measure could have been 
applied in a less invasive manner. Acts directed against third party-users would set 
stricter parameters to the requirement of subsidiarity; obliging a defender to revert to 
non-invasive defensive measures should they be appropriate to avoid the threat 
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(based on Art. 17 SCC as commented in Niggli and Göhlich 2019a, b: n 16 with 
further references). In practice this could mean that if a court finds that an attack 
could have effectively been stopped without inflicting damage on the third party, 
then it would not justify the use of any more invasive cyber-defence measure.
The requirement of proportionality would require a balance to be carefully struck 
between the imminent harm avoided by a company against the damage done to an 
innocent third party, and possibly also the initial attacker. The infliction of physical 
harm to hospital patients that are kept on life support by the hospital computer sys-
tem would, for example, be disproportionate to the financial interest of a company 
and could thus not be justified under self-defence. It would be more difficult to 
strike a balance between the financial interest of a company and the financial inter-
est of a cyber attacker or a third party computer user. Here again it can be noted that 
the requirements to proportionality would be higher if the act was to cause damage 
to a third party rather than the attacker. It is therefore to be expected that the safe-
guard of a financial interest of a company is unlikely to justify the considerable 
financial damage on a third-party user. This situation could be altered if the attack 
on the company poses imminent danger to life or physical well-being. As has been 
shown, striking a balance between two interests is by no means an easy task; in 
practice it can prove quite challenging and because the equation of proportionality 
needs to consider all the prevailing circumstances, no general line can be drawn.
16.4.5  The Argument of Uncertainty
Recognising that the paradigm of self-defence depends essentially on the parame-
ters of subsidiarity and proportionality, another aspect of attribution that should be 
discussed when considering the application of self-defence in cyberspace is uncer-
tainty. To calculate the parameters of a certain defensive action, foreseeing the con-
sequences of our actions is an inevitable necessity, as well as foreseeing the harm 
averted at least to a degree of reasonable certainty. Even if in very specific circum-
stances self-defence could justify the act of a defender who mistakenly believes the 
requirements of self-defence to be satisfied—even if objectively these requirements 
are not met (i.e. error of facts; putative self-defence; cf. Sect. 16.4.3)—such a right 
can only apply to the one whom truly errs. A defender knowingly accepting the 
uncertainty over all relevant factors of a defensive act no longer errs and can thus no 
longer benefit from a right to err (confirmed by the Swiss federal court in BGE 135 
IV 12, E. 2.3.1).
This could mean that if a defender cannot reliably attribute the source of the 
attack to a person or a server to a specific user, then consequently he or she cannot 
calculate the effects of an active cyber-defence action nor in some cases the harm it 
aims to avert. Consequently, because the defender cannot calculate the effects of his 
or her act, he or she lacks reason to think that the requirements of self-defence could 
be satisfied (see also Dittrich and Himma: 675). This is especially true given that 
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many active cyber-defence tools operate automatically and do not give the opportu-
nity to contextualise the circumstances of a particular situation (see also Denning 
and Strawser 2017: 12). To illustrate this, consider the case of data theft. Whereas 
the security team of a company could detect that someone had been in their system 
and had possibly stolen some internal data, it is likely that at the time at which they 
decide to get unauthorised access to the attacker’s computer system, they would not 
know who the hackers were nor what they intended to do with the removed com-
pany information. If the security team does not know what harm the company or any 
third parties would face or whether the information has already been passed on at 
the moment of the hack, then how could they decide whether their counter-action is 
necessary or proportionate at that given moment?
Even if we argue that attribution can be done quite reliably on all levels if done 
by the right people with the relevant capabilities, the problematic factor of applying 
self-defence to cyber-defence lies in the fact that the reasonable certainty of attribu-
tion increases the more time is spent on such activities (see for example Lin 2016: 
13; Rid and Buchanan 2015: 32). In fact, a reliable attribution of an attack asks for 
follow-up investigations that go beyond the initial attribution at the time of the 
detection of the intrusion (Lin 2016: 13). In the case of APT10 (Mandiant’s naming 
of the Chinese Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) group) for example, it took a 
group of anonymous researchers almost 2 years of investigation to identify what 
they thought was a hacking campaign masterminded by the Chinese government 
(Anonymous 2018). Considering the requirement of imminence of an attack dis-
cussed in Sect. 16.4.2, it becomes questionable if any attribution made to a degree 
of reasonable certainty could be concluded within the given time frame to make it 
possible for the defender to comply with the requirement of imminence (cf. Sect. 
16.4.2). Furthermore, reliable attribution may require active cyber-defence tech-
niques that would be considered within the realm of problematic defence measures 
and could thus be breaking the law. This would lead to the paradoxical situation of 
attribution being simultaneously the motive as well as the precondition of a justifi-
able defensive countermeasure. From the above, we conclude that the particular 
uncertainty connected to attacks in cyberspace could be the most convincing argu-
ment against the use of active cyber-defence in cyberspace.
16.4.6  Is Active Cyber-Defence Worth the Risk?
In addition to considering the legal legitimation of any active cyber-defence mea-
sure, it makes sense to weigh up the potential gains from deploying a problematic 
cyber-defence measure against the potential risks and drawbacks of that measure 
(see also Dewar 2017: 16). If a cyberattack cannot reliably be attributed, then a 
company can consequently not know who is behind the attack. It could, for exam-
ple, be a skilled teenage hacker, operating from his or her living room, a bunch of 
criminals seeking financial gains, an organised crime group, a competing company 
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trying to gain insight into company operations and trade secrets, a group of activists 
hacking a private company for political or ideological reasons or an adversary coun-
try controlling strategic cyberattacks for political and economic reasons. In fact, 
even if a person operating a specific attack was identified, it is not certain that this 
person is also the mastermind behind the specific operation. Depending on who is 
on the other end, the tools at a cybersecurity team’s hands may be very limited and 
counterattacks could provoke further and more harmful attacks on the company’s 
system or even have the potential of escalating into hostilities between nations, with 
severe consequences.
16.4.7  The Cross-Border Element of Cyber-Defence
There are a number of scholars who support the claim that it is best to specifically 
regulate active cyber-defence in separate new legislation (see for example Brunoni 
2016: 3). The need to further regulate active cyber-defence by private companies 
has been especially vocal among United States scholars (see for example Rabkin 
and Rabkin 2016) and on 25 May 2017, U.S. Congress Member Thomas Graves 
introduced the ‘Active Cyber Defence Certainty Act’. The bill would amend the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the U.S. legislation that made it a federal 
crime to access a protected computer without proper authorisation, so as to autho-
rise certain active cyber-defence measures by private sector organisations that go 
beyond their own network. The bill currently in congress has been heavily disputed 
by cybersecurity experts, who fear allowing private companies to use active cyber- 
defence could create a ‘cyber wild west’ and make vigilantism the norm (Swinhoe 
2018). Despite the potential consequences of changing the CFAA, the act has one 
important limitation: The bill does not specifically tackle nor prohibit cross-border 
active countermeasures, and this is where the situation becomes more challenging.
In fact, examining the highly interconnected cyber-space, it could be argued that 
by allowing companies to use active cyber-defence techniques at home it is likely to 
result in such companies stepping across their home jurisdiction boundaries and 
perpetrating attacks in other countries. In such an event, the affected country, for 
example France, whose policy stance prohibits private companies from using any 
active cyber-defence, will find the ones in charge of the execution of the measure as 
criminals under French law, regardless of how they may be considered under any 
other domestic law (Smolanoff and Brill 2018: 6 ff.). From there it is easy to imag-
ine how what would at first may seem like a legitimate defensive act by a private 
company could lead to a conflictual claim of states over criminal jurisdiction of the 
respective cyber-defence act. In fact, the international nature of data flows may be 
the biggest obstacle to any attempt to regulate active cyber-defence for private com-




Recalling the categorisation of defensive measures in Chap. 4, we conclude that, 
although in principle it cannot entirely be excluded that very specific cases of cyber- 
defence could fall under a right to self-defence, the nature of cyber-defence, such as 
the implied uncertainty connected to the attribution of cyber attacks  (cf. Sect. 
16.4.5ff.) and the likelihood of third party damages (cf. Sect. 16.4.3), pose signifi-
cant challenges to the reinterpretation of a physical concept of self-defence to the 
cyber world and thus make the use of problematic cyber-defence measures (marked 
in red in Table 8) particularly risky for a private company. It is best to entirely avoid 
their use. This counts in particular for such defensive measures that could result in 
physical harm to innocent third parties (such as in the case of the unintended take- 
down of a hospital server or a critical infrastructure for example) or considerable 
financial damage, no matter how small the risk of such an outcome may be (see also: 
Hoffman and Nyikos 2018: 53). A private company considering the application of a 
problematic cyber-defence measure should also keep in mind that such an act may 
result in financial liability for damages caused to third parties.
The decision to revert from using a problematic defensive measure does not 
always come lightly (see also Chap. 2), especially when it means accepting consid-
erable damage to the company and allowing the criminal to get away with his or 
her malicious attack. To avoid facing such a conflictual decision of whether to use 
a problematic cyber-defence measure, there are a number of security measures a 
company can take that typically fall within the category of unproblematic measures 
and that aim to prevent the negative effects of a cyberattack. Encryption could be 
such a preventive measure. This ensures that the company’s data is encrypted in 
such a way that it makes it more difficult for an attacker to read data and conse-
quently use it in a malicious manner against the company. Other examples of pre-
ventive measures could be to run a firewall or other suitable security programs. 
There are several other security tools and techniques that can ensure the continued 
functionality of a system and limit the damaging effects in case of a hacker attack 
(see Dewar 2017). Securing an offline data backup could, for example, be an effec-
tive measure to avoid losing access to company data as a consequence to a hacking 
attack. At the same time, a power station could ensure the continued supply of 
electricity in the case of an attack (Dewar 2017: 12; for a conceptualisation of dif-
ferent cyber-defence measures see also Chap. 2).
If applied consciously, a range of active cyber-defence measures placed in the 
grey zone of Table 8 could be useful to complete a security strategy, provided they 
are applied in such a way as to avoid any negative effects or create tension with 
other countries. Their application would demand a careful consideration of all 
related effects (direct and secondary) and should include not only the location of the 
effects (within own network or outside own network) but also the thorough under-
standing of the scale of the effects (temporary or reversible impact, permanent or 
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destructive impact) (Hoffman and Nyikos 2018: 57; on the benefits and problems 
connected to different active cyber-defence tools, see for example Jarko 2016). 
The considerations implied in choosing to consciously apply such defensive mea-
sures should not be the responsibility of a company’s security person or team but 
should be a policy decision backed up by the management and taken in consultation 
with the right experts and in view of the relevant legislation. Finally, we should 
accept that no security technology is perfect, and as long as there are security mea-
sures there will be cyber criminals calculating ways to evade them.
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Chapter 17
Towards Guidelines for Medical 
Professionals to Ensure Cybersecurity 
in Digital Health Care
David Koeppe
Abstract There are no independent foundations and systems for general informa-
tion security in medicine. For the special processing situations and in particular for 
the very high protection requirements of data and processes—ultimately health and 
life can depend on bits and bytes—a corresponding implementation of the essen-
tially industry-independent procedure must take place. This topic is set to receive a 
special boost both among patients and among those responsible in the institutions 
because of the considerable increase in data protection awareness following the EU 
data protection basic regulation. This set of regulations addresses not only the law-
fulness but also the security of the processing and threatens considerable sanctions 
in the event of gross negligence in this area. Regardless of whether this leads to the 
implementation of a proper information security management system in a larger 
institution—or whether the resources for such a large solution are not available in a 
small medical practice and it is instead sufficient for a successive long-term project 
to be processed—the topic must be addressed systematically.
Keywords Authorisation · Data protection · Information security management 
system · Patient safety
17.1  Introduction
17.1.1  Why Data Protection in Health Care?
What is the core motivation to seriously address security issues in data processing? 
In addition to the abstract insight into the advantages of taking precautionary 
measures, it is, above all, the fear of the disadvantageous incidents occurring that 
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may even result in the termination of one’s own (business) activity. This focus on 
the business processes of classical information security has been expanded with an 
additional type of disadvantage, namely the legal sanctions imposed in the event of 
a failure of data protection because of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) in the European Union that applies from 2018 onwards (see also Chap. 5). 
The adoption of suitable and appropriate cybersecurity measures now no longer 
depends solely on a personal sense of responsibility and on liability risks. Rather, it 
is actively demanded by the legislator.
From the perspective of data protection law, the physician or medical institution 
involved in data processing poses a risk for the person concerned (here: the patient) 
and his or her ‘rights and freedoms’. In this respect, this perspective differs from 
that of traditional information security. In accordance with this significant increase 
in motivation prompted by the sanction regime of data protection law and based on 
the professional view of the author, the problem of cybersecurity in health care is 
here primarily approached from a data protection perspective. The contribution 
discusses the technical-organisational measures—also legally required (GDPR, Art. 
32)—for the security of data processing.
17.1.2  The Problem
A (executive or freelance) physician, apart from his actual profession, hardly has a 
real chance of creating a state-of-the-art level of security in the processing of the 
patient data entrusted to him using his own specialist knowledge and his own 
resources. Either he works in a large organisation that guarantees cybersecurity for 
him, or he makes use of an appropriate service provider. However, this does not 
release him from his responsibility, especially since he has to make or confirm a 
number of specifications in a sophisticated information security manage-
ment system.
The starting point of all considerations are the primarily medical and administra-
tive requirements of opening one’s own IT to ‘the outside’, in particular to other 
service providers, cost carriers and increasingly also to patients. This is a dynamic 
environment to which constant adjustments are necessary. In addition, the health 
ecosystem is currently undergoing rapid changes towards a patient-centred and 
technically increasingly ubiquitous landscape.
As a rule, information security cannot be designed from scratch, as health sys-
tems have their own history. The demand of dealing more intensively with cyberse-
curity usually arises during the day-to-day operations of an institution. It is based on 
amendments to the law (such as the GDPR), due to incidents or because of a general 
sensitisation towards the subject. Accordingly, at the beginning of all activities, an 
inventory of the existing processing methods and the system landscape is necessary. 
However, it does not make sense to stare at the cybersecurity dangers like a deer in 
the headlights. Without an overall view of processing security, only a patchwork 
would emerge. Thus, a checklist is not sufficient.
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17.1.3  Setting the Framework
It should be emphasised at the beginning that, due to the proximity of the topics of 
cybersecurity and data protection, a joint processing of the respective requirements 
in a unified process and uniform documentation is urgently recommended. A 
separate consideration ultimately leads to considerable additional effort, since the 
same item is touched several times and potentially viewed and described in different 
ways. This involves the considerable risk of inconsistencies. Therefore, a combined 
approach to the data processing landscape, primarily from the broader perspective 
of data protection, is followed in this contribution.
A systematic and documented procedure is indispensable for assessing the com-
pleteness of the consideration as well as the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
cybersecurity measures. Derived from the requirements of data protection law, there 
are essentially three elements:
 – (Inventory and) Description of processing activities
 – Risk analysis
 – Design of measures
Essentially, these are the same elements required for a data protection impact 
assessment following the GDPR.  This is a prescribed, formalised process to 
establish or ensure the legality and security of the processing of personal data. It is 
a generic process, whereas the peculiarities of the health care system usually require 
a very high level of protection for processes and data and that specific processing 
situations are considered.
17.2  Approach
From the perspective of classical information security, the focus is on processes, 
structures and technology. The view of data protection goes a little further and 
enriches the topic with legal and content-related aspects.
17.2.1  The Data Protection Perspective
From the perspective of data protection, the central subject to be described is ‘pro-
cessing activity’. This is a process or a chain of individual processing steps that 
represents the logical totality of the handling of personal data that is required to 
achieve a purpose or bundle of purposes. Such processing activities include, for 
example, a clinical study, payroll accounting, diagnostics using a medical device, 
video monitoring in a sleep laboratory, or debt collection for defaulting debtors in 
health insurance. From a European point of view, the compulsory ‘Register of 
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Processing Activities’ of the GDPR (Art. 30) provides guidance for structuring such 
activities. However, the minimum data specified there alone are not practicable; in 
addition, all available data that constitute the processing, e.g. with regard to the 
required transparency vis-à-vis the data subjects (Art. 12  ff. GDPR), should be 
collected centrally.
The mandatory information to be collected is as follows:
 – Purpose(s) of processing (e.g. billing of services)
 – Categories of data subjects and categories of personal data (e.g. patients and their 
master file data)
 – Categories of recipients (e.g. internal: patient administration, external: insurance 
provider)
 – Third country transfers and documentation of appropriate guarantees (e.g. 
Switzerland: adequacy decision of the EU Commission, India: use of EU standard 
contractual clauses)
 – Deletion periods for the categories of data (e.g. billing data 10 years after the end 
of billing)
 – General description of the technical and organisational measures taken to ensure 
the security of the processing (note: a reference to an existing security concept 
would be ideal here).
In addition, further information should be documented, in particular:
 – Legal basis of the processing (e.g. for the implementation of the treatment con-
tract pursuant to Art. 9 para. 2 lit. h GDPR)
 – Origin of data (e.g. transmission from referring physician)
 – If not obvious: description of the processing process with participants, inter-
faces, pseudonymisation levels, etc.
 – Description of the measures to guarantee the principles of processing (according 
to Art. 5 GDPR)
The structuring of these activities for the purpose of description is the most 
demanding aspect to guarantee data protection and data security. It must be carried 
out in such a way that, on the one hand, all processing operations of the institution 
or the person responsible are actually recorded in their entirety and there are no 
‘blind spots’ in the documentation. On the other hand, the handling of the individual 
processing activity should still be possible with a view to a meaningful description. 
The coarser while simultaneously more abstract the description, the lower the risk 
of overlooking something. At the same time, the associated complexity makes it 
difficult to create a comprehensible and functional description. Patient treatment as 
a single processing activity may make sense in a small medical practice, where all 
possible sub-processes (admission, diagnostics, findings, therapy, documentation, 
etc.) can still be potentially summarised in a single description. In a hospital, 
however, this would no longer be possible due to the complexity. Here, a modular 
decomposition into logical and self-contained sub-processes such as admission, 
medical diagnostics, medical and nursing documentation, discharge management, 




From a technical point of view, there is an obvious impulse to equate processing 
with the system (software, medical device) that is used for this purpose, to which 
manual activities are then added to complete the process description. This may be 
appropriate in individual cases, but in more complex processing environments, a 
specific software is often used for different purposes and thus for several processing 
operations and/or several applications, devices are required for one single processing. 
This requires adequate integration. For example, it makes sense to summarise 
similar processing operations in one description to avoid turning 100 blood glucose 
meters distributed over the hospital into 100 processing operations.
17.2.2  The Information Technology Perspective
A modularisation of the descriptions is urgently advisable in a more complex envi-
ronment. Components or technical sub-processes that are repeatedly used, e.g. the 
institution’s e-mail solution, the use of multifunction devices or simply the—ideally 
standardised—terminal (PC, smartphone) should be described and correlated with 
the relevant parameters in each case (technically and organisationally) to ensure 
they can then be referred to in the legal and functional context from the higher-level 
processing description.
With regard to information technology, the institution should be modelled. At 
least in larger institutions, this will have to be realised with appropriate software 
support, in order to be able to assign the components (software, terminals, servers, 
networks, rooms, personal groups) available in the underlying layers to each 
processing or business process (as a bundle of processing). Such a hierarchical 
model is indispensable for an information security management system. Appropriate 
handling will be possible, however, only with appropriate personnel and technical 
resources and thus remain rather reserved for larger institutions. A meaningful 
differentiation and grouping of components (e.g. networked PC versus stand-alone 
PC) can also be done manually in the medical practice.
To move from the rather abstract basics for security considerations to the practi-
cal conditions, the components that make up a processing activity must be analysed. 
From a purely technical point of view, these are the classic IT components such as 
servers, networks, end devices, operating systems, software, etc. However, the latest 
patch status helps little if the access door to the doctor’s practice is not locked at the 
end of the day. Therefore, in addition to the technical layers in the narrower sense, 
other organisational aspects must also be considered.
17.3  Risk Analysis and Assessment
As soon as the systematic description has provided an overview of which elements 
of the IT landscape exist and what they are used for, the actual problems can be 
identified in a differentiated risk analysis.
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Both the basic principles of information security (see also Chap. 2) as well as the 
data protection requirements for processing security (see also Chaps. 5 and 10) call 
for a risk-oriented approach. This enables scarce resources to be managed in such a 
way that only relevant risks are adequately addressed. However, a systematic risk 
assessment primarily contributes to ensuring that no hazards are overlooked 
(completeness of the risk model). A conscientious assessment of the identified risks 
based on this also provides the appropriate prioritisation for the following measures.
It is important to mention that risk assessment does not exclusively concern the 
risks for the operational information processing and thus the legal and economic 
interests of the physician. It also concerns the possible regulatory sanctions for 
breaches of duty. Thus, the European GDPR can now be regarded as decisive—
regardless of the possible consequences for the patients (or employees) themselves. 
Essentially, three dimensions play a role here: warranty targets, protection 
requirements and threats.
17.3.1  Warranty Targets
The essential step before starting a risk inventory is the definition of warranty tar-
gets, i.e. the overarching aspects of data processing which should be protected 
against threats. The categorisations resulting from the different approaches are 
largely similar. There is not yet a European standard for the implementation of 
warranty targets from the GDPR. For the time being, reference is made here to the 
scheme of the ‘standard data protection model’ agreed upon within Germany by the 
data protection supervisory authorities (see https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/





 – Intervention capability
 – Non-linkability
 – Data minimisation
The objectives that are important for the security of processing in the narrower 
sense are availability, integrity and confidentiality (in italics), which are also the 
classic warranty objectives in information security. Thus, regardless of the different 
perspectives of operational information security and data protection, not only are 
the terms identical, but in the long run the measures to be taken are too. The four 
further objectives are primarily oriented towards the rights of the persons concerned 
and are initially ignored at this point, as they affect the risks for the persons 
concerned but less so cybersecurity, which is the focus here.
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17.3.2  Protection Needs
The warranty targets relevant for cybersecurity are to be supported with measures 
depending on the risk. To achieve scalability here, a protection requirement is 
defined for each processing or for each data category to be processed, depending on 
the processing purpose and environmental conditions. It makes a considerable legal 
and practical difference whether an email (which per se contains personal references 
by sender and recipient) is used to order a catalogue of goods from a supplier or 
whether it is used to send a report of findings to another doctor. Usually, the level of 
protection required is normal, high and very high and can be defined as follows:
 – ‘Normal’ stands for a personal reference that has hardly any potential for abuse 
or stigmatisation with regard to the individual concerned. Depending on the 
processing scenario, this can be simple contact data, a company telephone 
directory or the functional designation of a jobholder.
 – ‘High’ would be a need for protection if the person concerned had an increased 
interest in the data not being disclosed, uncontrolled or misappropriated. This 
could concern the amount of salary, a bank account or a reference.
 – A ‘very high’ need for protection must be provided for special categories of per-
sonal data and for data which are subject to a separate legal obligation to main-
tain secrecy—i.e., ultimately for all patient-related data arising in the context of 
health care or medical research.
This means that a very high need for protection for processing will usually have 
to be assumed in the health care system. Lower protection requirements will usually 
only arise in the handling of (most) employee data, information on relatives and in 
the B2B context (suppliers, service providers, colleagues from other institutions).
The category of data in connection with the category of data subject is not the 
only decisive factor for the classification. It also depends on the processing context. 
For example as soon as the absence of an employee is due to health reasons, the 
need for protection for confidentiality rises from normal to very high.
As is the case for the warranty targets, the protection requirements must also be 
presented from the perspective of those affected. The result is a matrix in which the 
need for protection is determined for the respective processing in relation to the 
warranty objectives. In simplified form, this could look as follows (Table 17.1):
Table 17.1 Example of a protection needs matrix
Availability Integrity Confidentiality …
Salary statement High High High
Data exchange with collaborating physician High Very high Very high
Patient record High Very high Very high
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As far as possible, a qualitative or even quantitative assessment of the protection 
requirement categories is recommended in order to arrive at comprehensible defini-
tions. For example, the integrity (e.g. in the case of manipulation/falsification of 
data) would have to be measured in the following cases: a) detection of the error is 
very likely, does not have major consequences and is easy to correct (= normal, e.g. 
wrong academic title in the salutation), b) detection of error has potentially tempo-
rary unpleasant consequences for the person concerned and a higher correction 
effort is needed (= high, e.g. incorrect payroll), c) danger to life or physical condi-
tion of the person concerned and errors possibly cannot be corrected (= very high, 
e.g. findings that serve as the basis for medication or surgery).
17.3.3  Hazards
To arrive at measures from the warranty targets (What must not be impaired?) and 
the need for protection (How in need of protection is it?), it is necessary to 
operationalise the hazards (What must I protect myself against?) as concretely as 
possible. These hazards must be related to the individual components (categories). 
A workplace PC faces other dangers than a cloud platform or a sonography device.
Many relevant hazards can be identified with systematic thinking in a rather sim-
ple process. However, it makes sense to use existing schematisations to avoid the 
risk of overlooking relevant aspects. The international standard for information 
security management systems is ISO 27001, which includes a catalogue of ‘controls’ 
for both processes and systems. However, the basic IT protection documentation 
(IT-Grundschutz-Kompendium; available at: https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/
ITGrundschutz/ITGrundschutzKompendium/itgrundschutzKompendium_node.
html; last access: July 72,019) of the German Federal Office for Information 
Security (BSI), which is similar in approach and freely available, is much more 
detailed and comprehensive. A complete implementation for the entire organisation 
would be a project of considerable scope. However, as long as there is no obligation 
to implement and no need for an audit, the relevant and/or interesting building 
blocks for one’s own circumstances can be selected and successively worked 
through. The IT-Grundschutz-Kompendium currently contains 80 modules (e.g. 
‘Home Workstation’, ‘Web Browser’, ‘Clients under Windows 10’, ‘Remote 
Maintenance’, ‘Sensitization and Training’). For each module, there are hazard 
catalogues along with requirements (measures/guidelines/recommendations) 
graded according to protection requirement levels (basic, standard, increased). The 
47 ‘elementary hazards’ that are independent of the modules alone are a helpful 
catalogue for analysing an individual’s situation.
As long as we move only between the three more technology-related warranty 
objectives of availability, integrity and confidentiality, there is usually no major 
difference in the result between the information security (facility-related) or data 
protection (affected-related) view. Ultimately, the data protection perspective in the 
basic protection system is an additional one which, by referring to the ‘standard data 
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protection model’ of the German data protection supervisory authorities, will in 
future offer an operational implementation of the requirements of the basic data 
protection regulation, above all with regard to the additional warranty objectives.
17.4  Design of Measures and Possible Conflicts
17.4.1  Balancing Measures
The risk analysis determines whether a measure should be taken in order to encoun-
ter a hazard that has been recognised and identified as relevant. The character and 
intensity of a measure depends on the requirement resulting from the risk in connec-
tion with the need for protection. It is not a question of maximising the protective 
effect but of appropriateness, which includes assessing the concrete circumstances 
of the processing, the state of the art and the implementation costs (see also Chap. 
7). Excessive costs, however, do not speak in favour of foregoing processing secu-
rity as such but rather in favour of foregoing this specific form of processing.
Data security measures do not only include obvious technical measures, such as 
installing a patch or activating an encryption feature. Organisational measures are 
also indispensable, especially when dealing with the human factor. Work instructions, 
restrictive allocation of authorisations, and the sensitisation and empowerment of 
employees are just as important and belong equally to an overall concept.
When designing measures, it is not only important to take the measure (e.g. data 
carrier encryption). Rather, a systemic perspective must be adopted to ensure that 
the measure is only taken if necessary. The mechanisms of an information security 
management system serve this purpose. In less complex environments, the proven 
PDCA cycle should be implemented at least: Plan-Do-Check-Act, i.e. a regular 
review with regard to the completeness of the risk inventory and assessment as well 
as the appropriateness and effectiveness of the measures with any necessary 
adjustments. In the case of significant changes in the processing or the environment 
at least, the continued legal conformity and thus the security of the processing 
should be checked.
It is advisable to consult a proven expert when designing measures in the techni-
cal environment. The correct configuration and administration of a firewall, a pos-
sibly mixed IT and medical technology network or a mail server should not take 
place at the amateur level—too much depends on it.
Finally, it is essential to document the measures to be taken and those actually 
taken based on the previous process steps. In addition, the justification for not taking 
a certain measure should be part of this documentation.
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17.4.2  Data Security Vs. Patient Safety
IT disruptions can jeopardise the care of patients and, to a serious extent, their 
health. Carefully designed data security ensures that medical systems are protected 
against data loss and falsification or a considerable restriction of availability. 
However, it is possible that the measures to be implemented already affect the 
supply process and not the disruptions that are prevented by them. This creates a 
further level that must be included in the risk assessment. This view is most likely 
to be manageable if it follows the original design of the measures as a control loop.
An example of this would be a networked blood glucose meter that requires the 
entry of patient and employee IDs to ensure the traceability of the measurement and 
documentation process and to assign measured values to the correct patient. 
However, it must be technically possible at any time to carry out a measurement 
without an administrative lead-time, especially in medical emergencies. In such a 
case, an organisational determination would have to be made as to how the non- 
automatically assignable measurement values are to be addressed in the course of 
operations.
17.4.3  Authorisation Restrictions
In complex IT systems, a differentiated assignment of authorisations is necessary, 
not only from the point of view of confidentiality. Whereas in a small medical 
practice it is merely a matter of controlling certain functions in accordance with 
professional responsibilities and authorisations, in larger organisations particular 
attention must be paid to confidentiality. It is unacceptable that in a hospital, 
hundreds or even thousands of employees can access a patient record. Classical 
authorisation matrices have emerged, such as the authorisation of nursing staff for 
patients within their care units or the authorisation of physicians to the organisational 
units assigned to them, such as the specialist department and, at given times, also 
the emergency unit or specialist departments within the framework of night on-call 
services. In the course of increasingly variable treatment processes and increasing 
staff shortages, this simple basic principle of authorisation restriction is maintained 
increasingly infrequently.
The consequence of this is the urge to expand authorisations for being able to 
address any exceptional case in order to ensure the data are always available. Here, 
the argument of the ‘obstruction of work’ must not be given too much room at the 
expense of data protection; a relativisation of the articulated needs is often possible. 
Occasional requirements, e.g. on the part of administrative functions, can often be 
met by the division of labour processes, and in a great hurry, e.g. in the case of 
resuscitation, the physician also has better things to do than tackle an information 
system. A differentiated consideration is necessary, but in the end, a dampening of 
the safety effect by concessions to the work ability will have to be accepted.
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A decisive element is how short-term adjustments of access can be made by the 
user administration, especially in the case of flexible personnel deployment. 
Automated approaches for the process-controlled and patient-centred assignment of 
authorisations exist in modern systems. However, this is still a dream of the future 
for most institutions whose static information systems are architecturally rooted in 
the 1990s.
17.5  Aspects Deserving Special Attention
Regardless of the requirement to carry out a systematic and area-wide examination 
of all aspects of cybersecurity, several ‘classic’ topics are often neglected in everyday 
data protection, although they can affect the security of processing. These aspects 
are often overlooked, especially in smaller institutions that lack the expertise and 
resources for a sound approach in the form of an information security or data 
protection management system. In the following, some of these aspects are outlined.
17.5.1  Data Transfer
As soon as the (electronic) release of data is concerned, a distinction has to be made 
between whether the data are transferred to a service provider who only processes 
them on behalf of the recipient (order processing in accordance with the GDPR, Art. 
28) or whether it is a transfer in which the recipient pursues his own purposes with 
the processing. This could be a co- or aftercare provider, a cost unit, the holder of a 
research or quality assurance register, a patient transport service or a service provider 
of the patient who operates an electronic health record on behalf of the patient. In 
such cases, the transfer of the data also represents the transfer of responsibility (also 
under civil law). This means that—after ensuring the legality and a secure design of 
the transfer—the further responsibility lies with the recipient. As a rule, this also 
means that no further efforts are required to influence the recipient’s processing 
circumstances, e.g. through data protection clauses in a cooperation agreement.
17.5.2  Order Processing of Data
If a service provider is commissioned with data processing that does not pursue its 
own content-related purposes, this falls into the domain of data protection order 
processing. An example could be a computer centre in which servers are hosted or 
applications are operated, a billing service provider, an envelope-inserting copy 
centre or a company that provides service and maintenance for IT, medical or office 
communication systems. Even if the data is not physically transmitted, order 
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processing must be carried out regularly in the case of (remote) maintenance if the 
service provider’s activities could impair the achievement of even one of the 
warranty targets. The legal distinction between order processing and transmission 
can be difficult to make in individual cases, and the competent data protection 
officer should be consulted for advice.
The existence of order processing not only entails the obligation to conclude a 
highly formalised contract pursuant to Article 28 of the GDPR, but it also has a 
decisive significance for the allocation of responsibility. The client remains 
responsible for the processing and its legality, and for guaranteeing the rights of the 
data subjects. Accordingly, no contractor may be commissioned who does not offer 
the guarantee that he fulfils the requirements of data protection law—including 
those on data security—during processing. This must be checked before the order is 
placed and if necessary also during the course of the contractual relationship. As it 
is not possible to carry out more than superficial plausibility checks on the basis of 
one’s own expertise, meaningful certificates or attestations by independent bodies 
should be demanded regarding the suitability of the service provider (in particular 
with regard to the security of the processing, e.g. in accordance with ISO 27001). A 
small typing office will not be able to offer this, but such certifications can be 
expected from a provider of cloud solutions. Certifications specifically relating to 
data protection exist sporadically, but the market will certainly develop a wider 
range of meaningful certificates in the coming years.
17.5.3  Mobile IT
A conventional, stationary IT environment is not easy to protect. However, as soon 
as mobile devices with possibly special mobile operating systems are added, 
additional and serious risks arise. Classic consumer devices are still hardly usable 
for operational use for processing health data. The presettings for synchronisation 
with the manufacturer’s cloud, device location and the assumption that the device 
user would always be willing to transfer data to social media can hardly be mastered 
by an average user. Without the use of a restrictively set up mobile device 
management and an administration solution for restricting the possibilities while 
simultaneously processing risks of the end devices, the use of smartphones and 
tablets should be discouraged.
Another problem is the large and somewhat functionally tempting range of appli-
cations for communication and for medical use, and increasingly also for health 
professionals. In general, we can assume that the developers have maximised ben-
efits and usability but were insufficiently effective in data protection and data secu-
rity. In recent years, this has been confirmed by various studies on the security and 
data protection conformity of apps. Before using such applications (this also applies 
to web platforms and applications on stationary IT), the certification or at least the 
manufacturer’s promise with regard to data protection and data security must always 
be checked. Otherwise, the following applies: Although the patients may use such 
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devices on their own responsibility, such an unexamined solution is unsuitable for 
professional use.
17.5.4  Internal Networks and Applications
The fact that IT components are operated in the premises of the institution does not 
mean that they are not exposed to any dangers and therefore do not have to be 
designed securely. Today, networking is omnipresent. Without a connection to the 
Internet, almost no information technology can be adequately operated. Whether for 
data exchange, for downloading patches and updates, or even for access by service 
providers, access to the Internet is nowadays technically and above all economically 
almost unavoidable.
However, it would be irresponsible to confine oneself to a single hurdle at the 
Internet access point (firewall, malware filter), since on the one hand hundred 
percent protection can never be guaranteed there and on the other hand dangers can 
also get into one’s own network, e.g. by a data medium exchange. In recent years, 
there have been several examples where hospitals have had to do without core 
elements of their IT for days despite the usual protection mechanisms, due to 
malware.1
17.5.5  Communication with Patients
From the perspective of data security, the manifold possibilities for electronic com-
munication with patients represent an increasing problem. It is not enough that 
patients increasingly expect health care professionals to use the e-mails, messengers 
and social media they have become fond of in other areas of life. Medical institutions 
also offer corresponding channels—partly in response to patient needs, partly on 
their own initiative. The fact that very few are suitable for communication with 
confidential information is often ignored or sometimes even not recognised.
Regardless of the patient’s ignorance, indifference or simple comfort, the strict 
requirements for the integrity and confidentiality of data processing also and 
especially apply to communication via public networks by medical institutions. In 
any case, state-of-the-art transport encryption is indispensable, ideally end-to-end. 
This means that standard e-mail communication is already ruled out as a medium, 
unless an obligatory encryption technique is set up. However, most recipients cannot 
handle such an encryption technique. In addition, solutions of the platform operators 
and telecommunications service providers must meet the warranty targets obligatory 
1 See https://rp-online.de/nrw/staedte/neuss/neuss-computer-virus-legt-das-lukaskrankenhaus-
lahm_aid-9614119 (last access 25.09.2018) or https://www.england.nhs.uk/2017/05/cyber-attack-
updated-statement-and-background-information/ (last access: July 72,019).
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for the health professional. The obligation to transmit all contact data in one’s own 
database is, for example, a knockout criterion under data protection law for the use 
of a widely used, albeit end-to-end encrypting messenger.
It is advisable to offer patients a confidential digital communication channel in 
addition to telephone, fax and letter. Even if hardly anyone uses the PGP public key 
provided for email communication, it is still a signal to the interested public that 
inspires confidence.
17.5.6  Obligation to Report Data Breaches
If the efforts in data security have been insufficient and an incident occurs, there are 
regulatory consequences in addition to practical coping. Incidents in data or 
information security are frequently simultaneous violations of data protection. If 
personal data are disclosed unlawfully or unintentionally, destroyed, altered or lost, 
at least in the case of patient data, a reporting obligation to the data protection 
supervisory authority (Art. 33 of the GDPR) is necessary. In addition, the existence 
of an obligation to notify the persons concerned (Art. 34 of the GDPR) should also 
be assumed. Since failures to report or give notice in accordance with obligations 
are threatened with sanctions, the educational approach of the legislator to first 
understand these provisions as a deterrent should be appreciated by not 
underestimating efforts in data security from the outset.
17.5.7  Training, Awareness Raising and Instruction 
of Employees
The majority of data security problems are likely caused by human actions or omis-
sions. Whether the cause is insufficient sensitivity, lack of knowledge or simply 
convenience—or a mix of these factors—this can and must be counteracted. 
Whether it is clicking on links in ominous e-mails, forgetting to make regular 
backups or simply misusing devices and software: from the perspective of the 
person responsible, these aspects also need to be considered—not just technical 
expertise in patient treatment. Serious errors or omissions can endanger the existence 
of both the facility and those affected by the data breakdown. Work instructions, 
user training and regular sensitisations are indispensable. This applies even if no 




Although ensuring data security is laborious and systematic processing within the 
framework of an information security management system, or at least on the basis 
of it, requires considerable work, it is nowadays an indispensable duty, especially in 
the health sector. The integrated processing of data protection obligations—
underpinned by sensitive sanction threats—and the requirements of conventional 
information security are urgently recommended. Although this increases the 
complexity of the task, both have to be accomplished anyway. This results in 
considerable synergy effects through uniform documentation and the avoidance of 
time-delayed double consideration of the relevant aspects. Professional support 
from experts should be a matter of course, both in the conception of the procedure 
(to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the institution), in the 
processing, and not least in the design of the measures.
Nevertheless, the worst solution is doing nothing and hoping for the best. In any 
case, it is better to venture into the subject with work aids published by an expert 
and with the support of relevant advisers in the literature, and to fill the obviously 
largest gaps successively. In the course of dealing with the subject and growing 
sensitivity towards it, the willingness to ask experts for advice from a certain point 
will also increase. Ultimately, it comes down to a simple statement: patients would 
like to visit their doctor and be able to entrust him with their health and intimate 
secrets.
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Chapter 18
Norms of Responsible State Behaviour 
in Cyberspace
Paul Meyer
Abstract Cyberspace has witnessed a ‘militarisation’ as a growing number of 
states engage in a variety of cyber operations directed against foreign entities. The 
rate of this militarisation has outstripped the diplomatic efforts undertaken to pro-
vide this unique environment with some ‘rules of the road’. The primary mechanism 
for discussing possible norms of responsible state behaviour has been a series of UN 
Groups of Governmental Experts, which have produced three consensus reports 
over the last decade. The 2015 report recommended a series of principles and 
confidence- building measures to prevent conf1lict, but prospects for its implemen-
tation have receded as differences amongst states persist over how security concepts 
should be applied to cyberspace. Renewed efforts to promote responsible state 
behaviour will require greater engagement on the part of the private sector and civil 
society, both of which have a huge stake in sustaining cyber peace.
Keywords Confidence-building measures · Cyber conflict · Norms of responsible 
state behaviour · OSCE · United Nations
18.1  Introduction
18.1.1  Cyberspace: A Realm of Peace or War?
Cyberspace as a term was coined by William Gibson, a Vancouver-based writer of 
speculative fiction whose 1984 novel Neuromancer described it as “a consensual 
hallucination experienced daily by billions”. Today, with over three billion users of 
the Internet, Gibson’s projection has proven prescient, but few among current users 
would realise that this unique space has experienced, alongside exponential growth, 
a marked ‘militarisation’ in recent years. States, with their monopoly on organised 
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armed force, have energetically turned their attention to cyberspace, declaring this 
environment to be a domain for ‘war-fighting’ and investing heavily in the develop-
ment of capabilities for offensive as well as defensive cyber capabilities. According 
to the US Director of National Intelligence, over 30 states currently possess cyber- 
attack capabilities, and such attacks now figure prominently in the intelligence com-
munity’s ranking of global threats faced by the United States. (Coats 2018). In this 
chapter, the gradual efforts of the international community to define an order for 
cyberspace are examined, and in particular the ongoing effort to develop norms of 
responsible state behaviour in this new and unique environment. After surveying the 
contributions of the chief national and multilateral actors and inputs from other 
cyber stakeholders, the chapter concludes with some ideas for bringing this com-
plex international discussion of norms to a practical outcome.
While states have long engaged in electronic intelligence-gathering, the emer-
gence of cyberspace as a perceived domain for inter-state warfare with the attendant 
establishment of specialised units within militaries to conduct it is relatively recent 
(see also Chap. 12). It was only 2009 when the US created a dedicated Cyber 
Command, but as this element has enjoyed a rapidly increasing share of the defence 
budget ever since, America has set the global pace for military engagement in cyber-
space. Many militaries now boast cybersecurity units and increasingly acknowledge 
that their capabilities extend beyond purely the defence of national systems to 
include offensive cyber action. This ‘militarisation’ process has proceeded with lit-
tle political or public debate and is now frequently depicted as an inevitable 
development.
Significantly, however the US military, in acknowledging a ‘diplomatic risk’ of 
being seen as ‘militarising’ cyberspace, asserts that this environment represents “a 
domain already militarised by our adversaries”. Given that the United States is 
widely perceived as the author of the ‘Stuxnet’ cyber weapon directed against 
Iran—the first cyber payload providing for actual physical destruction—the allega-
tion that others were to blame for the ‘weaponisation’ of cyberspace rings rather 
hollow. This assertion from Cyber Command suggests, however, a certain sensitiv-
ity as to how its overt pursuit of military “superiority in cyberspace” will be per-
ceived by other users, both governmental and non-governmental (Cyber Command 
2018: 10).
States have struggled with incorporating the new, potent technology represented 
by cyberspace and its most salient embodiment, the Internet, into existing frame-
works of international affairs. Part of the reason for this lies in the initial use of 
cyber capabilities by the intelligence community. As this covert activity was 
shrouded in secrecy and entailed accessing information from foreign targets without 
alerting them to this fact (the so-called Computer Network Exploitation) there was 
little incentive for states to acknowledge these actions, let alone discuss reciprocal 
limits on them. Espionage has eluded any effort at more than tacit agreement 
amongst states. In contrast, states have long cooperated in the field of international 




To the degree that intrusive cyber operations emerged from the shadows of the 
intelligence sphere into the somewhat more transparent field of military 
 establishments and capabilities, it became more feasible to treat such activity as a 
potential realm for international agreement.
In the event, it was a Russian-led initiative at the UN in 1998 to adopt a resolu-
tion on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security” (UNGA 1999) that first brought the issue of 
“information security” before a diplomatic forum. This resolution, introduced in the 
First Committee of the General Assembly (the committee responsible for issues of 
disarmament and international security), raised the threat that these new technolo-
gies could be employed in ways that could “adversely affect the security of states”.
18.1.2  The GGE Process: Early Failure and Initial Success
The Russian-initiated focus on this potential risk to international security was 
widely supported and led, 4 years later, to the authorisation of a UN Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE) “to consider existing and potential threats in the 
sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address 
them…” (UNGA 2002).
This GGE met in the 2004–05 period but was unable to agree on a consensus 
report (as required by UN procedures for such GGEs). The chief issues that report-
edly divided the group were how to characterise the threat represented by state 
exploitation of information and communication technology (ICT) for military pur-
poses; and whether the concept of security should be limited to the ICT infrastruc-
ture itself or be extended to include the content of the information conveyed. In 
particular, there was a dispute over whether information that was the subject of 
trans-border transmission should be controlled as a matter of national security 
(UNIDIR 2016: 6).
This initial failure to agree did not impede efforts at the UN to pursue consider-
ation of the issues contained in the information security- international security 
nexus. A second GGE was convened in the 2009–2010 timeframe and on this occa-
sion, the 15 experts were successful in producing a consensus report. The report 
affirmed that “Existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security 
are among the most serious challenges of the twenty-first century”. It went on to 
enumerate a series of malicious and disruptive ICT-enabled activity including the 
fact that “States are developing ICTs as instruments of warfare and intelligence, and 
for political purposes.” In response to these developments, the report recommended 
that states pursue cooperative measures. Specifically, the GGE recommended that 
states should “discuss norms pertaining to state use of ICTs, to reduce collective 
risk and protect critical national and international infrastructure” and consider 
“Confidence-building, stability and risk reduction measures to address the implica-
tions of state use of ICTs” (UNGA 2011: 8).
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18.2  National Strategies for Cyberspace
18.2.1  The US Strategy for Cyberspace
The 2010 GGE report introduced the concept of norms for state conduct into the 
diplomatic discourse that hitherto had focused on state responses to malicious activ-
ity by non-state actors. The report also drew upon the past diplomatic tool box of 
arms control in advocating confidence-building and risk reduction measures. The 
United States was the first leading power to pick up on these suggestions in its 
International Strategy for Cyberspace issued by the Obama administration in May 
2011. This policy document recognised the dangers that unchecked state cyber 
action could represent: “Cybersecurity threats can even endanger international 
peace and security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into 
cyberspace” (White House 2011: 4). This application of traditional national power 
in cyberspace was occurring in the absence of “clearly agreed-upon norms for 
acceptable state behaviour in cyberspace” (White House 2011: 9). To rectify this 
situation, the Strategy affirmed: “We will engage the international community in 
frank and urgent dialogue, to build consensus around principles of responsible 
behaviour in cyberspace” (White House 2011: 11).
The initiation of this urgent dialogue, however, proved elusive and the Obama 
administration experienced difficulty in translating its clear interest in developing 
“norms of responsible behaviour” into an actual diplomatic process to achieve this 
end. Initial follow-up action seemed to have been delegated to the United Kingdom, 
where then Foreign Secretary William Hague hosted an international cyberspace 
conference in London in November 2011. Secretary Hague characterised the con-
ference as an opportunity to discuss norms of acceptable behaviour in cyberspace 
and to explore mechanisms for giving such standards “real political and diplomatic 
weight” (Hague 2011). In his chairman’s summation of the conference discussions, 
he indicated: “All delegates agreed that the immediate next steps must be to take 
practical measures to develop shared understanding and agree common approaches 
and confidence-building measures. There was no appetite at this stage to expend 
effort on new legally-binding international instruments” (Hague 2011).
While Secretary Hague’s conclusions may have reflected British preferences to a 
degree, there did appear a broad consensus that the “common approaches” for gov-
erning state behaviour in cyberspace should take the form of politically as opposed 
to legally binding measures. Early in the UN’s polling of national views, influential 
states such as the US and the UK argued that in the realm of cyber conflict, legally 
binding agreements were superfluous as the laws of armed conflict would apply 
(Tikk and Kerttunen 2017: 20). Whether it was the time-intensive character of nego-
tiating international legal instruments, the absence of adequate verification means or 
the risk of such efforts being rendered obsolete by a rapidly developing technology, 
states in general seemed more comfortable with the idea of political versus legal 
arrangements in this new environment.
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18.2.2  Sino-Russian Code of Conduct
This approach was reinforced when Russia and China (alongside Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan) submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 2011 a proposal 
for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security. Although these 
states generally advocated legally binding agreements in the realm of international 
security, in this case the sponsors decided to utilise the less demanding and more 
palatable form of politically binding measures represented by the Code of Conduct. 
At the same time, the conflict prevention dimension of the proposal was stressed by 
the sponsors. In his introduction of the proposal, the Chinese Ambassador Wang 
Qun stated that “countries should work to keep information and cyberspace from 
becoming a new battlefield, prevent an arms race in information and cyberspace and 
settle disputes on this front peacefully through dialogue” (Qun 2011).
The co-sponsors of the Code characterised it, therefore, as a collection of volun-
tary measures designed to maintain international stability and security. The chief 
undertaking would be a commitment by states “not to use Information and 
Communication Technologies, including networks, to carry out hostile activities or 
acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace and security or proliferate 
information weapons or related technologies” (Code 2011). This external security 
aspect was associated with other measures with far more of an internal security 
focus. The Code affirmed the rights of states “to protect, in accordance with relevant 
laws and regulations, their information space and critical information infrastructure 
from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage”. How such hostile actions would be 
defined could prove problematic, as what one state might view as a “disturbance”, 
another might consider a simple exercise of freedom of expression. From a classic 
arms control perspective, the definitional challenges inherent in determining what 
constituted an “information weapon” or an “act of aggression” in cyberspace were 
also significant obstacles. At the same time, the Sino-Russian Code represented the 
first major diplomatic effort to provide a set of “norms of responsible state behav-
iour” as called for in the 2010 GGE report and the US 2011 Strategy.
In the event, China and Russia chose to proceed cautiously with their initiative, 
engaging over the next few years in consultations on the margins of UN General 
Assembly sessions but not seeking to bring the Code forward for adoption by that 
body. A revised Code was circulated by the co-sponsors in January 2015 that essen-
tially eliminated the previous “arms control” aspect but retained the bulk of the 
measures directed at prohibiting cyber interference “in the internal affairs of other 
States or with the aim of undermining their political, economic and social stability” 
(Code 2015). The internal control orientation of the Code was further evident in its 
affirmation of the sovereign rights of states to protect “their information space and 
critical information infrastructure against damage resulting from threats, interfer-
ence, attack and sabotage”. The Sino-Russian Code of Conduct for Information 
Security reflected, in its use of the term ‘information security’ over the prevalent 
terminology of ‘cybersecurity’, a fundamental conceptual difference with the West. 
Whereas ‘cybersecurity’ was seen as focusing on the integrity of the computer 
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 systems comprising cyberspace, “information security” implied that the content of 
information transmitted should also be viewed through a security prism. This con-
ceptual distinction continues to colour the preferred approaches of leading cyber 
powers in pursuing common norms of responsible state behaviour.
18.3  International Developments
18.3.1  GGE 2013
In parallel to these unilateral or plurilateral forays into suggesting norms to govern 
state conduct in cyberspace, the UN GGE process continued to act as a locus for 
multilateral cybersecurity diplomacy. A successful GGE report in 2013 contributed 
to the framing of the problem by flagging the increasingly sophisticated nature of 
malicious cyber activity and stressing “[T]the absence of common understandings 
on acceptable State behaviour with regard to the use of ICTs increases the risk to 
international peace and security” (GGE 2013: 7). The report established the princi-
ple that international law is applicable to cyberspace without attempting to delineate 
how it did so. In a counterbalancing finding, it also affirmed the applicability of the 
sovereignty principle to state cyber conduct and state jurisdiction over ICT infra-
structure within its territory. The report stated that “States must not use proxies to 
commit internationally wrongful acts” (GGE 2013: 8) and indicated that states had 
the responsibility to ensure that non-state actors did not engage in such unlawful use 
of ICTs on their territory. The GGE reiterated the earlier call for states to consider 
“the development of practical confidence -building measures to help increase trans-
parency, predictability and cooperation” and suggested a series of basic consultative 
and information-exchange measures towards this end (GGE 2013: 9).
18.3.2  GGE 2015
The UN-centric GGE process reached a culmination of sorts with the successful 
conclusion of an enlarged (20 experts) GGE in the summer of 2015. This GGE, 
explicitly building on its two predecessors, stated that “Voluntary, non-binding 
norms of responsible state behaviour can reduce risks to international peace, secu-
rity and stability” while observing that “norms do not seek to limit or prohibit action 
that is otherwise consistent with international law” (GGE 2015: 7). The report pro-
vided the fullest elaboration to date of the “norms, rules and principles for the 
responsible behaviour of states” and the “confidence building measures” that formed 
the chief headings of the GGE reports. Importantly on the normative side, the report 
recommended that “A state should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity 
contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical 
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infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to 
provide services to the public” (GGE 2015: 8).
A further major restraint measure was set out to the effect that “States should not 
conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of the autho-
rised emergency response teams (sometimes known as computer emergency 
response teams or cybersecurity incident response teams) of another state. A state 
should not use authorised emergency response teams to engage in malicious inter-
national activity” (GGE 2015: 8).
In these two restraint measures, there is a clear connection with pre-existing 
obligations under international humanitarian law not to target civilians or crucial 
infrastructure for the public. It also mirrors recognition of a certain “protective sta-
tus” for the computer emergency response teams akin to that accorded to medical 
personnel and facilities under international humanitarian law.
In addition to these restraint measures, the 2015 GGE report also recommended 
proactive steps such as encouraging states to report “ICT vulnerabilities and share 
associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities” (GGE 2015: 
8). Given that this reporting concerns the very vulnerabilities that states have 
secretly harboured to develop targeted exploits, it would seem doubtful that states 
will undertake such cooperation anytime soon. After its enumeration of proposed 
measures, the report acknowledged that “while such measures may be essential to 
promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment, their 
implementation may not immediately be possible” (GGE 2015: 8). The 2015 GGE 
may have elaborated the most practical set of measures to date, but its experts were 
aware that their proposals remained only recommendations, the implementation of 
which would depend on state capacity or willingness to adopt them.
Some of the underlying problems of the GGE process in generating recom-
mended measures that states would actually embrace were made manifest in the 
subsequent GGE (at 25 experts, the largest yet) which operated in the 2016–17 
timeframe yet failed to achieve a consensus report. Whereas there was considerable 
speculation as to the reasons for the failure of the latest GGE, it seems likely that it 
reflected basic disagreement among leading cyber powers as to the relationship 
between inter-state cyber conflict and the laws of armed conflict. In brief, whereas 
states such as the US and UK wanted to elaborate on the rules around cyber opera-
tions in the context of the laws of armed conflict others, namely Russia and China, 
balked at this direction. As one observer remarked: “Russian and Chinese diplomats 
wanted to concentrate their efforts on preventing cyber-based conflict in the first 
place, instead of setting the rules for something that should not be allowed to hap-
pen” (Grigsby 2017: 114). This fundamental divergence over the appropriateness of 
state-conducted cyber operations helps explain why defining responsible state 
behaviour has proven so difficult. As another analyst of the GGE concluded, 
“Authoritative guidance for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace remains far-
fetched, not just because of yawning technical capacity divides and the known dif-
ficulties of attribution of state behaviour in cyberspace, but also because the principal 
questions of the international cybersecurity discourse are far from settled politi-
cally” (Tikk and Kerttunen 2017: 5).
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18.3.3  Regional Security Organisations and Cyber 
Confidence-Building Measures
Although the UN and its GGE process has been the primary focus of discussion of 
norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, it has not been the only inter- 
governmental forum to have taken up this issue. Notably, the 57-member 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been engaged 
since 2012 in an effort to develop cybersecurity confidence-building measures to 
“enhance cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability to reduce the risks 
of misperception, escalation and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs” 
(OSCE 2012).
In 2013, the OSCE was able to adopt a set of 11 confidence-building measures 
relating to cybersecurity information sharing and in 2016 it was able to add five 
additional measures including the protection of critical infrastructure and the estab-
lishment of protected channels of communication. It has been noted that the mea-
sures adopted by the OSCE are cast in more prescriptive language than the 
comparable measures identified by the UN GGE. The OSCE has also established an 
on-going working group for discussion relating to the implementation of the agreed 
confidence-building measures (Hitchens and Gallagher 2018: 6). Other regional 
organisations such as the AU, OAS, and ASEAN Regional Forum have considered 
cybersecurity confidence building measures over the last decade, although none 
have progressed as far as the OSCE in agreeing on a substantial package of mea-
sures. It remains to be seen whether the relative success of the OSCE in addressing 
the issue of international cybersecurity cooperation will be sustained in a context of 
deteriorating East-West relations, notably between leading OSCE member states 
Russia and the US.
18.4  Other Stakeholders
While the inter-governmental discussion of norms of responsible state behaviour 
proceeds with various degrees of progress, there is increasing engagement in its 
subject matter by other stakeholders. The private sector, civil society, academia and 
mere Internet users have legitimate reasons to be concerned with how states will 
conduct themselves in cyberspace. Beyond the fact that this special, human-created 
environment is overwhelmingly owned and operated by non-governmental entities, 
disruptive or destructive state activity in cyberspace could have serious detrimental 
effects on the interests of ‘netizens’ and humanity in general.
In recent years, several of these stakeholders have begun to express their views 
on what would constitute responsible state behaviour in cyberspace in an effort to 
influence the inter-governmental debate.
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18.4.1  International Committee of the Red Cross
Given its role as a custodian of international humanitarian law, it is not surprising 
that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been monitoring state 
action in cyberspace and has begun to air its concerns. In its statement to the 2017 
session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the ICRC drew attention to 
the upswing in major cyber-attacks including those “affecting the functioning of 
electricity networks, medical facilities and a nuclear power plant”. Such attacks, the 
statement noted, “are a stark reminder of the vulnerability of essential civilian infra-
structure to cyber-attacks and of the significant humanitarian consequences that 
may ensure”. The ICRC affirmed that international humanitarian law “applies to 
and restricts the use of cyber capabilities as means and methods of warfare during 
armed conflicts. Crucially, IHL prohibits cyber-attacks against civilian objects or 
networks, and prohibits indiscriminate and disproportionate cyber-attack” (ICRC 
2017: 3).
The ICRC, however, also wanted to make it clear that “by asserting that IHL 
applies to cyber operations, the ICRC is in no way condoning cyber warfare, nor is 
it condoning the militarisation of cyberspace. Any resort to force by a State, whether 
physical or through cyberspace, remains constrained by the UN Charter (jus ad bel-
lum)” (ICRC 2017: 3). The ICRC expressed its regret over the failure of the 
2016–2017 GGE to adopt a consensus report and called upon all states “to renew 
discussions in appropriate forums on the critical issues raised by cyberwarfare, with 
a view to finding common ground on the protection afforded by IHL to civilian use 
of cyber space” (ICRC 2017: 3).
18.4.2  Civil Society
At the same session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee that heard the 
position of the ICRC on the threats posed by irresponsible state behaviour in cyber-
space, there was also a statement delivered by the Women’s International League 
for Peace and Freedom on behalf of several civil society organisations. This state-
ment was especially noteworthy as it went beyond affirming the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to state cyber operations to challenge the militarisa-
tion of cyberspace itself. Expressing its regret over the failure of the latest GGE, the 
civil society statement suggested that it was “an opportune moment to put forward 
a few basic questions: how much more militarised are we going to allow cyberspace 
to become? When and under whose authority did it pass from a civilian domain to 
the so-called ‘fifth domain’ of conflict, and how was that allowed to happen?” 
(WILPF 2017: 1). According to the civil society statement there was still time to 
“turn back the clock” on militarisation: “States can choose to elaborate methods to 
preserve cyber peace, rather than resign themselves to formulating the norms of 
cyber war” (WILPF 2017: 1). This statement argued in effect for a new orientation 
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for the future discussion of norms, one that would seek to reinforce the peace in 
cyberspace rather than merely set out the limits to warfare undertaken by states 
within it.
18.4.3  The Private Sector
A relevant sector that might have been expected to be at the forefront of the discus-
sion of state conduct in cyberspace given its implications for its business model is 
that of the ICT industry.
The industry has largely been silent on issues of international cybersecurity pol-
icy, however, and not particularly engaged with the nascent inter-governmental dis-
cussion of norms of responsible state behaviour. An important exception to this 
general trend of the industry has been the Microsoft Corporation, which has for 
several years been advocating cooperative approaches and restraint measures for 
international cybersecurity. Its president, Brad Smith, has been outspoken in voic-
ing alarm about the implications of irresponsible state conduct in cyberspace and 
the threat posed to civil interests. He has stated: “A cyber arms race is underway 
with nations developing and unleashing a new generation of weapons aimed at gov-
ernments and civilians alike, putting at risk the critical data and digital-powered 
infrastructure that we all depend on for our daily lives” (Smith November 2017).
Smith has not shied away from blaming governments for the damaging conse-
quences for society flowing from their practice of hoarding software vulnerabilities 
in order to use them on their adversaries via targeted “exploits”. In the aftermath of 
the ‘WannaCry’ ransomware attacks of early May 2017, Smith wrote “this attack 
provides yet another example of why the stockpiling of vulnerabilities by govern-
ments is such a problem …We have seen vulnerabilities stored by the CIA show up 
on WikiLeaks, and now this vulnerability stolen from the NSA has affected custom-
ers around the world. Repeatedly, exploits in the hands of governments have leaked 
into the public domain and caused widespread damage” (Smith May 2017).
These concerns have led Smith to propose a new international agreement that 
would set out standards for state cyber operations. In a keynote speech at a major 
industry conference, he explained “What we need now is a Digital Geneva 
Convention. We need a convention that will call on the world’s governments to 
pledge that they will not engage in cyberattacks on the private sector, that they will 
not target civilian infrastructure, whether it’s of the electrical or the economic or the 
political variety” (Smith February 2017). He went on to espouse the need for a neu-
tral entity along the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the ICRC to 
partner with governments in the development of such an accord. More broadly, he 
outlined prospects for the ICT industry as a whole to play a role as a “neutral Digital 
Switzerland on which everyone can depend and rely” (Smith February 2017).
Smith’s advocacy on behalf of an international arrangement for responsible state 
behaviour and the engagement of the private sector in bringing such arrangements 
about seem to have yielded some further allies in the industry. In April 2018, 34 
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companies (including major actors such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Dell and Cisco) 
signed a ‘Cybersecurity Tech Accord’ which pledged to uphold four principles sup-
portive of cybersecurity. The principles are to: (i) protect all of our users and cus-
tomers everywhere; (ii) oppose cyberattacks on innocent citizens and enterprises 
from anywhere; (iii) empower users, customers and developers to strengthen cyber-
security protection and iv) partner with each other and with like-minded groups to 
enhance cybersecurity (Smith April 2018). Although these general principles are 
open to question and interpretation (e.g. who decides which citizens and enterprises 
are “innocent”?) they do represent some common ground on the part of leading 
firms in the ICT sector in espousing positions relevant to the future development of 
cyberspace and especially the trend towards its ‘militarisation’.
18.5  Prospects and Proposals for Norms of Responsible State 
Behaviour
The failure of the 2016–2017 iteration of the GGE process has derailed to some 
degree the momentum that this process had developed in terms of agreed norms for 
state conduct in cyberspace. For some observers, the pursuit of agreed norms repre-
sents a “bridge too far” given the absence of shared ideological principles, and the 
more modest aim of accepting a few practical confidence-building measures is 
advocated instead (Grigsby 2017: 116–18). There has also been reference to the 
“cybersecurity dilemma” that generates fear amongst cyber powers and impedes 
cooperation, as intrusions into foreign networks are advantageous for both defen-
sive and offensive purposes and thus promote “worse-case scenario” reactions by 
the intruded party (Buchanen 2016: 188). A general lack of transparency regarding 
policy and doctrine concerning offensive cyber operations in particular also consti-
tutes an impediment to more cooperative approaches.
At the same time, the recommendations emerging from the GGE process, while 
falling short of the clear norms and rules of state conduct that some would have 
liked to see, still constitute an important step in that direction. As noted by one long- 
time observer: “In this reading, the 2015 GGE provides the international commu-
nity with a very valuable roadmap to strengthening international cyber security”. A 
roadmap that, for all of its utility in providing direction, leaves much of the distance 
to be completed as “There is hardly any state, even among those having participated 
in the OSCE and the GGE discussions, that to date fully implements all the GGE 
recommendations” (Tikk 2018: 7–8).
The UN Secretary General sees a future role for himself in the prevention and 
peaceful settlement of cyber conflict as well as in “foster[ing] a culture of account-
ability and adherence to emerging norms, rules and principles on responsible behav-
iour in cyberspace” (ODA 2018: 56). How exactly these contributions are to be 
realised is unstated in the Secretary General’s An Agenda for Disarmament, but the 
UN is likely to retain a vital convening role for the norms discussions, especially 
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given the alignment between its universal membership and the universal nature of 
cyberspace. Member state action will remain crucial, however, in order to achieve 
progress in normative development, and unfortunately prospects for inter-state 
cooperation have become dimmer. The 2018 session of the General Assembly wit-
nessed a bifurcation of future work on cyber security norms when two competing 
resolutions were adopted on divided votes. A Russian-led resolution established an 
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to ensure “more democratic, inclusive and 
transparent” negotiations in developing “rules, norms and principles of responsible 
behaviour of states”; whereas a US-led resolution adhered to the traditional GGE 
format with limited membership (UNGA 2018). This splintering of the UN work on 
devising cyber security norms reflects the strained relations between the leading 
cyber powers and will further complicate the effort to identify and operationalise 
such norms at the universal level.
Even if states persist in disputes regarding the nature of the norms that should 
apply to state conduct in cyberspace, there are constructive proposals being gener-
ated by other stakeholders. The Swiss-based NGO ICT4Peace, for example, has 
suggested that the cooperative measures recommended by the UN GGE process 
(specifically the measures recommended in the 2015 GGE report) be taken up by 
states regardless of the future course of this UN mechanism. ICT4Peace has also 
engaged in cybersecurity capacity building and has promoted this as a crucial 
enabler for the developing world to participate effectively in international policy 
discussions.
Finally, we should expect to see a greater engagement by the private sector and 
civil society with the specialised forums where representatives of government 
debate these issues (see also Chap. 13). Heightened awareness of the damage to 
civil interests that offensive state cyber operations can cause, intentionally or inad-
vertently, is likely to foster greater lobbying efforts to press governments to support 
cooperative efforts and measures of restraint in cyberspace. The ‘Digital Peace 
Now’ campaign launched in September 2018 by Microsoft in cooperation with 
ICT4Peace and other NGOs is a manifestation of this reaction. Moves to accelerate 
an unregulated ‘militarisation’ of cyberspace are likely to call forth countervailing 
pressures to ensure that inter-state cyber conflict, if not precluded, is at least miti-
gated and subject to some form of reciprocal restraint. Diplomatic discussion and 
the negotiation of norms of responsible state behaviour are likely to continue to 
feature prominently in these efforts.
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 Appendix
 List of Cybersecurity Organisations
In the following, a non-exhaustive list of organisations (both public and private) that 
are active in the cybersecurity domain are presented with a focus on European 
Organizations. First, several groups of international organisations are listed includ-
ing a short description and the respective URL. Then, a selection of national organ-
isations is presented to the reader.
 International Organisations: Global
Electronic Frontier Foundation
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading non-profit organization defending 
civil liberties in the digital world.
https://www.eff.org/de
International Telecommunication Union
ITU is the United Nations specialized agency for information and communication 
technologies. Founded on the principle of international cooperation between gov-
ernments (Member States) and the private sector (Sector Members, Associates and 
Academia), ITU is the premier global forum through which parties work towards 




NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is a multinational and 
interdisciplinary cyber defence hub. It does research, training and exercises in four 
core areas: technology, strategy, operations and law.
https://ccdcoe.org/
World Wide Web Consortium
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community where 
Member organizations, a full-time staff, and the public work together to develop 
Web standards. W3C’s mission is to lead the Web to its full potential, especially by 
developing protocols and guidelines that ensure long-term growth for the Web.
https://www.w3.org/
 International Organisations: European Union Related
Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party
The Article 29 Working Party (Art. 29 WP) was the independent European working 
party that dealt with issues relating to the protection of privacy and personal data 
until 25 May 2018 (entry into application of the GDPR).
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/news-overview.cfm
Computer Emergency Response Team EU
After a pilot phase of one year and a successful assessment by its constituency and 
its peers, the EU Institutions have decided to set up a permanent Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) for the EU institutions, agencies and bod-
ies in 2012. It cooperates closely with other CERTs in the Member States and 
beyond as well as with specialised IT security companies.
https://cert.europa.eu/
DG Connect: Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content 
and Technology
The ‘Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology’ 
is the European Commission’s department responsible to develop a digital single 
market to generate smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in Europe. It develops 
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and carries out the Commission’s policies on: Digital economy and society, Research 
and innovation, business and industry, as well as culture and media.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/communications-networks-content- 
and-technology_en
Directorate E: Future Networks
The Directorate ‘Future Networks’ is responsible for strategic advancement of the 
policy, technological research and standardisation on all-encompassing Future 
Internet dimension, ensuring an innovative intertwining of all these aspects so that 
Europe can lead in the design, piloting and roll-out of the Internet of tomorrow.
Directorate H: Digital Society, Trust and Cybersecurity
The Directorate ‘Digital Society, Trust and Cybersecurity’ provides a strategic 
approach to the societal dimension of the DSM, focusing on applications that com-
bine digital policy, digital Research and Innovation, and deployment and provide for 
leadership in cybersecurity and digital privacy and digital trust policy, legislation 
and innovation.
European Cybercrime Centre, Europol
Europol set up the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in 2013 to strengthen the 
law enforcement response to cybercrime in the EU and thus to help protect European 
citizens, businesses and governments from online crime. Since its establishment, 
EC3 has made a significant contribution to the fight against cybercrime.
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3
European Cybercrime Training and Education Group, Europol
The European Cybercrime Training and Education Group (ECTEG) is composed of 
European Union and European Economic Area Member States law enforcement 
agencies, international bodies, academia, private industry and experts. In close 
cooperation with Europol-EC3 and CEPOL it aims to support international activi-
ties to harmonise cybercrime training across international borders to build the 




European Data Protection Supervisor
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is the European Union’s (EU) 
independent data protection authority. The objective of the EDPS is among other 
duties to monitor and ensure the protection of personal data and privacy when EU 
institutions and bodies process the personal information of individuals.
https://edps.europa.eu/
European Network and Information Security Agency
The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, which was established in 2004, is 
actively contributing to European cybersecurity policy, in order to support member 
states and European Union stakeholders to support a response to large-scale cyber 
incidents that take place across borders in cases where two or more EU member 
states have been affected. This work also contributes to the proper functioning of the 
digital single market. The agency works closely together with member states and 
private sector to deliver advice and solutions as well as improving their 
capabilities.
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
European Network for Cyber Security
The European Network for Cyber Security (ENCS) is a non-profit member organi-
zation that brings together critical infrastructure stake owners and security experts 
to deploy secure European critical energy grids and infrastructure.
https://encs.eu/
 International Organisations: Private
Chaos Computer Club
The Chaos Computer Club e.V. (CCC) is Europe’s largest association of hackers, 
providing information about technical and societal issues, such as surveillance, pri-
vacy, freedom of information, hacktivism and data security for more than 30 years. 
As the most influential hacker collective in Europe, the CCC organizes campaigns, 





ECO: Association of the Internet Industry
With more than 1100 members, eco is the largest Association of the Internet Industry 
in Europe. As a network of experts, ECO encourage communication between enter-
prises in the industry and support the marketing of their products and also lobbies 
on current issues such as Internet law, infrastructure, online services, and e- business, 
in political arenas and before international entities.
https://international.eco.de/
European Cyber Security Organisation
The European Cyber Security Organisation represents the contractual counterpart to 
the European Commission for the implementation of the Cyber Security contractual 
Public-Private Partnership. ECSO members include a wide variety of stakeholders 
such as large companies, SMEs and Start-ups, research centres, universities, end- 
users, operators, clusters and association as well as European Member State’s local, 
regional and national administrations, countries part of the European Economic 




European Digital Rights (EDRi) is an international not-for-profit association of 
digital human rights organisations. The aim is to defend and promote rights and 
freedoms in the digital environment, such as the right to privacy, personal data pro-
tection, freedom of expression, and access to information.
https://edri.org/
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) was founded to 
improve the mutual exchange of information in the field of forensic science. This, 
as well as improving the quality of forensic science delivery in Europe have become 




ISF: Information Security Forum
The ISF is a non-profit organisation, dedicated to investigating, clarifying and 
resolving key issues in information security and risk management, by developing 
best practice methodologies, processes and solutions and therewith supplying 
authoritative opinion and guidance on all aspects of information security and deliv-




PI is a independent charity that challenges the governments and companies that 
want to know everything about individuals, groups, and whole societies. PI con-
ducts campaigns against companies and governments, driven by charitable aims: to 
promote the human right of privacy throughout the world.
https://privacyinternational.org/
SANS Institute
The SANS Institute was established in 1989 as a cooperative research and education 
organization. Its programs now reach more than 165,000 security professionals 
around the world. SANS is the largest source for information security training and 
security certification in the world. It also develops, maintains, and makes available 
at no cost, the largest collection of research documents about various aspects of 
information security.
https://www.sans.org/
 National Organisations: Computer Emergency Response Teams
A Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is an expert group that handles 
computer security incidents. Alternative names for such groups include Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team and Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT). The following list contains cyber security organizations on a national level 
in Europe and their online presences:
 – Austria: Computer Emergency Response Team Austria; https://www.cert.at/
 – Belgium: Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium; https://ccb.belgium.be/




 – Croatia: National CERT Croatia; https://www.cert.hr/en/home-page/
 – Czech Republic: National Cyber Security Center; https://www.govcert.cz/en/
 – Denmark: Danish Computer Security Incident Response Team; https://www.
cert.dk/en
 – Estonia: CERT Estonia; https://www.ria.ee/en/cyber-security/cert-ee.html
 – Finland: Finnish CERT (Traficom); www.viestintavirasto.fi/en/cybersecurity.
html
 – France: Centre Expert contre la Cybercriminalité Français (CECyF); https://
www.cecyf.fr/
 – Germany: German Federal Office of Information Security (BSI); www.bsi.bund.
de/
 – Greece: National CERT; http://www.nis.gr/portal/page/portal/NIS/NCERT
 – Hungary: National Cyber Security Center; https://nki.gov.hu/
 – Iceland: CERT-IS; https://www.cert.is/en/node/2.html
 – Ireland: National Cyber Security Centre; https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/
 – Italy: Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale; https://www.agid.gov.it/
 – Latvia: CERT.LV; https://cert.lv/en/about-us
 – Lithuania: National Cyber Security Centre; https://www.nksc.lt/en/
 – Luxembourg: Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg; https://www.
circl.lu/
 – Netherlands: Cyber Security Council, Netherlands; https://www.cybersecurity-
raad.nl/
 – Norway: NorCERT; https://www.nsm.stat.no/norcert/norcert-eng/
 – Poland: CERT Polska; https://www.cert.pl/en/
 – Portugal: National Cyber Security Centre Portugal; https://www.cncs.gov.pt/en/
 – Romania: Romanian National Computer Security Incident Response Team; 
https://cert.ro/
 – Slovak Republic: Slovak Computer Emergency Response Team; https://www.
sk-cert.sk/en/about-us/index.html
 – Slovenia: Information Commissioner, Republic of Slovenia; https://www.ip-rs.
si/en/
 – Spain: Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad; https://www.incibe.es/en/
 – Sweden: National Defence Radio Establishment Sweden (FRA); https://www.
fra.se/
 – Switzerland: Swiss National CERT; https://www.govcert.admin.ch/
 – United Kingdom: The National Cyber Security Centre; https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/
 National Organisations: Selection of Cybersecurity Expert Organisations
Below, a non-exhaustive selection of European academic, public and private organ-




SBA Research is a research centre for Information Security funded partly by the 
national initiative for COMET Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies. 
Within a network of more than 70 companies, 15 Austrian and international univer-
sities and research institutions, and many additional international research partners 
we jointly work on research challenges ranging from organizational to technical 
security to strengthen Europe’s Cybersecurity capabilities.
https://www.sba-research.org/
Austria: Vienna Centre for Societal Security
Vienna Centre for Societal Security (VICESSE) is a private non-profit research and 
consulting organisation, focussing on the analysis of a wide array of security issues 
in a broader societal context. Locating security problems and proposed solutions 
emerging at local, national and European levels in wider social and historical con-
texts VICESSE operates at the interface between science, technology, law and 
policy.
https://www.vicesse.eu/
Austria: TU Graz, Institute of Applied Information Processing 
and Communications
The Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) 
focuses on information security. Fifty researchers at IAIK conduct research, teach, 
and consult private and as public organizations. The institute is part of the Faculty 
of Computer Science at Graz University of Technology.
https://www.iaik.tugraz.at/
Belgium: Brussels Privacy Hub
The Brussels Privacy Hub (BPH) is an academic privacy research centre with a 
global focus. As an entity of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University of 
Brussels or VUB), it uses its location in Brussels, the capital of Europe, to engage 
EU policymakers, data protection regulators, the private sector, and NGOs, and to 
produce innovative, cutting-edge research on important questions of data protection 




Belgium: KU Leuven, Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography 
(COSIC) Group
COSIC is part of the Department of Electrical Engineering at the KU Leuven. 
COSIC focuses on the protection of digital information. COSIC develops advanced 
cybersecurity solutions to protect data in the cloud and in the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and to protect the privacy of users.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/
Bulgaria: Institute of Information and Communication Technologies at 
the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
The Information Technologies for Security Department of the Institute of 
Information & Communication Technologies studies the interrelation between the 
development of information technologies and the new security challenges of the 
twenty-first century. The interdisciplinary research team explores advances and 
applies methodologies and tools for IT governance and change management, design 
and analysis of architectures and capabilities, modelling and simulation for the 
security sector, and information security management.
http://it4sec.org/
Denmark: Technical University of Denmark, Department of Applied 
Mathematics and Computer Science
DTU Compute is an internationally unique academic environment spanning the sci-
entific disciplines mathematics, statistics, computer science, and engineering. Our 
interdisciplinary research areas are big data and data science, artificial intelligence 
(AI), Internet of things (IoT), smart and secure societies, smart manufacturing and 
life sciences.
https://www.compute.dtu.dk/english
Finland: University of Helsinki, Department of Computer Science
The Department of Computer Science is a leading teaching and research unit in its 
area in Finland. The research groups address significant research challenges in their 




Finland: Aalto University, Department of Computer Science
The Department of Computer Science provides research and education in modern 
computer science to foster future science, engineering and society. The work com-
bines fundamental research with innovative applications.
https://www.aalto.fi/en/department-of-computer-science
France: Ecole Normale Supérieure, CASCADE Team
The research activity of the project-team Construction and Analysis of Systems for 
Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities (CASCADE) at the ENS of 
Paris addresses the following topics, which cover most of the areas that are currently 
active in the international cryptographic community, with a focus on public-key 
algorithms: Implementation of cryptographic algorithms, and applied cryptogra-




EURECOM is a Graduate school and Research Centre in digital sciences located in 
the Sophia Antipolis technology park (French Riviera), a major European place for 
telecommunications activities. It was founded in 1991 in a consortium form [GIE] 
that allowed EURECOM to build a large network of renowned academic and indus-
trial partners. EURECOM research teams are made up of international experts.
http://www.eurecom.fr/en
Germany: Association of Data Protection Officers
The Association of Data Protection Officers (BvD) represents the interests of about 
1500 company and official data protection officers and consultants in Germany. It 
was founded in 1989 and is the oldest association representing the interests of the 
sector. Headquartered in Berlin, we are promoting modern and feasible data 
protection.
http://www.bvdnet.de
Germany: Centre for Research in Security and Privacy
The National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity CRISP is an institution of 
the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft for its two Darmstadt-based institutes SIT and IGD, in 
cooperation with Technische Universität Darmstadt and Darmstadt University of 
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Applied Sciences. This unique and innovative collaboration model of university and 
non-university research combines the Fraunhofer competencies and strengths with 
the competencies and strengths of the universities.
https://www.crisp-da.de/
Germany: Cybersicherheitsrat Deutschland e.V.
The Cyber-Security Council Germany aims to advise businesses, government agen-
cies and policymakers on issues relating to cyber security and to strengthen the fight 
against cybercrime. Objectives are to increase collaboration between politics, pub-
lic administration, business and academia, to set up initiatives and projects, to 
develop a nationwide cyber-security network in a European and international con-
text and to provide a knowledge platform, forum and network for members of the 
association.
https://www.cybersicherheitsrat.de/english/
Germany: Deutscher CERT Verbund
The German CERT Network is the alliance of German security and computer emer-
gency teams that cooperate in collecting and processing Information. Furthermore, 
it aims to ensure the protection of the national information technology networks and 
the fast and common reaction on Internet security incidents.
https://www.cert-verbund.de/
Germany: Deutsche Vereinigung für Datenschutz
Founded in 1977 the German Privacy Association (DVD) represents interests of 
citizens as data subjects as a nonprofit association. The purpose of DVD is to give 
people advice concerning the risk in using electronic data processing and the pos-
sible restriction of their right to informational self-determination.
https://www.datenschutzverein.de/
Germany: German Association for Data Protection and Data Security
The German Association for Data Protection and Data Security (GDD) was founded 
in 1976 and stands as a non-profit organization for practicable and effective data 
protection. The GDD interacts with government officials, data protection authori-
ties, associations and privacy experts world-wide. Main tasks are support for busi-
nesses, public authorities and data protection officers and promoting effective 




Germany: Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security
The Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security (HGI), Research Department of the Ruhr- 
Universität Bochum, was founded in 2002 to address shortcomings in IT security 
research in Europe as a whole. The HGI currently hosts 26 professors and their 
teams, who conduct research in electrical engineering and information technology, 
mathematics and computer science as well as the humanities and social sciences.
https://hgi.rub.de/en/home/
Germany: Technische Universität Berlin, Center for Technology and Society
The Zentrum Technik und Gesellschaft (ZTG; Center for Technology and Society) 
is an institution of the Technische Universität Berlin which was established to 
enable research beyond disciplinary boundaries. Since current and future challenges 
are complex, they carry out projects with a broad range of scientists and researchers 
from various fields, along with individuals, groups and institutions from civil soci-
ety, business and government.
https://www.tu-berlin.de/ztg/menue/startseite_ztg/parameter/en/
Ireland: University College Dublin, Centre for Cybersecurity and Cybercrime 
Investigation
UCD Centre for Cybersecurity & Cybercrime Investigation (CCI) is a unique, 
world-class education and research centre with strong and well-established collab-
orative relationships with law enforcement and industry.
http://www.ucd.ie/cci/
Netherlands: Cyber Security Academy
Leiden University, Delft University of Technology and The Hague University of 
Applied Sciences have combined their knowledge and expertise in education for 
professionals in this field in the Cyber Security Academy (CSA) in The Hague. The 
CSA is an initiative of the municipality of The Hague. At the CSA scholars and 
lecturers together with experts from private and public sectors translate these issues 





Netherlands: Maastricht University, European Centre on Privacy 
and Cybersecurity
Whilst a digital world brings enormous economic benefits, it also creates new vul-
nerabilities. Cyberspace is prone to malicious activities and the misuse of personal 
data. The delicate balance between privacy and security is an important issue within 
the scope on law enforcement in cyberspace. To tackle such challenges, the Faculty 




Netherlands: The Hague University of Applied Sciences – Centre of Expertise 
Cyber Security
Building and securing of developed expertise, insights and knowhow in the field of 
Cyber Security: is the mission of the Centre of Expertise Cyber Security of The 





SINTEF is one of Europe’s largest independent research organisations. Every year 
we carry out several thousand projects for customers large and small. We apply our 
multidisciplinary approach in a wide range of projects, from small test and verifica-
tion projects and expertise evaluations, to multinational research programmes with 
several partners. Our research on cyber security analyses technical, organisational 
and human aspects of cyber security and personal privacy.
https://www.sintef.no/en/
Norway: University of Bergen, Department of Informatics, Selmer Center
The Selmer Center is a research centre for secure and reliable communication at the 
University of Bergen. The Selmer Center currently has 26 members with primary 
research fields including cryptology, coding theory and its application, crypto-





Switzerland: CERT for the Swiss University Network
SWITCH-CERT protects members of the Swiss academic community, holders of.ch 
and.li domains, Swiss banks and the entire Swiss Internet community against 
cyber-attacks.
https://www.switch.ch/security/
Switzerland, EPFL, Security, Privacy & Cryptography Group
EPFL has both a Swiss and international vocation and focuses on three missions: 
teaching, research and innovation. Research in the Security, Privacy & Cryptography 
Group covers the underlying mathematical principles and applications of cryptogra-
phy; the foundations of secure and privacy-preserving machine learning; techniques 
to secure and verify large and complex software codebases; or the principles to 
design secure and privacy-preserving systems based on decentralized architectures 
(e.g., blockchains and cryptocurrencies).
https://www.epfl.ch/schools/ic/research/security-privacy-cryptography/
Switzerland: ETH Zürich, Institute of Information Security
The Institute of Information Security at ETH Zurich carries out research across the 
spectrum of information security, ranging from mathematical foundations of cryp-
tography to building solutions to pressing problems in securing networks, cyber- 
physical systems, and applications. As security is highly interdisciplinary, work is 
collaborative, with strong links to industrial partners and other faculty areas.
https://informationsecurity.ethz.ch
Switzerland: Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance
MELANI is the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance in 
Switzerland. MELANI is active in the area of security of computer systems and the 




United Kingdom: Imperial College London, Institute for Security Science 
and Technology
Imperial College has a vibrant cyber security community tackling cutting edge 
research challenges, educating the next generation, and working with industry. Our 
community includes academics from the Department of Computing, Institute for 
Security Science and Technology (ISST), Department of Mathematics, and the 
Centre for Cryptocurrency Research and Engineering.
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/security-institute/
United Kingdom: Royal Holloway University of London, Information Security 
Group
The Information Security Group (ISG) at Royal Holloway University of London is 
a world-leading interdisciplinary research group dedicated to research and educa-
tion in the area of information (cyber) security. The ISG comprises more than fifteen 
full-time academic faculty members, including a mix of computer scientists, math-
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